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This book is about how the future 
of energy will affect your future. 
President Barack Obama has made energy 
and climate change the centrepiece of his 
programme to revive America's economy. 
China, India and the East want and need 
more energy. Meanwhile, Britain's shortage 
of electricity generation could mean power 
cuts.
Energise! argues that you shouldn't feel 
guilty about your carbon footprint. The way  
to deal with global warming is to build a 
bigger, better energy supply – not to invite 
the state to meter your family's every use  
of energy at home and in the car.
This book shows why you are not addicted 
to energy – despite what doomsayers tell 
you – and why there's still time to fix global 
warming without downgrading your lifestyle. 
Taking an in-depth view of the past,  
present and future of energy and climate 
change, Energise! sets out a programme 
for innovation in nuclear, carbon-based and 
renewable energy. That programme is one 
in which governments and industry do what 
they are supposed to do: enable people to 
get on with their lives. 
With a special emphasis on Obama’s  
energy policies and on Western fears of  
the East, Energise! is a challenge to climate 
zealots, climate sceptics and government 
moralisers alike. This is a refreshing and 
a required read for anybody tired of Green 
cant, bored by the idea of merely surviving, 
and confident that human beings can still 
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Before the financial crisis 
of autumn 2008, soaring Chinese demand for oil led some 
commentators to predict a rosy future for renewable energy. Then, 
after the Crash of 2008, others suspected that new renewables 
firms would falter through lack of finance, and that prospects 
for renewable energy in general would recede. Yet the $700bn 
bailout of the US financial system, agreed in October 2008, was 
accompanied by important tax credits for renewables, and for 
plug-in hybrid vehicles. 1 
 It’s a difficult moment to forecast the future of energy. 
Completed in the weeks that saw the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the climax of the US Presidential campaign, this 
book tries to take the longer-term view. 
 In the past 100 years, energy forecasters have pretty 
much  failed to get their predictions right. 2 But as Alan Kay, 
architect of the Graphical User Interface, so memorably said: 
‘The best way to predict the future is to invent it.’
This book, therefore, has a pragmatic intent. We want to help 
invent a future of rational energy supply. Our emphasis is on the 
politics of energy innovation. That’s also why we’ve put some of 
the more technical matters around energy and climate change 
'into grey-tinted panels'.
About this book
This book is a riposte to the endless doctrine that you are 
personally responsible for climate change and must curb your 
consumption of energy. Energise! argues that consuming more 
energy isn’t a problem if the right kind of supply can be arranged. 
With the right supply, climate won’t run out of control. But so 
long as the state’s ineffective, moralistic policy on energy is left 
unchallenged, it's the state's interventions in our everyday lives 
that look set to run out of control.





discipline so vast that it’s impenetrable. So, to summarise the 
state of climate science in a handy manner, the end of Chapter 
1 presents tables that give a bird’s eye view on some of the main 
forecasts and recommendations that have been made about 
global warming. In these tables, we also present our own ideas. 
 In Chapter 2 we establish why people see energy as a 
problem of individual consumption more than one of supply. This 
is a concept that must be understood if a rational politics of 
supply is ever to win through. 
 Chapter 3 is about climate change, and presents a new 
interpretation of it.
 In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 – on nuclear, carbon-based and 
renewables technologies – we make suggestions about which 
energy technologies will make the most sense, both generally 
and in terms of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). 3 We 
also follow Alan Kay’s activist spirit and suggest roughly how, 
and by how much, different technologies could triumph, if people 
mobilise political backing for them. 
 At the end of each of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, then, we 
present tables that give an overview of the advantages and 
disadvantages of key technologies. We then provide simple 
ratings, out of 10, for each technology considered, both today, 
and in a better future. 
 Finally, in Chapter 7, we move somewhat beyond the 
energy sector. Both inside and outside it, in fact, we compare 
our proposals for transforming the planet with those of the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
consultants McKinsey, and Bjørn Lomborg, the world’s most 
prominent critic of Green thinking.
How we approach climate change
Necessarily, this book deals with the science of climate change. 
It also deals with something rather different – the politics of 
climate change. We very much favour science, but very much 








 Ironically, it was free-market ideologues and members of 
the energy establishment who, when climate was first raised with 
them, pioneered the idea that scientific evidence could substitute 
for political argument and thus refute the idea of man-made 
global warming. Thereafter, the Left and many environmentalists 
adopted the same tactic to advance their solutions to global 
warming. More recently, in a rearguard action, an old Conservative 
– Baron Nigel Lawson of Blaby, Britain’s former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer – has indulged in a little deification of science. To back 
up his main argument that government policy on global warming 
is a denial of personal liberty, he has used some very partial 
data about average world temperatures to bolster those who are 
sceptical about man-made climate change: climate sceptics. 4
   This book differs from both environmentalism and climate 
sceptics. It offers a radically new perspective on energy and 
climate change. It covers not just the technology, economics, 
science and politics of these two issues, but also their sociology: 
how people perceive energy and how they organise it. Our main 
focus is on humanity’s need for a lot more energy, and a lot more 
innovation in energy supply. 
 With this focus, Energise! is unlike mainstream books on 
climate change, in which the pattern is: first, identify what level 
of climate change is dangerous; second, identify the maximum 
level of GHGs compatible with that; and third, propose measures 
to ensure that this limit is not exceeded. 
 The standard book on climate change tends to build its 
conclusions into its premises. Beginning with somewhat arbitrary 
definitions of what is dangerous, it typically uses science to 
calculate the ‘right’ emission levels, and then feeds those levels 
into dubious and opaque economic models to calculate how 
costly CO2 taxes or CO2 permits should be to keep emissions 
below those levels. 
 If such an approach sounds boring and technocratic, 
that’s because it is. Ours is different. We concentrate on climate 
change, but we put it within a social context. That social context 





Austerity and the sociology of energy
In the wake of the Crash of 2008, climate change is destined 
to become more, not less important, to political and economic 
decisions. However much European industry would like emissions 
regulation to be delayed, and however much consumers will 
need to focus on tightening their belts, the weather will not stop; 
and neither will the contemporary impulse to connect absolutely 
everything with climate change. Indeed, there’s already evidence 
that the authorities will paint the austerity of 2009 onward in 
feelgood shades of Green. 
 Tightening belts, it is now said, is a good thing – because 
all individuals have a responsibility to conserve energy, and, 
in that cause, improve their behaviour. EdF, a French energy 
company, offers to engage Britons in what it insists is a ‘coaching 
programme’ on how to save energy. 5 Others want more radical 
steps to be taken. One ‘radical fantasy’ suggests not just that 
people will ‘earn less and consume less,’ but that the Crash of 
2008 has given them ‘a chance to start again.’ 6 
 The compatibility between capitalism and Green thinking 
is something that Green thinkers themselves have long been 
keen to promote. 7 In the next few years, people can expect to 
hear a lot more about how:
going Green saves money, which is something everyone •	
must do 
slower growth is wiser growth•	
the world must not exhaust finite supplies of energy too •	
fast.  
Whether the general public finds these arguments for austerity 
credible, though, remains a very open question.
 Like climate change, energy is set to become an increasingly 
important factor in people’s lives. In looking at energy, however, 
we’re not overly concerned with burying the reader in statistics 








Nor do we mull over whether it was speculation that really drove 
up oil prices in much of 2008. But we are interested when Barack 
Obama tells Fox TV that, had he been President during 9/11, he 
would have asked Americans not to shop, as George W Bush 
did, but  to ‘tap into the feeling that everybody has been caught 
up in’. In other words, to tap into America’s need for a bold 
energy policy. 8
 Obama said that, after 9/11, he would have proposed that 
all Americans ‘make commitments’ to increase fuel efficiency 
in their cars and in their homes, somehow. The government 
would have worked ‘in partnership’ with them in the cause of 
decreasing America’s dependence on foreign oil by 20 or 40 per 
cent over a decade or two. 9
 This book suggests that the call to arms to cut energy use 
is not going to go away. Most likely, it will grow more urgent. 
 One example of a call to arms in energy is ‘fuel poverty’ 
in the UK – officially, circumstances in which a household 
spends 10 or more per cent of its income on energy. In 2001, 
New Labour promised to end this newly defined condition by 
2018. 10 Following that, not much was heard about it. But by 
October 2008, Friends of the Earth (FoE), along with the charity 
Help the Aged, was ready to sue the government in the High 
Court for its failure to meet its own targets. Claiming that more 
than five million households now suffered from fuel fuel poverty, 
an FoE spokesman announced:
‘A massive energy efficiency programme is needed. This 
will keep people warm, cut bills and help meet our targets 
for tackling climate change.’ 11
 
Yet Prime Minister Gordon Brown is already planning a massive 
programme to promote energy efficiency in British homes. All 
that can be surmised is that, for government and critics alike, 
rallying the nation around energy conservation is what now 
passes for a political cause. 






The meaning of energy
Given that in the UK, old-fashioned poverty has been transfigured 
into fuel poverty and is supposed to afflict nearly a fifth of 
households there, it ought to be clear that the precise meaning 
of energy among men and women is pretty malleable. But with 
every shift in its social significance, energy looks poised to count 
for more than it ever did in the past. 
 The meaning of energy is what conventional treatments of 
energy, just like conventional books on climate change, tend to 
avoid. This book doesn’t make that mistake.
 In the downturn that has followed the Crash, the meaning 
of energy has changed again. Politicians have rediscovered the 
Depression economics of John Maynard Keynes, the merits 
of state spending, and the merits of state spending on energy 
in particular. In his election campaign, Barack Obama said he 
wanted to spend $150bn on renewables over the next decade, 
so that this source of energy produces a quarter of US electricity 
by 2025. British Chancellor Alistair Darling proclaims that in 
switching his spending priorities, energy is one of the ‘areas 
that make a difference’. It’s an area, indeed, ‘where people 
are feeling squeezed at the moment,’ and spending on it would 
 create jobs. 12
 Here energy acquires a new meaning. It’s now about 
creating jobs. But before people sign up for the Keynesian 
management of economic demand through spending, investment 
and job creation around energy, consider two facts. First, the 
number of jobs likely to be created in the UK renewable energy 
sector is set to be very limited. Second, and more importantly, 
job creation for the few will be accompanied by renewed cries 
that everyone cut their demand for energy.
 This book makes no apology for its historical dimension. 
That allows us to see where the future of energy is headed. 
In all the euphoria around applying Keynesian principles to 
energy, it’s worth recalling what Keynes actually said about his 








work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
(1936), he expressed the hope that his book would help German 
economists develop a theory ‘designed to meet specifically 
German conditions’. His book’s theory was, he said, ‘much more 
easily adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state’ than were 
theories premised on free competition and a large measure of 
laissez-faire. 13
 Britain and the US today don’t face the advent of a 
totalitarian state. However, the state’s intervention in personal 
demand for energy, and its insistence that energy use is cut 
back, could well turn out to be an authoritarian exercise. 
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Human beings need lots 
more cheap energy
If the world could be 
more thoughtful about 
energy supply, 
individuals could be 









Irresponsible? No. The authors of this book 
acknowledge that climate change exists and is largely man-
made. We accept that there’s a problem with greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). But we believe that these concerns must be seen in 
perspective. 
 Energise! is about the science and technology of energy. 
Our starting point, however, is the uniqueness of human beings. 
To us, humans will always want to do more than simply survive. 
They will always want more home comforts, better-lit streets and 
greater mobility.  But to get all of this – now and in the future – 
they will need more cheap energy. In energy matters, therefore, a 
far bigger and more urgent challenge than global warming lies in 
thoughtfully supplying the world’s populations and organisations 
with lots more cheap energy. If people can do that right, then 
they will be able to overcome man-made climate change in the 
process. 
 Energy innovations can do so much more than simply slow 
global warming. They can help humanity thrive, not just survive. 
 Before the Crash of 2008, several enthusiasts for free 
markets breezily suggested that oil priced at $130 a barrel 
or more had one merit: it would force people to conserve 
energy. 1 After the Crash, others observed that people would 
worry less about climate change during a downturn, especially if 
it turned out to be deep and prolonged. 2 In fact, both of these 
views are complacent. 
 When oil can only be extracted, refined and piped with 
difficulty, producing and transporting the world’s food becomes 
expensive. When energy in general is expensive, steel and 
cement cost more to make, inflating the price of buildings, roads, 
rail systems and even wind turbines. To put it simply, every sector 
and every nation has an interest in more cheap energy.
 On the other hand, concerns about climate change will 
outlive the current period of financial turmoil. These concerns 
are deep-seated not just in large swathes of the population of 
the West, or with Barack Obama, but also among elites in China, 
























more on the East’s leadership – not least, around the issue of 
global warming. We are certain that climate change will regain its 
prominence in national and international politics.
People are constantly being told that they live in a consumer 
society. Yet for most adults under 65, the main event in life 
remains work – the realm of wealth generation, production and 
the different kinds of waste products that go with that. 
 It’s the same with energy. 
 Too often, governments and environmentalists address us 
as ignorant consumers, telling us to curb our driving and flying, 
eat local food, switch things off and insulate our homes. But in 
fact, the human input into climate change is best dealt with not 
in people’s personal lives, but at source – in the world’s energy 
supply sector (see panel below). And even if climate change 
disappeared tomorrow, energy supply would still deserve much 
more investment over the next 30 years than it has had over the 
past 30. 
 Without a large new round of investment in advanced 
energy technologies, human beings face power cuts. There’s no 
need to be alarmist about these, nor, as we show later on in this 
book, attribute them to an alleged ‘peak’ in oil supplies. But in 
2008 alone, power cuts occurred in places as varied as South 
Africa, Pakistan, China and the UK.
 Worse, society simply won’t develop. Even the conservative 
World Bank estimates that, without a change in energy policy, 60 
per cent of sub-Saharan Africans will lack access to electricity 
in 2030. 3
 It’s time to get a grip on these facts and stop feeling 
guilty about climate change. Thoughtful ingenuity, not changes 
in consumer awareness or behaviour, is the way to exit today’s 








Climate change is best fixed at  
source – in the energy supply sector 
In 2004, the world’s road transport created about four billion 
tonnes – four Gigatonnes (Gt) – of CO2 emissions. However, 
electricity plants contributed more than 10 Gt, and oil refineries 
a further 2 Gt. In sum, the world’s energy supply sector emitted 
three times as much CO2 as its motor vehicles.
As the  IPCC  puts it, by 2004 CO2 emissions from power 
generation represented more than 27 per cent of all man made 
CO2 emissions; indeed, the power sector was ‘by far’ the most 
important source of such emissions. 5
 Widen out from CO2 to GHGs as a whole, and agriculture 
appears as a significant emitter of CH4 and N2O. Nevertheless, 
in 2004, energy supply was unequivocally the main source 
of GHGs.
Direct worldwide emissions of CO2, by sector,  
1970–2004 4












































GHG emissions by sector, 1990-2004 6
Between 1970 and 2004, the IPCC reports, GHG emissions 
from energy supply rose by more than 145 per cent, while 
those from general transport rose by 120 per cent. Interestingly, 
GHG emissions associated with residential and commercial 
property experienced the slowest growth – just 26 per cent in 
34 years. 7
 The basic figures show that emissions from road transport 
are growing fast, but those from power generation are much 
larger – and are growing faster. Even with transport and buildings, 
people need to look beyond immediate use, and back to energy 
supply. A vehicle or building supplied with clean energy would 
have zero emissions of CO2.






























The amount of energy the world will need
In 2000 the US, representing five per cent of the world’s 
population, consumed 25 per cent of its energy. If the whole 
world were to consume energy at that same rate, then global 
energy consumption would quintuple.
 Today, millions of Americans are living below the poverty 
line. If we can imagine a time when nobody worldwide suffered 
from the kind of poverty that still exists in the US today, then 
energy consumption would not only be a lot higher: it would be 
about 10 times its current rate.
 In both the 19th and the 20th centuries, energy production 
from modern sources rose 16 times, doubling every 25 years. 8 
Perhaps the constancy of the increase was just a coincidence, 
but 16 times may not be a bad estimate for how much our energy 
use will grow by 2100.
 Some will write off such estimates as absurdly high. 
Energise! sees them not as forecasts, but as ambitions.
 Looking from 2005 just to 2050, the International Energy 
Agency, a Paris-based club of the world’s big energy-using 
nations, takes a much narrower view. In its 'baseline' scenario, 
world annual economic growth averages a robust 3.3 per cent, 
quadrupling to $227 trillion by 2050. But world final energy 
demand doesn’t even quite triple. Indeed, the IEA believes that 
because of changes in world economic structure, and, even 
more, increases in the efficiency with which energy is used, 
world energy demand will in practice just double. 9 
 That seems to us improbable. In a moment, we will 
deal with the merits and limits of improvements in energy 
efficiency; but even with such measures, and certainly with the 
aggressive programme of thoughtful innovations put forward in 
this book, world energy demand could and should double in 25 

























For convenience, through good choice of technique
The industrialisation of the West brought with it man-made 
emissions. But it also brought new products, and, even more, 
innovations in the process of production. Industrialisation gave 
us the whole idea of convenience – of not having to scrape 
around to build a fire, but instead having hot running water, and 
eventually central heating. Finally, too, industrialisation brought 
with it a special form of convenience: mobility.
 Convenience is still something worth fighting for – 
especially convenience in the use of energy. People should not 
have to spend their time watching ‘smart meters’ that tell them 
how much CO2 they are generating every time they make a cup 
of coffee. Instead, they should be looking forward, as Energise! 
does, to a world where energy is: 
cheap, always on, and to hand •	
available to everyone, wherever they are•	
delivered so unobtrusively that nobody worries about it. •	
As far as possible, the means of delivering energy should be 
invisible, or simply part of the furniture.
 In developed countries, few worry about the humble sockets 
that deliver electricity to their appliances. The householder does 
not pause to maintain, repair, or clean an electricity socket, in 
the same way that the family with roof-mounted solar panels 
must spend time up a ladder fiddling with them. 10
 People should know how energy works, but they shouldn’t 
have to think energy all the time. Life is too much fun for that.
 The idea that people should now start to sacrifice 
convenience in the cause of energy conservation is also 
particularly insulting to women. Even today, the women of 
the world do most of its cooking, washing and food shopping. 
In truth they need all the convenient gadgets and all the energy 









Around the world, priggish politicians and celebrities – Bono, 
Bob Geldof, Sienna Miller, Leonardo DiCaprio – urge everyone 
to consume less and conserve more energy. Some suggest that 
the way to beat climate change is to stop families having more 
than two children. 12 Meanwhile, Sir Paul McCartney suggests 
that everyone stop eating meat. 13 
 This is all bad news. When politicians and celebrities insist 
that people adopt their kind of etiquette of energy use, they 
bolster the state’s growing interference with people’s personal 
lives. In practice, their liberal-sounding demand that people make 
‘informed choices’ about energy is an authoritarian affront. Why 
should people listen to what these dignitaries say about how we 
should behave? What do they know about the potential for new 
energy technologies to bring convenience, mobility and fun to 
billions of people?
 Politicians and celebrities are not the only problem. 
Educationalists in particular seek to come between parents 
and children. As the urban critic Austin Williams has shown, 
since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, many educationalists have 
tailored school curricula to environmentalist ends. 14 Worryingly, 
pupils are sometimes expected to upbraid their parents for failing 
to live ecologically correct lives.
 Yet mankind does not yet face a Greenhouse Apocalypse, 
from which the only way out is to cut back on energy use 
immediately – to tax it harder, make travel by car or air 
unacceptable, or introduce personal carbon allowances. Most 
people will not give up their energy-using habits that easily, in 
any case. 
 Instead of consumer cutbacks as a one-size-fits-all 
alternative to global warming, human beings in fact face a still 
open-ended choice of technique in energy supply. Here, in 
























Green misanthropes (1): Paul Ehrlich and  
Amory Lovins – more energy as ‘mischief’
Energise! believes that the world needs cheap, abundant energy. 
But two of America’s most prominent environmentalists reacted 
against that simple, humanistic idea back in 1975. Giving society 
such energy, Stanford University professor Paul Ehrlich wrote, 
would be the moral equivalent of ‘giving an idiot child a machine 
gun’. 15 In another vivid metaphor, he lamented that mankind was 
likely to follow the ‘pied pipers of technology’ to ‘destruction’. 
 In casting human users of energy as imbeciles and rats, 
Ehrlich was first in a long line of Green misanthropes. 
 In 1976, Amory Lovins, an American physicist representing 
Friends of the Earth in the UK, took a similar anti-energy, 
anti-human line. Attacking US electricity generation for its 
inefficiency and its capital cost, he proposed that it be cut by 
60 per cent. Lovins also hoped that in the long term, a modest, 
zero, or negative growth in America’s rate of energy use would 
be realistic. He favoured ‘soft’ energy: sources that were 
renewable, diverse, low-tech, small-scale and geared to end user 
needs. Like Ehrlich, he reserved particular contempt for nuclear 
fusion, arguing: 
‘We should prefer energy sources that give us enough for 
our needs while denying us the excesses of concentrated 
energy with which we might do mischief to the earth or to 
each other.’ 16
So mankind should seek softness in energy, because too much 
powerful and concentrated energy will only lead to mischief.
 Mischief-free softness is a fascinating concept, but one 
that has proved rather elastic for Amory Lovins. He co-founded 
the influential, non-profit Rocky Mountain Institute in Snowmass, 
Colorado, in 1982. 
 Since that year, he’s consulted for that enormously soft, 








Don’t fear the East – celebrate it 
On 11 May 2007, the US House of Representatives authorised 
the compilation of a National Intelligence Estimate on climate 
change. Diplomatic tensions on climate preceded that date; but, 
compounded by the subsequent US sub-prime crisis and the 
credit crunch, 2007 was the year when those tensions broke 
into the open.
 Today it’s clear that many of the West’s general fears centre 
on the East. The Crash of 2008 made Wall Street vulnerable to 
Eastern financial institutions; and there is always the chance 
























that these may move more decisively into the West’s energy 
sector. When it thinks energy, the West thinks East. When the 
West looks East, it sees energy and climate problems. 17 
 The growing part of the world’s oil that today comes from 
the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
has re-focused attention on the Middle East, and on security 
of supply in energy. There is also concern about Europe’s 
dependence on Russian gas. Last, the West has made much 
of the fact that China overtook the US in 2007 as the world’s 
largest emitter of CO2. 
18
 It’s true that NASA scientist James Hansen has blamed 
Britain for doing the most to boost the world’s accumulated stock 
of man-made CO2 emissions. For Hansen, Britain’s pioneering 
Industrial Revolution has made it emit even more CO2 since 
1751 than the US. 19  Yet what most worries Western planners is 
Eastern demand for energy. 
 In choice of technique in energy supply, elites in North 
America and Europe fret about China and India’s fondness for 
coal-fired power generation. But the dread that billions of Asians 
will one day drive cars and travel by plane looms still larger. 
 Like most fears in society, this one must be resisted. 
 First, the East wants, and deserves, all that we have in the 
West. Second, the East simply won’t allow the West to dictate to 
it. Third and above all, to see the populous East just as billions of 
consumers is a mistake.
 If the world can think through energy supply, it can be 
entirely sanguine about Asian energy use. Indeed, Asia promises 
to be an important source of energy innovation and investment 
in the future. It’s well known that China easily leads the world in 
solar water-heating panels: it has 52 million square metres of 
them and wants four times that by 2015. 20 But what isn’t so well 
known, for example, is that China’s work in ‘fourth generation’ 
(4G) nuclear technology has already drawn significant interest in 
the US, and might one day figure in a revitalised nuclear program 









 It would be idle to imagine that, on climate change, the 
West’s diplomacy toward the East will be motivated merely by 
environmental concerns. Even before the July 2008 collapse 
of the Doha talks on trade, Bill Emmott, former editor of the 
Economist, gave a vivid sketch of how West-East economic 
antagonisms are likely to intertwine with diplomacy on GHG 
emissions. 22 Already, too, the West entertains imposing ‘carbon 
border taxes’ on Eastern exporters it conveniently deems a 
danger to the planet. 23
 The general prospect is for Western leaders to use climate 
change to try to control the pace and direction of growth in the 
East. But from the point of view of humanity, that would be a 
great shame. The thought and the engineers that the East has 
to offer the world are precious. They should not be jeopardised 
by Western highhandedness on the issue of climate change.
 
Given good science and technology,  
scarcity isn’t an absolute
At the December 2007 Bali conference on climate change, 
where there were profound disputes between West and East, 
it was agreed that the rate of transfer from West to East of 
technological innovations in energy supply should speed up. 
 Yet to be thoughtful about energy supply means thinking 
hard not just about advances in energy, but also about the 
general business of technological innovation. And, as a concept, 
technological innovation is far too exciting to be reduced, in the 
manner of the Bali conference, to technology transfer. 
 Technological innovations aren’t just moved around from 
one nation, sector of industry or organisation to another. They 
are also produced in the first place. They therefore rely on fresh 
thinking, and upon a whole series of prototypes, experiments and 
refinements. New technologies, therefore, rely on new scientific 
insights, together with a willingness to take practical risks, both 
in the laboratory and elsewhere. 
 Exactly the same is true of new energy technologies. 
























energy. But this book upholds science, technological innovation, 
research and development (R&D), and indeed, what is today 
derided as the ‘technical fix’. 
 Environmentalists love to say how the science of climatology 
has reached a consensus that will tolerate no ‘denial.’ And to point 
to the limits of the world’s resources, the environmental group 
WWF likewise insists that if the world’s inhabitants shared the UK 
population’s lifestyle, three planets would be needed to support 
their needs and their waste. 24 Swept away by their desire to go 
carbon accounting and thus moralising about consumer excess, 
too many environmentalists ignore new scientific insights beyond 
those of climatology, and ignore, too, how thoughtful supply-side 
technologies can overcome the alleged scarcity of the Earth’s 
energy resources. 
 Scarcity isn’t an absolute. The IEA and BP make 
generous estimates of the world’s likely reserves of oil and 
non-conventional oil (heavy, or from tar sands, shale and the 
Arctic). 25 But leave aside oil reserves. Overleaf, we describe how 
solar power can be used both to make hydrogen from water, 
and to strip carbon out of atmospheric CO2. It’s also true that 
two types of planned nuclear reactors will be able to generate 
hydrogen (see the table at the end of Chapter 4). In principle, 
then, zero-carbon renewable and nuclear energy can be used 
to separate out hydrogen and carbon from water and air, and 
then combine them so as to make many Earths’ worth of new, 
compact and powerful hydrocarbon fuels. By perhaps 2050, 
those artificial carbon-based fuels will start to power more and 
more transport vehicles. When consumed, they’ll emit CO2; 
but over the whole process of getting hold of carbon from the 
atmosphere, combining it with hydrogen, and burning the result 
to go places, no new CO2 will be created. Artificial fuels will 
join biofuels in gradually making transport a limitless, carbon-
neutral affair.   
 Since 1972, when the English economist Barbara Ward and 
the French-American microbiologist René Dubos published Only 








finite the planet’s riches are, compared with mankind’s infinite 
capacity for causing havoc. 26  Yet it’s really the imagination of too 
many environmentalists that is finite. Just two current research 
projects in energy hint at boundless possibilities:
1. At the Paul Scherrer Institut, Villigen, Switzerland, 170 
scientists have learnt how to generate a lot of high-energy 
neutrons. In principle, such particles can turn long-life 
nuclear waste into short-life or even stable elements  27
2. At Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, solar 
collectors irradiate giant rings that rotate at one revolution 
per minute and contain a metal oxide. Cooled from 
1500°C to 1000°C, then exposed to superheated steam, 
the scorched rust generates free hydrogen. In the same 
labs, solar power is used to split CO2 into oxygen and 
carbon monoxide. The hydrogen and carbon monoxide 
can then be used to synthesise hydrocarbons. 28
 
For most environmentalists, the world has already reached 
a tipping point, so no faith can be placed in exploring these 
two projects. After all, in 2005 some scientists said that even 
the current stock of accumulated greenhouse gases would, 
in the long term, heat the planet by 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels. Any more greenhouse gas would make for big shifts in 
climate variability. 29 
 In this urgent Green framework, then, even a ‘nearly ready’ 
kind of energy technology like Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
will take too long to make a difference. To build a new round of 
nuclear power stations would similarly take too long. 
 Chapter 3 of this book shows, however, that a Second 
Flood is not just round the corner. In any case, the problem that 
Greens have with energy innovation isn’t that it’s too slow. Green 
objections are designed precisely to slow up the building of new 
nuclear power stations. Rather, the problem Greens have with 
























Taking risks to leave the low-CO2 cave
Imagine that someone comes to you with a thoughtful energy 
innovation. He says it’s powerful, sometimes lethal, and that he 
doesn’t yet know precisely how it works. It brings new problems, 
certainly; but it could also bring enormous benefits for civilisation. 
Do you say yes, even if you want to know more about the safety 
of the innovation? Or do you dismiss it as a ‘technical fix,’ and 
instead follow the Precautionary Principle, which gained legal 
and political prominence at the UN Rio Summit of 1992 and was 
adopted by the European Commission in 2000? 
 To date, the conduct of the UN and the Brussels 
Commission does not tell in favour of the Precautionary Principle. 
The Principle means that with this technological breakthrough, 
as with any other, fears about even the remotest possibility of 
irreversible harm to the environment or humans must come 
before turning the breakthrough into a mass-market affair. 
 But what if the energy breakthrough you’re offered 
is in fact fire? Fire is something that mankind first tamed nearly 
790,000 years ago – if we are to believe seven Israeli scientists 
who have dated some of the wood, bark, fruits, seeds and flints 
that were burned during the Lower and Middle Pleistocene, or 
Ice Age. 30
 Fire is also risky stuff. In Greek mythology, Prometheus 
was chained to a rock and had his liver pecked out each day by 
an eagle, as punishment for stealing fire from the gods and giving 
it to the human race. Fire burns children easily and can destroy 
whole communities. But the fact is that the domestication of fire 
on the shores of an ancient lake, in the middle of the Levantine 
Corridor from Africa to Europe, is what first may have allowed 
homo sapiens to move north of the Mediterranean. It was by not 
having the Precautionary Principle around that Africans first took 
fire, with all its risks, to help keep themselves warm when they 
migrated to and colonised the colder lands of Europe. 31
 From fire onward, technological innovations in energy 
supply have brought risks. But they have also brought human 








 The caves of old were low-carbon. But they were just that 
– caves. Society needs to remember and uphold the historic and 
progressive role of energy supply in colonising the natural world 
and making it comfortable and convenient to live in. 
Campaign for energy supply and energy R&D
Energy innovation has been weak these past 30 years. Holding 
fast to the Precautionary Principle, the West has developed a 
deep cultural aversion to risk, technological innovation, and 
energy innovations in particular.  
 Jonathan Leake, the respected science correspondent of 
The Sunday Times, London, highlights the skittishness of Western 
culture when he notes that several different answers to climate 
change have had their 15 minutes of fame. 32 As solutions, 
planting trees and carbon trading aren’t especially technological; 
but just like nuclear power, CCS, biofuels and wind farms, each 
has had its Andy Warhol moment. 
 Yet there is a solid reason behind this flirting with 
choice of technique. The West lacks the confidence to make 
serious investments – either in general technology, or in 
energy innovations. 
 Between 1988 and 2006 in the US, gross expenditure 
on R&D as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
stagnated at below 2.7 per cent. The commitment to R&D made 
by members of the European Union (EU) was even worse, and 
now lies at a trifling 1.8 per cent of GDP. 33 
 Across the 30 members of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), both public and private 
sector expenditure on energy R&D has declined. Indeed, 
between 1991 and 2002, R&D expenditure as a fraction of the 
energy sector’s total turnover dropped by more than a half – to 
just 0.33 per cent. 34 
 So much for the much-vaunted ‘knowledge economy’. 
These statistics suggest that there has been a stark dumbing 
down of energy research. With that in mind, Energise! believes 
























refuse to be stigmatised as energy wastrels•	
campaign for more of society’s money and brains to go •	
into energy supply and energy R&D in both the private and 
public sectors.
Renewable sources of energy, it is said, can both save money 
and make money. Yet if they’re so inherently profitable, why have 
they been avoided for so long? 
 Late in 2007, Al Gore’s $1.2bn investment fund, 
Generation, linked up with a $200m Silicon Valley venture capital 
fund to bring Green innovations to market. But around the same 
time, the head of General Electric’s energy business had this to 
say to the London Financial Times about what he called ‘wind, 
solar and so on’: 
‘I don’t see a disruptive new technology that changes the 
game in the next 20-30 years. It is not the nature of this 
industry… Everything that has been developed so far… 
has taken decades to come to fruition. My expectation is 
that it will remain that way.’ 35
The pace of innovation in renewable energy is still sluggish, no 
matter how strident the authorities’ calls for personal self-denial 
have grown. 
 Why the slow pace? Not, as Greens repeatedly allege, 
because the usual neo-conservative clique of business chiefs 
and their pawns in government have conspired to kill off Green 
innovation – all in a Wall Street-style quest for short-term profit. 
 No. In fact, renewable sources of energy have taken 
decades to develop because they only become economically 
viable when they are built on a grand scale – a scale which 
today’s culture in the West often finds too daunting. We explore 
this further in Chapter 6. 
 But there’s something else, too. The slowness to introduce 
Green energy innovations reflects Western fear of, and sloth 































 All parts of the energy sector need to free themselves 
from this sad culture of the past.
Doing better than Carter and his sweater 
The capitalist spirit now favours Green energy innovations, but 
the capitalist flesh looks like it might take 20-30 years to properly 
introduce them. 
 Sensitivity to risk makes Western elites anxious: not just 
about nuclear fission and fossil fuels, but also about serious 
innovations in renewables. Take biofuels, for instance. As late as 
August 2006, some environmentalists routinely endorsed them 
as a remedy for global warming. 36 Yet now, despite the fact that 
they come in an enormous variety, the whole biofuels sector gets 
a bad rap. 37 According to various authorities, they can lead to:
 
deforestation, and thus a net addition to CO•	 2
 38 
the destruction of natural habitats •	 39
the marginalisation of women farmers •	 40
food price inflation. •	 41
Similarly, many Greens object to a proposed tidal barrage for 
the Severn Estuary in the UK because it would kill the wildlife 
in the area. 42 And wind power done at scale? One scientist has 
already noticed a snag: it could have ‘non-negligible’ impacts on 
climate. 43 
 For every low carbon solution, a major problem is found. 
That’s because many Greens want people to change more than 
the energy supply. 
 On 2 February 1977, environmentalists gained an 
enduring inspiration for their cause. Then, a newly inaugurated 
US president came on television in a sweater, asking Americans 
to save energy by turning down their thermostats – and by 
Fireside chat: President Jimmy Carter sports  
a jersey so as to try to get people to conserve  









 Sometimes it can be wise to turn the heating down, and 
to dress warmly indoors. But to turn these individual choices 
into a presidential policy is to negate the whole concept of 
convenience in favour of labour-intensive, mindless toil. This puts 
us in a medieval world in which, by pulling sweaters on and off all 
day, humans repeatedly have to concede to their environment, 
instead of just getting on with things. 
 It’s time to wave goodbye to the impoverished Jimmy 
Carter approach to energy.
 Humans do waste energy. But personal struggles to 
conserve energy do little more than waste time (see panel 
below). Made into a habit, they represent not ‘awareness’, but a 
























The run-round to save energy  
with UK consumer electronics
Leave a mobile phone charger on all day without a phone to 
charge, and you waste one watt. Britain’s government-backed 
Energy Saving Trust (EST) thinks that if the UK’s (roughly) 25 
million households didn’t make that mistake with their 25 million 
chargers, they’d save 25 megawatts (MW) of electricity – enough 
to power 66,000 homes. 44
 That sounds impressive. But suppose the average UK 
householder – pensioners included – takes 10 seconds a day 
to get to a charger and switch it on and off. A national effort to 
do that switching would absorb 26.37 million hours a year. The 
energy saved would power 66,000 homes, but that’s still only 
0.25 per cent of UK households.
 Now, scale up the EST’s fidgety philosophy across the 
full range of hateful, electricity-guzzling consumer electronics 
devices in the home. In 2004, the average UK household owned 
2.4 televisions, 1.9 video recorders, 0.5 set-top boxes and 5.2 
external power supply units. 45 The total today is at least 10 
gadgets per home.
 But if all British households spent 10 seconds fiddling 
with each gadget, they’d spend about 264 million hours a year 
switching. Electricity savings would power a majestic 2.5 per 
cent of UK households.
 In the three months to July 2008, which we may take 
as a reasonably typical period, Britain’s 29.54 million people in 
employment worked 947 million hours a week – equivalent to 
135 million hours a day over seven days. 46  If those people were, 
now, really to take on society's supplication to the socket, they 
would be spending roughly the equivalent of two extra working 
days a year engaged in fruitless, labour-intensive overtime around 
electricity supply in the home.
 Most British householders, however, might prefer to leave 
their consumer electronics on standby, and instead move on to 








The three accusations made against the energy sector
Why, in energy, do environmentalists tend to favour personal 
conservation over industrial innovation? Well, unlike new 
technologies, consumer cutbacks cost nothing (or at least nothing 
financially). They’re also supposed to bring immediate benefits to 
the Earth’s climate. Finally, many Greens are more interested 
in being sanctimonious about other people’s behaviour than in 
actually doing something about energy.
 We deal with these issues in the next chapter. For the 
moment though, let’s tackle something even more basic: 
environmentalism’s deep-rooted disdain for generating any 
energy at all. 
 Environmentalists believe that energy generation: 
consumes resources•	
pollutes the Earth•	
is marked by what are known as ‘negative externalities’. •	
Certainly, energy generation consumes resources – but as we 
have seen, scarcity isn’t an absolute. Through sunlight, the Earth 
each day receives an almost unlimited supply of energy in a diffuse 
form. But that rather useless kind of energy contrasts strongly 
with human beings’ desire, need, and ability to concentrate and 
order energy to pursue tasks that are more and more intricate. 47 
Those energy intensive tasks include: 
etching silicon chips•	
performing laser eye surgery•	
flying long haul to see an ailing aunt just before she dies •	
cutting pollution. •	
In the same way, mankind will most probably need to expend a 
lot of energy, and even generate a lot of CO2, to build the low or 
zero-carbon power sources and carbon traps of tomorrow.
 It’s ironic, but society’s main use of energy is to extract, 
























mankind’s largest energy hog. But that’s a good thing: it has led 
not just to convenience, but also to civilisation. 
 What about the pollution caused by the energy industry? 
As we saw earlier in the chapter, the industry is indeed responsible 
for the largest share of man-made emissions of GHGs. However, 
environmentalists often exaggerate the energy industry’s 
misdeeds: from the wreck of the Torrey Canyon supertanker in 
1967, through the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989, to the Brent 
Spar fiasco in 1995, Greens have made rather too much of oil 
spills at sea. 48
 Yes, energy corporations stand in need of a much more 
thoughtful pollution regime. But by itself, such a regime will 
not deliver more energy, which is what the world needs. The 
energy industry will only pollute less if it becomes generally more 
thoughtful, investment-orientated, and focused on R&D. 
 In 1986, after going 100 metres beneath the North Sea, 
one of the authors of this book exposed for The Economist 
how Shell UK’s Brent Alpha offshore oil platform was at its 
most dangerous during periods of shutdown, when frenzied 
maintenance work could easily lead to mistakes. 49 Shell nearly 
sued – yet in the 6 July 1988 explosion of Piper Alpha, a North 
Sea oil platform run by Armand Hammer’s Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation, 167 men died precisely during such a shutdown 
period. 
 Following Piper Alpha, a host of new safety regulations 
came in. Yet despite this, years of underinvestment have once 
again made regulators issue a ‘stark warning’ about the lack of 
safety on North Sea oil platforms. 50
 Safety on the North Sea contains clear lessons for energy 
industry pollution. Neither safety nor pollution is just about 
geology and chemistry: both are much more about the state of 
technology, science, management, priorities, and funding. 
 Energy industry pollution, like corporate pollution 
everywhere, is a social question. Rather than hatred, or new 









Imposing face of the New Scientism:  
Nicholas Stern. In 2006, his massive and thoroughly 
neutral treatise on what to do about global warming 
focused on a scenario in which there was an almost  
10 per cent chance of mankind being made extinct  
by 2100 (Stern Review, page 47). Within 12 months  
of this gloomy speculation, Stern was given a life 
peerage. In the House of Lords, he sits as a 
























 So what, thirdly, are the energy sector’s ‘negative 
externalities’? In his famous 700-page report on climate change 
published in 2006, London School of Economics professor 
Nicholas Stern mentioned ‘externalities’ more than 70 times. 51 
But the concept in fact dates back to 1890 (see below).
 That energy industry pollution carries an external cost 
to society seems commonsensical. But can right-minded 
technocrats accurately tax pollution, or successfully price and 
run markets for CO2? The market is too chaotic not to pollute 
the world, but state bureaucracies also act chaotically in their 
attempts to beat pollution with paperwork or court fines.
 Stern saw climate change as the greatest market 
failure ever. 52 Yet it’s not just markets that have failed: energy 
corporations have also failed to innovate – thoughtfully, 
consistently, and therefore cleanly. 
 Climate change speaks also of state failure. As we show 
in Chapter 3, the possibility of man-made global warming began 
to emerge strongly in US research in 1956. However, Western 
governments have taken decades to do something about it.
 When first conceived, externalities were about costs 
imposed on others. With the rise of environmentalism, however, 
externalities turned out to be costs imposed on nature, which was 
represented as something plundered. Today, environmentalist 
obsessions ensure that externalities and nature often become 
the very starting points of economics. Assigning a quantitative 
value to nature, environmentalists believe it represents a ‘natural 
capital’ that mankind consumes, or ‘eco-system services’ that 
mankind pollutes. 53
 But it is human activities, including those of the energy 
industry, which actually add value to capital and supply services. 
Nature builds no machines, high-speed trains, or the Internet. 
Mankind is not a negative blot sucking up energy from the 
landscape, but a positive force for progress. The ultimate energy 
on the planet is human. 
 Al Gore was right about one thing. Political will is a 









CO2 taxes, CO2 markets:  
the inside story on externalities
In 1890 the English economist Alfred Marshall praised not the 
intrinsic creation of value through production and innovation, 
but positive factors external to that: the goodwill surrounding a 
business, and the spin-off from transport infrastructure. 54 
 After the conflict of 1914-18, opinion darkened, focusing 
instead on negative externalities. For Marshall’s Cambridge 
successor Arthur Cecil Pigou, factory smoke inflicted ‘a heavy 
uncharged loss on the community’. In 1920, Pigou fathered the 
modern idea that state taxes on CO2 emissions can internalise 
their external costs to society. 55
 In 1960 the Chicago economics professor Ronald Coase, 
a Swedish social democrat enthused with American capitalism, 
took issue with Pigou. For Coase, governments might fix smoke 
more cheaply than private organisations, but governments 
themselves could also, ‘on occasion’, be ‘extremely costly’. 56
 In effect, Coase rejected pollution taxes, preferring that 
the state put a price on the right to pollute. Later the US Congress 
established a market-based cap and trade mechanism. From 
1995 onward, the Acid Rain Program capped the total sulphur 
dioxide emitted in American electricity generation, and, at the 
US Environmental Protection Agency each March, auctioned off 
permits to emit nearly three per cent of that total. 57 Similarly 
under George W Bush, the EPA issued, in 2004, the first federal 
rule to cap and trade emissions of mercury from coal-fired power 
plants. 58 
 Today, CO2 emissions are traded through the EU’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Taking a leaf from that scheme, 
Barack Obama has also promised to implement a cap and trade 
programme to reduce GHG emissions in the US. 
 In fact, both state taxes and state caps on CO2 reflect 
undue faith in the state, undue faith in the market, and not 
enough faith in energy innovation. We hope that Barack Obama 
knows what he’s proposing. As Chapter 3 shows, the ETS has 

























There’s a big contrast between 
contemporary culture, which ridicules humans’ ambitions •	
as hubristic, warns that nature will take ‘her’ revenge, 
and insists that the limits imposed by nature on man can 
never be breached
and 
the logic of this book, which highlights how, depending on •	
the state of civilisation, humans have a remarkable record 
of overcoming what are perceived as immutable limits.
For politicians, climate change means that nothing is certain but 
death, energy meters, and carbon taxes. Politicians want people 
to atone for their shocking selfishness: they want to add to the 
sum total of guilt in the world (though they don’t seem to feel 
very guilty themselves). They seek legitimacy through the truly 
limp cry: ‘Let’s survive! It’s in everyone’s interest!’
 Meanwhile celebrities set themselves up as role models, 
favouring the chic politics of the prominent gesture. Pompous 
and narcissistic about their energy selflessness, they feel no 
guiltier than politicians.
 As for the energy industry, it’s on the back foot. Nuclear 
interests refuse to make a bold case for their role in creating 
much more energy, instead pleading that their plants have only 
a modest pollution impact. Against this defensive argument, 
Jimmy Carter’s pullover will always win.
 Oil, gas and coal are cast as pariahs. And renewable 
sources of energy are dogged by delays and inconclusive 
debates.
 Finally, people are disempowered by the doctrine that 
they are greedy consumers of energy.








Putting their back into it: hippies erect a solar 
panel on a timber house in Cornwall, England.  
At the level of the individual household, Green 
technologies demand a lot of time and effort for 
























not just consumers; they can and should be energetic citizens, 
with lives that are convenient enough to be expansive, not 
spent watching energy meters. They can and should be able to 
vigorously debate, vote on and act upon choice of technique in 
energy supply.
 The desire to do something about energy is fair enough. 
To make a better world, however, people can do more than go 
through the motions with energy at home, in the shops or on 
their travels. It’s right to:
feel that voting for a politician every few years doesn’t •	
help society much
feel that following every twist and turn of celebrity gossip •	
doesn’t do much for society either
want personal transport that’s convenient, cheap and •	
clean.
But human-powered bicycles won’t solve the world’s transport 
problems. People can do more for energy in Africa or Bangladesh 
than switch to the most ethical supplier of household gas. 
 To give something back to society and make much more 
than a difference, people need to mobilise for the proper kind 
of energy commitments – and mobilise on the basis of nobler 
and more profound feelings than consumer disgust with energy 
companies.
 Solar panels on a roof, like a Toyota Prius outside a 
doorway, can look cool to neighbours and friends; but to uphold 
the microgeneration of energy by a panel, or energy efficiency in 
a car, is thinking too small. In practice, humans will always have 
larger ambitions. Certainly they will want to do more than just 
survive.
 Is it irresponsible to let people be thoughtless in energy 
use? No. To neglect the energy innovations that the world 








What is a horsepower, anyway? 
Energy is measured in Joules. A Joule is roughly what it takes 
to lift an apple one metre. The more usual main units are: 
1 kilojoule (kJ) = 1,000 Joules
1 Megajoule (MJ) = 1,000,000 Joules  
1 Gigajoule (GJ) = 1,000,000,000 Joules
In 2005, the world consumed 500,000,000,000 GJ of energy. 59
 Per kilogram, coal contains 20-30 MJ. Oil contains 50 MJ. 
Oil packs the bigger punch – it has a higher energy density.
 Power is measured in Watts. One Watt is use of energy 
at the rate of one Joule per second. A fairy light on a Christmas 
tree gives out energy at a rate of about one Watt. James Watt’s 
vivid coinage, horsepower, approximates to 750 W.
 One kilowatt (1 kW), or 1,000 Watts, approximates to the 
power consumed by a single-bar electrical heater. 
 One kW-hour on your electricity bill is 3.6 MJ. The average 
American consumes power in all its forms at 10 kW per person, 
amounting to about 300 GJ per person per year.
 Given a strong wind, a 1 MW (1,000,000 Watts), industrial-
scale windmill produces energy equivalent to all of the needs 
of about 100 Americans. For a coal or nuclear power station 
running at 1 GW (1,000,000,000 Watts), that figure rises to 
about 100,000 Americans.  
 When a power station burns coal, the coal produces heat. 
Each kW of power generated is abbreviated as 1 kWt, to show 
that this takes the form of thermal power – heat. The thermal 
power is then converted into electrical power. Losses in heat-to-
electricity conversion (typically about 40 per cent) and power-
station-to-consumer transmission (typically seven per cent) 
mean that less than 1 kW of electricity – abbreviated as 1kWe 
– is actually delivered to the consumer. Conversely, to deliver 

























 Primary energy is the total energy used up in the 
production and distribution of energy to end-users; it’s the energy 
in the coal that enters a power station, or in the oil that enters 
a refinery. Secondary energy is the amount finally delivered to 
end-users, such as the energy delivered by a light bulb, or a car 
engine. Thus secondary energy is equal to primary energy, less 
losses in transmission and conversion.
 Most primary energy still comes from fossil fuels.
Shares of total primary energy supply,  
by type of energy, per cent 60
WORLD: 1973 2005 OECD: 1973 2005
Oil 46.2 35.0  53.0 40.6
Coal 24.4 25.3 22.4 20.4
Gas 16.0 20.7  18.8 21.8
Nuclear 0.9 6.3 1.3 11.0
Hydroelectric 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.0
Other 10.7 10.5 2.4 4.2
 
 
Converting energy into different forms 
Energy comes in different forms: chemical, electrical; as heat, 
light, motion and so on. Society makes use of energy by using 
different technologies to convert it from one form to another. 
For example, coal-fired power plants turn the chemical energy in 
coal into heated steam, which, through a turbine generator, is 
converted into electrical energy. In the home, lamps and motors 
convert that electrical energy into light and motion.
 At each conversion, however, a little energy inevitably 
escapes. That escaped energy isn’t destroyed – the First Law of 
Thermodynamics states that energy can be neither created nor 
destroyed. But the escaped energy does become unavailable for 
human use. As a result, more energy must always be put in at 








the end of that chain.
 While most oil is used for transport, and most gas for 
heating and cooking, history suggests that electricity – a 
particularly concentrated and flexible form of energy – will grow 
in significance. The largest source of electricity is coal, but 
nuclear, gas and hydroelectric are also important. Renewables, 
meanwhile, should make themselves felt in electricity generation 
in years to come.
  As consumed by the end-user, more and more energy 
takes the form of electricity. 
Shares of final energy consumption, by type of  
energy, per cent 61
WORLD: 1973 2005 OECD: 1973 2005
Oil 48.2 43.4  56.7 51.9
Coal 13.1 8.3 10.1 3.3
Gas 14.3 15.6  18.2 19.2
Other 15.1 16.4 3.6 5.6
Electricity 9.3 16.3 11.4 20.0
The numbers show a rise in electricity used by the consumer, but 
understate its significance for two reasons. 
 First, electricity only makes up 20 per cent of the energy 
directly used by consumers in the developed world; but generating 
that electricity in power stations itself absorbs about three times 
as much energy. Electricity, in other words, is a highly refined 
form of energy. Consumers don’t get to see all the energy behind 
the electricity they use.
 Second, electricity is the most versatile and convenient 
form of energy. That’s the reason why using a lot of energy to 
generate it is worthwhile.
 Like other forms of energy, electricity can provide power for 
heat, light and motion. In these applications, however, it typically 
























electric motor has the same power rating as a steam engine, but 
is more compact. It also has a turning force that can be set more 
precisely. 
 In terms of convenience, switching on a light is a whole lot 
simpler than lighting a match. Similarly, laying electrical cables is 
easier than installing pipes to carry fuels.
 Electricity is also essential for information technology. 
Computers are nothing but miniaturised electrical circuits, and 
electrical energy is necessary to drive electrons around them.
 The world needs a lot more energy, a lot more electricity 
– and a lot more of those unsung heroes, the electrical 
engineers. 62
Capacities and load following
Choice of technique in energy supply isn’t just a matter of how 
much energy each technique can potentially produce when 
working flat out, but how much each can actually produce over 
time. Also critical is whether energy is available at the time it is 
needed.
 Peak potential energy generation is known as nameplate 
capacity. That’s what’s generally quoted when new power 
production is discussed. The proportion of that energy actually 
produced is called the capacity factor.







These figures mean that 1 GW of nameplate capacity will produce 








farm. That doesn’t mean that wind turbines only work a third of 
the time – just that they rarely reach full power.
 Two main considerations determine capacity factors. The 
first is availability: how much a plant is actually doing its work. 
All techniques of energy generation require some downtime for 
maintenance. Nuclear and carbon-based generation also require 
downtime for refuelling. In the case of renewables, downtime 
occurs when the wind isn’t blowing or the sun isn’t shining.
 A second consideration is load following. Because 
demand for energy fluctuates over each day, it’s necessary to 
have spare generating power that’s available, but not put to use 
– idle capacity. That inevitably means running a plant at a lower 
capacity factor.
 A mix of technical issues and economic ones determines 
what a plant’s idle capacity should be. 
 On the technical side, different power sources come on 
line in different amounts of time. In the case of hydroelectric 
power, for example, water flowing through a dam can begin 
generating energy in seconds. 
 By contrast, it isn’t wise to turn large nuclear or coal-fired 
power stations on and off too much. They take a long time to 
heat up and cool down. If needed at short notice, they have to be 
kept hot, wastefully, in a condition known as ‘spinning reserve.’ 
 Because they’re smaller than those in nuclear and coal-
fired plants, turbines in gas-fired power stations can be started 
and stopped more quickly. They’re a better source of reserve 
power. 
 Load following requires the kind of power that’s available 
on demand, or ‘dispatchable’ by grid managers. A gas power 
station that runs 30 per cent of the time but helps cope with 
peak loads is more useful than a wind turbine that runs 30 per 
cent of the time because that’s the proportion of time during 
which the wind blows.
 On the economic side, it makes sense to run capital-
intensive power at higher capacity. Most of the cost of nuclear 
























operators try to run them 24/7. The opposite is true of gas, 
where fuel makes up a significant proportion of costs. That’s 
another reason gas is used to cover peak loads.
 What this shows is that low capacity factors are not in 
themselves a problem. They are most problematic when power 
output is intermittent – that is, unpredictable, as with wind. Next 
best is power that’s sometimes on but always predictable: tidal 
energy is an example here. Best of all is power available any 
time, on demand, such as gas or nuclear.
Energy efficiency and energy conservation 
Energy efficiency means doing more with less. Narrowly, it’s 
the proportion of energy put in that goes on a designated task. 
Broader measures of energy look not just at energy conversions, 
but also at human goals. For example:
when an efficient home boiler meets a •	 poorly-insulated 
roof, the overall home is rendered inefficient 
an efficient vehicle engine powering a •	 heavy vehicle 
spends most of that power on moving it, rather than its 
cargo and passengers. 
The difference between the two measures is clearest in the 
energy industry itself, where there’s great scope for increasing 
efficiency. Here the narrow definition is appropriate. New 
turbine technology is raising the efficiency of gas fired electricity 
generation. In the 20th century, about 35 per cent of the energy 
in gas was converted into electricity. Today, new technology is 
pushing that number above 60 per cent. 
 For the economy as a whole, the broad measure of 
efficiency is appropriate. Here energy is being converted not just 
into other forms of energy, but into mobile phones, orange juice 
and everything else. The overall energy efficiency of a national 
economy is measured by its energy intensity, or the amount 








intensities mean higher efficiencies.
 Efficiency doesn’t say anything about how much energy is 
used overall. Conservation, however, means using less energy. 
Efficiency is one route to conservation: installing roof insulation, 
for instance, conserves gas by making use of central heating 
more efficiently. But cutting back on energy, and often accepting 
inconvenience in the process, need not involve improvements in 
energy efficiency at all.
 Progress in energy efficiency is exactly that – progress. 
Significantly, the IEA observes:
‘Energy efficiency in OECD countries has been improving 
at just below one per cent per year in recent times. A sharp 
decline from the rate achieved in the years immediately 
following the oil price shocks of the early 1970s.’ 63
But it’s wrong to believe, as so many do, that efficiency is the main 
means of curbing CO2 emissions. There are limits to efficiency. 
It takes a certain amount of energy to move objects, say, or to 
heat them up. The infamous Second Law of Thermodynamics 
sets further limits of how efficiently energy can be converted 
from one form to another. 64 Once efficiencies have reached the 
maximum allowed by the laws of physics then, to do even more, 
there’s no choice but to generate more energy.
 For the IEA, improvements in energy efficiency account 
for no less than 36-44 per cent of the emissions cuts it seeks 
to make on its ‘baseline’ scenario for 2050; nuclear, just six 
per cent; CCS, 14-19 per cent, and renewables, 21 per cent. 
These figures betray an extraordinary reliance on efficiency 
measures – what the IEA itself describes as a ‘first step’ – rather 
than on those related to energy supply. 65 In both of the IEA’s 
preferred scenarios, energy efficiency improvements in buildings, 
appliances, transport, industry and power generation represent 
‘the largest and least costly savings’. 66 
 The IEA recognises that higher efficiency means more 
























use rather than less: if you can do more with your energy, it 
becomes more expendable. Mainstream economists like to point 
out that higher efficiencies lower the price of energy and increase 
demand for it. 
 To progress beyond the IEA’s goals will require greater 
investment in the clean production of energy.
 
The question of embodied energy
‘Don’t Buy That New Prius! Test-Drive a Used Car Instead’, said 
Wired magazine in 2008. Its reasoning:
‘Pound for pound, making a Prius contributes more carbon 
to the atmosphere than making a Hummer, largely due to 
the environmental cost of the 30 pounds of nickel in the 
hybrid’s battery.’ 67
Greens tend to generalise this logic. The investment you propose 
to make in a Green house or car, they argue, will in fact use up 
more energy or generate more CO2 than staying as you are.
It’s true that energy isn’t just about what’s consumed 
when products are in use. It’s also about what’s consumed 
during production. The jargon has this as ‘embodied energy’. 
It’s not necessarily physically embodied in that house or car; 
but for Greens it adds to the awfulness of such items. Rather 
than make energy invisible and taken for granted, the concept of 
embodied energy is another way of trying to make energy weigh 
more heavily on your conscience.
The argument presumes a low-growth or no-growth 
world. But do people want to live like the Cubans under economic 
blockade, keeping second-hand cars running for decades?
Making production more energy-efficient is a problem 
for engineers – and one that they pay considerable attention 
to. That might help bring down prices of consumer goods. But 
if society invests enough in energy supply, it isn’t something 








Growth means building more goods – including houses 
and cars. That will use up energy. Efficiency will not mean using 
less energy overall. It will only mean using less energy than would 
have been the case with old-fashioned technology. The bottom 
line is still that the world needs more energy.
As the Wired example of the Prius battery shows, the 
‘embodied energy’ argument is also applied to energy generation 
itself. It’s said that your proposed investment in clever energy 
supply will use up more energy or put out more CO2 than you 
generate.
The jargon is ‘energy return on energy invested’, or EROEI. 
It’s modelled on a financial measure, ‘return on investment’ (ROI). 
ROI is used by business to decide on where to put its money.
It does indeed take energy to produce a barrel of oil, a 
biocrop, a windmill, and a solar panel. Moreover, energy needs 
to be produced efficiently. But EROEI studies are often suspect, 
reflecting politics as much as physical realities.
With investment, you’re supposed to get more out than 
you put in. But things are more clear-cut in the world of money 
than they are in the world of energy. You know what counts as 
money invested. But exactly what energy goes into running an 
oil rig in the North Sea? Running the machinery, and providing 
heat and light for the oil workers, certainly. But what about the 
steel to build the rig? What about the food for the workers? What 
about food for the miners who dug the steel that built the rig?
Overall, society does need to capture net energy. 
But the preoccupation with EROEI reflects an obsession with 
quantity over quality. More energy goes into a refinery or a power 
station than comes out, giving an EROEI of less than one. But 
the energy that comes out emerges in a form more useful to 
human beings. 
Electricity is more useful than the coal that precedes it. 
Petrol is more useful than a barrel of crude oil.
























Carbon intensity and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
In 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, the world’s governments agreed that 
GHGs gases must be limited to a level that would ‘avoid dangerous 
climate change’. Just what ‘dangerous climate change’ might be, 
let alone the levels of GHGs needed to avoid them, has been 
argued over ever since. But in 1997, the world’s governments 
confirmed in Japan what they had really committed themselves 
to back in 1992. 
 The resulting 28 Articles and two Annexes of the 11 
December 1997 Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change – the Kyoto Protocol – dodged the question of 
how much GHG was ultimately acceptable, but insisted that 
developed countries cut their emissions.
 Different countries were given different targets, but the 
collective average was a five per cent cut below 1990 levels 
for developed countries. Developing countries – including China 
and India – weren’t given targets, but the Clean Development 
Mechanism instead (see Chapter 3).
 After George Bush senior signed the Framework document 
in 1992, George Bush junior famously backed out of ratifying 
Kyoto.
 The latter’s alternative was to set targets for decreasing 
carbon intensity. As with energy, carbon intensity measures the 
amount of CO2 emitted per unit of GDP. In 2002 Bush set out a 
voluntary target for the US to reduce its carbon intensity by 18 
per cent by 2012. 68
 Greens ridiculed Bush. They made the point that if GDP is 
increasing, cutting carbon intensity gives no guarantee of lower 
CO2 emissions. But in April 2008 Bush added a ‘new national 
goal’ that emissions should peak by 2025.  
 In fact carbon intensity is more important than Greens 
allow. Emissions can be cut simply by doing less. Carbon intensity 








Understanding concentrations of GHGs 
In 2008 the level of CO2 in the atmosphere stood at 384 parts 
per million (ppm). Bubbles trapped in cores of ice have revealed 
that, in the 10,000 years between the end of the most recent 
Ice Age and the industrial revolution, CO2 concentrations have 
ranged from 260 to 280ppm. Over the past 650,000 years, ice 
cores show that CO2 ranged between 180 and 210ppm during 
ice ages, and from 280 to 300ppm during warmer interglacial 
periods – such as the world enjoys at present. 69
 As we’ve explained, there are also other man-made GHGs 
in the atmosphere. The effect of these can be converted into a 
carbon dioxide equivalent, or CO2eq. This is the concentration of 
CO2 that would have the same effect as the combined power of 
these other GHGs. Note that this equivalence doesn’t mean that 
the effect of a quantity of man-made GHGs other than CO2 is 
identical to the effect of another quantity of CO2 in every respect. 
For example, and rather importantly: after being emitted, CO2 
remains in the atmosphere for centuries. Methane, by contrast, 
stays for only decades.
 The total level of GHGs in the atmosphere today is about 
440ppm of CO2eq. Of this, about 280ppm is the natural pre-
industrial level of CO2. About 100ppm is man-made CO2, while 
the remaining 60 ppm is from other man-made GHGs. 
 It makes sense to convert to CO2eq because only one 
number needs to be thought about. Note, though, that when 
commentators talk about a low- or zero carbon economy, the talk 
is loose. Only two-thirds of the rise in GHGs consists of CO2.
 
Rises in Parts Per Million of CO2eq,  
temperature, and sea levels: how fast? 
At the moment, CO2eq is rising at about 2-3ppm a year. Now, 
simply extrapolating such annual rises to 2100 would take 
levels beyond 700ppm; but in fact, economic growth is likely 
























industrialising countries stick just to present-day technologies, 
which they won’t.
 Human beings need to take control of global warming. 
Nature could always throw something unexpected at them, 
but it’s likely that, as emissions are got under control and then 
reduced, so warming will slow and temperatures, though higher, 
will stabilise.
 We anticipate that the planet can take a doubling 
of GHGs above their pre-industrial level. That would raise 
the concentration of GHGs from 280 to 560ppm of CO2eq. 
Stabilising concentrations at 560ppm by 2100 would 
ultimately lead, sometime before 2200, to a temperature rise of 
about 3º C.
 Of course, to look up to 2200 is to look a long time 
ahead. We agree with the climate scientists Myles Allen and 
David Frame when they write: 
‘Uncertainties in how the available policy levers translate 
into global emissions, and how emissions translate into 
concentrations through the carbon cycle, are so large that 
uncertainty in the final concentration we are aiming for in 
2200 is probably the least of our worries.’ 70
We agree with Allen and Frame, too, that humanity’s descendants 
will revise their targets in the light of the climate changes they 
actually observe. Indeed, provided those descendants have the 
sense to alter course in response to what Allen and Frame term 
‘the emerging climate change signal’, then they ‘probably won’t 
care’ about the climate change uncertainties that detain their 
ancestors today. 71
 In the two tables below, we give an overview of 
1.   Estimates, by Energise! and by key individuals and 
institutions, of how fast the situation is deteriorating
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countries to cut 
GHG emissions   
5.2 per cent 
below 1990 
levels, 2012 81 
Cut GHG emissions 
20 per cent below 
1990 levels, 2020, 
rising to 30 per cent 
if other industrial 
countries agree 82 
Cut GHG 
emissions 
26-32 per cent 
below 1990 
levels, 2020, 
and by at least 
80 per cent, 
2050 83 
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Rise in sea level, cm, 
estimated, plus the date 
the estimate is made for. 
Premised on continuing 
‘business as usual’
As Stern  
Overview of main climate estimates and targets (1): 
concentrations of CO2eq 
72
Overview of main climate estimates and targets (2):  











































550ppm of CO2 by 
2050.74 The IEA 
doesn’t account 
for other GHGs, 
but rises at the 
same rate would 
equate to 700 
ppm CO2eq







450 ppm of CO2.
78 
The IEA doesn’t 
account for other 
GHGs, but rises 
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would equate to 
about 550ppm   
CO2eq
Stabilise between  
450 and 550 79
Cut current levels 
to 350 ppm  
CO2. 
80 Believes 
that a target for 
CO2 alone, rather 











ambitious  of 
two scenarios 
envisions halving 
CO2  emissions 
relative to 1990, 
2050 85
To stabilise at 550 ppm of 
CO2eq, Emissions should 
peak 2016-26, then fall by 
about 1-3 per cent per year. 
Emissions need to be about 
25 per cent lower than 2006 
levels, 2050 86
















Best estimate, 1.8-4.0 
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2090-99. Unlikely: less than 
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In reading the tables, it’s important to distinguish between the 
total stock of GHGs in the atmosphere, and emissions, which are 
a flow of GHGs into the atmosphere. It’s the former that makes 
temperatures rise. Even if emissions begin to fall, they will still 
contribute to a rising stock – until, that is, they reach levels so 
low, the earth will naturally remove them from the atmosphere. 
So unless human beings find ways of directly reducing the stock 
of GHGs, there will in the very long term have to be a cut of about 
80 per cent in emissions.
Often targets for emissions are stated in terms of cutting 
them with respect to the level reached in 1990. In that year, 
the world’s emissions amounted to 39.4 Gigatonnes of CO2eq. 
Roughly three quarters of them consisted of CO2, while the rest 
was made up other GHGs. 98
 
 
Runaway, irreversible, dangerous: how likely  
is it that climate will change in these ways?
Climate needs serious attention now. But we are less precautionary 
in our targets than Allen and Frame. Why are we so relaxed about 
a doubling of GHGs above their pre-industrial level, to 560ppm 
of CO2eq, when others would find such a target intolerable? 
 Governments and environmentalists fear that, above 
certain concentrations of GHGs, the greenhouse effect may lead 
to what they call runaway, irreversible and dangerous climate 
change. They hold that if a little warming leads to a little more, 
and that in turn to a lot more, then the only wise option is to stop 
the process before it starts. For them, the possibility of ‘runaway’ 
warming gives good grounds for dramatic action now. 
This, however, is alarmism. Its basis lies in two key points:
1.  Alarmists fear that a doubling in GHGs will produce 
enormous rises in temperature – up to 10º C or more. Put 
differently, they worry about the factor known as climate 
sensitivity 
























In line with mainstream scientific opinion, we concur that climate 
sensitivity – the temperature rise likely to accompany a doubling 
of GHGs above pre-industrial levels, to 560ppm – is about 3º C. 
Where alarmists err is on the magnitude and significance of the 
uncertainty attached to 3º C.
The IPCC gives a likely range for climate sensitivity of 1.5-
4.5º C, adding that ‘high values are consistently found to be less 
likely than values of around 2.0° C to 3.5° C.' Crucially, it adds 
that studies ‘cannot rule out’ values above 4.5º C. It says that 
the upper bound to its range is ‘difficult to constrain’, because 
1.  The ultimate long-term warming has a complex relationship 
with the observed short-term response
2.  With climate change, observational records are limited in 
length
3.  Observations of ocean heat uptake and of the behaviour of 
aerosols are subject to particularly large uncertainties. 99
A high value of climate sensitivity, some add, would result in 
runaway change. 
 There are economists who believe that the uncertain 
possibility of runaway change dictates that mankind adopt what 
they call an insurance policy. A panel in Chapter 3 deals with 
this argument. Here, we just want to suggest that the IPCC’s 
interpretation of the evidence on climate sensitivity is too 
apprehensive.
It’s hard to rule out, in principle, the possibility of runaway 
climate change. Yet very little, in life and in science, should 
ever be completely ruled out. What’s more productive is to look 
at where the accumulation of evidence on climate change is 
pointing.
No single line of evidence is enough to exclude high climate 
sensitivity. A more fertile approach, however, is to combine a 
number of different lines of evidence. At the Frontier Research 
Center for Global Change, Yokohama, Japan, James Annan and 








20th century, volcanic cooling, the last ice age, and the Maunder 
Minimum period of low solar activity (the years 1645-1715). They 
draw bounds for climate sensitivity that are tighter than those of 
the IPCC, around a central value of 2.9º C. 100
While the IPCC cites Annan and Hargreaves alongside 
other studies, we think that their approach of integrating different 
lines of evidence gives a qualitatively better answer, deserving 
more weight.
 If climate sensitivity does turn out to be far above 3º C, 
then a small amount of warming would imply a great deal. Annan 
and Hargreaves already suggest that this is unlikely – and the 
longer-term climate record supports the same conclusion. If it 
were really balanced on a knife-edge, climate should have, over 
hundreds of millennia, left evidence of a number of different 
episodes of sudden change.
The idea that humanity faces runaway warming implies 
that if the world waits, or things turn out worse than expected, 
nothing can be done. This same idea is emphasised in the idea 
that change may be irreversible.
It’s true that climate changes are likely to be irreversible. 
If, for example, warming were to melt the Earth’s ice caps, then 
just reversing that warming would not necessarily result in their 
return. Similarly, if warming makes a species extinct, cooling will 
not bring it back to life.
But irreversible processes are common in both nature and 
society. The fact that the future is inevitably different from the 
past does not mean that it’s inevitably worse. Whether and how 
people respond to warming, and what they make of a warming 
world, matters much more than irreversibility.
Even in the unlikely event that warming runs away, there 
will still be much that people can do to make a difference. 
Greens tend to dismiss the idea of adapting civilisation to large 
temperature rises. We think that adaptation is fair enough; 
indeed our own concept of transforming the planet goes further 
than that (see Chapter 7). 
























sensitivity really turns out much higher than 3º C. In that case, 
our descendants will most likely notice, and, if necessary, 
take action. Anyway, civilisation should be able to deal with 
temperature rises larger than 3º C.
This leads to our second difference with the alarmist 
perspective. Apart from being less bothered by uncertainty 
around climate sensitivity, we think that the consequences of 
temperature increases will be far less serious than generally 
portrayed. 
For Barack Obama, global warming ‘is a fact that is 
melting our glaciers and setting off dangerous weather patterns 
as we speak’. 101 But for us climate change is not the danger 
he makes out. The basis for our optimism here is not so much 
an alternative reading of science, nor even the important point 
that climate change cannot be held responsible for particular 
incidents of weather (see Chapter 3). We are optimistic about 
the dangers of climate change because we have confidence – 
at least as much confidence as Obama – in the talent human 
beings have to thrive in a very wide variety of conditions.
In 2004, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a conference 
on avoiding dangerous climate change, in preparation for making 
climate the theme of the UK’s presidency of the G8 group of 
nations. ‘More than just another scientific conference’, he said, 
the gathering would address the big questions ‘on which we need 
to pool the answers available from the science’. In particular, 
Blair imagined that science could answer the question ‘What 
level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is self-evidently 
too much?’. 102
Blair’s conference, then, was billed as an attempt to use 
science to pin down the slippery question of just what constitutes 
‘dangerous’ climate change. Yet when the conference proceedings 
were published, the editors noted that: 
‘The conference did not attempt to identify a single 
level of greenhouse gas concentrations to be avoided… 








societies and international debate… It would be expecting 
too much of the scientific community to act as the arbiter 
of society’s preferences as reflected in the valuation 
metrics actually employed and the decision processes 
actually implemented.’ 103
We agree. Danger isn’t just a scientific issue, but a political one. 
Furthermore, judgments about danger are inevitably informed 
by wider assessments of human beings’ vulnerability, resilience, 
and capacities for innovation.
 For changes in temperature that are at all likely – even 
changes of 3º C or more – the pace of innovation and development, 
not climate, will be the most important determinant of human 
well-being.
The specific consequences of climate change for humanity 
are exaggerated. First, Bjørn Lomborg is right to point out that, 
in terms of the deaths that are today caused directly by changes 
in temperature, those from cold far outnumber those from heat. 
Second, global warming’s deleterious effects on a disease like 
malaria, for instance, is not nearly so important an issue for 
humanity as the eradication of malaria itself (see Chapter 7).
There’s no need for mankind to lose sleep about its fate. 
Nevertheless, the consequences of climate change for the rest 
of the biological world, beyond human beings, are important. 
How the biosphere will respond to rising temperatures is still 
more uncertain than the physics of heating gases and fluids. 
But it’s clear that many ecosystems may be at risk at 3º C and 
above. 
Nature is less adaptable than humanity. Here there is 
reason to be cautious about temperatures rising too far and 
too fast. There are both economic and aesthetic grounds for 
conserving nature – or, more accurately, for managing it.
With the non-human kingdom, however, Greens exaggerate 
the doom ahead. Their theory of ecosystem services certainly 
overstates the economic importance of nature.
























nature. That’s their right. While we like nature as much as they 
do, however, our moral universe is centred on human beings.
 
To capture losses in transmission 
In alternating current (AC) used for high voltage, long distance 
transmission, electrons move back and forth along the ‘skin’ of 
cables, changing direction 50 times per second. At the moment, 
an average of seven per cent of electrical energy is lost in AC 
transmission and distribution. 104 As grids grow larger and stretch 
over longer distances, that figure could rise, and technologies to 
reduce it will become more significant. 
 One technology that makes particularly good sense for 
long distance transmission is direct current. With DC, electrons 
move in one direction only, but do so through the whole body of 
cables and not just their skins. That results in lower losses. 
In undersea cables, AC interacts with salty water and 
is beset by bigger losses than those that occur on land. Here, 
therefore, DC has an added advantage: it doesn’t interact with 
salt water. Particularly over long distances undersea, therefore, 
DC is superior to AC. Undersea cables to bring power from 
offshore wind to land, or undersea interconnectors linking up 
international grids, are ideal candidates for DC.
 The transmission of what is called high voltage direct 
current (HVDC) has been made possible by the development of 
semiconductor power electronics. That kind of electronics scales 
up the chips that control the flow of electrons in computers so 
































Transformer: a Siemens HVDC 
power transformer at one end  
of the world’s longest undersea 
cable, which runs over 290km 
from Australia to Tasmania. The 
cable handles 600 MW of power
About to lay down a wire: an 
ocean-going ship loads high 
voltage direct current cable made 
by ABB. Over long distances at 
sea, HVDC loses less energy than 



























No need to feel guilty
You’re not a needy, 
greedy, energy addict. 
You shouldn’t worry 
about your personal 
carbon footprint. 
The world of work, 
and especially the 
energy industry, is 
where CO2 emissions 









People see energy as a problem of individual 
consumption. It’s hard to say exactly who first coined the phrase 
‘consumer society’, but the idea of consumption as a way of life 
was certainly given an airing at the height of the Cold War. On 
24 July 1959, on a stand at the American National Exhibition in 
Moscow, US Vice President Richard Nixon teased Soviet Premier 
Nikita Krushchev with, of all things, a floor-sweeping home robot. 
Moderating Cold War military tensions with consumerism, Nixon 
proclaimed: 
‘Would it not be better to compete in the relative merits of 
washing machines than in the strength of rockets?’ 1
During the credit- and property-led economic boom of the 1980s, 
Nixon’s doctrine triumphed. Consumer society, personal lifestyle 
and the market won a popular victory over state intervention. 
Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that that there 
was ‘no such thing’ as society. Later, she clarified that the ‘real 
sinews’ of society were ‘the acts of individuals and families’. 
That reflected her ‘fundamental belief in personal responsibility 
and choice’. 2
 But Thatcher was wrong to think that consumer choice is 
what characterises modern society. 
 It’s a waste of personal energy to change your lifestyle 
in the belief that ‘the consumer,’ when added up into millions, 
has clout (see panel below). Like it or not, you cannot change 
climate by refusing to buy blueberries air-freighted from Chile. 
On standby: British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, at the UN headquarters, New York,  
16 April 2008, four days before he issued his 





















Changing your home habits makes 
little difference to CO2 
Gordon Brown once warned UN ambassadors that the leaving 
of consumer goods on standby accounted for one per cent of 
global CO2 emissions. 
3 So, would a more moral approach to 
your everyday home habits make a difference to CO2? 
 Turning lights and appliances on adds to CO2 back at 
power stations of varying carbon intensity. By contrast, the other 
three quarters of household-based emissions are released on 








Household-related CO2 emissions, UK: Megatonnes 
and percentage shares, by technology, 2002 4
Technology Mt CO2 share of total CO2, per cent
Space heating 76.1 51.6 
Lights and appliances 36.3 24.6
Hot water 30.2 20.5
Cooking 5.1 3.4
Total 147.6 100
Now, say every household in the UK never switched on its lights 
again. Next, consider two facts: 
1. Lighting accounts for perhaps 10 per cent of the CO2 
emissions associated with the category ‘lights and 
appliances’ 5
2. Household-related CO2 emissions take just 27 per cent of 
the UK total. 6
So, if homes went dark forever, that would lower the UK’s total 
CO2 emissions by a maximum of 10 per cent of 24.6 per cent of 
27 per cent, or 0.6 per cent. 
 That’s a small reward. Of course, everyone could make a 
bigger difference to CO2 by never using central heating or having 
a hot shower ever again. But again the penalty in terms of loss 
of convenience far outweighs the saving in CO2.
Consumers can do little about climate because their 
role in the economy is relatively modest
As late as November 2007, despite the fact that the sub-prime 
crisis in US housing finance was already in full swing, the Bureau 




















rose from 64.8 to about 70 per cent of GDP from •	
1970-2006, and would stay at about that level over 
2006-16 7 
would account for 2.08 per cent of the 2.8 annual •	
percentage change in real GDP over 2006-16. 8
However, consumer spending doesn’t play the weighty economic 
role that the BLS would have Americans believe. The commonly 
used ‘expenditure measure’ of GDP only computes the demand 
for final goods and services. It includes goods and services 
delivered to the consumer such as energy in the home, but to 
avoid double counting, it excludes ‘intermediate inputs’ such as 
the huge delivery of energy to businesses. 
 Making energy for business absorbs resources just as 
much as making energy for consumers does, and generates both 
jobs and consumer incomes. So once intermediate inputs like 
energy for business are taken into account, corporate spending 
vastly exceeds consumer spending. 
 Because of its long rise, not least in housing, consumer 
expenditure still dominates the Western economic imagination. 
But after 11 September 2001, George W Bush shouldn’t have 
looked to real estate salesmen, supermarkets and car dealerships 
to turn the US economy around. Even Americans don’t live in a 
consumer society – the colossal investments of business and 
government make sure of that. It’s upon these investments, 
along with those made by energy firms, that thoughtful strategy 
in energy supply should focus. 
Consumption is responsible for about a quarter of CO2 
Homes and transport emit very few GHGs – except for CO2. Looking 
at the places where that gas is actually emitted, the consumer 








UK CO2 emissions, Mt and percentage shares, by site 
9 
T 1970 1990 2006
Energy supply 260 242 221
Business 204 107 92
Industrial processes (cement, etc) 21 13 14
Public sector 24 13 10
Military aviation and shipping 4.5 5.3 2.8
Road transport 60 109 120
Residential 96 80 81
Aviation 0.7 1.2 2.3
Rail 2.7 2.2 2.2
Shipping 3.6 4.1 5.5
TOTAL 685 592 555
Percentage shares: 1970 1990 2006
Roads 9 18 22
Homes 14 14 15
Planes 0.1 0.2 0.4
Trains 0.4 0.4 0.4
Ships 0.5 0.6 1
TOTAL TRANSPORT AND HOME 24 33 39
We say a maximum of 39 per cent, because all UK transport 
and home use cannot be reduced to family life, shopping and 
consumer leisure. Given the freight, corporate fleets, number of 
people who drive or take a train to work, and number of people 
who work from home, the CO2 directly caused by consumption, 
rather than by wealth creation, probably comprises about 25 per 
cent of the UK national total. 
Founding father, English reaction: 


























A vulgar, 2D view: scarce supply,  
ever more greedy consumer demand 
It’s time to shelve the two-dimensional view of energy that sees 
only scarce resource supply confronted with ever more greedy 
consumer demand. 
 Economists and sociologists have long been obsessed 
with consumer demand. Turning now to the most popular 
thinkers on the subject, we begin with the historic inspiration for 
Green thinking – the right-wing English country parson, Thomas 
Malthus (1766-1834). 
 In his widely read 1798 Essay on the Principle of Population, 
Malthus started from what he took as two fixed laws of human 
nature: the need for food, and what was termed in his day ‘the 
passion between the sexes’. Reflecting the largely agricultural 
conditions of an England that nevertheless stood on the brink of 
rapid urbanisation, Malthus then contrasted a relative scarcity of 
food with population numbers growing ‘unchecked’. He attacked 
the ‘carelessness, and want of frugality’ of the lower classes, all 
the while upholding what he called ‘unproductive consumption’ 
among landlords and capitalists. 10 Malthus also accused ‘some 
men of the highest mental powers’ of being addicted to the 
pleasures of sensual love. 11 
 Writing in reaction to the French Revolution, Malthus 
returned to sex, ‘vice’ and ‘moral restraint’ nearly as much as to 
his main theme: the natural limits to human consumption. 
 Today, University of California geography professor Jared 
Diamond is no Malthus. But he does contrast a world ‘already 
running out of resources’ such as oil, and ‘total world consumption, 
the sum of all local consumptions, which is the product of local 
population times the local per capita consumption rate’. 12
 Unlike Malthus, ‘per capita’ is how today’s environmentalists 




















It’s a horrible fate – to be an energy fatty
In 2001 British ecologists, supported by the National Federation 
of Women’s Institutes and the Faculty of Public Health Medicine 
of the Royal College of Physicians, published a major attack on 
‘food miles’. Their conclusion:
 
‘Every time we eat, we are all essentially “eating oil”.’ 13
Five years later, Northern Ireland Electricity and the government-
backed Energy Saving Trust began to link excessive appetite for 
energy with… appetite. The two bodies encouraged Northern 
Ireland householders to stop being ‘energy obese,’ adding: 
‘Slimming down your energy use is a sure way to save pounds… 
of the money variety.’ 14 In 2007 the Centre for Alternative 
Technology, Wales, made the same breakthrough. Britain, it said, 
was energy obese: 
‘Far more is used than is actually required to deliver 
wellbeing. Years of cheap, abundant petrochemicals have 
led to highly wasteful practices and attitudes.’ 15
Philosophies built around energy and the body were bogus when 
first developed in the 19th century. 16 But today, when British 
Greens hatefully connect energy use with eating, they show 
an unprecedented disgust for their fellow human beings. The 
philistine Brits, they say, don’t eat locally enough: instead, they 
nosh oil, and consume too many calories in everything they do. 
To make things worse, they have the wrong attitude. 
 Not to be outdone, UK health secretary Alan Johnson 
takes a similar line. He casts obesity as a potential crisis on the 
scale of climate change, and insists that Britain’s new towns 
should be designed so that people are forced to exercise. 17
 For Whitehall, as for thin, ascetic British Greens, fat 
motorists are the lowest form of life. For us, by contrast, all three 








Veblen and conspicuous consumption
Malthus wasn’t as misanthropic as today’s Greens. In old age, 
he thought that humanity had risen to ‘eminence’ and might 
yet ‘rise higher by the same means’. 18 Later, the Norwegian-
American sociologist Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) was more 
cautious. 
 In The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), Veblen 
famously satirised the wealthy of America’s Gilded Age for their 
conspicuous consumption. For example, when the rich favoured 
certain foods, or intoxicating ‘beverages and narcotics’, they 
were, for Veblen, engaging in the ‘ceremonial differentiation of 
the dietary’ – in other words, showing off their good taste and 
connoisseurship. 19 
 Today Tim Jackson, a top British Green, invokes Veblen, but 
is more pessimistic. For Jackson, the environmentally damaging 
pathology of consumer society is imbued in humans, because 
evolution has encoded, within human genes, the desire to use 
consumer goods to ‘advertise ourselves to our competitors, to 
the opposite sex, to any number of our fellow human beings’. 
Implicitly suggesting that the rapid consumption of energy can 
also be a form of social and sexual selection, Jackson asks: 
‘What is it with young men and fast cars?’. 20 
 Too many environmentalists make glib, sub-Malthus 
critiques of personal transport and mating patterns. One leading 
British environmentalist thinks there’s a better way to cut CO2 
emissions than reducing food miles: reducing the flights made 
by men to stag parties held in Tallinn. 21
 For many environmentalists, energy use isn’t so much 
economic or political as biological. And if consumption, energy 
use and personal transport are indeed founded on deep-
seated competitive and sexual drives, you will need even more 
awareness of your personal culpability for climate change – and 



















Consumer excess as a deep, animal urge 
To say that excessive personal consumption of energy is a deep, 
animal urge demeans people. It suggests that man’s use of 
energy has deflowered Mother Earth of its energy resources. And 
it implicates women as sinners, too. Asked by a young woman 
what she could do about CO2 emissions, Sir David King, for seven 
years the UK government’s chief scientific adviser, admonished 
her to ‘stop admiring young men in Ferraris’. He later explained:
‘What I was saying is that you have got to admire people 
who are conserving energy and not those wilfully using it… 
young women think it is sexy to see men driving Ferraris. 
That is the area where a culture change is needed.’ 22
In their quarrel with excessive personal use of energy, 
environmentalists are fond of psychobabble – and much fonder 
of it than their intellectual predecessors. 
 In Chapter 1 we told how Alfred Marshall set a value on 
psychological ‘externalities’ such as the goodwill surrounding a 
business. Veblen also played up psychology. He emphasised the 
motive of what he called ‘pecuniary emulation’, or the drive to 
amass riches so as to gain respect from others, and thus more 
self-esteem.
 Veblen was polite about Marshall, but attacked him for 
his static view of how a modern economy works. For Veblen, 
Marshall’s theories of the normal case, equilibrium, and limits 
which were held to apply for all time, failed to account for 
‘developmental sequence’ in economics. 23  
 Unlike Marshall and today’s Greens, then, Veblen didn’t 
just indulge in psychological speculations. He also tried to 
integrate technological advance into his political economy. 24 









Hobson’s focus on consumers at home and oil abroad
Both consumption at home and oil abroad obsess radical folk. 
When environmentalists do choose to broaden their critique 
of energy use beyond the individual consumer, they move, in 
impressionistic style, to scarcity of world energy resources. They 
think they’re doing something really new here, but there are two 
strong precedents for their thinking – one at the turn of the last 
century, and one at the apogee of the Cold War.
 In 1889 two left-leaning English economists, John Hobson 
and Alfred Mummery, mounted their own critique of inequality. 
Writing in an age when mass poverty was still very real, they 
contended that insufficient consumption was economically 
harmful. 25 
 Then in 1902, shocked by his experiences in the Boer 
War, Hobson ventured a very important thesis. The disparity 
between high production and weak public consumption at home 
was the ‘taproot’ of imperialism and of ‘militarism, war, and risky, 
unscrupulous diplomacy’. Britain’s economy depended on the 
tropics for food and raw materials, while limited consumer markets 
at home made America’s industrial and financial ‘princes’ in oil, 
among other commodities, go ‘seeking investments outside their 
country’. Indeed the latter trend, Hobson stressed, was what 
was responsible for Theodore Roosevelt and ‘the adoption of 
Imperialism as a political policy and practice by the Republican 
party’. 26
 Later in this chapter we’ll see how the simplistic axis of 
home consumer spending and iffy foreign oil reappeared in 
American thinking during the 1960s. Here we merely note that 
while Hobson at least wanted the masses to be able to consume 



















Keynes shows a special  
haughtiness about consumption
During the Depression, the Liberal English economist John 
Maynard Keynes traced his famous General Theory back to 
Malthus on consumption, and held that Hobson’s Physiology of 
Industry had marked ‘in a sense, an epoch in economic thought’. 
For Keynes, more consumer demand would bring Britain much-
needed economic benefits. 27
 So did Keynes, whose largesse extended  to the Bloomsbury 
Group and the New Statesman, take an equally generous line on 
consumption? No. Indeed, without referring to Veblen, Keynes 
had earlier stolen his theme of pecuniary emulation and given it 
a distinctly misanthropic twist.
 In his Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren (1930), 
Keynes suggested that some consumer needs were ‘non-
economic’. For him, needs fell into two classes: 
1. Absolute – felt regardless of the situation of others
2.  Relative, in that satisfying them makes people feel superior 
to others. 
Keynes concluded:
‘Needs of the second class, those which satisfy the desire 
for superiority, may indeed be insatiable; for the higher 
the general level, the higher still are they.’ 28
For all his concern to raise consumer spending, Keynes anticipated 
today’s Green critique of energy use. Condescendingly, he 
dismissed some needs as competitive and therefore insatiable – 
even if he wasn’t Green enough to describe them as selfish and 
illegitimate.
 Always satisfying the ‘desire for superiority’ in his personal 
life, Keynes forgot that the simple effort to better oneself in 








dangers – but insofar as it drives people to aspire to more, it has 
its benefits as well. 
 Keynes also forgot that insatiable desire, like insatiable 
curiosity, isn’t wrong either. The desire to achieve, aided by 
copious amounts of energy, is entirely human – and entirely 
commendable.
Maslow: mankind as needy, but also  
in search of knowledge, truth and wisdom
The Keynesian focus on popular consumption was buttressed 
during the privations of the Second World War. In 1943 the 
American psychologist Abraham Maslow codified the distinction 
between the basic human need for food and safety, and the 
higher, relationship-based needs for love, esteem and self-
actualisation. 29 Today, no human resources or marketing 
slideshow comes without a pyramid diagram of Maslow’s famous 
hierarchy of human needs. 
 Wrongly, Maslow thought man was a ‘perpetually wanting 
animal.’ Yet he was right in his conclusion that any theory of 
human motivation should be ‘human-centred rather than 
animal-centred’. Maslow postulated a human ‘desire to know, to 
understand, to systematise, to organise, to analyse, to look for 
relations and meanings’. 30 
 For him, people weren’t just consumers with cravings, 
but also active protagonists shaping the world. He’d see a 21st 
century not just of energy users with needs, but also of energy 
scientists and technologists with talents. How sad that over 
the decades, millions of marketing buffs have invoked Maslow 
Inspiration to Obama: John Maynard Keynes.  
‘To dig holes in the ground’, Keynes said figuratively, 
‘will increase, not only employment, but the real 
national dividend of useful goods and services’ 
(The General Theory, Chapter 16). Maybe; but 
Obama’s programme to help the US private sector 
create five million new green jobs could amount  


























without reading him, thus preparing a culture in which people 
are apprehended primarily as needy consumers! 
 Maslow didn’t mention energy when he discussed basic 
needs. But for Canadian energy economist Peter Tertzakian, he 
should have included energy alongside food, water and shelter 
as a ‘primary need’. 31
 In fact, Maslow’s basic needs are ones that are immediately 
felt – needs that our earliest ancestors would recognise. Energy 
isn’t like that: the modern idea of it only emerged in the 19th 
century. When individuals use energy today, they generally want 
convenience more than they want to show off. Their needs 
are both basic and ‘higher’, quite legitimately insatiable, and 
definitely not worth worrying about all the time. 
Galbraith and the doctrine of consumer dependence
Today, environmentalists see people as unconscious, needy 
consumers who are also unhealthily dependent on energy. This 
condescension is nothing new: in fact, it dates back to the height 
of the Cold War. 
In The Affluent Society (1958), another patrician 
economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, convinced millions of 
Americans that many consumer needs had come to be contrived, 
and were therefore not really urgent. First, following Veblen and 
Keynes, one man’s consumption had become ‘his neighbour’s 
wish’ – pecuniary emulation again. Second, in their quest for 
more and more production, corporations created wants, through 
‘advertising and salesmanship’. In what Galbraith damned as 
the Dependence Effect, many wants depended on the very 
production that satisfied them. So if those wants were bizarre, 
frivolous or immoral, no case at all could be made for them. 32 
Galbraith’s analysis was very partial. Although ‘keeping up 
with the Joneses’ did go on in his day, the desire for convenience 
also informed Americans’ purchases. 
Galbraith was right in asserting that capitalism creates 
new and surprising wants. Indeed, it’s partly through that 




















In the past, even Karl Marx had celebrated the creation of new 
wants as a dynamic aspect of capitalism when compared with 
feudalism. 33 But now Galbraith, a Democrat critic of the post-
war boom and of growth itself, said that new wants indicated 
consumer excess and dependency. 
As the London-based economics writer Daniel Ben-
Ami notes, it took time for Galbraith’s arguments to enter the 
mainstream. 34 Yet it wasn’t long before another US bestseller 
made energy use a special target for vitriol.
Packard: industry makes consumers  
wasteful – and America dependent
In 1960, the muckraking American journalist Vance Packard 
was already famous for his assault on US advertising and 
its manipulation of consumers. 35 But in The Wastemakers, 
published that same year, Packard tipped his hat to Veblen 
and Galbraith and redoubled his attack, indicting industry for 
promoting wasteful consumer behaviour in order to sell its ‘ever-
mounting stockpiles’ of products. 36 
 In a key chapter titled ‘The Vanishing Resources’, Packard 
also developed themes first set out by Hobson:
the US economy had become ‘more vulnerable to a cut-•	
off’ because of its growing dependency on foreign raw 
materials
in domestic oil, production would be ‘peaking out’ sooner •	
or later
America’s growing need for foreign oil would put it ‘deep •	
into the hands of Arabian and Latin American politicians.’ 37 
 
From Hobson around 1900, through to Packard in the Cold War, 
industry’s reliance on consumer spending, America’s lack of 
energy security and its resort to imported oil gradually emerged 
as the mud to throw at rich corporations, rich oil sheikhs and 
general inequality. Yet this radicalism, whose contemporary ideas 








a platform upon which to build a thoughtful energy politics. 
 So long as political economy remains populist and focuses, 
mistakenly, on consumption, what begins as a right-on attack 
on Big Oil ends in conservationist and conservative disdain for 
the lifestyles of human beings. While ordinary men and women 
have better things to do than spend each day fretting about their 
pollution of the planet, environmentalists now denigrate them 
as guilty of the ultimate kind of ignorance, thoughtlessness and 
dependence: of being consumers who are addicted to oil.
A stupid but unquestioned metaphor:  
addiction to energy
After 9/11, The Economist denounced what it called the world’s 
‘dangerous addiction’ to oil. Later, the Californian environmentalist 
Richard Heinberg wrote that America, ‘an energy-addicted 
society’, would find it ‘hard to wean itself from the habit.’ In 
2007 Thomas Friedman, a Pulitzer prizewinning writer, made two 
further and equally astonishing discoveries: the Soviet Union had 
died, in part, because of its oil ‘habit’; and in the future Iran 
could succumb to ‘the same disease’. 38 
 The metaphor of addiction dominates today’s critique of 
energy use. It
 
steers debate away from energy supply•	
makes people feel guilty about what they do with energy•	
helps Greens order you to cut back on energy. •	
Yet nobody has a compulsion to inject oil. Regularly visiting your 
grandmother by car cannot be compared with heroin use. Indeed, 
given these facts, the popularity of the addiction metaphor 
deserves some historical unravelling.
 The early 1970s was when the idea of addiction to energy 
first gained public credence, being popularised by the former 
priest Ivan Illich (1926-2002). Today, Illich is a largely forgotten 
figure; yet in 2006 George W Bush, in his State of the Union 




















Gordon Brown took up the same refrain. Finally, in August 2008, 
Barack Obama denounced America’s addiction to foreign oil as 
a threat responsible for high petrol prices, redundancies, Middle 
Eastern terror, and ‘the rising oceans and record drought and 
spreading famine that could engulf our planet’. Indeed, Obama 
felt that addiction to oil went to ‘the heart of what we are as a 
nation, and who we will be’. 39
 We turn now to look at how, over 30 years, the concept of 
energy addiction moved from the pen of an early Green crank to 
the mouths of world leaders.
Environmentalism’s climacteric: the early 1970s
Toward the end of the Vietnam War, Western states encountered 
recession and a loss of popular legitimacy. Rising private 
consumption appeared to undermine the Protestant work ethic, 
causing the state to try and modernise itself by finding new 
codes of conduct for people. In the process, the state did not 
dissent from the growing view that a dangerous moral depletion 
of society brought about by unbridled consumerism had also 
resulted in a dangerous depletion of natural resources. 40 
 As the post-war boom drew to a close, Western 
governments tried to shore up their authority by outsourcing 
some parts of public policy to a wider group of ‘experts’ – 
especially experts in the environment. In 1970 Edward Heath’s 
Conservative government attached a new and powerful Central 
Policy Review Staff to the Cabinet, with the job of independently 
assessing policy. In America it was a similar story. President Nixon 
established the US Environmental Protection Agency (1970), and 
saw the Endangered Species Act (1973) pass into legislation. 
Meanwhile in 1972, the UN set up the UN Environment Program 
(UNEP). 
 As the Green consultants SustainAbility usefully note, 
the first ‘wave’ of environmentalism peaked between 1969 and 
1973. 41 Yet this wave was less a mass movement, and more 
a sub-elite’s concern about limits. Modern environmentalism 








the face of considerable unrest, had every interest in sponsoring. 
And once the diffusion of governmental authority toward experts 
began, environmentalists who held personal energy use to be 
dependency – an addiction contrary to limits imposed by nature – 
found they could gain a hearing. This was particularly true during 
and after 1973-4, when Arab oil producers ran an embargo on 
oil exports to the West. 
 Responding to the 1973-4 energy crisis, Heath’s Cabinet 
considered that petrol rationing would provide few benefits. 
Nonetheless, it would ‘have a marked effect on public opinion, 
and would underline the gravity of the crisis.’ 42 In the event, 
Heath opted for ‘Save it!’: a propaganda drive pressing millions 
to recognise that personal energy conservation was a public 
duty. In the US, too, the Advertising Council ran a nationwide 
campaign on energy in 1975, with the pun-tastic tagline ‘Don’t 
be Fuelish’.
 In the 1960s, two historians point out, the New Left 
in American had attacked consumption as ‘seduction, a form 
of captivity’. 43 Then, in 1972, the Club of Rome’s computer 
model of what it called the future ‘predicament’ of mankind, 
The Limits to Growth, was published. So was Victor Papanek’s 
art school bestseller, Design for the Real World. In 1973 Ernst 
Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful also gave Green politics a mass 
readership. 44 Yet the legitimacy crisis of the state, government 
attempts to counteract this, and the upset over oil together did 
more than Reds or Greens to institutionalise the idea of cutting 
back on home heating and road transport.
 Since the stagflation of the early 1970s, the passing of 
the Cold War visions of Left and Right has opened up still more 
space for the state to characterise personal energy use as the 
eighth deadly sin: addiction. In putting the accent on personal 
use, the state merely deepens the tendency to outsource 
responsibility beyond itself. 
 With indecision the hallmark of many Western governments, 
playing up personal energy use absolves the modern state from 



















Green misanthropes (2): Ivan Illich casts driving  
as an addiction, and praises the ‘psychic powers’  
of human feet
In his anti-car tirade Energy and Equity (1974), Ivan Illich 
argued that human beings were energy addicts. ‘Beyond a 
certain threshold,’ he asserted, ‘mechanical power corrupts.’ 
He continued: 
‘Even if nonpolluting power were feasible and abundant, 
the use of energy on a massive scale acts on society 
like a drug that is physically harmless but psychically 
enslaving. A community can choose between Methadone 
and “cold turkey” – between maintaining its addiction to 
alien energy and kicking it in painful cramps – but no 
society can have a population that is hooked…’ 45
The ‘habitual passenger,’ Illich added, was addicted to being 
carried along, and had ‘lost control over the physical, social, 
and psychic powers that reside in man’s feet’. A worldwide class 
structure of ‘speed capitalists’ had emerged, ensuring that more 
energy meant less equity. Indeed, once public transport offered 
speeds beyond 15mph, even non-automotive power added to 
inequality. By contrast, people on their feet were ‘more or less 
equal’. 46 
 For Illich it wasn’t history, economics or politics that 
brought about a gap between rich and poor. Rather, technology, 
mechanical power and excessive energy created a distasteful 
technocracy and a reckless jet set. But just so the poor knew 
their place, the post-industrial, low energy, high equity society 
favoured by Illich would also be labour-intensive. 47
 For all his disgust with inequality, Illich had total contempt 
for his fellow man. Turning Veblen’s pecuniary emulation to 
perverse ends, he announced: ‘In a consumer society there are 
inevitably two kinds of slaves: the prisoners of addiction and the 
prisoners of envy.’ Illich’s whole purpose was not liberation, but 
rather ‘a political process that associates the community in the 








Illegitimate arguments, subterranean influence: 
Ivan Illich. Born in Vienna, Illich became a Catholic 
priest in New York in the 1950s, as well as a virulent 
critic of consumption. The opening lines of his essay 
Energy and Equity, published just before the 1973/4 
oil crisis, turned cutting back on energy into a moral 
virtue. ‘High quanta of energy,’ Illich wrote, ‘degrade 





















Said with a sneer: technology as a ‘fix’
When Greens use the metaphor of addiction, they add the sneer 
that this or that energy innovation is just a ‘technical fix’. In 
Chapter 1 we argued that Greens want people to change more 
than the energy supply. In this chapter we argue that the addiction 
metaphor lets Greens present technological innovations as being 
as stupid and dangerous as a heroin user’s needle. 
 In a report on geo-engineering, or solutions to climate 
change that are conducted on a planetary scale, the London 
Observer calls them ‘the ultimate technological fixes’. 
It continues:
‘Opponents to such schemes point out that it is technology 
that got mankind in its current fix. An even bigger dose 
of technology is therefore the last thing the planet 
needs.’ 49
So technology comes in doses, and further doses will just make 
things worse.
 As the journal Nature points out, critics of geo-engineering 
say that it is:
‘… a way to feed society’s addiction to fossil fuels. “It’s like 
a junkie figuring out new ways of stealing from his children”, 
says Meinrat Andreae, an atmospheric scientist at the 
Max Planck Institute for Chemistry in Mainz, Germany.’ 50
For many Greens, the resort to ambitious technologies reveals 
the compulsive thoughtlessness of an addict. Human beings 
must kick two habits: that of using too much energy – especially 
oil – and that of looking to technology, rather than their own 
behaviour, as a way out of the mess they’ve made. They must 









 The metaphor of energy addiction has a strongly therapeutic 
character. Indeed, wanting technology to mend the world’s energy 
supply and its climate is widely held as a mark of mental illness. 
 In her fascinating collection The Technological Fix (2004), 
Lisa Rosner, of the Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, 
suggests that the US nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg, director of 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, was first to advocate 
‘cheap technological fixes’ as solutions to social problems in his 
1967 book Reflections on Big Science. But by 1970, Rosner 
notes, the tide was turning. 51 Britain’s Michael Gibbons, later an 
international doyen of science policy, acclaimed a book by René 
Dubos, presciently observing:
‘… alas, there is much work to be done before the 
ecological thinking of Dubos permeates the intellectual 
structures of Western society and becomes an effective 
alternative to the one dimensional “technological fixes” 
that society has so far provided to solve its problems.’ 52
Today that work has indeed been done. As an essay in 
Technological Fix on artificial hearts says, ‘in a society less 
enthralled today with technological fixes than a generation 
ago’, healing, not ‘a mechanical response to a biological 
set of problems,’ is felt to be the right way to deal with 
difficulties. 53 Indeed the healing, ‘change your mindset’ approach 
is what governments and Greens recommend for energy.
 ‘Technological fixes,’ the distinguished American historian 
of science Thomas Hughes sums up, ‘leave us in a fix.’ 54 
What’s missed here is the therapeutic way in which ‘fix’ is used 
to hint that advocates of technology are themselves addictive 
personalities – part of the problem, not part of the solution. 
 ‘Technological fix’ is a charge made against intra-uterine 
devices, against the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and – significantly 
– against nuclear power. 55 But in energy as elsewhere, objections 
are not so much to this or that innovation, as to the whole idea 




















Mankind isn’t addicted to hydrocarbons. The need for more 
energy is about human progress, not beastly longings. Nowadays, 
however, all kinds of activities are portrayed as addictive. 
 In the early 1980s, health insurance schemes started 
to cover US employees for addiction, while the media, therapy 
lobbyists and bestsellers in self-help began to treat gambling, 
shopping and sex as addictions. 56 By 1989, too, information 
technology (IT) was being classed as addictive: social inadequates, 
it was said, used IT too much. In 2001 it was claimed that the 
computer game EverQuest was addictive. Nowadays,
the use of Facebook at work is compared with crack •	
cocaine
IT-based forms of gambling, shopping and sex are thought •	
to be especially habit-forming
Greens indict Britain’s rulers as ‘addicted to road building.’ •	 57 
Today, cheap phrases stolen from psychology have become the 
main way in which politics, society, and especially consumption 
are understood. Tabloid newspapers and celebrity magazines are 
replete with addictive personalities, revealing their tendencies 
toward denial that they have a problem. That’s one reason 
why anyone who cavils at environmentalism’s authoritarian 
programme of social reform around personal energy use is 
denounced as a climate change ‘denier.’
 In fact, people are no more habituated to energy than 
they are to oxygen. Dictionaries merely define addiction as 
the persistent, compulsive use of a substance known to be 
harmful; but in popular parlance ‘addiction’ to energy suggests 
a physiological tie that’s not just personally harmful, but also 
socially reprehensible. The tag is insulting. 
 Green critics of energy use love talking ‘addiction’: that 
way, they can tap into today’s mainstream psychobabble. 
But they’re also keen on adding things up. Nowhere are 




























Happiness and the legacy of Jeremy Bentham
For all their dislike of consumer society, many environmentalists 
still take it as their starting premise on energy. They’ve plenty 
to say about energy corporations, government policy, and 
companies keeping their lights and PCs on after hours. But they 
go even further than this, and focus above all on consumption.  
 Greens are quite right about two things: 
1. By itself, consumption brings little meaning to life
2. Alfred Marshall‘s neo-classical economics – which portrays 
consumers as always making rational decisions – doesn’t 
stand up. 
Nevertheless, because their analysis begins from consumption, 
environmentalists share the myopia of the free-market economists 
they despise. In particular, their view that more energy doesn’t 
guarantee more happiness misses the point.
 Despite recent economic growth, experts observe that 
‘life satisfaction has been kind of flat’. 58 In the UK, Strathclyde 
University professor Michael Common and Sussex University 
senior research fellow Sigrid Stagl pursue this idea in the realm 
of energy. They form their alternative to GDP by dividing
Number of Happy Life Years – the product of average •	
Happiness and Life Expectancy 
by
 E, or energy consumption per head. •	
 
Trying to measure happiness as accurately as they do tonnes of 
oil equivalent consumed, the authors conclude from international 
data that developing countries generally beat developed ones in 
getting a lot of happy life years out of modest energy use. 59 
Number-cruncher: Jeremy Bentham.  
His Introduction to the Principles of  
Morals and Legislation (1791) tried to  








  In fact, as many critics of the Greens have said, to argue 
that economic growth and growing energy use in the West have 
failed to bring greater happiness is to take the correlation of two 
trends as causation. 
 That’s a mistake. The purchase of more fuel does not lead 
to mental depression.
 For Hamburg University researcher Dr Katrin Rehfanz and 
Southern Denmark University professor David Maddison, it’s not 
energy but climate that explains ‘differences in self-reported 
subjective well-being’. Drawing again on international data, the 
two authors daringly suggest that: 
people would prefer higher mean temperatures in their •	
year’s coldest month, and lower temperatures in its 
hottest
global warming might improve winters in the North, but •	
might make the those living in the tropics less happy. 60
In corporations and government, bean counting and the target 
mentality have long been a way of life. 61 Green accountancy 
exercises, though, add up happiness, reducing temperament 
to temperature. Here there’s no trace of the world’s need for 
lots more energy, energy innovations, and convenience. Instead, 
energy use is ridiculed as bringing about unhappiness.
 In adding up happiness, environmentalists revive the 
English utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). 
 Like Malthus starting from the need for food and sex, 
Bentham began with nature, which he believed had ‘placed 
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters’: pain 
and pleasure. To ‘take an exact account’ of the moral worth of 
any act, Bentham proposed summing up ‘the values of all the 
pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the 
other’. He also wanted to sum up ‘the number of persons whose 
interests appear to be concerned’. 62
 Although Greens do like media stunts as a means of 




















action on climate change in Benthamite terms. For them, such 
action isn’t about rallying behind a programme for more and 
better energy supply, but rather about adding up the sum total of 
ritualistic, moral and happiness-inducing energy conservations 
made by individual consumers.
A metaphor even sillier than  
energy addiction: your carbon footprint 
The key way in which Greens push their diminished conception 
of democracy is to use a metaphor even sillier than energy 
addiction: that of your personal carbon footprint.
 Right away, this second metaphor portrays human beings 
not as active and sociable, but as clumsy consumers engaged in 
contaminating an otherwise pristine planet. Yet it’s the metaphor 
that’s clumsy, not human beings. CO2 emissions, after all, go 
upwards to the atmosphere, and don’t relate to walking on soil.
 So why footprint? In fact the metaphor of the carbon 
footprint gains its weird, upside-down incongruity from an earlier, 
land-orientated metaphor: that of the ecological footprint.   
 Between 1990 and 1994, University of British Columbia 
professor William Rees, a doctor in population ecology, supervised 
a PhD thesis by a Swiss, Mathis Wackernagel. Through a jointly 
published book in 1996 and later through Wackernagel’s Global 
Footprint Network (GFN), they updated the idea of the carrying 
capacity of land, or its capacity to carry more or fewer people. 
 That Malthusian idea was first used by the colonial 
authorities in Northern Rhodesia to speculate about and warn 
against future population growth among black Africans – a 
particular concern among white settlers. 63 Now, with ecological 
footprints, GFN experts popularised carrying capacity by turning 
it into what they called a ‘research and accounting question’ 
about the past. For any city, the GFN says, an ecological footprint 
is how much land and water area it requires ‘to produce the 
resources it consumes and to absorb its wastes’. 64
 Not content with computing ecological footprints in the 

































in 2007, the world went into ecological overshoot on 6 October, 
when its demands on cropland, pasture, forests and fisheries 
exceeded the ability of these ecosystems to generate resources 
and deal with humanity’s detritus by the end of that year. Over 
time, the GFN adds, ecological overshoots accumulate  to create 
a global ecological debt, which in turn is bequeathed to future 
generations. 65
 Ecological footprints, overshoots, debts: what is forgotten 
in these pseudoscientific catchphrases is that to the extent 
that there’s enough technological progress around to raise the 
efficiency of energy supply and lower its cost, so the consumption 
of energy is likely to rise. Indeed, that’s one reason why the 
demand for energy is insatiable, and also why such demand 
can so easily be derided as an addiction. Yet people need more 
energy simply to do what they want to do – and the amount of 
energy available to the world faces, in principle, no limits.
 The ecological footprint is a ghastly entry in the Green 
accountant’s ledger book of past crimes. And that’s true of the 
carbon footprint, too. 
 A recent and sympathetic review of the concept 
concedes that it covers everything from direct on-site emissions 
of CO2, to all the GHGs emitted not just on-site, but also in 
upstream production processes. The units for measuring carbon 
footprints are unclear and, despite the metaphor’s ubiquitous 
deployment: 
‘There is an apparent lack of academic definitions of what 
exactly a “carbon footprint” is meant to be. The scientific 
literature is surprisingly void of clarifications...’ 66
The carbon footprint, then, is a metaphor without merit. 








Carbon footprints as a Green ‘Bootprint’ on the brain
Adding up a footprint can only be a vague exercise, because the 
metaphor has a primarily moral intent. That’s why you constantly 
have to undergo the following interrogations: 
Has •	 all of your CO2 been included in the scales of justice? 
If you’ve bought local food, you’ve saved food miles – but •	
what kind of cooking are you doing with it? 
How much CO•	 2 does your Toyota Prius really emit in use, 
and how much in manufacture and disposal?
You could spend a lifetime accounting for the CO2 in your every 
breath, but in practice you couldn’t add it up. More importantly, 
the carbon footprint idea strips each individual and social activity 
of its merits and dissolves all goals into one: add up your carbon 
impact and reduce it. 
 In this scheme the value of regularly visiting your ailing 
grandmother by car is of course not comparable with the value 
of flying an artificial heart to save someone’s life. Such things 
can never be quantified. All that is given a bogus quantification 
is Bentham’s ‘pains’ and Marshall’s externalities. 
 From the Manifesto Club, a campaigning network of 
humanists, Josie Appleton notes that, in ethical terms, people 
are now judged by the trail they leave behind. The question is not 
what their activity adds to the world in human terms, only the 
resources it takes away. 67 
 Hating the consumer, but still taking consumption as 
its Alpha and Omega, environmentalism is forced to ignore all 
the great things people can do, the productive lives they can 
lead, and the impact they can have as citizens banding together 
around a new politics of energy supply. 
 Even more lamentable is just how many people buy into 
the idea of carbon footprints. Altogether, the footprint idea acts 
as a Green ‘Bootprint’ on the brain. Under its influence, dozens 




















footprints have emerged. 
 Designed to make one feel good, these rituals turn out to 
be exhausting exercises in not being good enough.  
 With carbon footprints, as with religion, we must know 
right from wrong, publicly admit to sin, do our bit, obey priests, 
and conform to sacred texts. But for all its similarities with 
religion, environmentalism does differ from it. While followers of 
religion at least want humanity to transcend the here and now, 
Greens want people merely to react against it.
 But human use of energy isn’t the hateful tread of a 
dinosaur, leaving its grubby but unwitting mark everywhere it 
goes. Individuals don’t plague the Earth with soot. People are 
right to ‘colonise’ the planet’s energy resources, because in 
doing so they’re just trying to go about their business. 
 But many people, if by no means all, are also at risk of 
having their minds colonised. 
 In 1936, in the concluding paragraph of his General 
Theory, Keynes famously proclaimed: 
‘Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt 
from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of 
some defunct economist.’ 68
Wrong about economics, Keynes was right to underline the 
long-term influence of ideas on society. Indeed, powerful ideas 
issued from beyond the domain of some defunct economists 
can have an enormous contemporary effect, given the right 
social conditions. 
 The 21st century isn’t, as Illich said in 1972, enslaved by 
consumption as addiction and as envy. 
 But for as long as millions of people see themselves as 
consumers with a carbon footprint, they will indeed be slaves of 









Summing up this chapter
When pressed, many might agree that consumer actions have 
little effect on climate. They might also agree that talk of energy 
addiction, technical fixes and carbon footprints has gone too 
far. After all, alarmist popular literature on contamination, such 
as High-Tech Holocaust and The Coming Plague, long predates 
today’s Lady Macbeth-like desire to expunge our CO2. 
69
 Yet many, too, would argue that contamination exists – 
and that, more importantly, you’ve got to start somewhere: with 
your home, your car, whatever. Some might add that, although 
consumer conservations of energy are mostly a ritual, you should 
still show  you care about the planet. Finally, in the intervals 
between national elections and, thus, changes in government 
policy on energy supply, the daily chance to make even a tiny 
difference to the world appears valuable to many.
 In fact, however, to continue with Edward Heath’s Save 
It! and Jimmy Carter’s sweater campaigns into the 21st century 
is to: 
accept personal culpability for climate change•	
absolve the political classes of the responsibility of •	
organising a bigger and better energy supply – before, 
during and after elections
beckon the state to take an even greater interest in our •	
private lives than it does already.
To conserve energy and perhaps save money in your personal 
life is all very well. But it isn’t really an ‘and’ on top of improved 
energy supply. In national and international politics, it works out 
as an ‘or’ – a deluded alternative to a rational policy.
 What, in energy, people need to add to is not the sum 
total of consumer conservations, but the sum total of human 
knowledge and power.
 Altogether, the Green critique of energy consumption is an 




















is that repulsive species really still in a macho 1950s time warp, 
where each lords it over his neighbours because of how many 
cylinder heads he has underneath his bonnet? Do American 
men really need rehab from their addiction to cars? Americans, 
it’s well known, take short holidays and suffer from stagnant 
incomes; so are they really just leisurely junkies, always driving 
to places they’ve no business driving to?
 In energy as elsewhere, Americans get a bad rap. But British 
Greens subject Britons, too, to outrageous charges. In 2004 
the government-funded Sustainable Development Commission 
(SDC) warned then Prime Minister Tony Blair that ‘unsustainable’ 
economic growth – the kind that led to ‘substantial’ increases 
in GHGs – was as undesirable as crime, drug trafficking, sexual 
exploitation, and pornography. 70 
 It’s a poor social solidarity that Greens offer: because 
everyone shares a need to consume, everyone can come 
together… in feeling guilty about their crimes against the 
planet.
 What the SDC forgot to mention in its repudiation 
of ‘unsustainable’ economic growth was rather important. 
Who decides what is sustainable and what is not? 
 In this chapter, we have seen that, for environmentalists:
democracy has become the adding up of millions of •	
feelgood personal energy conservations
politics has become the adding up of your personal carbon •	
footprint.
There is, however, one other abacus that Greens like to brandish. 
They claim that:
science – especially climate science – is the •	
adding up of worthy scientists’ opinions into a 
consensus that can and should brook no denial. 



























No need to panic
Science now 
dictates that the 
state gets tough 
about our profligate 










Politicians and celebrities 
want consumers to conserve energy now. This demands no 
investment, and boosts self-satisfaction amongst carbonistas. 
Unlike the building of a new energy supply, this is also a measure 
that has immediate effect. 
 But just how urgent is the situation? How, to what extent, 
and how fast is mankind changing the climate? 
 Many factors drive climate in complex interaction, which 
is what makes climate science so complicated. However, simple 
concepts explain the key driving forces; and  – whatever climate 
sceptics say – the biggest driving force for change in the climate 
turns out to be mankind. 
 The good news? Whatever Greens tell us, we believe that 
the human origins of climate change form a basis for optimism, 
not breast-beating.
Yes, mankind unwittingly made a mistake. It wasn’t the 
first time and it won’t be the last. But immediate atonement 
through lifestyle change is the wrong solution. 
Without increasing energy, society will face real 
problems. But with new energy supply, there’s also a chance to 
tackle climate change at source. 
Overturning the personal habits that have evolved with 
modernity is different. Conserving energy and lowering one’s 
personal carbon footprint aren’t just ineffective: they’re also by 
no means dictated by the real pace of climate change. 
The future of the planet is not at stake in the next few 
years. There’s time to make big changes in energy supply – and 
there’s no need to panic.
 This chapter first distinguishes climate from weather. It 
then surveys global warming, global cooling and – a key concept 
– radiative forcing. 
 That the origins of climate change are man-made, we 
suggest, doesn’t make Greens right to moralise about man’s 
past ‘misdeeds’. In fact, humanity’s continuing domination of the 
natural world means that it should be able to solve climate with 

















 Much is certain about climate, but it’s the unknown that 
rules many minds. The Precautionary Principle suggests that 
Anything Could Happen At Any Moment. 
 In fact, climate is unlikely to make quantum leaps in 
ferocity. Feelings that it might just do that, we show later, owe 
much to the Second World War and the Cold War.
  While environmentalists play up mankind’s intrinsic 
uncertainty about nature, they always stress the absolute, 
finished quality of scientific consensus on the certainty of climate 
danger. When it isn’t being dumbed down, then, climate science 
is falsely elevated into the New Scientism: a technocratic and 
unanswerable demand for people to change their behaviour in a 
conservative direction.
 The conditions surrounding the discovery of global 
warming in 1956-7 memorably contrast with those of today. The 
discovery was a tribute both to R&D, and to the role of chance 
in R&D. In the mid 1960s, however, the view grew that climate 
could be fundamentally indecipherable. By the time the IPCC 
was born in 1988, the zeitgeist in the West was not about R&D, 
but a growing politics of anxiety.
 Those politics predate the end of the Cold War and 11 
September 2001. Today, they demand harsh consumer penance. 
More broadly, the policy of insuring future generations is used 
to play down innovation in energy supply, and instead uphold 
more national and international state regulation.
Climate is what you expect; weather, what you get
According to the UK Meteorological Office, southern England 
experienced, in the 29 Novembers between 1971 and 2000, 
an average maximum temperature of 10.0° C, an average of 5.4 
days of air frost, and an average of 77.4mm of rainfall. 1 
 That’s climate – a long-term average.
 For England as a whole, the November of 2007 differed 
from the average November of 1971-2000. The Met Office 
reported that England was more anti-cyclonic during that 









A whole lot of energy: Hurricane Katrina 
makes its second and most damaging landfall, 
southeast Louisiana, 29 August 2005
it also saw a couple of notable unsettled periods either side 
of mid-month. Temperatures soared to 18.8° C at Wiggonholt, 
Sussex, on the first day of the month, and reached 18.2° C at 
Portland, Dorset, on the second. Although England had some 
chilly nights in the first week, conditions were generally too mild 
for frost. 2 
 That’s weather – the circumstances that obtain at a 
particular place and moment in time.
 Climate sceptics say that, since it’s hard to make reliable 















how climate might change in 100 years. Yet they miss the point. 
Hard though it is to make a long-term climate forecast, it’s an 
easier exercise than making a long-term weather forecast. For 
example, it’s pretty certain that January months in the Northern 
hemisphere over the period 2060-2070 will on average be 
colder than August months. But it’s not at all certain what the 
temperature will be in London on 3 January 2065.
 Climate science is about looking at long-term driving 
forces. If the atmosphere traps more heat, then, other 
things being constant, there will be a long-term rise in the 
average temperature. Just how and where the rise emerges – 
that’s weather.
 Journalists err when they state that climate change causes 
a particular weather incident such as Hurricane Katrina (2005). 
The long-term driving forces of climate change only make such 
events more or less likely.
 What are these forces? Energy from the sun drives both 
climate and weather. Sunlight heats the Earth, but doesn’t 
illuminate it uniformly. Sunlight is more intense at the equator, 
and disappears at night. It’s absorbed mostly at the surface of 
the Earth, rather than higher in the atmosphere. 
 These imbalances drive the weather. Wind and water 
carry massive amounts of heat toward the frozen poles, forming 
gigantic eddies and swirls as warm and cold fronts collide, tumble 
over mountains, and move from sea to land. A famous example 
of a major current is the Gulf Stream, which carries heat from 
the Gulf of Mexico toward Western Europe.
 The sun’s heat is redistributed over the Earth, but the 
never-ending input of energy must ultimately be balanced by an 
output of energy from the Earth back into space. The Earth gets 
rid of its energy in the same way as the sun: it glows with heat. 
The difference is that the Earth is cooler than the sun, and so 
glows not with visible light, but with radiation at the infrared end 
of the spectrum.
 In principle the Earth should radiate enough infrared 









would regulate its temperature. That’s the big picture. But to 
understand climate change, and how humans are influencing it, 
we need to go a lot deeper.
Warming, cooling – and radiative forcing
Two key natural effects, both modified by human activities, now 
need considering. The Greenhouse Effect warms the Earth, while 
the Earth’s less publicised albedo cools it.
 Though the atmosphere is transparent to sunlight, it 
contains GHGs which absorb the infrared light that the Earth 
radiates outward. To return to radiative equilibrium, therefore, 
the Earth has to give off more infrared rays for enough of them to 
escape into space; and that can only happen if it heats up. The 
higher the concentration of GHGs, the more they trap infrared 
radiation, and the more the Earth warms. 
 The most important GHGs – including water vapour, CO2, 
methane, nitrous oxide and ozone – occur naturally. Without 
them, the Earth would be about 30º C cooler. The big concern 
over climate is that human activities will raise the concentration 
of these gases, and especially CO2, enough to boost warming 
by several degrees.
 So what about albedo? This is a percentage measure of 
how reflective the Earth is. Where it’s very reflective, for example 
over its white ice sheets, most sunlight isn’t absorbed, but rather 
reflected straight back out into space. In such areas, the Earth 
isn’t heated up and so isn’t made to re-emit incoming light 
as infrared. 
 By contrast, areas of low albedo, such as dark green 
forests, absorb almost all the sunlight that falls on them, heating 
the Earth. 
 Changes in humanity’s use of land alter albedo, which 
today stands at about 30 per cent. Dark tarmac reduces albedo, 
while replacing dark forest with cropland often increases it. 
Through mechanisms not yet fully understood, human activity 
can also change albedo through influencing cloudiness, which is 

















 To quantify how both human and natural forces have 
changed climate, scientists use the concept of radiative forcing 
– the difference between the energy leaving the Earth and that 
entering it. A Christmas tree fairy light emits 1 W, but a radiative 
forcing of just a few watts per square meter over every part of 
the Earth, land and sea, 24/7, all-year-round, could warm it by 
several degrees.
  Exactly by how much the Earth will warm, and how fast, 
depends on factors harder to calculate than the forcing itself. 
How radiative forcings translate into temperature is summed 
up – as we saw in Chapter 1 – in a number known as climate 
sensitivity. We’ll come back to this question.
 The chart overleaf is adapted from the IPCC’s 2007 
assessment. It shows the change, from 1750-2005, in the 
radiative forcings associated with different contributors to climate 
change. 3 To the IPCC’s credit, it also highlights the status of 
different aspects of climate science.
 The forcings are collected from many observations, and 
interpreted using several different theories. Both observations 
and theories are associated, as always in science, with a 
changing mix of certainty and uncertainty.
Uncertainty, certainty and the level of scientific 
understanding
As science progresses, uncertainty and imprecision tend to give 
way to certainty and growing precision – although relapses can 
often follow unexpected discoveries. Thus, the chart’s horizontal 
error bars show the IPCC’s best assessment of the values within 
which it’s 90 per cent confident that the true value lies. That 
is, on each error bar, the IPCC claims that there’s only a five 
per cent chance that the true value lies to the left of the bar, 
and only a five per cent chance that it’s to the right. In addition, 
different aspects of science progress at different speeds. To 
register this, the IPCC rates, in the final column of the chart, the 
level of scientific understanding that’s so far been reached in 
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CO2 main man-made component has been from the burning of fossil fuels. There are other significant 
sources, such as the cement industry
N2O
O3
main man-made components have been from paddy fields, landfill, ruminant animals such as 
cows, and leaks surrounding the use of natural gas.
main man-made component has been from the use of fertilisers in agriculture
Stratospheric water vapour – when aircraft put out water in the Earth’s stratosphere, which is normally 
                    extremely dry, they create a disproportionate warming effect  
Surface albedo – soot from industrial activities such as burning coal has blackened the surface of snow, and
                    so led to warming. Changes in the use to which humans have put the land have increased 
                    albedo, and so led to cooling 
Total aerosol effects – burning coal, wood or dung causes the emission of small particles. In what is called 
                    the direct effect, these particles reflect sunlight, increase the Earth’s albedo, and so have 
                    significantly cooled it. 
 
 Since the small particles in aerosols form points around which water can condense into droplets, 
 aerosols also increase cloudiness, and so make a second contribution to albedo – the indirect, 
 cloud albedo effect 
Solar irradiance – although sunlight is by far the most important factor in determining the temperature of the
                    Earth, it has only changed by a small amount. This is a long-term effect, on top of the 11-year 
                    ‘solar cycle’, over which there is a regular rise and fall in the sunlight reaching the Earth, 
                    but no net change
Linear contrails – the trails of cloud that can be seen behind aircraft engines have a slight net warming 
                    effect, reflecting more light back down to Earth than up into space
Halocarbons – (F-gases) are almost entirely man-made, principally for refrigeration. Now regulated, to lower 
                    damage to the layer of ozone that’s to be found in the Earth’s stratosphere  
ozone, a relatively unusual form of oxygen, is also a greenhouse gas. Halocarbons have 
destroyed enough stratospheric ozone – ozone higher than about 10km – to bring about a 
small fall in forcing. But the fall has been more than outweighed by a rise in the ozone that 
cars and other machines generate at ground level. This is known as tropospheric ozone 
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Given these significant reservations about certainty and the level 
of scientific understanding, what then does the chart convey?
 
It’s pretty certain that climate change is man-made 
First, humanity’s total net and positive impact on radiative forcing 
has exceeded the sun’s, by a large margin. Within 90 per cent 
confidence limits, that margin could lie anywhere between 0.25 
watts per square metre and more than two. A low level of both 
scientific certainty and understanding still surrounds the cloud 
albedo effect. 5 As a result of the large error bar around that 
effect, there is a lengthy error bar about humanity’s total net 
impact. According to the IPCC, then, uncertainty still surrounds 
that total net impact.
 Second, over the past 250 years, the use humans have 
made of land has done something to offset the increase in 
overall radiative forcing brought about by man’s production of 
GHGs. Man’s production of aerosols has done even more. Yet 
even when put together, these two tendencies have not been 
enough to counter the impact of human-created GHGs. Man-
made warming has exceeded man-made cooling.
 Climate sceptics portray humanity’s warming of the planet 
as a deeply uncertain affair. But a high degree of scientific 
certainty attaches to the positive radiative forcing brought about 
by man-made GHGs, and a low-to-medium degree of certainty 
attaches to the negative radiative forcing brought about by 
land use and aerosols. In Chapter 7, we show that much of 
today’s ‘natural’ landscape has, for some centuries, been 
strongly contoured by man. What the chart shows is that, in 
relation to both its heating and its cooling, the whole of the 


















That climate change is man-made shows how fixing 
energy supply could make a huge difference
What’s known about radiative forcing is a rebuke not just to 
climate sceptics, but also to climate zealots. 
 The chart suggests a reality to man-made climate change 
more radical than climate zealots allow. It shows that humanity’s 
contribution to climate change: 
 
has been large•	
has cut both ways.•	
Until the discovery of global warming, that contribution was made 
thoughtlessly. But today, through climate science, humanity 
knows about global warming. In technology and operations on 
a global scale, humanity is now also strong enough to control 
global warming. It must just thoughtfully invest in a new round 
of energy supply. 
 Mankind is ingenious enough – and has time enough – to 
fix global warming during a wider endeavour: to give itself enough 
energy to grow. That climate change is man-made shows how 
the right, ambitious choice of technique in energy supply can 
now make a massive difference.
 There’s no need to be frightened. Moreover, there’s no 
need for mankind’s past mistakes in climate to be labelled 
misdeeds.
Climate as a moraliser’s murder mystery
Climate zealots are wrong to argue that humanity has been 
evil in sullying and thus heating the planet. Humanity has also 
blackened the planet, made it more physically reflective and 
therefore cooled it. 
 These are facts, not ethical judgments. In a recent book on 
climate change, Gabrielle Walker and Sir David King flippantly ask, 
‘Whodunnit?’. 6  They forget that human ‘responsibility’ for climate 









Similarly, government documents lapse into criminology when 
they portray man-made contributions to climate change not just 
as footprints, but also as fingerprints. 7 Why not use the less 
freighted metaphor of signatures? 
 To moralise about human agency in climate change 
can only be right if industrialisation, agriculture, land use and 
aviation are deemed repugnant practices, because they oppress 
a conscious thing, nature. Greens often interpret climate change 
in such a way as to advance this point of view; but that doesn’t 
make it the right one.
 Humanity’s mixed, unknowing impacts in the past can 
now be rectified by determined, aggressive and thoughtful 
action on GHGs, beginning with CO2. But to be effective, and to 
bring real gains for humanity, the action must be around a bigger 
and better energy supply, not around imposing parsimony on the 
individual consumer.
Man-made climate change does  
not equal imminent catastrophe
Climate change will mean fewer cold snaps, more heat waves, 
rising sea levels, changing patterns of rainfall and storms, 
and changing conditions for agriculture and disease. But 
environmentalists claim more than this. They exaggerate the:
speed of climate change•	
conclusions of climate science •	
precision that surrounds these conclusions •	
scientific certainty that surrounds these conclusions.•	
They also ascribe many weather incidents, and even wars, to 
climate change. 8 To make themselves heard, environmentalists 
will often do anything to represent climate change as an imminent 
catastrophe.
 Perhaps, in their urgent tones and their scientific 
exaggerations, some environmentalists seek, through alarmism, 

















climate sceptics attack zealots with the cry ‘Follow the money!’, 
we’re no more satisfied than when zealots find Exxon dollars 
behind every sceptic. Nor, for us, does the liberal, sound-bite-
orientated, hysterical character of the media really explain the 
popular resonance of the zealots’ vision. 
 What’s actually going on in this fast-forward vision of 
planetary disaster is environmentalists surfing on a much wider 
social culture of fear, distaste for man’s works, and disgust with 
his wastes. 9 It’s as if geniuses like Michelangelo or Einstein 
are unremarkable in comparison with the havoc, pollution and 
destruction that mankind has visited on Noble Nature.
 What Kent University sociology professor Frank Furedi 
calls ‘the expanding empire of the unknown’ weighs on the 
environmentalist’s mind as much as it does on the rest of 
society. 10 That’s why, when climate sceptics pick on particular 
exaggerations of climate change and accuse environmentalists 
of abusing science, they’re obtuse. 
 Environmentalists don’t just deal in science. They invoke 
the Precautionary Principle – an argument that is legal in form, 
though moralistic in content.
Precaution: what diplomats and  
international Non-Governmental Organisations love
As the Hull University geographer and ethicist Sonja Boehmer-
Christiansen notes, the Precautionary Principle is said to have 
made its way into the English language during the early 1980s, 
as a poor translation of the German term Vorsorgeprinzip. Literally, 
that term means ‘prior care and worry’; but it’s also readily linked 
to state-influenced planning or provisioning for the future. Applied 
to environmental matters, Vorsorgeprinzip emerged in the early 
1970s, with German clean air legislation. 11
 The first treaty to refer to the Precautionary Principle was 
the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer. After appearances in several subsequent international 
conventions, it then achieved a breakthrough in 1992. In 









the Maastricht Treaty of that year amended article 130r(2) 
of the EEC Treaty: ‘action on the environment’, it proclaimed, 
‘shall be based on the Precautionary Principle’ – although the 
Treaty declined to offer a definition of the Principle itself. 12 
 Also in 1992, in Rio, civil servants and international Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) succeeded in pressing the 
UN Environmental Programme into adopting the Principle – not 
least, in relation to climate change. 13 In the Rio Declaration, 
Principle 15 reads:
‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to 
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ 14
Clearly, a lawyer could have drafted this. Usually incanted as if it 
were an axiom of natural science, the Precautionary Principle is 
nothing of the sort. It’s an edict of international law, concerned 
with procedures and the burden of proof. 
 That isn’t so terrible. But in fact the phrase ‘lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used’ downgrades the role of 
science in decision making. To understand why, it’s vital to 
distinguish between risk and uncertainty. 15
 Technically, risk exists when man can calculate – more 
or less accurately – the probability of different outcomes. When 
insurers use statistics for life expectancy, fires or floods, they’re 
in the business of managing risk. Particular events cannot be 
predicted; but the statistics are quite reliable.
 Uncertainty, by contrast, occurs when probabilities are 
unknown. What are the chances that a revolution in physics will 
solve the world’s energy problems? Perhaps the probability is 
very low. But there’s no real way of knowing. 
 Crucially, it’s through science that uncertainty can be 
















manner, and from different angles – technological, economic, 
political and environmental.
 Officialdom uses the Precautionary Principle to play up 
lack of full scientific certainty. With the Principle, there’s never 
a scientifically quantifiable risk, but always an infinite amount of 
uncertainty. As a result science and scientists must take a back 
seat. They have no role transforming uncertainty into risk. As two 
enthusiasts for precaution around climate change say, it ‘entails 
a greater degree of humility or realism over the role and potential 
of science in the assessment of risks’. Indeed not just the setting 
of policy, but also the assessment of risks should encompass 
public agreement and participation. 16
 That all sounds very democratic. But take genetically 
modified (GM) foods: almost all scientists say that enough is 
understood about GM foods to treat the problems they bring as 
specific risks. Greens counter with the argument that mankind 
still has much to learn about biology – so nobody can be certain 
what might happen with GM foods. Scenarios which scientists 
hold unlikely must, in this framework, nevertheless be taken 
extremely seriously. Greens also invoke the opinion of the 
European public in their assessment of GM risks as being not 
worth the candle. 
 But who is the public, whose appraisal of risk is as worthy 
as that made by scientists? Could it by chance consist of ‘the 
interests, including beliefs and political tactics, adopted by those 
who claim to speak in the name of the public, society or even 
future generations’? 17 In environmental matters, ‘the public’ 
often amounts only to a group that has promoted an issue 
according to its own beliefs or interests. 18
 That was what happened in Rio in 1992. There, state 
bureaucrats and international NGOs managed to fix juridical 
uncertainty and fear as the operating concept in all future official 
assessments of climate change. 
 Denied data on probabilities, it’s natural for the real public 
to focus on worst-case scenarios. Give up trying to quantify how 









to prioritise what you value and what you don’t. If you dread 
some circumstances that are highly unlikely, it’s simple enough 
to envisage others that are even worse. What if there’s a design 
flaw in the next generation of nuclear power stations – one 
that brings multiple Chernobyls? What if the next generation of 
solar cells turns out toxic? What if a world dependent on wind 
power encounters a volcanic eruption big enough to disrupt 
global wind patterns?
 To begin from what isn’t known is to let the flesh creep. 
Yet US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did exactly that on 
12 February 2002, when he famously publicised what elites had 
long been discussing: ‘unknown unknowns’. 19 
 Our response to this phantasm is: so what? The unknown 
is a large, real and ever-present realm. But what can ever be said 
about it, other than that it is unknown?
 What governments and Greens are really up to with the 
Precautionary Principle is smuggling in presumptions about how 
human society is highly vulnerable. That might or might not 
be true; but the starting point for assessing vulnerability, 
as anything else, must be what is known. Greens often 
underestimate how much is known. And where it really is the 
case that little is known, precious knowledge must still form the 
basis for decision-making.
 When applied to climate change, the Precautionary 
Principle ensures that the future can only be a lurid journey 
into a Dantean inferno. Stern’s very own PowerPoint – complete, 


















Climate portrayed as leaping about 
Let’s now move from legal principles to the physics of climate 
change. Attacking Bjørn Lomborg, a sophisticated critic of 
climate alarmism, Cambridge economics professor Sir Partha 
Dasgupta shows how the empire of the unknown now dominates 
mainstream thought. Here’s the (shortened) conclusion of 
his polemic:
‘If there is one truth about Earth we all should know, it’s that 
the system is driven by interlocking, nonlinear processes 
running at different speeds. The transition to Lomborg’s 
recommended concentration of 560ppm would involve 
crossing an unknown number of tipping points… We have 
no data on the consequences if Earth were to cross those 
tipping points… Even if we did have data, they would 
probably be of little value because nature’s processes 
are irreversible… [Estimates] of climatic parametres 
based on observations from the recent past are 
unreliable for making forecasts about the state of the 
world at CO2 concentrations of 560 ppm or higher. 
Moreover, the nonlinearities mean that doing more of a 
bad deal [Kyoto] may well be very good… These truths 
seem to escape Lomborg… [He] believes we shouldn’t buy 
insurance against potentially enormous losses resulting 
from climate change.’ 21
On climate change, then, what is fashionable is to highlight 
the almost complete absence of certainty. The only certainty 
allowed is that planetary behaviour is profoundly non-linear – 
that it can leap about at bewildering speeds and unpredictable 
rates. Multiple interlocking non-linear processes make the Earth 
a deeply unstable place. Thus immediate personal conservations 
of energy, together with Kyoto-style agreements, C02 taxes, 
trading or rationing, represent sensible, precautionary insurance 
policies, which will save much more money later. 









Lord Stern’s ‘projected impacts of climate change’
Global temperature change (relative to pre-industrial)
1°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 5°C
Falling crop yields in many areas,
particularly developing regions
Possible rising yields in
some high latitude regions












Rising intensity of storms, forest fires, 








Significant decreases in water 
availability in many areas, including 
Mediterranean and Southern Africa
Small mountain glaciers
disappear – water supplies 
threatened in several areas
Increasing risk of dangerous feedbacks and
abrupt, large-scale shifts in the climate system
Rising number of species 
face extinction
rd Stern’s ‘projected impacts of climate change’
















Exponential growth, feedback, non-linear  
behaviour, and chaos 
When discussing climate, Greens love to throw around modern 
mathematical jargon. Sadly, they often have little respect for the 
precise meaning of the concepts they use. In a fearful variant of 
Orwellian Newspeak, terms such as exponential growth, feedback, 
non-linearity and chaos have become, in Green commentary, 
little more than code for the planet spinning out of control.
The first worrier about exponential growth was Malthus. 
He fretted that while ‘the means of subsistence, under 
circumstances the most favourable to human industry, could not 
possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio’, 
population was different. Food production could not keep pace 
with population. ‘When unchecked’, Malthus warned, population 
‘goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years, or increases in a 
geometrical ratio’. 22
 Exponential growth is defined as a process that doubles 
(or halves) over a period of time that remains constant. In the 
case of Malthus, this period was every 25 years. Closely related 
to exponential growth is feedback, which comes in two variants: 
positive and negative. In positive feedback, a change creates 
a greater change, magnifying the original effect. In the case of 
Malthus, the feedback is simple – more people breed yet more 
people. In negative feedback, a change provokes an opposite 
change, stabilising things.
 CO2 added to the atmosphere raises temperatures, which 
leads to the evaporation of more water vapour, which – being a 
GHG – raises temperatures further. This is a positive feedback. 
Less well understood is that more water, by forming clouds that 
reflect sunlight, may also make for a negative feedback.
 The most significant uncertainties in climate science 
surround feedbacks. Without feedbacks, a doubling of CO2 
concentrations would produce a temperature change of only 
1.2º C – which is nothing really to worry about.
 The difficulty is that there are undoubtedly many feedbacks. 









rise in temperature into the range of 3º C in the century 22nd 
century. Greens worry that feedbacks may produce even more 
warming than that.
 Non-linear is a broad adjective. The mathematician 
Stanislaw Ulam has been credited with the remark that ‘non-
linear science’ is like ‘calling the bulk of zoology the study of 
non-elephants’. 23 Broadly, in a linear equation the cause is 
proportional to effect. If the cause doubles, then the effect 
also doubles. 
 For scientists, linear equations are attractive because 
they can be solved. Solutions can also be added together to 
produce new solutions. Any solution can be broken down into 
simpler, more tractable components – a fact that allows linear 
equations to be solved systematically.
 Linear equations describe many situations. The 
fundamental equations of quantum mechanics, describing the 
motion of atoms and molecules, are linear. They’re also good 
approximations to many situations for small motions – the swing 
of a pendulum when it’s not too large, a sound wave when it’s 
not too loud, or a ripple on the surface of water.
 Non-linear simply describes all other situations  – situations 
in which the effect is not simply proportional to cause. If, say, 
the cause is doubled, and the effect is quadrupled, that’s an 
example of non-linearity. Rivers, electrical circuits, car engines, 
the sun and most other phenomena in nature all exhibit non-
linear behaviour.
 Tipping points are also examples of non-linearity. Beneath 
a certain threshold, change in a cause produces little or no 
effect; but a small change that crosses the threshold creates 
a large effect. Clearly, the effect is not simply proportional to 
the change.
 Non-linear equations cannot usually be solved exactly. 
They can be solved approximately by a mass of arithmetic, 
nowadays run on computers. This is how computerised models 
of climate are built and operated.

















it is. But often feedback can be described by a linear equation. 
When a change in a quantity is proportional to itself, the result 
is exponential growth. That’s the case with growth of bacteria: 
the increase in the number of bacteria is proportional to the 
number of bacteria that are already present. This is an example 
of feedback described by a linear equation.
 More important is that non-linearity creates the possibility, 
although not the necessity, of chaos. In chaotic systems, states 
that begin close to one another can rapidly diverge. This is 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Very small changes – 
perhaps changes that are too small to measure – can have very 
large consequences.
 But chaos requires more than a simple explosion in 
which points that were close together move rapidly apart. It also 
requires that states starting far apart come close together. 
 Weather is a chaotic system. Patterns of wind and cloud 
that look similar will evolve into very different states over a few 
weeks. That’s why weather forecasting is hard. On the other 
hand, weather patterns continually fall into familiar regularities – 
coming back closer again.
 Neither non-linearity nor chaos should be interpreted as 
closing off human understanding. Newtonian gravity, for example, 
is non-linear. Considered over billions of years, the motion of the 
planets is chaotic. 24
 Newton’s step forward was once hailed as the foundation 
of the Enlightenment. Though today’s insights into non-linearity 
and chaos in fact build on Newton, the expanding empire of the 
unknown in today’s human imagination ensures that they are 
interpreted as revealing the limits of science.
 Even if it’s impossible to predict the exact motion of 
a chaotic system, it’s often still possible to understand its 
properties. The pressure of a gas, for example, arises from the 
molecules that make it up chaotically colliding with the walls of a 
container. Many molecules hit those walls every millisecond; but 










 In the same way, it may be that even if we cannot predict 
the weather in a week or a month, we have good prospects for 
understanding the climate system on longer timescales, including 
hurricanes, heat waves, ice sheets and the rest.
 Climate exhibits feedback, non-linearity and perhaps 
tipping points. But while feedbacks will, in aggregate, raise 
temperatures, the mere existence of non-linear processes cannot 
be pressed into the service of an accelerated apocalypse.
 Even tipping points need not be uniquely frightening. 
‘Tipping Points in the Earth System’, a workshop held at the 
British Embassy in Berlin in October 2005, brought together 
36 experts. Continued GHG emissions, they said, might push 
humanity past nine possible tipping points over the next 100 
years. Their examples show that tipping points can be managed 
similarly to other environmental questions. 25
 Later on, we examine the melting of the Earth’s ice 
sheets, by way of a look at Greenland. Here we summarise the 
workshop’s other examples.
 The melting of summer arctic ice would not have serious 
consequences for human beings. It would put species such as 
polar bears under additional pressure and add to the overall 
pace of warming (dark water reflects less heat than white ice). 
But humanity should be able to get round these problems.
 Disruption of El Niño, the circulation of warm water in the 
Pacific, could lead to broad changes in regional climate across 
the globe. Yet these changes would likely occur over a century or 
more, giving plenty of time for adaptation. The possibility is also 
remote: it might happen within a millennium, but ‘the existence 
and location of any threshold is particularly uncertain’. 26
 Disruption of the Indian summer monsoon would be a 
problem, albeit one that could be adapted to with better water 
management. But though a possibility, it’s more related to clouds 
of smoke from more traditional air pollution across Asia than 
to GHGs. If anything, additional greenhouse warming stabilises 
India’s summer monsoon.

















that would also be a problem. But a side effect would be a 
greening of the Sahara and its surroundings – ‘a rare example of 
a beneficial potential tipping point’. 27
 Serious damage to the Amazon rainforest has been 
predicted if temperatures rise by 3° C or more. Yet again the 
story is not simply one of climate change: the fate of the Amazon 
‘may be determined by a complex interplay’ between changes in 
land use and climate change. 28
 For forests in Canada and Russia, rises of 3° C or more 
are again projected to be problematic. But it’s less clear why 
transformation of such forests to grassland would be catastrophic. 
In any case limitations in existing models and physiological 
understanding make such a transformation a matter that is still 
‘highly uncertain’. 29
 No doubt our reading of the facts put forward by the Berlin 
workshop is much more sanguine than that made by those 
who participated in it. But whether the facts drive an alarming 
analysis, or a calm one, relates more to differing approaches to 
precaution and uncertainty than to the facts themselves.
Behind environmentalism’s accelerated Apocalypse
It’s glib to describe environmentalism as a religion. While Green 
images of burning heat and a second Great Flood do recall 
religious faith, they’re more symptoms of environmentalism than 
premises. Still, if radical climate change isn’t an instantaneous 
matter, why do so many environmentalists want to believe it is? 
 There are several reasons. In Chapter 1, we discussed the 
fear and lack of investment that today surround technological 
innovation and R&D in the West. Chapter 2 showed how, in 
the early 1970s, environmentalism won a legitimating status 
for itself. Altogether, then, contemporary techno-fear and the 
statist origins of modern environmentalism make Greens’ views 
of the future highly conservative. In general, environmentalism 
interprets the future as something that happens to you, rather 









on climate change is framed at the modest level of individual 
consumption, rather than organised at the ambitious level of 
global energy supply.
 Beyond that, however, two major historical experiences 
have shaped the particularly fast-moving character of the doom 
envisaged by modern environmentalism: the Second World War, 
and the Cold War.
 History has always contoured forecasts of the future. 
In particular, the speed of the Second World War’s onset in 
Europe following the Munich Conference of October 1938, the 
drama of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour and the brevity of the 
Pacific War’s conclusion in Japan have had an enduring impact 
on the Western psyche. Environmentalism, too, has absorbed 
this impact. 
 And when political, business and environmental leaders 
talk about climate change, they very often search for epic effect 
by bringing up the Second World War. 30
The Second World War as the template  
for lightning change
Addressing the UN in 2007, Gordon Brown upheld Nicholas 
Stern’s view that the likely costs of climate change would compare 
with those of the Depression and the Second World War put 
together. 31 After that, Richard Branson, the head of Virgin Group, 
told the UN that people needed to take global warming as seriously 
as the British did the last war. 32     
 Greens love that war. They long for:
1. Rationing through personal carbon allowances 33
2. A ‘supreme effort of national mobilisation’ 34
3. Climate sceptics to be given the same short shrift as those 
who would deny the Holocaust. 35
Above all, though, references to the war assist Greens in 















 After 1945, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and 
Johnson pressed the lessons of Munich into the service of the 
Cold War. To make peace with aggression was seen as an error. 
Post-war ‘security’ in the West meant that world-shattering 
turbulence, now led by communists rather than fascists, 
must be nipped firmly in the bud. Even in the US presidential 
campaign of 2008, George W Bush felt the same way, hinting 
that Barack Obama’s foreign policy amounted to ‘the false 
comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited 
by history’. 36
 The imperative to compress the likely evolution of climate 
change is really a Green shadow, in the world of nature, to the bad 
faith still felt about appeasement in the world of politics. From 
Hitler at Munich, through Admiral Yamamoto at Pearl Harbour, 
to Osama Bin Laden and climate change today, ‘evil’ has been 
assumed typically to gain such a swift dynamic that only super-
urgent, monumental and unanimous action can reverse it.
 The idea of an unstoppable chain reaction first 
entered popular consciousness with Hiroshima; and today 
environmentalism loves that idea. In 2005, the UK government-
funded Carbon Trust ran a series of television commercials. Each 
drew on the ancient, mystical Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita, 
which Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the Bomb, had ruefully 
recalled during the Trinity atomic test, conducted in the US on 
the eve of Hiroshima (see Chapter 4). To background footage of 
a mushroom cloud, the commercials proclaimed: ‘I have become 
the destroyer of worlds’. 37
 The alarmist approach suggests that when mankind plays 
with the fundamentals of nature, a conflagration will follow in no 
time at all. In this sense, your carbon-profligate lifestyle helps 
pulverise the planet, and must cease forthwith. 
Rapid infection, falling dominoes, ladders of 
escalation: the influence of the Cold War
The next experience shaping modern thought about doom 









a biological metaphor for Apocalypse. Thus, preparing top 
Congressmen for the Cold War in 1947, US Under Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson used the language of contamination and 
epidemiology to emphasise that one bad thing can quickly lead 
to another. Speaking of pressure by the Soviet Union on the Near 
East, he advised:
‘Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the 
corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. 
It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor 
and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France…’ 38
The fears that once accompanied the spread of the  ‘communist 
menace’ today attend global warming. A paroxysm knowing no 
national boundaries is felt to be imminent. 
 The 21st century already dreads international 
contaminations and geometrically multiplying viruses. 
Little wonder that climate cataclysm is felt to be possible at 
once, everywhere.
 In 1954, when Vietnam began to best France during 
the battle of Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower added another fearful, 
affecting image of communist expansion – the falling domino: 
‘You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the 
first one, and what will happen to the last one is the 
certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could 
have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the 
most profound influences.’ 39
Soon, under Kennedy, the possibility that the world could be 
destroyed through a rapid, uncontrollable and irreversible trail 
of human-initiated events became further enshrined in the 
US doctrine of nuclear deterrence through Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD). 
 As we showed in Chapter 2 with Galbraith and Packard, the 

















energy use. But the Cold War’s peak also moulded futurologists, 
climate scientists, and environmentalists. 
 Notoriously, the Pentagon corralled emerging, 
mathematics-based disciplines – cybernetics, game theory – 
into its cause. 40 After the advent of the integrated circuit in 
1957, computers were also used, in practice and in propaganda, 
to make military manoeuvres more respectable. 
 In 1960 Herman Kahn, arguably the inventor of modern-
day forecasting, used his background in the highly computerised 
RAND Corporation to predict, with assiduous calculations, the 
death counts for future nuclear conflicts. 41 Then, in 1965, 
Kahn developed a metaphor for what he called the ‘coercive 
aspects of international relations’: complete with 44 rungs and 
six ‘firebreaks’, it was that of a ladder of escalation. 42 
 What for Kahn was a metaphor became, in the imagination 
of many, a very real ladder. The future looked different. In a nuclear 
world, it could well be a succession of discrete catastrophes, 
linked over shorter and shorter intervals, each magnifying 
the last. 
 Sound familiar?
The Old Scientism and the New Scientism
To meet, Kahn was so big, he even looked like a think tank. 43 
As so much the expert, his views could not be contradicted. 
Perversely, Kahn used computers to predict devastation in 
the future, and to back the most aggressive postures in the 
present. His approach was but one example of the wider Cold 
War phenomenon of scientism: modish, computerised, cool, 
‘independent’, unanswerable. 44
 Kahn used ‘systems analysis’ to draw up digitally-based 
models of nuclear war. Once popularised, his outlook suggested 
that the future could move in quantum leaps of lethality; so it 
didn’t prove hard, in the 1960s, for some scientists to interpret 
the future of climate as a set of lurches toward hell. After all, 

























 In today’s war against global warming, people are once 
again told that what they’re up against isn’t smooth, graceful, 
geometrical progressions. In a kind of subconscious residue of 
Cold War fears, a series of rapid, bucking, ever more disruptive 
changes, or switches, is held out as jeopardising the very 
existence of the Earth. 45 And more than ever, computer models 
of everything are invoked to smudge over the difference between 
natural science and the social sciences, between science and 
its interpretation, between science and policy proposals about 
what to do. 
 In the process, science is perverted – so much so, indeed, 
that Lord David Sainsbury, Tony Blair’s adviser on science and 
technology, once described it as a tool of British foreign policy in 
dealings with the Chinese. 46 And while the old scientism of the 
Cold War had its critics, today’s New Scientism runs pretty much 
unquestioned. 
 In 1973, when The Limits to Growth came out, Christopher 
Freeman, director of the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex 
University and one of the world’s top technology policy gurus, 
satirised the approach as ‘Malthus with a computer’. 47 The Fall 
of Man, some felt, could not be verified by the movement of 
electrons around printed circuit boards. 
 Today things have changed. Unchallenged, the Stern 
report referred more than 500 times to ‘models’ of 
climate change and its monetary cost •	
hydrology and crop growth•	
risk and uncertainty•	
innovation, technology and energy. •	
Stern’s opening words give science an all-determining position:
‘It is the science that dictates the type of economics and 
where the analyses should focus, for example, on the 
Finger on the dark button of fate:  









economics of risk, the nature of public goods or how to 
deal with externalities, growth and development and intra- 
and inter-generational equity.’ 48
Similarly, while the IPCC’ s Working Group I confines itself to the 
physical science of climate change, Working Group II, focusing 
on the impacts of climate change and human adaptation and 
vulnerability in the face of those impacts, makes a mish-mash 
of monolithic computer simulations around disciplines quite 
separate from climatology. 49 The same is true of the Working 
Group III on the mitigation of climate change. Here models of 
climate merge into free-market models of economics and into 
projections of demography. 50
 Given its willingness to mix up natural science with 
social forecasts, the New Scientism, like the old, is not actually 
very respectful of science. In fact, the New Scientism is about 
deifying nature. Once nature is put before humanity, science 
becomes merely the winged messenger for nature, there to tell a 
dumb human species that it must have more ‘awareness’ of how 
dumb it is.
Mitigation, Adaptation and Transformation
Official answers to climate change suggest that it can either be 
averted, or lived with.
 Slowing or stopping climate change is known as mitigation. 
In practice, this generally means cutting the net levels of GHGs 
added to the atmosphere each year, by:
conserving energy•	
decarbonising energy supply•	
conserving, enhancing or fireproofing •	 carbon sinks  –  
 large features of the planet, whether natural or artificial,  
 that absorb CO2. 
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is the right way to go. The third is fine, although when there 
are more appropriate uses for natural sinks such as forests and 
oceans, then developing new, bigger and better sinks may be 
preferable to simply conserving, enhancing or fireproofing the 
ones that already exist.
 An alternative to mitigation is adaptation – measures 
that the IPCC says ‘reduce the vulnerability of natural and human 
systems’ to climate change. 52 
 Bad weather already causes damage, especially in 
the Third World. Therefore adapting both landscape and 
settlement to handle climate change makes sense. Better roads 
and telecommunications, for example, could speed the pace 
of evacuations. 
 Yet the world needs better roads and IT networks regardless 
of emergencies. It needs to do more than just ‘ruggedise’ its 
cities against the immediate effects of climate change.
 For Greens, adaptation represents too much, not too little. 
They prefer mitigation for three reasons:
1.  By contrast with leaving future generations to adapt   
to the consequences of today’s errors, conservation   
brings benefits now.
2.  Adaptation might be a Band-Aid; taking precautions   
through mitigation is a dead cert. Carry on adding GHGs  
to the atmosphere? That’s like poking an ‘angry beast’. 53 
3. The poor simply can’t afford to adapt to the effects of   
climate change. 
We don’t agree. We’ve already dealt with precaution; but there 
are two other arguments to be made here.
 First, today’s legacy to future generations isn’t just a burden 
to be lightened. Through innovation and progress, humanity can 
leave its descendants a much more vibrant bequest.
Second, it’s true that the poor cannot afford to build flood 
defences. But to prefer mitigation to adaptation because the Third 









that’s a circular argument. No doubt achieving economic takeoff 
in Mozambique and Bangladesh will be hard. But will it be any 
harder than a crash cut in GHG emissions? 
 Our programme of transformation goes beyond mitigation 
and adaptation. In our view,
1.  The business of mankind is not just to slow or stop   
climate change, leaving climate in a more ‘natural’ state,  
but also to take control of as much of the environment  
as is possible.
2. Rather than just adapting human arrangements to   
deal with climate change, both the energy and the  
non-energy aspects of the environment merit a   
transformation to meet human needs.
Transformation is about making the planet a more human kind 
of place. It goes beyond energy and GHGs, even if human place-
making is one reason why the world needs more energy. 
 As hinted earlier and more fully developed in Chapter 7, 
the beginnings of transformation are to be found everywhere. 
Human beings now live not in raw conditions, but in a built 
environment. They have altered between a third and a half of 
the Earth’s land, and used more than half of its accessible fresh 
surface water. 54 More nitrogen, which is crucial for all life, is now 
fixed by human industry for use in fertiliser than by the entire 
natural biosphere. 55 
 Transformation has tended to be the rule in the past, and 
should definitely be the rule of the future.
 
Global warming’s discovery, 1956-7, and the  
conditions that allowed it 
The height of the Cold War didn’t just nurture a computerised 
sense of urgency about the future. It also installed a science 
regime committed to fundamental exploration. Despite the 

















into weather and climate over 1956-65, both fields enjoyed 
fundamental breakthroughs. 56
 In the 1930s the American oceanographer Roger Revelle 
researched ocean chemistry, and, among other topics, its 
carbon dimension. In the 1950s he won funds from the US Navy 
to measure radioactivity and ocean mixing. He concluded that 
radioactive wastes introduced into the upper layer of the ocean 
might stay there for many years. 
 Then, in 1957, Revelle published a paper with Hans Suess 
of the US Geological Survey. 57 It included perhaps the world’s 
most famous paragraph ever to have been Scotch-taped to an 
original draft. As the brilliant US science historian Spencer Weart 
summarises that paragraph, seawater 
‘… needed to absorb only about a tenth as much gas as a 
simple-minded calculation would suppose. While… most 
of the CO2 molecules added to the atmosphere would 
wind up in the oceans within a few years, most… would 
promptly be evaporated out.’ 58 
In 1956 Revelle said that the Greenhouse Effect might bring 
harm by 2000; in the following year, he warned that the effect 
might turn Southern California and Texas into ‘real deserts’. 59 
But the confidence of US science in his day, reflecting America’s 
economic boom and its overall military superiority to the Soviet 
Union, tempered these kinds of fears.
 Concluding his 1957 paper, Revelle famously wrote that 
mankind was performing an unprecedented and unrepeatable 
‘large scale geophysical experiment’ with climate. But as Weart 
perceptively remarks, the word experiment:
‘... sounded benign and progressive to Revelle as to most 
scientists… he only meant to point out a fascinating 
opportunity for the study of geophysical processes. 
People’s attitude toward the rise of CO2, he would write 

























Relative to the economy, Cold War R&D in the US was broader 
and more intensive than it is today. A military but expansionist 
context buoyed up science, and allowed it to progress – 
sometimes through a kind of organised serendipity. 
 Society’s mood, then, can profoundly affect the 
interpretation of science. 
 When environmentalists bang on about consensus, they 
miss how science, despite its enormous recent progress, has 
yet to reach agreement on the detailed mechanisms of climate. 
But even if consensus is eventually created on areas of scientific 
uncertainty, environmentalists would still be wrong to interpret it 
as a directive for you to minimise your carbon footprint their way 
right now. That would be an outrageous distortion of science, 
undertaken for decidedly political ends. 
 In its emotional claims to objectivity, the New Scientism 
deflects society’s focus, and the focus of science, right away 
from energy supply.
 Today, the world should revive Revelle’s emphasis on 
experimentation and curiosity – and uphold the vital role of 
well-funded serendipity in science. Luck can never replace 
thoughtfulness in energy supply. But investment and luck 
in energy R&D would today be wiser than piling on more 
apprehension about the rapidity of climate change.
 Such apprehension began with Revelle himself, in 1956. 
Meanwhile, general Cold War jitters also reached a pitch. Soon 
humanity came to be blamed not just for global warming, but 
also for dangerous climate change. 
 By 1960, rises of atmospheric CO2 were found consistent 
with Revelle’s line on weak sea absorption of CO2. Then, after the 
organised serendipity that had attended Cold War oceanography, 
a more accidental serendipity in Cold War meteorology 
allowed non-linear planetary behaviour and chaos theory to 
be discovered. 
The man who first alerted the world to 









Difficulty in predicting the weather turns into the 
impossibility of understanding climate
In 1961, a meteorologist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, the late Edward Lorenz, found by a chance computer 
simulation that weather exhibits such sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions that its long-term behaviour was impossible to 
predict. Given the basic distinction between weather and climate, 
Lorenz was correct. 
 Lorenz’s pioneering researches revealed the new power of 
computer models – though his were models of natural, not social 
phenomena. But in 1965, concluding his opening address to a 
major conference on climate change held at Boulder, Colorado, 
Lorenz turned chaos in weather into something much broader – 
human uncertainty about climate. He said:
‘Climate may or may not be deterministic. We shall probably 
never know for sure.’
In just four years Lorenz had moved from the intrinsic 
unpredictability of weather to mooting an intrinsic 
incomprehensibility of climate. This was a mistake, reflecting the 
uncertain times.
 As Revelle summed up the Boulder conference, minor 
and short changes in the Earth’s past behaviour might have 
been enough to ‘flip’ its atmospheric circulation from one state 
to another. 61 But as Weart shows, it took another 30 years for 
measurements of past climatic flips to narrow their duration 
from thousands of years to decades or less. 62 Nevertheless, 
apprehensions that human beings could cause future flips in 
climate quickly and to disastrous effect grew up as hastily as 
Lorenz had put the whole idea of climate science into doubt.
 When Lorenz invoked uncertainty about climate science, 
going on to develop the concept of chaos, he was not alone. 
At the Cold War’s peak, Western culture was deeply uncertain 

















 America’s reaction to the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 
showed how panicky things could get. In seminal articles for 
the New Yorker, Rachel Carson contended that, along with the 
possibility of the extinction of mankind by nuclear war, ‘the central 
problem of our age’ had become pesticides and insecticides. 63 
Among historians of science, the effect of the ambiguities in 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) 
was to throw the whole idea of progress in science into doubt. 64 
So in the tense and anxious late 1950s and early 1960s, it was 
easy for climatologists to leap, as Tony Gilland of the Institute of 
Ideas puts it, ‘from rudimentary findings to cataclysmic worst-
case scenarios’. 65
 It wasn’t possible to detect anthropogenic warming 
at least until 1980. 66 Yet that didn’t stop the 1965 Boulder 
conference from agreeing that the climate system ‘showed a 
dangerous potential for dramatic change, on its own or under 
human technological intervention, and quicker than anyone had 
supposed’. 67
The formation of the IPCC
The final years of the Cold War supplied a second episode 
shaping environmentalism. SustainAbility describes the period 
1988-1991 as the second wave of environmentalism. 68 In 
those years, a second absorption of environmentalism  into 
statecraft took place – an absorption firmer than that which 
befell environmentalism in the early 1970s.
 The formation of a functioning IPCC in November 1988 
occurred in a much larger context than that which greeted the 
first heyday of environmentalism. This time, the outsourcing of 
policy was extended to an intergovernmental panel of government 
experts. In addition, the IPCC was born during a resurgence and 
multiplication of social and environmental fears. 
 In 1985, UNEP, the World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO) and the International Council for Science (ICSU) sponsored 
a conference of 89 scientists – including biologists and engineers 









conference proved a key ramp toward the formation of the IPCC. 
Urged by the three sponsors to make policy recommendations, 
the conference concluded: 
‘the rate and degree of future warming could be profoundly 
affected by government policies on energy conservation, 
use of fossil fuels, and the emission of greenhouse 
gases.’ 69
This was an inauspicious prelude to the IPCC. ‘Independent’ 
scientists were invited by inter-state bodies to step beyond 
climatology and make political proposals. And – surprise – the 
proposals were not about reducing the carbon intensity of energy 
supply, still less about increasing that supply. Instead, they were 
about… energy conservation and use.
 The 1980s produced anxiety on a grand scale. There were 
fears around:
cruise missiles, Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative, •	
and the possibility of ‘nuclear winter’ 70 
the likely future incidence of AIDS among Western •	
heterosexuals
the extent of child abuse in families•	
a repeat of the explosion at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986.•	
In 1986, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck published Risk 
Society, which suggested that the big problems human beings 
face followed from the unforeseen consequences of past 
technological developments. In 1987, the American journalist 
James Gleick published Chaos, which popularised Edward Lorenz’s 
doctrines. Then, in 1988, Margaret Thatcher came out in favour 
of sustainable economic development and issued a warning 
about climate. Echoing Revelle in her own admonitory style, she 
said that mankind was engaged in ‘a massive experiment with 
the system of this planet itself’. 71 

















scientists, both in and well beyond climatology, who had by •	
this time become fearful of climate change and politically 
active around it
UNEP, WMO and ICSU, which wanted to build on their past •	
successes in the control of ozone
above all, the Reagan administration, which sought to restrain •	
UNEP and settle sharply differing views among various US 
government agencies. 72
The IPCC is mostly a US government creation, and wholly a 
political body. Its three Working Groups are mandated to assess 
not just climate change, but also its social impact – and what to 
do about it. 
 So when environmentalists say that IPCC pronouncements 
mean that ‘The Science’ has spoken, they misrepresent it. And 
through this device, they give politicians a nice, neutral, high and 
mighty way to attack you for your supposedly profligate lifestyle. 
 
Green misanthropes (3): Achim Steiner and Rajendra 
Pachauri insist you change your habits
Achim Steiner knows how to do a press launch. He is Executive 
Director of the United Nations Environment Programme , a co-
founder of the IPCC. On 2 February 2007, the IPCC published 
a ‘Summary for Policymakers’, anticipating the full report of 
its Working Group I on the physical science basis of climate 
change. 73 Speaking at a press conference to mark the event, 
Steiner said that the evidence for human beings causing climate 
change was ‘on the table, and we no longer have to debate 
that part of it’. For Steiner, ‘the science’ should not disempower 
individuals: rather, it meant that ‘every individual can today walk 
out of their front door and cut their emissions by more than what 
Kyoto had ever envisaged’. 74 
Steiner’s biography boasts of his track record in 









as well as his ‘first-hand knowledge of civil society, governmental 
and international organisations’. Before joining UNEP, he ran 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature, managing 
1000 environmentalists. 75 A German born in Brazil, Steiner was 
educated at Oxford, and spent time at Harvard.
None of that, however, gave him the right to claim that 
scientific debate on the human input to climate change had been 
concluded. None of it gave him the right to say that science 
dictates that you cut your GHG emissions.
Nevertheless, Steiner plunges on, insisting that the 
Spinning science their way: United Nations 

















world has ‘less than seven years’ to stabilise GHG emissions. 76
Rajendra Pachauri represents a similar story of scientific 
sobriety and independence. An Indian economist and vegetarian, 
he is chairman of the IPCC and, in 2007, saw it awarded – along 
with Al Gore – a Nobel Peace Prize.
Pachauri isn’t backward coming forward about climate 
change. The prospect of cars in India costing just 100,000 
Rupees (£1300), he told Indian industrialists, meant that 
‘I am having nightmares, I don’t know what will happen then.’ 77
But it’s not just around driving that Pachauri exhibits 
strict scientific neutrality. His kinds of worry about the 
effect of cattle farming on climate change has made 
him advise readers of the London Observer: ‘Give up 
meat for one day [a week] initially, and decrease it 
from there.’ 78
 
After the Cold War, a fad for tipping points
In retrospect, the Cold War was a reasonably stable era. 79 Yet 
even before 9/11, post-Cold War visions of mass disaster stayed 
as strong as they were in the 1980s. Indeed, from Russians with 
nuclear suitcases in the early 1990s to bird flu today, fears of a 
conflagration have grown. 
 Today, more than any other contender, climate change has 
come to embody and concentrate risk consciousness. And it’s 
around climate change, more than any other issue, that computer 
forecasts of society have had a baleful influence. In the UK, 
officialdom now goes to market with models of the future by:
starting with the headlines it wants to generate•	
mixing in rich diagrams to show The Indisputable Science•	
adding grave, illustrated Days-in-the-Life-of-Daisy•	
alluding vaguely to an Annex, somewhere, that contains hard •	
number-crunching around some obscure algebraic formulae. 
Et voilà! The future is laid out for everyone to worry about. It can 









again, this New Scientism looks hip and incontrovertible. But in 
fact it’s deeply fatalistic. IPCC Working Group II recommends 
‘altered food and recreational choices’ and planning regulations. 81 
Working Group III wants people to adopt an ‘efficient 
driving style’. 82 But just like climate sceptics, both groups 
miss the point. 
 The consequences of climate change are like climate itself. 
They depend little on personal consumption and driving habits, 
and a lot more on each particular society’s level of economic 
development, and, not least, on the state of its energy supply.  
In the Third World as elsewhere, these things can be improved – 
and that’s a policy proposal determined not by climate science, 
but by respect for human talents.
 A new century has made a fad of tipping points. After 
all, the  ‘millennium bug’ in computers was supposed to lead 
to a world standstill. More importantly, a very popular book on 
the power of word-of-mouth communications in modern society 
proved a gift to climate zealots. 
 Malcolm Gladwell’s The Tipping Point: How Little Things 
Can Make a Big Difference was published in 2000. Using the 
language of epidemiology to track such trends, it suggested that 
the emergence of social trends was best understood if they were 
thought of as viruses. 83 Gladwell held that ‘little causes can 
have big effects’, and that human beings had ‘a hard time’ with 
geometrical progressions ‘because the end-result – the effect – 
seems far out of proportion to the cause’. He went on:
‘We need to prepare ourselves for the possibility that 
sometimes big changes follow from small events, and that 
sometimes these changes can happen very quickly.’ 84
Gladwell pointed out that viruses transform themselves and so 
can become much more deadly. But later, in an Afterword, he 
noted that people develop resistance to viruses. 85
 Despite the commendable balance Gladwell showed on 

















to the power of small events. As Spencer Weart notes, ‘Around 
2005 the phrase “tipping point” appeared in both scientific and 
popular climate reports, an admission that change could be not 
only rapid but irreversible’. 86 
 In 1972, Edward Lorenz gave a talk titled ‘Predictability: 
Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off A Tornado 
in Texas?’. 87 Today, this metaphor for chaos is largely forgotten. 
Instead, environmentalists refer to tipping points around future 
climate change with a knowing air, confident that nobody will 
object to the concept.
Melting ice as a tipping point:  
the example of Greenland
For climate alarmists, melting ice is an iconic image. The world 
boasts a lot of ice – in glaciers, floating at the North Pole, on 
Greenland and on the Antarctic. Lots of ice is also melting. But 
like climate, it’s never a cut-and-dried affair.
 Take Greenland’s ice sheet, remembering that the issues 
it raises are similar to those raised by Antarctica. Future rises 
in sea levels will not only, or even mostly, come from it melting. 
According to James Hansen, whom we cited in Chapter 1 and 
who is very alarmed about climate, the seas are rising at about 
3mm per year – but the melting of Greenland’s ice makes up 
only about 10 per cent of that. About 50 per cent of the rise is 
from expansion of water in the oceans as they warm. 88
 Greenland’s ice sheet has become the focus of concern 
because of the fear that it may pass some sort of tipping 
point. Indeed, though it’s only slowly melting at present, the 
whole thing could begin rapidly to slide into the sea. And once 
that happens…
 Hansen writes that ‘reticence may be a consequence of 
the scientific method’, but that ‘in a case such as ice sheet 
instability and sea level rise, there is a danger in excessive 
caution’. Addressing the possibility of climate tipping points, he 
concedes that the non-linearity of the ice sheet problem makes 









specific date. But he continues that the threat of a large change in 
sea levels is a ‘principal element’ in his line that additional global 
warming must be kept at less than 1° C above the temperature 
in the year 2000 – and that ‘even 1° C may be too great’. 89
 So would it be right to panic about Greenland’s ice? Well, 
if we leave out lots of other complications, the mass of that ice 
is in fact determined not by one process, but by the balance 
between two.
 Warming is thickening the ice at the centre of the Greenland 
ice sheet. Why? Because today’s warmer temperatures mean 
more evaporation over the world’s oceans. In turn, that means 
more precipitation – adding to Greenland’s ice.
 At the same time, warming has led to more melting at 
Greenland’s edges. That leads to more meltwater run-off, and 
more ‘calving’ of icebergs.
 If all Greenland’s ice were completely to melt, or slide 
into the sea, sea levels could rise by seven metres, drowning 
most of the world’s coastal cities. When Al Gore was challenged 
that his Photoshop images showing this were in fact worst-case 
scenarios, he invoked what he termed two ‘wild cards’: Greenland 
and West Antarctica. He continued: ‘Greenland is the wilder of 
the two.... It’s undergoing a radical discontinuity’. Gore said that 
scientists, when asked off the record if Greenland could break 
up this century, ‘cannot rule that out and privately will not’. 90
 In 2007, however, the IPCC painted a rather more 
sober picture. 
 To start with, it’s still not entirely certain how much 
Greenland’s ice is changing. The IPCC is probably fair in pointing 
out that ‘Lack of agreement between techniques and the 
small number of estimates preclude assignment of statistically 
rigorous error bounds’ – and in adding that ‘the short time 
interval covered by instrumental data is of concern in separating 
fluctuations from trends’. 91
 The IPCC’s best estimate is that the annual change in 
Greenland’s ice ranged from growth of 25 billion tonnes to 
Melting icebergs in Disko Bay, off of  























shrinkage of 60 billion tonnes, 1961-2003.
 Since 2003, it’s true, Greenland’s ice has been shrinking. 
Indeed shrinkage now stands at more than 100 billion tonnes a 
year. Yet that rate translates into an annual rise of sea levels of 
only 0.3mm. In turn, over a century, this amounts to just a few 
millimetres. 92
 That’s not such a big deal. As Bjørn Lomborg has pointed 
out, the last 150 years saw sea levels rise at 3mm per year. 93 
 The Greenland ice sheet has been melting since the end 
of the last Ice Age, and mankind has pushed that process along 
a little faster. But even with a global warming of 3º C in the 22nd 
century, models show most of Greenland’s ice remaining intact 
by the year 3000.
 It’s true that models have sea levels rising by more than 
two metres by AD 5000. 94 By then, though, humanity could well 
have radically tamed the climate, preserved Greenland or – more 
simply – moved coastal cities inland.
 Environmentalists claim that the IPCC was wrong to 
exclude poorly understood non-linear processes. 95 But the IPCC 
was only doing its job – laying out the relatively well-understood 
science. If Greens want to worry about things that are not yet 
established, they’re free to do so. What they cannot do is claim 
the mantle of established scientific consensus.
 It’s also true that seven metres of sea rise all at once, or 
even all in a single century, would be bad news. And as we’ve 
said, there remain important uncertainties in climate science.
 New processes have been discovered. Instead of flowing to 
the sea across the surface of ice, melt water can cut a crevasse 
downwards, going on to flow to the sea either through or under 
the ice. 96 In the words of Al Gore, the ice could be ‘like Swiss 
cheese, metaphorically, and vulnerable to a sudden breakup’. 97 
The worry is that this could lubricate the flow of ice, so that large 
parts of the Greenland ice sheet could simply slip into the sea.
 Perhaps environmentalists are right that Greenland’s ice 
will melt sooner rather than later. But a recent study suggests 

















Positioning System, the study’s authors measured the movement 
of Greenland’s glaciers over time. They concluded:
‘it has been suggested that the interaction between 
meltwater production and ice velocity provides a positive 
feedback, leading to a more rapid and stronger response 
of the ice sheet to climate warming than hitherto 
assumed. Our results are not quite in line with this 
view... the internal drainage system seems to adjust to 
the increased meltwater input in such a way that annual 
velocities remain fairly constant.’ 98
This, of course, will not be the last word in a rapidly advancing 
field of research. But two points have been established.
 First, fears about Greenland melting are not based on 
settled science. On the contrary, they are based on fear of the 
unknown. Second, as science develops, worst-case scenarios 
don’t always play out. In the 18 months since the IPCC published 
its last assessment, catastrophic scenarios have become less 
realistic, not more.
 Everyone will agree that more study is needed. But as 
for what else mankind should do, it’s clear that social attitudes 
toward risk and the Precautionary Principle will determine 




Even if climate is not a guaranteed catastrophe, economists 
argue that spending a lot of money now to cut emissions is 
justified as a form of insurance. After all, people don’t refuse 
to spend money on fire or health insurance on the grounds that 
that the worst will never happen.
 For economists, the question of how much to invest in, 
say, clean energy involves the same sort of calculations that 
an investor makes when looking to maximise return. Those 









interest rate it’s worth borrowing money to invest in a factory, or 
how quickly to pump oil out of a field to maximise profit.
 However, over climate, economists have produced some 
peculiar results: first, when trying to factor in the Precautionary 
Principle to their calculations, and second, when trying to apply 
insurance to the long term future of the whole of society.
 Stern acknowledges that most economic models show 
that 3° C of warming would be far from catastrophic. Indeed, he 
acknowledges that such a rise in temperature may even have 
beneficial effects:
‘Up to around 2-3° C warming, there is disagreement 
about whether the global impact of climate change will 
be positive or negative. But, even at these levels of 
warming, it is clear that any benefits are temporary and 
confined to rich countries, with poor countries suffering 
significant costs.’ 99
SInce the IPCC’s central projection is that a doubling of greenhouse 
gases will most likely produce a warming of 3° C, discussion might 
reasonably now focus on ensuring that all countries become rich 
– and on how to make benefits permanent. However, Stern uses 
‘uncertainty about the shape of the probability distributions for 
temperature and impacts, in particular at their upper end’ to 
justify focusing on worst-case scenarios and magnify the costs. 
100 He proceeds by expanding uncertainty along two dimensions, 
warning about ‘surprises’ in climate, and warning, too, about 
climate bringing about ‘conflict, migration and flight of capital 
investment’. 101
While the IPCC gives little basis for considering the 
kind of climate surprises Stern raises, he arbitrarily adds 
‘amplifying natural feedbacks in the climate system’ to the IPCC 
assessment. 102  There have been remarkably few objections to 
this cavalier approach.
Another precautionary economist, based at Harvard, is 















convert the Precautionary Principle into an insurance premium. 
Paul Krugman, who won the Nobel prize for economics in 2008, 
described Weitzman’s paper of the same year as ‘driving much 
of the recent high-level debate’ on climate. 103
In that paper, Weitzman tries to juggle vanishingly small 
probabilities of climate catastrophe against costs that verge on 
the extinction of human life. 104 Showing himself to be a better 
mathematician than economist, he concludes that the costs of 
climate catastrophe are... infinite. Indeed, Weitzman muses that 
the industrial revolution – let alone future emissions – may have 
not been worth the GHGs it has created. He wonders whether 
conventional economics is simply not equipped to deal with the 
type of risk raised by climate. Finally he believes that nobody has 
the answers he is looking for. 105
Weitzman’s derives his pessimistic results on the basis 
that extremely large climate changes are possible. He justifies 
this partly by the Precautionary Principle, and partly on the 
grounds that science cannot tell us even the scale of likely 
change – whether it is likely to be 0.3, 3, 30 or 300° C. But here 
Weitzman is wrong. Science has established the scale of climate 
sensitivity at 3° C. It may be half, twice or conceivably three 
times that. But it is not 10 or 100 times as large.
More attention to what is realistic would dramatically bring 
down the costs of climate change projected by both Stern and 
Weitzman.
A second problem arises from the attempt to take a long-
term view. The American economist William Nordhaus points 
out that Stern’s projected costs of climate change – a 20 per 
cent cut in consumption per head, now and forever – are not 
what they seem. That’s because Stern counts as costs today 
problems that will not arise for a long time to come. As Nordhaus 
puts it: 
‘the relatively small damages in the next two centuries get 
overwhelmed by the high damages over the centuries and 









methodology is used, more than half of the estimated 
damages “now and forever” occur after 2800.’ 106
Stern justifies his approach here by claiming that to neglect 
such long term costs would be a betrayal of future generations. 
In fact the approach is simply absurd. The costs that Stern 
imagines are from the spread of disease, effects on agriculture, 
flooding and so on. In reality even a discussion of 2100 seems 
highly speculative. 
In the 22nd century and beyond, there will be new 
technologies, settlements in new locations, and no doubt new 
diseases and problems to deal with. But to imagine we can 
today anticipate the extent to which warming will aggravate – or 
relieve – these problems is to underestimate how far society is 
capable of progressing.
To imagine that we can sensibly discuss the consequences 
of warming in the centuries after 2800 is to detach oneself still 
further from reality.
For Stern, the relationship between present and future 
generations – like the possibility of human extinction – comes 
down to actuarial calculations and assumptions about discount 
rates. His only question is who inflicts damage on whom, and 
how much should the culprit should be made to pay. That’s why 
he misses entirely the prospect that, through innovation now 
and in the future, the world will be made better and better for 
succeeding generations. 
The mindset that begins and ends with insurance policies 
is a  poor one with which to negotiate climate change. As an 
individual, you can insure your house – and if it burns down, the 
insurance company can compensate you. 
But the long-term future of the world will not work out 

















Regulation cannot be a force for energy innovation 
If – and it’s quite a big if – international diplomacy and the 
Precautionary Principle win a new agreement on climate 
change, succeeding the Kyoto Protocol for the year 2012 and 
beyond, it will actually be nothing to celebrate. Regulators may 
pass laws and set targets for reductions in CO2, but these 
guarantee nothing.
 In 2005, the consultants McKinsey, often described as 
as the Jesuits of capitalism, pronounced that regulation, for 
decades the bête noir of free-marketeers, was a good thing. 
Acutely, McKinsey wrote:
‘For companies in many nations, regulatory policy 
increasingly shapes the structure and conduct of 
industries and sets in motion major shifts in economic 
value. In network industries such as airlines, electricity, 
railways, and telecommunications, as well as in banking, 
pharmaceuticals, retailing, and many other businesses, 
regulation is the single biggest uncertainty affecting 
capital expenditure decisions, corporate image, and risk 
management. In the electric power industry, for example, 
the smallest price revisions can have a dramatic impact 
on corporate profits.’ 107
 
Regulation, McKinsey insisted, should become a core element 
of corporate strategy. Inside companies, a high-level executive 
with easy access to the CEO should run ‘the regulatory function’. 
That function should expand way beyond the traditional role 
of compliance and periodic interaction with regulators. 
Instead, savvy companies should aim to be ‘thought partners’ 
for regulators. They shouldn’t only manage regulatory risk, but 
also shape their industries and create potential opportunities 
for themselves. 108 In short – though McKinsey was only implicit 










 In fact, regulation cannot be a force for innovation. 
Innovation in energy supply must take precedence over new 
rules, because realities will be determined by innovation, not 
by legislators.
 In December 2007 the revered consultants in innovation, 
Arthur D Little (ADL), came to conclusions similar to those of 
McKinsey. Carbon – defined, worryingly, as ‘greenhouse gases 
that include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and ozone’ 
– was helping to rewrite the rules of competition in business, 
locally and globally, by ‘creating new opportunities for competitive 
advantage’. The thing to do was to go about ‘creating a carbon-
integrated strategy; and ADL hinted this should be done at 
board level. But in that strategy, innovation should not mean 
technological innovation. ADL said: 
‘Innovation plays a key role in carbon management for 
business protection and business creation. However, 
senior executives need to recognize that their business 
will gain most benefit from innovation that goes beyond 
exploiting carbon markets and new technologies. What’s 
needed is innovation based on understanding how markets 
will look in a low-carbon economy in 2020; understanding 
your core competencies, now and in the future, as part of 
an effective partnering strategy; and understanding new 
routes to market.’ 109
McKinsey wanted the regulatory function to be a ‘thought partner’ 
of the state. For its part, ADL wanted the carbon function to go 
forecasting, checking competencies, partnering, and thinking 
about mechanisms of distribution.
 These are not programmes of innovation; rather, they 
show the dominance of the regulatory mindset. 
 Regulation today is driven not by a commitment to genuine 
innovation, but by a political crisis of legitimacy and a strong 
aversion to risk. It is less direct than in the past, and less driven 

















we shall see in Chapter 7 – more perverse in its consequences 
than in the past. 
 For environmentalists and governments, ‘doing something’ 
means passing laws and agreeing treaties. For us, ‘doing 
something’ means taking action on the ground, and in the real 
world. We hold that more energy for the world will require each 
and every one of the key technologies discussed in the next three 
chapters to be planned, implemented, evaluated and improved.
 In the global politics of regulation, the role of the EU is 
notable. With 27 members, the EU is now, as the Financial Times 
observes, the world’s biggest economy. It is also the world’s 
biggest single trading bloc, ‘setting many of the world’s de facto 
regulatory standards’. 110 
In energy, the EU’s benign interventions include proposals 
that: 
manufacturers of domestic appliances cut, by 2020, the •	
power that their machines use while on standby by 73 per 
cent 111
carmakers cut the average carbon emitted by new cars •	
from 160g/km in 2006 to 120g/km by 2012, and to 95g/
km by 2020. 112 
 
These measures seem innocuous enough. But they are far from 
free of problems.
Through regulation, the EU hopes to improve the energy 
efficiency not just of domestic appliances, but also of every kind 
of consumer product – lights, air conditioning units, PCs. Yet 
even if the EU never regulated these things, firms, in the 21st 
century, already compete to improve the energy performance of 
their goods. Sometimes it is cheaper to manufacture appliances 
that use a little more energy; but there’s rarely a reason not to 
consider running costs.
Mobile phone operators are worried about the ‘mobile 
footprint’. 113 Much of the international design community, 









that the new, right and proper mission of product design is to 
minimise carbon footprints. But as regulations multiply, the focus 
of the corporate innovation will tend to shift away from all-round 
improvements toward compliance with decrees. In particular, 
complying with regulation takes time – something that small and 
medium enterprises, often a source of innovations, have little of. 
Strikingly, when carmakers fail to make the EU’s regulatory 
targets, they will be fined – and the fines will fund innovation. 
Errant manufacturers, the European Parliament suggests,
‘… should pay an excess emissions premium in respect 
of each calendar year from 2012 onwards. The premium 
should be modulated as a function of the extent to which 
manufacturers fail to comply with their target. It should 
increase over time… to provide a sufficient incentive to 
take measures to reduce specific emissions of CO2 from 
passenger cars, the premium should reflect technological 
costs. The amounts of the excess emissions premium 
should be considered as revenue for the budget of 
the European Union and used to increase support for 
CO2 reduction research and innovation activities in the 
automotive sector.’ 114
It all sounds great, doesn’t it? The Brussels Commission can 
cane manufacturers into behaving, and make regulatory fines a 
force for even more innovation.
The trouble is that heroic targets, as Joseph Stalin found 
out, don’t necessarily make for heroic results. California’s 
attempt to legislate zero emission vehicles is instructive here. 
Without the technology becoming a reality, the legislation had 
to be scrapped.
In 1990, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) 
passed the Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate, requiring a rising 
percentage of California’s cars to be free of emissions. Not 
too long after that, however, US car manufacturers negotiated 
















mandate require them to build the electric car only to the extent 
that there was consumer demand for it. By 2003, the date 
at which 10 per cent of new vehicles were meant to be zero 
emission, CARB chairman Alan Lloyd ended the Mandate. 115
The lesson is that passing a law or making a regulation 
demanding higher environmental standards can lead nowhere.
There is a place for regulation. Regulation can ensure 
that businesses stick to standards that have been agreed upon 
as socially acceptable. The public needs to be protected from 
serious hazards and businesses need to work on a level playing 
field. But regulation is most effective in codifying the status quo. 
It’s too blunt to be a consistent agent of change. If the demands 
of regulation are too far out of line with what’s technically possible, 
or with how people behave, then regulation is experienced as 
diktat, and is actively resisted where it is not simply ignored.
Socially acceptable standards deserve full political debate 
before regulations are adopted. That much is confirmed by the 
example of the EU creating regulated markets for CO2. These 
were certainly not subjected to popular European debate – and 
the results have been decidedly mixed.
Capping and trading CO2 cannot  
be a force for innovation 
We saw in Chapter 1 how Ronald Coase effectively preferred 
the state putting a market price on the right to pollute to 
pollution taxes. The Kyoto Protocol gave much impetus to this 
second strategy. 
The Protocol demands that developed economies cut GHG 
emissions by five per cent, 2008-12. Since January 2005, the 
EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) has tried to meet Kyoto’s 
provisions by setting a limit on the aggregate CO2 emissions 
made by 11,500 energy-intensive industrial facilities – including 
power stations; together, these are responsible for nearly half 
the EU’s CO2 emissions and, thus, 40 per cent of its GHG 
emissions. 116 The ETS has accounted for more than 80 per cent 
of the world’s market for CO2. 










prime example of the world’s attempts to cap and trade CO2.  
How is the ETS supposed to operate? At the end of 
each year, firms in the EU emitting less GHGs than the amount 
allowed under National Allocation Plans (NAPs) are able to sell 
their excess allowances on exchanges, while those emitting 
more than their quota must either clean up their act, and/or buy 
the extra allowances they need on the market. The hope has 
been that, by engineering a scarcity of allowances, NAPs would 
force cuts in emissions. 
It has not worked out that way.
The first trading period of the ETS ran from 2005 to 2007. 
Here, a number of EU member states gave away, for free, too 
many allowances – each of which gives the right to emit one 
tonne of CO2. That lowered the price of allowances, adding to 
difficulties already experienced in verifying data and harmonising 
allocations between different member states. 
The EU’s top bureaucrats failed to anticipate this 
development. As they blithely put it,
‘The Commission has no view on what the price of 
allowances should be. The price is a function of supply 
and demand as in any other free market.’ 118
How a market created by Brussels could function like ‘any other 
free market’ seemed to escape the collective eminence of 
the Commission. 
In the second trading period, running from 2009 to 2012, 
the EU, now supplemented by Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, 
intends to cap national emissions at an average of about 6.5 per 
cent below 2005 levels. It also intends to give fewer allowances 
away, and instead auction more. For the third trading period, 
running from 2013 to 2020, the EU intends, in 2009, to 
establish one EU-wide cap instead of 27 NAPS•	


















auction 60 per cent of allowances in 2013, and higher •	
percentages in later years
extend the ETS to new sectors (petrochemicals, ammonia •	
and aluminium), and to GHGs beyond CO2 (N2O emissions 
from the production of acids, and perfluorocarbons from 
the production of aluminium).
 
Altogether, and without including all the modifications of 
the second and third trading periods, these measures are 
meant to cut EU CO2 emissions from about two to about 
1.7 Gigatonnes. 119
 The best-laid regulations, however, can go awry. In July 
2008, a one-tonne CO2 allowance cost €29.33; by November 
2008, it cost merely €18.25. As recession hampered economic 
activity and so diminished emissions, so firms needed to buy 
fewer allowances to prove themselves clean. As Carl Mortished, 
world business editor of the Times, commented, the ETS had 
made ‘a mockery’ of Europe’s ‘stumbling attempts to lead the 
world in a market-based carbon strategy’. 120
In revising its own regulations, the EU’s administrators ask 
themselves no fewer than 34 questions about it. 121 That just 
might suggest that regulation cannot dynamise innovation. Yet 
back in 2005, McKinsey was emphatic that it could. Kyoto’s 
implementation was reshaping international energy markets. The 
ETS had created a multibillion-euro market for CO2 emissions 
certificates. It had
‘… reshaped the incentives for electricity production 
as generators switch from coal-burning to natural gas-
fired plants to achieve lower levels of CO2 emissions, for 
example. The strategic landscape is being redrawn as 
a result.’
A Europe-wide electrical utility, McKinsey reported, had brilliantly 
modelled how best to allocate CO2 emissions certificates before 









a holistic perspective, on different national markets within the 
EU. And so? Its final allocation plans ‘highlighted arbitrage 
possibilities’ in: 
replacing capacity or building new capacity in neighbouring •	
markets 
re-importing electricity through the European power •	
grid. 122
So the reality of the nation state within the schemas of 
international energy regulation makes for innovation – but 
innovation in the sense of arbitrage, or profiting from the 
differences in prices between different markets; or in the sense 
of re-importing electricity. 
How terrifically innovative!
From Kyoto to Copenhagen
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol committed developed nations to a five 
per cent cut in emissions below their 1990 levels, as measured 
over the period 2008-2012. At the end of 2009 talks are set for 
negotiations in Copenhagen to replace the Kyoto Protocol.
First, it is worth assessing Kyoto. From 1990 to 2006, 
EU emissions fell by 4.6 per cent, with the record of individual 
countries varying from the UK’s 15.6 per cent cut to a rise of 
53.5 per cent in Spain. Over the same period, Japan’s emissions 
rose by 5.8 per cent. In the US, which signed but did not ratify 
Kyoto, emissions rose by 14 per cent, while in Canada, which did 
ratify the treaty, emissions rose by 54.8 per cent – mainly due to 
the development of oil sands. 
In total, countries committing to cuts under Kyoto, 
including the US, reduced emissions between by 4.7 per cent. 
But most of that was due to the collapse of industry in Eastern 
Europe following the end of communism. For the Eastern 
European ‘economies in transition’, emissions fell by 37 per cent. 
The remainder of the developed world increased emissions by 
















Eastern Europe shows that economic collapse is a route 
to reduction of emissions, albeit a destructive one. In the case 
of the UK, reductions were achieved by a shift from coal to 
gas. Many of the easier cuts in non-CO2 GHGs, for example in 
agriculture, have already been made; so future cuts are likely 
to be harder and concentrated around energy. Investments in 
clean energy will begin to have a greater impact over the coming 
years – but falls in emissions are unlikely to meet Kyoto targets 
by 2012 unless the economic downturn following the Crash of 
2008 proves to be prolonged and deep. 
To meet their targets, countries in the developed world are 
relying on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Instead of 
setting the developing world targets, Kyoto set up the CDM as 
a scheme that allows the developed world to meet targets by 
paying for emissions reductions in the developing world. But the 
record of the CDM is not very encouraging.
In principle, investments under the CDM must be in 
projects where the emissions would not otherwise have been 
cleaned up, known in bureaucrat-speak as ‘additionality’.
In practice, as with emissions trading generally, the CDM 
has been surrounded by suspicion of scams and corruption. In 
some cases it appears to have stimulated emissions for the sole 
purpose of cleaning them up to gain credit, as in Chinese and 
Indian factories producing hydrofluorocarbon refrigerants. 124
The CDM has not brought much genuine clean technology 
to the developing world. Instead, it has acted as a means for the 
developed world to avoid the real challenge: using innovation to 
develop cheap clean energy.
No doubt Copenhagen will attempt to correct what are 
seen as the weaknesses of Kyoto. In some cases, however, 
the mistakes could be magnified. If conservation of forests is 
written in as an alternative to technological innovation, then 
investments from the rich countries in preventing deforestation 
in poorer countries that want to develop their land may provoke 
far more tension than has been the case with the CDM.









the developed world and the rising economies led by India and 
China. From 2000 to 2008, European smugness had an outlet 
in the figure of George W Bush. With Obama in the White House, 
it is likely that the East, and China in particular, will loom larger 
as a target for Green opprobrium.
It also seems likely that the developed world will try to 
agree a global cap and trade system. But how the countries 
of the East will fit into that system is unclear. At present, 
their negotiating position is a robust one: that they cannot 
compromise on growth. Whether that position will shift remains 
to be seen. But China has already in some respects gone further, 
demanding that the developed world spend at least one per cent 
of its GDP on technology transfer. 125
Two key factors will be more important than paper targets 
and markets for CO2. First: innovation to cheapen clean energy. 
Realistically, it is this that will set the pace at which emissions 
are cut. The biggest danger at Copenhagen is that cuts will be 
agreed that try to go too fast, too soon, by relying on efficiency 
and cutbacks instead of ambitious, long-term R&D.
The second factor is the overall pace of economic growth 
in the world economy. A slowdown may, at first, appear as good 
news for emissions, which will fall for a year or two. But aside 
from its disregard for economic welfare, that perspective is 
shortsighted. In the longer term, energy will only be cleaned up 
by new investment and replacement of the energy infrastructure. 
That demands economic growth.
Consider again China’s demand for technology transfer. If 
the economy of the developed world were to grow for a single year 
at three per cent rather than two per cent, or two per cent rather 
than one per cent, then that extra growth would be sufficient to 
fund a clean-up of China’s energy sector.

















Summing up this chapter
The balance of evidence suggests that man-made global warming 
has outrun man-made global cooling – and that man is the key 
factor in climate nowadays.
 But the balance between certainty and uncertainty 
in climate science is also important. We’ve argued that the 
certainties are much greater than they were when Roger Revelle 
discovered global warming.
 Today’s remaining uncertainties deserve full debate. They 
don’t, however, justify Greens in what might be called not a ladder 
of nuclear escalation, but a greasy slide of climate categories. 
On that slide,
1. Selfish consumption and untempered economic growth  
 boost global warming
2. Feedback effects raise temperatures still further
3. Greenland’s ice, or ice somewhere else, melts irreversibly
4. Sea levels rise, mass migrations to higher land begin
5. With climate as a whole, non-linear, chaotic and tipping- 
 point behaviour grows – irreversibly
6. Climate proves capable of infinite surprises
7. The world goes to the dogs.
Yet enough now is known about climate, in fact, to say that 
melodramatic leaps, switches, or flips are unlikely. If they do 
happen, science is also unlikely to be taken by surprise. The 
picture with climate is evolution more than revolution. If global 
warming speeds up still further, an attentive science community 
is likely to spot the trend. 
 Mankind shouldn’t lose its nerve. It has some years yet to 
develop a more rational energy supply. Here, it’s time to ditch 
illusions in: 
science as consensual and precautionary•	










regulation and international treaties as dynamos of •	
innovation.
The New Scientism insists that climate science has met the 
end of its history and means you must change your habits. By 
contrast, we argue that climate science remains open. Our 
interpretation of it, however, suggests that mankind can and 


















Has global warming stopped since 1998?
According to many climate sceptics, global warming stopped 
in 1998 – or perhaps in 2000. 126 Others who accept the 
IPCC’s science as a basis of policy – Nigel Lawson and Bjørn 
Lomborg, for instance – also make the point that warming 
has stopped. They do that as a reminder that the science is not 
really settled. 127
 The issue is an interesting example of the distinction 
between climate and weather. Sceptics argue that the past 10 
years are enough to characterise climate, while mainstream 
science sees variation over that period as more akin to weather.
 Here’s a chart of global average surface air temperatures 
over more than a century: 
Global average surface air temperatures, 1880-2007: 
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Now here’s a close-up of the same temperature data over the 
years beginning in 1998. Choosing 1998, an exceptionally hot 
year, as a starting point disguises the long term trend… but 









Global average surface air temperatures, 1998-2007: 
change from 1951-80 average baseline, º C 129
º C
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The first chart shows a trend toward warming, with fluctuations 
around it. The causes of some of these fluctuations are 
understood. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo, a volcano in the 
Philippines, brought about a dip in 1992. A strong El Niño caused 
the striking peak that appeared in 1998. 
 The acceleration of the trend toward warming since 1975 
is clearly evident – and, what’s more, the past decade is in line 
with that acceleration. On the other hand, recent temperatures 
could be taken as roughly constant.
 Statistical techniques can refine these observations, but 
they don’t change the basic picture. Looking at data over the past 
10 years, it’s consistent with global warming having stopped. But 
it’s just as consistent with continued warming. Taken in isolation, 
it just isn’t very informative.
 Nobody would argue that a single cool day, month or 

















 Variability in temperature data is such that 10 years is just 
too short a period to comment on. To see whether or not the 
trend has levelled off or is continuing, meteorologists probably 
need to make observations till 2015. 
 If the theory of global warming rested on global surface 
air temperature series alone, it might be in trouble. It certainly 
couldn’t be held with much confidence.
 In fact, however, mankind’s understanding of climate 
rests on a vast web of interlocking observations and theory. For 
example, there are observations not just of global temperature, 
but also of how temperatures vary 
in different regions•	
across the oceans and in their depths•	
through the atmosphere, between day and night •	
between the seasons.  •	
A particularly important observation is of sea temperatures. 
Heating water needs more energy than heating air (think of 
heating a pan on a stove). Although the oceans also show some 
variability, the warming is slower and steadier, and so more 
revealing of the long term trend.
 The latest data on ocean warming go up to 2003, and 
show no slowdown in warming. 130
 There are observations of other variables such as 
precipitation and wind. And there are also connections to other 
parts of science, where both theory and experiment allow 
predictions to be made. 
 All these pieces of evidence underlie the proposition that 
CO2 is having and will continue to have a warming effect. 
131 There 
is no space in this book to explore most of that evidence. But 
given everything else that is known about climate, including the 
long-term trend in global temperatures, we think it very unlikely 
that warming has stopped.
 However, the fact that on short time scales it is hard 









is presently gradual rather than catastrophic. As Lawson and 
Lomborg suggest, it should also remind people to keep an open 
mind. New data needs to be kept under constant review.
Is climate science now settled?
When the climate protest group Plane Stupid attacked the 
expansion of Heathrow airport, it held up banners claiming it 
came ‘armed … only with peer-reviewed science’. 132 Among 
campaigning journalists and Green bloggers, too, peer-reviewed 
science has become a totem for the ecologically correct. It’s held 
to have confirmed the case for action, and in conclusive style. 
 Climate sceptics often agree that mainstream science 
presents a monolithic picture. For them, however, the granite-
hard agreement is a result of a nefarious conspiracy, through 
which peer review crushes dissenting voices.
 Neither of these positions holds up to scrutiny. An 
examination of the scientific literature shows that plenty of 
doubts are voiced.
 The amount of research going into climate right now is 
vast. As a result, it’s easy to find articles in leading journals 
proclaiming that:
in ocean mixing, ‘much remains to be discovered’ •	 133 
predicting how changes to the •	 stratosphere will affect 
surface climate remains ‘a substantial task’ 134
the imprecision of computer models of atmosphere and •	
oceans is ‘irreducible’ 135 
with forests, global models of the biosphere-atmosphere •	
system are ‘still in their infancy’. Extrapolating from lab 
experiments or site-specific field studies to large scale 
climate models remains ‘a daunting challenge’ 136
models of climate addressing the next few decades •	
differ in the regions for which their predictions are most 

















Nor do many policy reports, when closely read, back up the 
impression often given by newspaper headlines – that ‘the 
science is in’.
It’s true that policymakers are fixated on science. But as 
this chapter’s treatment of the Stern Review shows, what are 
really obsessed about are the limits to science. 
Science, it’s claimed, has shown the possibility of disaster. 
Therefore science just isn’t strong enough to be able to rule 
disaster out, and often cannot even quantify its probability. In fact, 
though, Greens, governments and climate sceptics alike present 
everything as scientific so as to avoid political arguments.
For Greens, human actions are limited by nature. Since 
science is the study of nature, Greens are bound to elevate it so 
it becomes an all-powerful oracle.
For governments, science provides a basis for consensus 
at a time when they possess no big visions that can command 
mass loyalty. Not just in climate, but right across the board, 
government managers appeal to what’s termed evidence-based 
policy. Old-fashioned ideologies no longer get a look-in.
 For climate sceptics, emphasising science is a way 
of avoiding political combat. Sceptics find it hard to make a 
substantive reply to Green politics, often viewing it simply as a 
continuation of left-wing thought. Moreover, free-market sceptics 
are often suspicious of politics altogether, seeing it as little more 
than a grubby interference with ‘natural’ economic processes.
 Of course any critic of climate alarmism needs to answer 
the scary scenarios put forward by the Greens. But the case 
cannot be won on technical grounds alone – and attempts to do 
so inevitably lead to a distortion of science.
 More importantly, the argument that the science isn’t 
settled is not the trump card that sceptics believe it to be. 
After all: if, like Greens and governments, you believe in the 
Precautionary Principle, then uncertainty in science is a reason 


































Late and uniquely 
artificial as a means of 
energy supply, nuclear 
power should no longer 
be demonised. It can 
help meet the world’s 










‘We nuclear people have made a Faustian 
bargain with society.’ So wrote America’s nuclear chief Alvin 
Weinberg (Chapter 2), in 1972. Nuclear scientists, Weinberg 
argued, promised society cheap, inexhaustible energy which, 
‘when properly handled’, was ‘almost non-polluting’. However, in 
return, the need was to develop ‘a vigilance and a longevity of 
our institutions that we are quite unaccustomed to’. The need 
for vigilance followed from the danger of a catastrophic nuclear 
accident; the need for longevity, from the spectre of long-lived 
nuclear waste. 1
 Societies had made similar choices before, Weinberg 
added. Humanity’s move into agriculture, once accomplished, 
demanded that fields be tended forever; Dutch dikes required 
eternal maintenance. Weinberg concluded that ‘society must 
then make the choice’, a choice that ‘we nuclear people cannot 
dictate’. For him, though, investing in nuclear energy seemed 
‘well worth the price’. 
 Since Weinberg, environmentalists have come to different 
conclusions. For them, the bargain post-war nuclear science 
made with society hasn’t been worth the price at all. With 
nuclear matters, Greens worry about safety, waste, terrorist 
attacks, proliferation, costs and secrecy. Long able to slow the 
building of nuclear reactors, Greens have put the West’s nuclear 
industry on the defensive. 
 The East is building nuclear power much faster than 
the West. But instead of forgetting Dr Faustus, the West now 
wants to control what it sees as the East’s embrace of the 
nuclear bogeyman.
Legend has Faust selling his soul to the Devil in return for 
knowledge – and thus power. Traditionally, Faust was the scientist 
tempted to embark on reckless experiments in pursuit of learning. 
The legend captures how experimentation has always raised 
uncomfortable problems, even as it portends progress. But in 
the more optimistic tellings of the story, such as Goethe’s, Faust 























 With Weinberg the story is changed. Nuclear scientists 
are portrayed not as Faust, but as the Devil. It’s not them 
who have to make a fateful choice, but society. Altogether, 
Weinberg confirmed nuclear science and the energy available 
from the atomic nucleus as demonic powers that are outside 
normal society.
 Weinberg’s Faust fits with more general thinking since 
1945. Alongside the idea of consumer society (see Chapter 2), 
technology has come to be seen as an unstoppable, alien force 
that is beyond the ambit of consumers, though exercising a great 
influence on them. Thus the Internet is a ‘driver’ of globalisation, 
and genetics imperil the family. Or so we’re told...
 Before the acclaimed Internet Age and the Biotech Century, 
mankind was supposed to be in the Atomic Age. Nuclear power, 
then, always bolstered theories that had society as determined 
by, not the determinant of, technology. In the flawed post-war 
framework of technological determinism, nuclear power in the 
end appeared as intrinsically so brutish and military in origin, 
its entire trajectory could only be downhill. 3 Mankind’s nuclear 
dabblings were thus scripted to go awry, irrespective of social 
regime, economic conditions or political priorities. 
 In Chapter 3 we mentioned how Robert Oppenheimer, 
the father of Hiroshima, framed the power of the atom in fully 
apocalyptic terms.
 But a chain reaction in the atomic world, or in a reactor, 
need not lead directly to a conflagration for society.
Uniquely artificial, with a uniquely high energy density
As a form of energy, nuclear is the latest on the world scene. It’s 
also the one in which science and the military have been most 
involved. Nuclear fuels require a deeper interference with nature 
than fossil fuels or renewables. 
 For Greens, then, nuclear energy’s uniquely artificial 
character makes it sinister – and its military associations confirm 
the point. Historically and logically, nuclear appears to have been 









 The artifice of nuclear emerges in the sheer quantity 
of energy on offer from very little fuel. For those who want to 
conserve energy rather than meet new demand for it, that’s bad. 
But handled with care, and often generating more than 1 GW in 
a single plant, nuclear materials show just how much mankind 
can transform energy supply.
 Why does ‘nucleonics’ punch above its weight? 4 Chemical 
reactions, such as burning fossil fuels, concern the electrons 
that orbit nuclei within a tenth of a millionth of a millimetre. But 
nuclei themselves are a hundred thousand times smaller than 
that. 5 Now, it’s a basic law of quantum physics that smaller 
distances mean higher energies. For this reason, the physics 
of sub-atomic particles is called high-energy physics – and the 
energy released by nuclear engineering is colossal.
 In chemistry, nuclei are unchanged, and relatively low 
amounts of energy are released. But if, bombarded by neutrons, 
a nucleus shatters, it unleashes enormous amounts of energy. 
Thus nuclear fuels have a much higher energy density than 
chemical ones: 
Energy densities of some non-nuclear and nuclear 
fuels, kilowatt-hours per kilogram 6




Uranium after processing 3,500,000
Note that spent nuclear fuel can be reprocessed. In the 
reprocessing, unburned fissile uranium, newly created plutonium 
and newly created fissile uranium are drawn off and separated 
from high-level waste, and the bulk of the energy in the original 
fuel is recovered. This allows far more energy to be extracted from 
each original kilogram of uranium. Instead of a handful of kilowatt-























 Does the energy density of nuclear fuels, then, make 
them diabolically powerful? To argue this would be to scapegoat 
the subatomic world, nuclear physics and nuclear engineering for 
modern society’s loss of political and moral direction. If society 
can regain direction, then nuclear energy would be less like black 
magic; it would be less enigmatic and less frightening.
 People don’t mind unseen electrons working for them in 
the realm of IT. Similarly, hundreds of millions of people have 
learned to live with unseen nuclear reactions delivering energy to 
their homes. Nuclear physics is no longer a mystery. It’s simply 
retrogressive to hold high-energy exercises in the sub-atomic 
realm as above and beyond man’s capabilities.
Why we favour nuclear power
The difficulties that undoubtedly surround nuclear power are 
neither technological, nor to do with physics. Much depends on 
how society chooses to handle those difficulties. What, then are 
the positive reasons for nuclear power?
 First, the world needs lots more cheap energy – and 
nuclear power stations can help meet that need quite rapidly. It’s 
a sad fact that renewable sources of energy cannot immediately 
meet the rise of energy demand, whether in the UK or in Asia 
(see Chapter 6). But after 50 years of mostly trouble-free 
operation, today’s nuclear power station designs represent a 
mature technology that can be installed en masse.
 Reactors are ready to go. As we shall see shortly, no 
fewer than 300 are under construction or planned. Whereas 
wind turbines can be rapidly deployed in numbers today, their 
capacities rarely extend much higher than 3 MW. And, given all 
their problems of intermittency and energy storage, 1000 wind 
turbines are needed to generate energy equivalent to that put 
out by a typical nuclear power station.
 We deal with the economics of nuclear energy at the end 
of this chapter. But this much is clear already: the unique energy 
density of nuclear fuels makes them providers of prodigious 









costs with nuclear reactors form a very modest part of running 
costs. This is our second reason for backing nuclear power.
 Although uranium mining, like mining and drilling generally, 
is a hazardous business, to extract the nuclear ore necessary 
to generate a kilowatt-hour of electricity is a much less labour-
intensive affair than extracting the coal, oil or gas needed to 
generate the same kilowatt-hour. 
 Ironically, mining nature for nuclear fuels requires much 
less human effort than the search for fossil fuels. Thereafter, 
energy density ensures that, all along the supply chain to reactors, 
the costs of manipulating and transporting enough nuclear fuel 
to generate a kilowatt-hour are low compared with the cost of 
manipulating and transporting fossil fuels. Tucked away in an 
annex of a UK government White Paper published in 2006, the 
chart below confirms that as an input to reactor operating costs, 
fuel counts for little:
Indicative composition of nuclear running  































Because fuel costs with nuclear reactors form a very modest 
part of running costs, nuclear is ideal for baseload electricity 
generation. Running reactors flat out costs little more than 
running them slowly. While output from a gas-fired station can be 
racked up, rather expensively, to meet peak demand, a reactor 
is typically always on and delivering maximum output. Like coal 
(see Chapter 5), nuclear is the reliably powerful workhorse of 
future electricity generation.
 There’s another way of formulating the low running costs 
of nuclear. We uphold nuclear plants because we believe that the 
large-scale development of fixed capital testifies to the progress, 
such as it is, achieved by capitalist society. 
 It costs a lot of money to build a nuclear facility, and 
those costs are only amortised over a number of years. The 
relatively low running costs of nuclear power are something that 
it shares with renewables, and differentiate it, too, from fossil 
fuel plants. In the latter, coal and gas are continuously bought 
on the open market and respectively comprise a large and very 
large proportion of running costs. By contrast, nuclear embodies 
not so much repeated market transactions as a political and 
economic commitment to making energy for years and years. 
That kind of commitment is worth defending in its own right.
 Thirdly and finally, we favour nuclear power stations 
because in operation they generate no CO2. Famously, this 
is the line taken by James Lovelock, inventor of the Gaia 
theory. 8 It isn’t our primary argument, but in the course of 
building a new round of nuclear power stations, it represents an 
advantage over plants based on fossil fuels, and especially over 
coal-fired power stations. 9
Today’s nuclear revival
In 2006, just 439 nuclear reactors supplied 16 per cent of the 
world’s electricity, a quarter of OECD countries’ electricity, and 
more than three quarters’ of France’s. Nuclear engineers could 
boast of more than 13,000 years of operational experience. 10 









 In a risk-averse world, however, the revival is modest by 
historical standards. The IEA estimates that the planet needs 
between 24 and 32 new 1000 MW nuclear power stations each 
year between 2010 and 2050 – in other words, for between 
960 and 1280. But as the IEA has also noted, between 1977 
and 1993 France alone brought an average 3.6 reactors into 
operation each year. Given that world economic activity in 2005 
was about 30 times that of France in 1985, the IEA points out, 
scaling up France’s old nuclear programme to the whole world 
today would mean building 100 reactors a year – equivalent to 
adding 160 GW a year if each had the capacity set by Finland’s 
Olkiluoto project, a 1.6 GW Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). 11
 One hundred reactors a year sounds like a lot. But in the 
1980s, a new one opened almost every two weeks, until the 
1986 explosion at Chernobyl slowed the pace. 12 
 The good news today is that, for the first time in 30 
years, construction has resumed in the West. The East is also 
seeing dramatic growth. After years in which uranium markets 
were glutted and many reactors could be run on material from 
old Soviet warheads, demand for uranium is picking up. New 
mines are being explored in Africa and elsewhere. In the US, 
construction of plants to enrich nuclear fuel has revived.
 Aged Western nuclear firms now see opportunities in the 
East. America’s Shaw Group and France’s Areva have each won 
major Chinese contracts. In the East there’s a chance for the 
West to build up-to-date designs that only exist on paper back 
home. Thus Westinghouse, which is owned by Toshiba, will see 
the first implementation of its new AP1000 reactor design not 
in the US, where 12 are planned, but in two pairs of reactors 
at Sanmen and Halyang, China. Electricity generation is set for 
2013 – and 5000 US jobs will be created by the project. 13
 Much of Western nuclear innovation is today based on 
simplifying reactors so as to cut costs and increase safety. 
That’s the rationale behind the fourth generation (4G) reactors of 
the future. There are also smaller designs, to suit rural 























still, more people should now be able to gain their first access 
to nuclear electricity.
 Significantly, the more serious nuclear innovations now 
come from the developing world.
 In South Africa, Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Pty) Ltd 
plans to build eponymous reactors – the biggest change in 
nuclear reactor design since its inception. The company hopes 
to encapsulate fuel in thousands of graphite spheres rather than 
rods, making refuelling continuous, easy and safe. Construction 
is set to begin in 2009; plans are for 4-5 GW to come from 
20-30 pebble bed machines rated at 165 MW each. 14 South 
Africa is also collaborating with China on PBMRs, not least 
because China was first to develop an experimental plant. 
 Meanwhile India, which has little indigenous uranium, has 
for some time been developing ‘breeder’ reactors that convert 
thorium, which is thought to be three times more abundant than 
uranium, into usable uranium fuel. 15
The East is where the action is 
Among developed nations, France and Japan have few domestic 
fossil fuel resources, and have looked to nuclear energy as an 
alternative. Behind only the US, they lead the world in terms 
of numbers of reactors generating electricity. But the centre 
of new nuclear development has shifted East: to Asia, Russia 
and Eastern Europe. South Africa is the only African country 
with definite nuclear plans, although these are at a relatively 
early stage. 









The East is going nuclear more than the West: 
reactors operable, under construction and envisaged, 
and planned capacity increases, GW 16
Operable Being built Planned /
proposed 
New  GW, 
date
USA 104 0 32 
France 59 1 1
Japan 55 2 13 9 by 2015
UK 19 0 0
Germany 17 0 0
Sweden 10 0 0
Brazil 2 0 5
Russia 31 7 35 22 by 2020
India 17 6 19 16 by 2020
China 11 7 100 40 by 2020
South Korea 20 3 5 12 by 2017
South Africa 2 0 25
Rest of world 92 10 76
Total 439 36 311
In contrast with vibrancy in the East, nuclear power in the UK 
is going nowhere fast. Once a pioneer in the genre, the UK 
today continues in the more recent tradition of governments 
outsourcing policy – miring nuclear in consultations, deliberative 
workshops and stakeholder events.
 It’s worth recalling that, as late as 2003, a government 
White Paper declared that the current economics of nuclear 
made new power stations ‘unattractive’, and so refused to 
support building them. 17  More than five years later, the formal 
policy has changed, but real practice is little different.
Defensiveness in the UK
In the UK, environmentalists are certain that the government is 























lobby. At one level, official pronouncements on nuclear power 
do suggest that the authorities favour it. On close inspection, 
however, support in principle turns out to be prevarication 
in practice. 
 At his ‘addiction to oil’ press conference, Gordon Brown 
made a call for 1000 new nuclear power stations to be built 
worldwide. But his pro-nuclear rhetoric was qualified by the note 
that such a programme would have ‘serious implications’ for 
‘security as well as cost and change’ (sic). He went on: 
‘While I know there are nuclear protesters who object to 
any nuclear power, they need to know if they had their way, 
the resulting energy crisis would bring less security, more 
instability, faster climate change and more poverty.’ 18
On the surface, this appears to be a confident, aggressive 
response to Green critics of nuclear. But in fact Her Majesty’s 
Government shares the apprehensions of those who abhor 
nuclear power.
 Given that regulation cannot be a force for innovation 
(Chapter 3), Energise! does not advocate nationalising nuclear 
energy in Britain. But the fact remains that the government has 
at no time said that it will fund, still less build, or operate, nuclear 
power stations. Equally, industry refuses any forthright defence 
of nuclear, preferring to wait, diplomatically, for the next move by 
the government. 
 The government will pay neither for recycling nuclear 
waste, nor for decommissioning nuclear power stations. Instead, 
on 10 January 2008, introducing its response to a public 
consultation on nuclear, John Hutton, Secretary of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), merely 
‘invited’ energy companies to ‘bring forward plans’ to build and 
operate new reactors. 19 
 The 186-page White Paper that Hutton published on the 
same day was just as indecisive. Still, it had a confident title: 









 The White Paper deserves in-depth discussion here 
because it highlights the feeble character of nuclear advocacy 
today. Here’s a guide to its overall flavour:
Key concepts and number of mentions in  
the UK government’s January 2008 White  
Paper on nuclear power 20
Concepts Number of mentions 








Cost (excluding cost-benefit) 383
Waste 444
Benefit (excluding cost-benefit) 54
Research, in the sense of R&D 23
Growth (economic/in energy demand) 10
Innovation 1
Climate change and energy security dominate the government’s 
rationale for nuclear power, with the need to generate more 
electricity far behind these two considerations. Meanwhile, safety, 
risk, physical security, costs, waste and decommissioning weigh 
heavily with officialdom. With these obsessions as the ground 
rules, nuclear power cannot win. Only if society’s need for more 
energy is put in the foreground can nuclear power’s supporters 
expect to be victorious in arguments about it.
 Exactly how many nuclear plants does the UK need? How 
many megawatts should they generate? How fast should they 























to these questions, and for a reason. Seven times in its White 
Paper, it repeats this point:
‘The fundamental principle of our energy policy is that 
competitive energy markets, with independent regulation, 
are the most cost-effective and efficient way of generating, 
distributing and supplying energy. In those markets, 
investment decisions are best made by the private sector 
and independent market regulation is essential to ensure 
that the markets function properly and in accordance with 
our wider social and environmental objectives, particularly 
tackling climate change.’ 21
This is a hands-off approach to the future of UK energy supply.22 
Shrugging off any need for leadership, the government leaves 
decisions on actually building nuclear reactors to the caprice of 
market forces. Still, it’s deeply committed to regulation. BERR, 
DEFRA and the Environment Agency each have responsibility 
for nuclear affairs. Apart from, but sometimes within, these 
government departments, there are further regulatory agencies 
at work:
Just some of the bodies charged with  
looking after nuclear affairs in the UK
1. Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the 
 Environment
2. Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) 
3. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority  
4. Nuclear Directorate of the Health and Safety Executive 
 Health Protection Agency Radiation Protection Division 
5. Office of Nuclear Development 
As recently as 2008, in an innovatory, single-minded approach 
to nuclear power, John Hutton announced the creation of two 
new bodies: the Nuclear Development Forum, a state/industry 









to improve interdepartmental collaboration across government 
on nuclear matters. 
 The civil servants who wrote the White Paper are bold 
enough to exclaim about 20 times that nuclear power ‘cannot be 
excluded’. Here’s a typical formulation:
‘Ruling out nuclear as a low-carbon energy option would 
significantly increase the risk that the UK would fail to 
meet its CO2 reduction targets because we would be 
placing greater reliance on fewer technologies, some of 
which have yet to be proven on a commercial scale.’ 23
This isn’t a positive argument for more electricity and more 
nuclear power. It’s a logic based on fear and the Precautionary 
Principle. Nuclear is here presented not on its own merits, as a 
high-tech, low running cost form of energy supply, but rather as 
an insurance policy against climate change, and against external 
threats to Britain’s energy security.
 For the government, nuclear isn’t essential to economic 
growth. Instead, growth is subordinate to fears of CO2:
‘Without a healthy economy, the UK would not be in such a 
strong position to play a leading role in helping develop the 
new, innovative low-carbon forms of electricity generation 
needed to tackle climate change globally.’ 24
This is the White Paper’s single reference to innovation. Yet 
even here HMG won’t argue for nuclear power on its own merits. 
Instead, it enters the barren terrain of the CO2 emissions at issue 
in every stage in the life of a power station (see Chapter 1). It 
then concludes that those for nuclear ‘are about the same as 
those for wind generated electricity’. 25 This battle over CO2 ends 
in a draw. Nuclear cannot be declared the winner.
 Cutting CO2 is nowadays the only politically correct 
justification for nuclear power. Still, let’s now consider the 























 In Chapter 2, we showed that fears of dependence on 
overseas sources of oil have a long history. In the White Paper, 
the words ‘option,’ ‘diversity’ and ‘mix’ get no fewer than 250 
mentions. Partly the text concerns diversity of low-carbon 
technologies, but mostly it’s about keeping options open in case 
of overseas supplies of energy being ‘politicised’. Thus:
‘Diversity of energy sources can help to reduce our 
dependence on gas as reserves fall in the North Sea and 
reduce the impact on the UK should prices for fossil fuels 
rise globally.’ 26
It’s true that there’s no silver bullet in energy supply. To build 
supply quickly, cheaply and cleanly enough to meet the needs 
of the British economy is something that can’t be done using a 
single technology. However, the idea that nuclear is needed to 
safeguard security of inexpensive supply doesn’t amount to a 
convincing case for nuclear power. 
 To its credit, the White Paper repudiates Green fears about 
‘peak’ uranium, citing, among other sources, evidence from the 
IPCC. 27  But then it drops the ball: 
‘We also recognise that, with no significant indigenous 
source of uranium ore, we will have to import uranium 
fuel. However, uranium imports come from a range of 
countries that are not necessarily the same as those that 
supply other energy sources. Uranium is currently mined in 
19 different countries and resources of economic interest 
have been identified in at least 25 other countries. This 
provides valuable diversity of supply.’ 28
That will not mollify Green opponents of nuclear power. In a neo-
protectionist world, there’s no guarantee that even Australia – 
the main exporter of uranium to the UK – might not, at some 
point, deny supplies. Unlike, say, the economy of Saudi Arabia, 









commodity. Disputes with the UK, though distant, are certainly 
not ruled out, especially given the country’s republicanism and 
increasing orientation to China.
 Our point here is not that overseas supplies of uranium 
are likely to fall into jeopardy, but rather that the wind and the 
sun are subject to no export controls, and no insecurity of supply. 
Similarly, the White Paper gives another hostage to fortune when 
it says that measures around energy efficiency are ‘amongst 
the most cost effective ways of reducing energy demand’ and 
hence of reducing CO2 emissions. Its only argument for nuclear 
here is that, after they’ve improved the energy efficiency of their 
lives, people might still turn up their central heating, or buy more 
energy-consuming products. 29
 Only by blaming consumer extravagance, it seems, can 
Britain’s government make a case for nuclear. What a pity!
Greenpeace UK muddies the water 
In 2008, Greenpeace UK pursued an advertising campaign – 
between CHP (good) and nuclear power (bad). 30 Now, we’re 
all in favour of CHP, and especially the large-scale provision 
of heat to industry upheld by Securing Power, a report on 
CHP that Greenpeace commissioned from the consultants 
Pöyry. 31 Indeed, CHP will itself make use of the heat from… 4G 
nuclear power. 32 
 If nuclear plants cost £3-4.8bn to build, as Greenpeace 
suggested, do CHP plants really cost just its quoted figure of less 
than £1bn? Securing Power mentions neither figure. Probably 
CHP heat to industry will be a little cheaper than heat supplied 
through nuclear-generated electricity; but with CHP heat for 
homes and offices, the limited scale of such heat could make it 
dearer than the nuclear alternative.
 Next, Greenpeace argued that while CHP facilities ‘can be 
built on existing industrial sites, close to the demand for heat’, 
nuclear reactors ‘can only ever be built where there is enough 























 It’s true that reactors need a lot of cooling water. But if 
Britain ever runs short of clean water, the solution won’t be fewer 
nuclear reactors, but more energy – to power desalination plants 
that can provide the country with more water.
 Anyway, reactors don’t need to be near the sea. Switzerland 
has no coastline, yet 43 per cent of its electricity comes from 
nuclear reactors (just five, in fact). 33
 Location is always an issue with large infrastructure 
projects. But nuclear reactors can be built in many places in 
the UK, because water is more plentiful in the UK than Greens 
imagine. Similarly, large-scale CHP requires concentrated 
clusters of industries as customers. That’s fine too – although 
it’s striking that Greenpeace’s expert consultants, in identifying 
such sites in the UK, picked nine that are all… by the sea. 34  
Lethargy and bureaucracy in the UK
With officials’ arguments for nuclear power so weak, it’s 
hardly surprising that the pace of UK nuclear energy’s future 
development appears so sluggish. In a section titled ‘Why 
decisions on nuclear power are needed now’, the government’s 
White Paper spells out why urgency is needed. On the Paper’s own, 
conservative estimates (which have high hopes in measures of 
energy efficiency), about 30-35 GW of new electricity generating 
capacity will be needed over the next two decades, and about 
two-thirds of this investment should be made by 2020. Of 
the 22 GW likely to close by 2028, just over a half consists of 
fossil-fuel generation, and about 10 GW is nuclear. Indeed by 
2023, all but one of Britain’s nuclear power stations look set to 
have closed. 35 
 But wait – because the government surely will. The Paper 
states that the public must learn that 
‘… it takes a long time to plan and build nuclear power 
stations. This means that new nuclear generation can 









Really? In Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, Japan, the world’s first two 
advanced boiling water reactors started commercial operation 
more than 10 years ago, after just 62 and 65 months of 
building. 37 Given that still faster rates of construction ought to 
be possible now, delay in Britain would seem to come down to 
weak planning, and weak skills in nuclear engineering. 
 The White Paper concedes that nuclear planning has 
been inefficient, costly and lengthy in the past: Sizewell B, for 
example, took six years to secure planning consent, and cost £30 
million. 38 So let’s survey, as quickly as is possible, how the 
government proposes to start to commence to get ready to take 
steps to prepare a different kind of planning regime – maybe.
 In November 2007, the government introduced a reforming 
Planning Bill. If passed into legislation, it will establish a new 
‘single consent regime’ for nationally significant infrastructure, 
under which the government will produce a National Policy 
Statement (NPS) that will ‘reiterate the government’s policy on 
nuclear power’ – by building on the foundations laid down in the 
January 2008 White Paper. 39
 The nuclear NPS will cover the criteria that the government 
considers should be used to assess the suitability of potential 
sites for reactors. It may give ‘an indication of certain locations’ 
that meet these criteria – following, of course, a Strategic Site 
Assessment (SSA). If the NPS does give such an indication, there 
would then follow ‘a process of engagement and consultation 
with those local communities on which the NPS had a direct 
bearing, before this was finally adopted’. Planning reform would 
also create an ‘active pre-application phase, during which 
potential [nuclear power station] developers will need to consult 
publicly and locally on their proposals and engage with local 
authorities, statutory bodies and other key parties’. Developers 
would do this before submitting their applications to develop 
to a new Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC), which will 
decide on each application – in England and Wales, but not in 
Scotland. 40























these arrangements all sound very democratic. But far from 
being a single consent regime, the White Paper gives the state 
the job of seeking out multiple consents from ‘stakeholders,’ 
who themselves get 24 mentions and, interestingly enough, 
include ‘faith groups’. This consultation and deliberation, which 
relies partly on direct mail to 5,000 ‘grassroots and community 
organisations’, is actually not at all democratic. 41 
 Throughout all the consultations, Whitehall will have the 
final say.
  Still more questions need to be asked. If the nuclear NPS 
will also ‘set the policy framework’ for decisions made by the IPC, 
what exactly is the IPC? Typically enough, its 20-30 members 
won’t be elected, but will be appointed by ministers. And who will 
these appointees be? They will be
‘… well respected experts, drawn from a range of fields 
[which] might include national and local government, 
community engagement, planning, law, engineering, 
economics, business, security, environment, heritage, 
and health, as well as, if necessary, specialist technical 
expertise.’
The latter expertise will no doubt include that related to the 
nuclear sector. 42
 Contrary to what Greens like to believe, the IPC does not 
offer nuclear firms a green light to develop new plants. Rather, 
it nationalises and makes official the resistance to development 
that, for the most part, experts in many of the fields mentioned 
above already strenuously uphold in Britain. 
 In sum, after endless rounds of consultation, a body that 
promises to consolidate the environmentalist allergy to nuclear 
power will make the final decisions about it. The planning of 
nuclear infrastructure in Britain, like that of infrastructure 
generally, promises to become as Byzantine as the planning of 
new houses. In every case the end-result of planning and so-









expensive, to have an inquiry about it, and to seek judicial review 
about whether it should be allowed to go ahead.
 No wonder that the White Paper’s ‘indicative timetable’, 
showing what it says is the ‘fastest practical’ route to new 
nuclear power stations, begins to look as complicated as a 
nuclear reactor itself (see overleaf).
 From the timetable, it appears, about five years will have to 
pass before nuclear operators make a ‘full decision’ to ‘proceed 
and commit’.
 More delay is also possible. The reason: there just might 
be a genuine shortage of skills in UK nuclear engineering.
Motivating a new generation of nuclear engineers
In 2008, British Energy, a nuclear electricity generator in which 
the British government had a 35 per cent stake, excited interest 
from corporate bidders. In this contest, the government favoured 
a takeover by EDF, hoping that Britain could benefit from the 
French generator’s nuclear expertise. 45 Indeed, as the White 
Paper had earlier pointed out, failure to move ahead with nuclear 
could mean British skills in the sector being ‘lost’. 46 
 Eventually, EDF was successful in its bid. But other help 
was at hand: along with the nuclear industry, the Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council had begun to fund masters-
level and continuing professional development for the nuclear 
sector. And what was its cash commitment to this cause? A cool 
£1m – half the average price of a house in Mayfair, London. 47 
 Right across UK electricity, concerns about an ageing 
workforce are aired. But the real worry is about how to convince 
young Britons that electricity is a useful career. Three specialists, 
for instance, suggest a TV series featuring ‘heroic actions 
of electricity people’, or even ‘a reality show focused on an 
electricity industry company or team’. 48 
 Time was when adult politicians and industrialists could 
give children a good reason to grow up. In a new century, it 
























 The purpose of the electricity industry is to keep the lights 
on. Since Greens organise voluntary blackouts, it’s clear that 
not everyone thinks that’s worthwhile. 49 Electricity in general, 
and nuclear electricity in particular, needs articulate defenders. 
People need inspiring with a basic confidence in what human 
beings can do with very high technology – at the sub-atomic 
level as much as anywhere else.
Why nuclear remains on the back foot
No intrinsic technological defects explain nuclear power’s 
Cinderella status. Reactors do generate electricity, after all. To 
recruit a new workforce to the nuclear industry, in fact, citizens 
need new arguments even more than reactors can still benefit 
from new technologies. 
 The energised citizen should be able explain why: 
1. More energy for everyone is a good thing
2. Nuclear reactors deserve favour
3. Nuclear’s safety record has become pretty admirable,  
 and is a matter of running the right economic and  
 social regime 
4. Nuclear’s chequered career in the past need be no guide  
 to its prospects in the future.
We’ve already made the first two arguments. A panel at the end 
of this chapter deals with the third. But the fourth is the most 
important. To rephrase it: just exactly why have politicians and 
nuclear corporations become so defensive and lethargic about 
nuclear power? 
 Here historical insights are even more valuable than 
technological ones. The problems that pertain to nuclear reactors, 
insofar as they exist, are those of social regime, not intractable 
technology. More even than nuclear accidents, it’s the military 
origins of and more recent political dissent about nuclear power 
that have put its enthusiasts on the back foot.
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The British government’s ‘indicative pathway’  
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‘Justification’ means that it must be demonstrated that any 
benefits resulting from the introduction of nuclear power 
‘outweigh the associated health detriment’. The Generic Design 
Assessment assesses the safety, security and environmental 









Instead, it still hangs like a dark cloud over the industry. Why? 
Because nuclear’s history 
begins with Hiroshima and Nagasaki•	
developed through the perverse Old Scientism of the •	
Cold War 
developed also through liberal and leftist dissenters from  •	
the Old Scientism. 
Then, over the course of the 1970s, dissenters from nuclear war 
and nuclear weapons tests morphed into handwringers about 
the risks surrounding civilian nuclear power.
The 1970s: the decade when new doubts 
about reactors set in
For 30 years, nuclear power has made a historic retreat from 
confidence. So before turning to the earlier political history of 
nuclear power, let’s just underline the significance of the 1970s. 
 During that decade, ironically, oil came to look like a 
bad bet. Ironically, too, nuclear reactor technique had already 
matured. Nevertheless, an exhausted New Left and a nascent 
environmentalism began to single civilian nuclear technology out 
for ridicule and fear. 
 Once again, however, it was not Reds and Greens 
that consolidated doubts about nuclear power so much as 
governments. The recession of 1973-4, which proved too 
profound to blame simply on OPEC, was a key factor in nuclear 
power’s loss of impetus. Before that recession, demand for 
energy looked buoyant and nuclear power looked set for a great 
future. After it, many reactors were not built for years. 
 Before the 1970s, the main focus of establishment 
concern about nuclear power was its debatable economic 
performance against other forms of energy. After the 1970s, 
however, policymakers preferred to worry about risk. Institutions 
of the Old Scientism were wound up, and new agencies, with 























that Reds and Greens only buttressed the state’s loss of faith in 
nuclear. Worried about risks of war and risks to the environment, 
Reds and Greens now merely converged with governments that, 
after OPEC’s action and a major economic crisis, were already 
newly alive to risk.
 Today’s campaigns against oil and against coal-fired plants, 
it should be remembered, are relatively new. With nuclear power, 
by contrast, opposition began in the 1970s. Indeed, modern 
environmentalism can be said largely to have defined itself 
around nuclear power.
 The defensiveness of nuclear’s advocates today doesn’t 
relate to flaws intrinsic to reactors. The difficulties around reactors 
can be and have been controlled. Rather, the evolving political 
culture around nuclear power, and especially its advocates’ 
30-year-long failure to counter critics, explain why it has moved 
ahead in a rather haphazard and fitful manner.
Beginnings: nuclear power bears the taint of violence
On 6 August 1945, the Enola Gay bombed Hiroshima and 
140,000 people died. Then, in the Cold War, the Bomb seemed 
to threaten all humanity. Even today, when Hilary Clinton offers 
to ‘annihilate’ Iran in the event of it attacking Israel, fears of 
nuclear weapons run high.
 Real dangers surround nuclear reactors. But the passion 
that they elicit today can’t be traced to these dangers alone. 
 It’s true that nuclear weapons haven’t been used since 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki; that the Cold War is history; that 
perhaps 400,000 people have died in the Iraq war, but not 
through nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, civilian nuclear power 
still suffers from its:
origins around the Bomb, and around national •	
belligerence
links to nuclear proliferation•	










Civilian nuclear power bears the taint of violence. Nuclear physics 
seems to have introduced 
a new and vicious logic to fighting, and perhaps •	
to the fate of the Earth and to human actions generally
a specially vicious and durable kind of contaminant:  •	
ionising radiation capable of causing genetic damage that 
carries through to future generations.
If ever there were a Faustian contract, nuclear war, beginning in 
Japan, would seem to embody it. As for the nuclear reactor, it 
would seem to be merely a codicil to that contract – a proposition 
complete with its own dangers. 
 Civilian nuclear power is seen as special. Nuclear physics 
appears to have led inexorably to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Perhaps nuclear physics must have an almost equally remorseless 
and lethal momentum in the civilian domain.
 For critics, civilian nuclear reactors can only foster the 
spread of materials that are lethal: lethal both immediately, in 
war, and lethal over time, though radiation. So it’s little wonder 
that reactors have provoked dissent. In the public mind, their 
fuels have at least a historical association with violence toward 
nations, or at least the threat of such violence. Their fuels also 
have a historical association with civilian injuries and deaths 
caused by radiation, whether in nuclear weapons tests, or in 
nuclear accidents. 
 Yet the radiation around power stations is much weaker 
than that set off by a bomb (see panel below). What’s more, 
that example reveals a general truth: the uses to which nuclear 
physics and nuclear reactor technology are put are to do with the 
decisions of men and women, and don’t automatically adhere to 
uranium. Proliferation and breaches of safety in radiation are 
not determined by the structure of the nucleus. They relate to 























Let’s get precise about the dangers of radiation
In November 2006, the British press published striking 
photographs of Alexander Litvinenko, once a senior official in the 
KGB. Litvinenko was in a London hospital bed, dying of poisoning 
by polonium 210. Pale, wan and bald, he acted as a potent 
reminder about the effects of radioactivity. In high doses, such 
as he mysteriously received, radioactivity can kill you. In low 
doses too, it produces mutations in DNA that, building up over 
time, can produce cancer.
 The dangers of radiation from nuclear waste provoke a 
special dread. But with a high level of ingenuity, mankind can 
deal with those dangers.
 They should not be minimised. Nuclear waste gives out 
more radioactivity to those who work around it than do cosmic 
rays, to which long-haul jet travellers are strongly exposed. 
Nuclear waste is more radioactive than the soil. Only coal, once 
burnt into ash, is as radioactive as low-level nuclear waste.
 Levels of radiation exposure can be measured by the 
quantity of energy absorbed. For purposes of calculating risks to 
humans, however, this quantity of radiation must be weighted for 
the effectiveness of each type of radiation in causing biological 
harm. The unit in which this is done is a Sievert.
 One Sievert is a large unit. 50 For practical purposes, 
































Average annual exposure to radiation, milliSieverts 51
Exposure milliSieverts 
From artificial sources, civilian
Airborne discharges from nuclear power stations to the general public 0.0001
Liquid radioactive wastes discharged into the sea 0.0007 
Workers in medicine/research industry 0.1




Average dose within 5 miles of Three Mile Island 0.09
From artificial sources, military
Post-war nuclear tests, average worldwide dose, 1963 0.113
Post-war nuclear tests, average worldwide dose, 1999 0.51
From naturally occurring sources
Cosmic rays at ground level 0.392
Minerals (most significantly potassium and uranium) 0.765
Radon gas emitted from minerals, average dose 1196
From a rational point of view, doses of radiation from the routine 
operations of the nuclear industry, and even from accidents like 
Three Mile Island, are too small to be of concern. Notably, the 
artificial radiation dose from civilian nuclear power is hundreds 
of times less than the natural radiation dose from earth and 
space.
            The fact is that for most people, the main artificial source 
of radiation likely to be encountered isn’t a nuclear power station, 
but rather nuclear medicine. Here, as with other dangerous 
medical techniques, exposures are now both regulated and 
accepted as necessary.









Nuclear war suggests that  
nuclear power is a race apart 
When, after 9/11, anthrax was found in the US postal system, 
the world was briefly reminded that nuclear arms are not the 
only weapons of mass destruction. Nor are nuclear arms alone 
in causing genetic mutations. Those mutations brought about by 
US action in 1945 were terrible, but those caused by chemical 
weapons have since been termed ‘comparable’. 52 
 Some like to relativise the effects of nuclear weapons, 
which is an error. But many more would proclaim nuclear 
weapons a race apart – which is also not quite right. And so it 
is with nuclear reactors. They pose their own special technical 
challenges; but these challenges are not beyond human ingenuity 
to deal with, especially today and tomorrow.
 Let’s now see how reactors suffered from their association 
with military matters.
 During the Cold War, nuclear weapons seemed to have 
rid human conflict of its few remaining rational aspects. Nukes 
made technology appear to have acquired a menace and 
momentum all of its own. In the age of the Enlightenment, Carl 
von Clausewitz had famously said that war was the extension of 
politics by other means. 53 But after 1945, in a nasty paradox, 
the rational calculations of nuclear physics, when applied to war, 
seemed to make it the extension of something less rational even 
than politics.
 In nuclear weapons, pacifists and defenders of Stalin’s 
Soviet Union felt they had alighted upon a technology of 
exceptional beastliness. They were optimistic that the fact of 
such weapons might shift popular feeling their way. By the late 
1970s, however, the left was tired and increasingly desperate. 
But, in populist style, it had no compunction about adding civilian 
nuclear power to its list of easy targets.
 Nuclear power certainly grew out of nuclear weapons. 
The first man-made nuclear reactor was built on the Manhattan 























powered submarines wrote the book for US reactor design (see 
panel below). In Britain, Calder Hall, the first ‘commercial’ reactor, 
opened in 1956 by the Queen at what is now called Sellafield, 
Cumbria, was in fact chiefly designed to produce plutonium for 
bombs. 
 But it would be wrong to visit the sins of the father on to 
civilian reactors today. 
 Magnifying fear, governments and Greens insist that, like 
the prosecution of nuclear war, nuclear power can be subject 
to rogue actors bent on causing unimaginable disasters. This 
is a misanthropic vision. It’s also one that, in a deterministic 
style, strips selected technologies of their human design and 
transforms them into a primordial force for evil.  
 Here the nuclear fuel cycle is inherently a tool for rogue 
states and wild Islamic fundamentalists. Just as inherently, 
the fuel cycle is the plaything of cowboy plant managers and 
rapacious nuclear shareholders, who are both only interested in 
a fast buck. 
 Now, there’s certainly the possibility that such nuclear 
scenarios come true. They might come true for the first time 
(rogue states and fanatics), or repeat some of the industry’s poor 
if comparatively rare episodes of the past (maverick managers 
and shareholders). But it’s the reality of post-war American 
politics, not possible mishaps in the future, that explains the 
distaste which nuclear power arouses today. 
 Through its actions, the American state, run by both 
Republicans and Democrats, laid a real basis for modern 
suspicion of nuclear power. The state was the big ‘rogue actor’, if 
ever there was one. 
 At the same time the American left magnified the 









The US Navy: basis for modern reactor design 
Because nuclear energy doesn’t consume oxygen, it can power 
submarines underwater for extended periods. In 1946, a US 
Navy sailor, Hyman G Rickover, started work on this principle. 54
 In the ‘development’ part of R&D, it’s usual to manufacture 
components, construct a prototype and then organise a fully 
working system. Flouting this, Rickover concurrently built a 
prototype propulsion unit and a submarine. Ruthless on quality 
control, he launched the USS Nautilus in January 1954. 55 
 Given a cover portrait in Time magazine, Rickover remarked 
that scientists could
‘… think up thousands of reactors. But the Navy wanted 
a nuclear submarine… fast. We picked a simple type of 
reactor that we knew a lot about already. If we’d waited for 
the scientists, we’d still be fooling around.’ 56
Rickover’s compact reactor used fuel forged into uranium rods. 
It was cooled with pressurised water. By a twist of fate, his PWR 
design, made by Westinghouse, had far-reaching significance.
 Even before the launch of the Nautilus, Rickover was 
designing a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. But in 1953 
President Eisenhower cut funds for the project. That made the 
US Atomic Energy Commission scramble to recast Rickover’s 
design – for civilian purposes. 57 Four years later, the Duquesne 
Light Company of Pittsburgh began generating America’s first 60 
MW of nuclear electricity from a Westinghouse machine based 
at Shippingport, Pennsylvania.
 Through Shippingport, engineers and contractors gained 
valuable early experience in reactors. Today, Rickover’s PWR 
design remains the workhorse of the nuclear industry. Only now, 
with 4G designs, have engineers got round to thinking about 
which of Rickover’s ‘thousands’ of other putative reactors are 
worth taking forward. 
The man who designed the first 
































B-Reactor, Hanford, Washington. 
Completed in September 1944, it soon 
began making the plutonium that was 























The Manhattan Project and the bombings of Japan
The motives and need for the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
have been widely debated. 58 The making of the Bomb, and the 
devastation it wrought, have also been widely documented. 59 
Here, our focus is on three other crucial aspects.
 First, 120,000 scientists worked on the Manhattan Project. 
Fatefully, America involved Britain, France and Canada in it. Very 
soon after the bombings, this shared work led to important 
tensions within the West over both military and civilian nuclear 
power, leaving aside the obvious East-West tensions of the Cold 
War. Thus as early as 1946, the US Atomic Energy Act, which 
established the military-civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
ended West-West collaboration on nuclear research. 
 From the start, then, nuclear weapons raised issues of 
what became known as nuclear proliferation. Thus later, when 
civilian nuclear power developed, proliferation, nation states and 
conditions of secrecy were all prominent factors around it. We 
will come back to these issues.
 Second, the first and only use of nuclear weapons set 
the pattern for the Old Scientism. Nuclear weapons scientists, 
including a majority of the staff at Los Alamos, were often 
politically keener on using the Bomb on Japan than much of the 
US military and President Truman appeared to be. By the time of 
Hiroshima, there was little left to bomb in Japan. 60 Conventional 
bombing nevertheless continued, planning for invasion continued, 
and US diplomatic feelers toward the Emperor of Japan 
continued. 61 The point of Hiroshima was to deliver what Henry 
Stimson, US Secretary of State for War, sought at a key meeting 
on 31 May 1945: a ‘profound psychological impression on as 
many Japanese as possible’. 
 At the meeting, after it was suggested that one A-bomb 










‘The visual effect of an atomic bombing would be 
tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant 
luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 
20,000 feet.’ 62
In terms of international relations, then, Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
amounted to two demonstration projects – whichever country 
the demonstrations were aimed at. 63 The Pacific War also had 
a pronounced racial component. 64 Given this context, the US 
authorities tended to regard Japanese victims of the bombings 
less as humans in agony, and more as a source of military and 
medical information.
 Catherine Caufield’s political history of radiation, Multiple 
Exposures (1989), is exhaustive and illuminating, and we draw 
on it now. 65 Caufield confirms that the Old Scientism was 
insouciant, callous and dehumanising. It had no regard for 
Manhattan Project employees. University of California radiology 
guru Robert Stone, who led the Project’s health division, frankly 
noted that clinical study of Project staff was
‘… one vast experiment. Never before has so large 
a collection of individuals been exposed to so much 
irradiation.’ 66
Finally, Manhattan, Hiroshima and Nagasaki prompted dissent 
among some of the very scientists involved with them. At Los 
Alamos, the chief metallurgical chemist called the Project’s 
worker insurance ‘inhumane, unethical, and unfair’, and chemists 
refused to purify raw plutonium without extra insurance. 67 In 
June 1945, physicists at the Project’s Chicago operation, led 
by James Franck, advised Stimson not to use atomic weapons 
against Japan, and went on to found the Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists as a forum for all-sided debate. 68 
 On 6 July 1945, dissent accompanied Trinity, the world’s 
first atomic explosion – done, like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in the 























of the scientists who witnessed it: ‘Some wept, a few cheered. 
Most stood silently’. 69
 After the devastation in Japan, dissent intensified. For 
about 40 years after Trinity, US nuclear weapons scientists were 
broadly split between ‘arms racers’ and ‘arms controllers’. 70 
 On top of that, the radioactive fall-out, residual radiation 
and genetic mutations around Hiroshima and Nagasaki gradually 
became controversial. Meanwhile popular murmurings grew, 
not just around nuclear war, but also around the fall-out that 
accompanied nuclear weapons tests.
Radiation and the Old Scientism
Manhattan was about unleashing a bomb, not worrying about 
radiation. Perhaps just 200 scientists active in the Project knew 
its ultimate purpose. The rem, a unit of radiation dose covering 
alpha, beta and neutron radiation and not just gamma and X-rays, 
was only developed during the Project (it is now superceded by 
the millisievert, where 1 mSv = 0.1 rems). 71  
 By June 1945, however, new calculations showed that the 
Trinity test would be accompanied by serious radioactive fallout, 
as indeed it was. 
 Oppenheimer had medical reports on Trinity kept separate 
from other Trinity documentation, and made access to them 
subject to his personal approval. A war was on. Secrecy on the 
part of the US military was hardly surprising, and 50 years had 
to pass before there was any glimmer of what the New York 
City writer Sean Collins calls the dogma of transparency about 
institutions – the vapid, all-purpose call for secret conspiracies 
to be unveiled. 72 
 Nevertheless, in its policy on radiation, the Old Scientism, 
as embodied in the post-war nuclear agencies of the American 
state, had nothing to be proud of. 
 The Old Scientism covered things up. It censored and 
harassed dissidents. And in its disregard for the effect of military-
related radiation on human life, it sparked off irrational hostility 









 Despite the Old Scientism, a controversial culture 
surrounded radiation from the start. 73 Thus in 1947, worried 
about genetic mutations, America’s newly rebranded National 
Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) cut the limit of exposure 
to X and gamma rays from 1 to 0.5 mSv a day, renaming weekly 
limits of 3 mSv the ‘maximum permissible dose’. 74 In 1948, 
too, the NCRP adopted the theory, contrary to the AEC, that no 
threshold existed below which radiation was safe.  
 Only in 1954, however, did the NCRP publish its dose 
limits. The first federal radiation regulations only became 
effective in 1957. 75
The bombings of Japan set the framework  
for post-war dissent about radiation
From 1947 onward, funded by the AEC, the US Atomic Bomb 
Casualty Commission (ABCC) captured data on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. 76 In her comprehensive 1995 study of post-war 
debates around the radiation set off by the twin bombings, the 
Dundee University social scientist Sue Rabbit Roff is properly 
caustic about the ABCC. 77 It did not treat victims. Despite 
the incidence of radiation at the Trinity test, it refused for many 
years to countenance the idea that an airburst explosion, such 
as that over the two Japanese cities, could result in fallout and 
residual radiation. The ABCC also deliberately obscured the 
relationship between radiation and distance from the epicenters 
of the bombings. 
 In 1980, to cap everything, researchers at Lawrence 
Livermore laboratories discovered that the ABCC’s estimates of 
radiation around Hiroshima had contained a major error. As a 
result, gamma rays are now thought to be 40 per cent more 
likely to cause cancer than previously imagined. 78
 Nevertheless, Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave America vital 
data on radiation’s human impact. 
 Use of atomic bombs over Japan was always justified as a 
means of bringing about a swift and less bloody peace. However, 























so, for many years, did it provide a context in which US officials 
cynically and scandalously ignored, denied and underestimated 
the longer-term effects of radiation. Indeed, the shameful 
records of the AEC and ABCC on radiation, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were matched only by the technological determinism of 
nuclear dissenters. 
 Roff contends that with radiation today, ‘the only certainty 
is uncertainty’. Yet while this shows her closeness to the New 
Scientism’s conception of climate science (see Chapter 3), 
she’s nearer the mark when she notes that ‘all contemporary 
discussions about the types and extent of injury caused to 
humans by ionising radiation are grounded in the biomedical 
studies of the survivors’. 79 The reason for this state of affairs is 
worth examining (see panel).
Understanding low doses of radiation
If the dangers of civilian nuclear radiation should not be minimised, 
neither should they be exaggerated.
 Radiation consists of fast moving subatomic particles, 
expelled by the decay of a radioactive atomic nucleus. It can 
cause disease by smashing through the molecules in a cell, 
in particular DNA molecules. Artificial radiation shares this 
mechanism of toxicity with natural radioactivity, such as cosmic 
rays. Chemicals such as tobacco smoke also work in a very 
similar way, chemically attacking DNA.
 In all of these cases, doses matter in determining biological 
outcomes. If both strands of DNA’s double helix are broken at a 
single point, that’s enough, in principle, to start a cell on the path 
to cancer. A cancer could, therefore, be triggered by a single 
radioactive atom. Luckily though, the body is good at repairing 
DNA breaks. Natural radioactivity and chemical assaults result in 
many DNA breaks every day of your life. Either these breaks are 
repaired, or unlucky cells die.
 Acute radiation sickness results from very high doses of 









many cells at once. That’s what killed Alexander Litvinenko. High, 
short doses are also how radiotherapy kills tumours.
 For a few cells to die through low dose radiation, by contrast, 
is no problem. The body can replace those cells as part of normal 
cell turnover. When wrongly repaired or damaged cells survive 
after low doses, however, there is a long-term danger of cancer. 
 Each radioactive decay is another chance to create 
a cancer. In the long term, then, the effect of radiation is likely 
to be additive. Risk is in proportion to exposure. Since exposure 
to radiation from cosmic rays is 490 times larger than that from 
nuclear power station discharges to air and sea, the chance 
of developing cancer from cosmic rays is 490 times larger 
than the chance of developing cancer from nuclear power 
station discharges. 
 Proportionality of response to dose is known as linearity. 
At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ABCC’s measurements of large 
doses among large numbers of victims confirmed the broad 
outline of linearity. They also provided a clue to a much more 
difficult question: that of small doses among small numbers of 
victims. In the absence of a large research sample of people 
exposed to low doses of radiation, however, just how right is it to 
extrapolate down from the Japanese data? 
 A number of hypotheses exist about the lower end of dose/
response relationship. The simplest possibility is that proportionality 
continues right down to zero dose. This is known as the ‘linear no 
threshold’ model, or LNT, on the grounds that there’s no threshold 
below which the impact of radiation on human beings can be 
neglected – even below natural background levels.
 It’s also possible that very low doses may be more or less 
harmful than claimed by LNT, or even beneficial. The details 
depend on complicated biology. What’s clear, however, is that 
any such deviations from linearity are hard to detect. If people 
were living much longer or shorter lives from low-level radiation, 

























The peak of Cold War starts the  
discrediting of civilian nuclear power 
At Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands on 25 July 1946, in what 
was called Operation Crossroads, Baker, an underwater test, 
exposed 42,000 participants (including 400 US safety personnel 
unequipped with detectors of alpha rays) to copious amounts of 
radiation. Food on the participants’ boats was affected too, but 
it was officially announced that nobody had suffered ill effects. 
 Negative publicity broke out about Crossroads and 
subsequent tests. 80 Then, on 1 March 1954, the US exploded 
its first full-scale hydrogen bomb at an islet near Bikini. Bravo 
was 1000 times more explosive than the bomb that incinerated 
Hiroshima; and it was Bravo that confirmed that fallout was really 
a problem for the world. 
 Nearly 90 nearby islanders, including 29 children under 
10 years old, received 17.5 mSv. All 23 crew of a Japanese 
tuna trawler – Fukuryu Maru, ironically translating as Lucky 
Dragon – were also affected. Typically enough, though, the AEC 
said that the islanders were reported well, and its new chairman, 
a top Wall Street banker, pronounced that the LD was a ‘Red 
spy outfit’. 81
 In the era of Joe McCarthy, all this was to be expected. 
Nevertheless, it’s interesting that the Old Scientism anticipated, 
in the spirit of the Cold War, the New Scientism’s criminalisation 
of dissent. Like those who attack climate change ‘deniers’ today, 
the AEC frequently intimated that the very idea of fallout was 
unacceptable. It was unpatriotic.  
 The hostility of Japanese to US nuclear tests grew. 82 In 
a significant marker for future East-West tensions, India called 
for tests to be halted. The AEC was hit by a series of 
embarrassments. 83 In 1956 the United Auto Workers tried to 
stop a new reactor being built in Detroit. 
 By 1957 the AEC had moved the monitoring of fallout out 
to the US Public Health Service, but found itself asked questions 









Energy. Fallout from further weapons tests conducted in the US, 
together with other developments, now forced the AEC to get a 
bit more serious about radiation. 84
 In these crowded, fearful years, nuclear weapons tests 
constituted much of the substance of the Cold War: in 1958, 
more than 100 were made by the US, the Soviet Union and 
the UK. During the same year, however, a kind of epiphany 
occurred among US policymakers. Eisenhower rejected the 
recommendation of scientists that a massive programme of 
fallout shelters was the kind of measure that would see the US 
through a nuclear war. Technology, it was now felt, couldn’t quite 
do that. Instead, for the US, it was time to draw breath, calm 
down, and in arms, negotiate from a position of strength. 85
 Together, the conduct of the Old Scientism, the dynamics 
of the tests, and a more sober and eventually more public 
discussion about nuclear weapons
gave a Faustian tone not just to the radiation associated  •	
 with tests, but also to nuclear radiation in general
began to undermine the whole idea of conducting  •	
 experiments in the nuclear realm.
At Easter in 1958 Britain’s newly-formed Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament went on the first of its Easter marches in protest 
against nuclear weapons. In June, Dr Alice Stewart and others, 
having traced 1416 of the 1694 English and Welsh children 
who had died of leukaemia or cancer before their 10th birthday 
during the years 1953 to 1955, discovered that abdominal 
examinations of their mothers using X-ray radiation had been 
responsible for no fewer than six per cent of all fatalities. 86 In 
October, again in the UK, what had been Calder Hall (civilian 
nuclear) turned out also to be Windscale (military nuclear), which 
accidentally suffered a radioactive leak.
 Radiation, it seemed, was everywhere a malignant force. 
Around disarmament, the moratorium on nuclear tests agreed 























1958 did not dissuade France or the superpowers themselves 
from going on to conduct tests. Later, in 1963, the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty was followed by more tests than ever. Tests were now 
simply carried out underground. 
 For many, weapons tests and the failure to regulate 
them did much to discredit all experimentation in the nuclear 
domain. In climate science, experimentation helped Revelle and 
Lorenz (see Chapter 3). At the same time, however, Packard and 
Galbraith were beginning their wide-ranging critiques of American 
capitalism’s creation of new products based on dubious needs 
(Chapter 2). Politically, therefore, it was always likely that the bad 
smell surrounding nuclear weapons would spill over to civilian 
nuclear power.
 After the Shippingport plant started in 1957, the US found 
that it had built only three more nuclear power stations in five 
years. Then, in 1962, conservationists in California began what 
proved to be a successful campaign: to stop a civilian reactor 
being built at Bodega Bay. 87
 Despite increased testing, fallout declined. In the spring of 
1969, a celebrated dispute broke out, between dissenters both 
outside and eventually inside the AEC, on the genetic effects 
of radiation on American infants over the period 1950-65. 88 
Meanwhile, the scale of proposed discharges from a reactor into 
the Mississippi ranged the AEC and the nuclear industry against 
the state of Minnesota. 
 By 1969, scientists were looking at the radiation 
around reactors more closely. Attention shifted from fallout to 
nuclear power.
 In January and February 1970, the US Congress’s Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, including Al Gore, held lengthy 
hearings on the Minnesota conflict, and radiation generally.89 
In a sign of the growing crisis of legitimacy for state institutions 
(see Chapter 2), the AEC revised, in 1971, its standards on 
radioactive releases from reactors, tightening controls on them. 
Meanwhile, developments on the left prepared the ideological 









The left and the nuclear
With dissent about nuclear war, a potentially useful attempt to 
understand technology as a symptom of a failing society soon 
turned into a selective kind of technological determinism. In the 
1930s, the left had feared chemical weapons. Now, it highlighted 
nuclear weapons. Horrible technologies remained a defining 
feature of its critique of capitalism.
 At first, some of America’s brightest leftists focused on 
the economics of weapons. 90 Capitalism had changed, they 
argued: to capital goods and consumer goods, it had added ‘the 
production of the means of destruction’ – spending on which 
prevented an economic crisis. 91
 Though nuclear weapons turned out cheaper than 
conventional ones, Hiroshima orientated the left’s discovery 
of a permanent war economy toward the Bomb. This, leftists 
thought, was immoral, but integral to the new capitalism. Indeed 
in 1955, two years after Eisenhower announced his ‘Atoms for 
Peace’ programme for developing civilian applications of nuclear 
technology, one far-left economist was still convinced that only 
socialism could bring atomic power to the US. 92
 Once the US began to boom, however, the left had to shift 
its critique from economics to sociology. In a 1956 bestseller, 
the radical sociologist C Wright Mills attacked US military men 
for the ‘increased personnel traffic’ between them and the 
corporate realm, and warned of the possible ‘triumph in all areas 
of life of the military metaphysic, and hence the subordination to 
it of all other ways of life.’  93
 Mills was wrong: civilian control of Mills’ American 
‘warlords’ in fact increased from 1947 through to the 1960s. 94 
Nevertheless, the personal connections between the military 
and industry, plus the unstoppable, immoral dynamic of 
military technology, became the degraded staples of post-war 
leftist thought. 95 
 Here, if only in embryo, were ideas much favoured by later 























From Eisenhower to Marcuse
Oddly, Eisenhower left office in January 1961 with a farewell 
television broadcast that systematised Mills’ complaints against 
corporations connected with the new technologies of war. 
Public policy, Ike warned in a farewell address, might become 
the captive of a scientific-technological elite. The technological 
revolution, he argued, was largely responsible for the creation 
of a military-industrial complex that, reaching into ‘every city, 
every statehouse, every office of the federal government’, might 
endanger liberties or democratic processes. 96
 It took five years and a festering war in Vietnam for Ike’s 
warning to seem ‘more than the swan song of an old and naïve 
man’. 97 But much earlier, in October 1961, The Nation, weekly 
voice of leftish Democrats, reworked the song into a special 
issue on the loss of civilian control over the military. Fred Cook, 
an investigative journalist and a critic of Big Oil, wrote the issue, 
and then published a book on it, titled The Warfare State. 98
 Cook indicted both the logic of technology and human 
recklessness. The quick responses required by Cold War 
weapons meant that they had ‘come to dominate the Military as 
the Military dominates the State’. Even and especially ‘the lower 
echelons’ of the military endangered the planet: 
‘Not only do faulty information, bad judgment, rash action 
become at some time and place fatally inevitable, but one 
psychotic or one fanatic devotee of the let’s-blast-‘em-
and-get-it-over-with school easily could settle the fate of 
the world.’ 99
In stressing the connection between nukes and nutters, Cook 
was the first to popularise the theme of rogue actors – one that 
has run from Stanley Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove (1968) through 
to the present day. 100 Soon Herbert Marcuse, a German leftist 
and the key intellectual inspiration of the 1960s counterculture, 









on nuclear energy’s modern tormentors.
 Acknowledging a debt to Mills, Packard and Cook, 
Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964) followed form in 
distinguishing ‘false’ needs from ‘true’ ones. 101 Marcuse’s 
departure was to overturn the Old Left’s traditional support for 
technology. ‘By virtue of the way it has organised its technological 
base,’ he announced, ‘contemporary industrial society tends to 
be totalitarian.’ 102
 For Marcuse, science was no longer neutral, but now 
developed under a technological a priori that projected nature 
as merely ‘stuff’ for humans to ‘control.’ Instead of society, 
rather than technology, being the basic historical factor in the 
development of mankind, technology now circumscribed ‘an 
entire culture,’ including science. Both technology and science 
moved under the same logic – that of capitalist domination. 103 
 In the Cold War and Vietnam conflict, then, a populist of 
consumerism fused with fear of Armageddon and distaste for 
technologies deemed sinister or inappropriate. More generally, 
technology (bad) was counterposed to nature (good). 
 It wasn’t hard to recoil, impulsively, at the Old Scientism. 
In 1959, to turn nuclear fall-out shelters into good coin, Herman 
Kahn had recommended studies of human behaviour in other 
overcrowded environments: concentration camps, prisons, 
troopships. On 25 July 1961, in a televised address on the 
East-West crisis around Berlin, President Kennedy had called for 
fall-out shelters, saying: ‘We owe that kind of insurance to our 
families – and to our country.’ 104 Now Marcuse could fairly attack 
Kahn and the lack of feeling displayed by the Old Scientism, as 
well as ridicule shelters and the Scrabble they came with. 105 
 But then Marcuse went overboard. What he called the 
‘defence structure,’ he angrily proclaimed, ‘makes life easier 
for a greater number of people and extends man’s mastery of 
nature.’ 106 For Marcuse, it was not the particular exercise of 
technological power that was the problem, but technological 
power itself.























technologies were not confined to the left. Contrasting the 
impetuous and heedless pace of man with the deliberate pace 
of nature, Rachel Carson complained that radiation was now ‘the 
unnatural creation of man’s tampering with the atom’. 107 Even 
with Galbraith, there was a trace of the Marcusean vision. In his 
The New Industrial State (1967), Galbraith’s consumers were still 
the captives of corporations; but now corporations themselves 
had to obey what he famously labelled the ‘imperatives of 
technology.’ 108
 Before living standards began to stagnate in the early 
1970s, their rise obscured hair-shirt, low-tech alternatives 
to consumerism. But even before Ivan Illich (see Chapter 2), 
the willingness to be transfixed by technology, the desire to 
draw unfavourable contrast between technology and nature 
–  these things became the unquestioned foundations of 
Western dissent. 
 Later on, nuclear power, as the most profound of 
mankind’s manipulations of nature, proved unable to escape a 
full and vindictive interrogation.
The 1970s: campaigns against weapons  
make way for campaigns against reactors
On 2 October 1969, the US tested a 1.2 Megaton nuclear 
bomb on the island of Amchitka, off the west coast of Alaska. 
Fearful that earthquakes and tidal waves might ensue, radicals 
from Vancouver, Canada – the nearest major city to Amchitka – 
stormed America’s nearby border, closing off traffic for two hours. 
According to one account: 
‘In Vancouver at that time there was a convergence of 
hippies, draft dodgers, Tibetan monks, seadogs, artists, 
radical ecologists, rebel journalists, Quakers, and expatriate 
Yanks… Greenpeace was born of all of this.’ 109 
Greenpeace began as a Canadian branch of the Sierra Club, 









protest against American nuclear weapons tests – but this time 
the protest was not so much against nuclear’s impact on human 
beings, as against its impact on nature.
 As its name suggested, Greenpeace mixed 
environmentalism into the old anti-war feeling. Protests by a 
succession of Greenpeace boats against subsequent nuclear 
tests, not least by France, threw the organisation further in the 
limelight. 110 By the time of the Arab oil embargo of 1973, then, 
Marcuse’s legacy and the birth of modern environmentalism 
added to establishment hesitations about the most obvious 
alternative to oil: nuclear power. In these halcyon years for the 
British left, too, striking miners had leaders who were hostile 
to nuclear power; indeed, the most famous son of the National 
Union of Mineworkers, Arthur Scargill, was a longstanding 
member of CND.
 Eventually, outcries against DDT faded. The US soon forgot 
about Agent Orange, the chemical defoliant it had used against 
Vietnam. Détente between the superpowers took attention 
away from nuclear weapons. But nuclear power lived on, and 
emerged as a focus for Green suspicions. For environmentalists, 
it could never be the beneficial application of the objective laws 
of physics.
 In the summer of 1976, the UN Conference on Human 
Habitat, Vancouver, proved an opportunity for Greenpeace to 
hold a benefit concert and to launch another of the organisation’s 
boats. The secretary-general of the conference requested a 
ride; but the most significant development was a delegate 
telling Greenpeace that the US authorities had enough missing 
plutonium for there to be a black market in the stuff. That broke 
a national news story in Canada. 111  
 In April of the following year there was another sign of 
the times. More than 1400 anti-nuclear protesters were arrested 
at the site for Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, 60km north 
of Boston.
 Like the military, nuclear power was by now seen as 























by the early 1980s, the decade of Reagan and Thatcher, 
it was possible for the Washington correspondent of the 
London Observer, together with a lawyer and ex-member of 
Gough Whitlam’s Labour government in Australia, to publish 
a 578-page exposé entitled The Nuclear Barons – the inside 
story of how they created our nuclear nightmare. 112 Similarly, 
one UK energy specialist detected the existence of a nuclear- 
industrial complex.113
 In the 1980s, a pale residue of post-war radicalism 
made its own bid to rob nuclear power of credibility. However, 
policymakers had by then entertained second thoughts on 
nuclear power for nearly a decade. 
Nuclear grows before 1973/4, slows after  
Until 1973/4, nuclear reactors were broadly planned, built, 
and made operational. But then things changed. For elites, 
the recession was no time to continue the 1960s upswing in 
building reactors. 
 The downturn was especially evident in the US. In February 
1974, the AEC confidently predicted that worldwide nuclear 
energy would grow from under 100 GW to more than 500 in 
1985, roughly 1000-1500 in 1990, and roughly 2500-4000 
in 2000. But during 1974, demand for electricity use in the US 
failed to grow at all, after a steady annual increase of six or 
seven per for many years. As early as the spring of 1975, 87 
of the 180 reactors on order in the US had been deferred, and 
eight had been cancelled. 114
 Perhaps it was not surprising, then, that in 1975, 
criticism of the AEC reached such a crescendo, Congress  •	
abolished it, putting its civilian nuclear responsibilities in 
the hands of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
criticism, budgetary pressures and a burgeoning Japan saw •	
the ABCC replaced by a new, Japanese-American agency, 









Thus did the two US nuclear agencies guilty of the worst excesses 
of the Cold War meet their end.
 Worldwide, the slowing of nuclear took longer, but 
completely undid the AEC’s forecasts. Between 1972 and 2006, 
no fewer than 165 plants and more than 134 GW of capacity 
were cancelled after the granting of construction permits. Indeed 
on 62 cancelled plants, building had either begun, or was even 
complete. 115 World nuclear generating capacity would have 
been broadly 50 per cent higher, 1975-2005, had it not been 
for cancellations.
Worldwide nuclear capacity:  
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In Britain, a similar caution took a rather different form. Typically 
enough for the British, historians of nuclear power contributed 
to a broad disenchantment with it. In 1967, writing for Britain’s 
right-wing Institute of Economic Affairs, the journalist and 























Attlee government’s fondness for nationalisation had been to 
blame for the anarchic trajectory of civil nuclear power in the UK. 
Burn wrote:
‘The American type of organisation was not ruled out... by 
lack of resources or the smallness of firms or markets. 
The determining factor in the British choice is to be found 
in attitudes rather than circumstances; the choice reflects 
views on private enterprise, competition, central planning 
and administration and the competence of ministers.’ 117 
However, in 1974, Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold’s 
magisterial history of British nuclear affairs, Independence and 
Deterrence, confirmed to many opinion-formers that the genesis 
of atomic power had been much more about military dogmas and 
aspirations than economic ones. 118 Burn was wrong, Gowing and 
Arnold implied: post-war, Labour had not excluded firms such as 
ICI and English Electric from nuclear power. Such firms had been 
involved from the outset, but had concluded that nuclear work 
would drain precious manpower, turn out unprofitable, and lead 
to political hassles. 
 In the austerity of the 1940s and 1950s, Gowing and 
Arnold contended, Britain’s commitment to nuclear matters had 
been more about delusions of imperial grandeur than about 
cheap electricity. In taking this view, the two authors helped 
bring about an important shift in British officials’ opinions about 
nuclear power. Expert opinion now began to see it more as 
a matter of security in the sense of military and political risk 
management, and less as a matter of economic potential. 
 Also in 1974, a paper by Harvard’s Irvin ‘Chip’ Bupp 
and MIT’s Jean-Claude Derian began to change minds about 
nuclear. They estimated that light water nuclear reactors in the 
US were much dearer to run than had been previously thought, 
and that such reactors were likely to become more expensive 
still. Significantly, they put the increase in costs down to delays 









 By 1976, Gowing, Arnold, Bupp and Derian were cited, not 
without glee, by the Canadian environmentalist Walter Patterson. 
His book Nuclear Power, a relatively balanced Green critique 
of the sector, became something of a primer on the field. 120 
Patterson himself was a founder of Friends of the Earth in the 
UK. From then on, FoE played a leading role in undermining the 
case for nuclear power. 
Proliferation adds to the risk-orientated 
conception of nuclear power
In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 
London, Washington and Moscow. 121 By then, proliferation had 
already become an international concern. First, the arms race 
between the superpowers was spiralling upwards. Second, the 
superpowers feared the spread of atomic weapons to countries 
that had not yet developed such a capability.
 The NPT addressed both points. Articles I and II outlawed 
the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to non-weapons 
states, and obligated them not to seek it. Article VI, meanwhile, 
committed states possessing nuclear weapons to 
‘… pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control.’
For all the mangled prose, subsequent history was clear: the 
nuclear weapons states – America, Britain, China, France and 
the Soviet Union – proved far keener on keeping others out of 
the nuclear club than in pursuing disarmament themselves. 
 Altogether, the NPT ratified the status quo in the nuclear 
arms race, in the hopes of slowing it down. But since America 
had, apart from the upset of Sputnik, long led that race, the 
























 Against Russia and China, which had exploded her first 
hydrogen bomb in 1967, the Treaty sought to freeze in a Western 
advantage. And had India and Pakistan signed the Treaty, they 
would never have gained the nuclear weapons they now have.
 Most significant to the story of nuclear energy, however, 
are Articles III, IV and V. These guaranteed non-nuclear weapons 
states the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. Thus weapons 
states undertook to transfer nuclear expertise to those states 
that did not yet have it. The NPT gave the UN’s International 
Atomic Energy Authority, set up in 1957 to promote Eisenhower’s 
Atoms for Peace, a new job, and one it still has today: to police 
nuclear matters in the developing world through an intrusive 
system of inspections. 
 Nevertheless, 40 years ago, the nuclear superpowers 
formally paid some respect to the ambitions and the sovereignty 
of less powerful countries. They also expressed some confidence 
that the development of nuclear technology could have benefits 
independent of its military uses. As the 1960s turned to the 
1970s, however, these kinder sentiments began to vanish. 
 Under President Jimmy Carter, a former submarine 
nuclear engineer, US concern over proliferation came to a head, 
confirming that nuclear power was now more a matter of risk 
than of economics. In April 1977, Carter announced to the 
nation that there was no dilemma more difficult to resolve than 
that connected with the use of nuclear power. The world needed 
energy, but ‘components of the nuclear power process’ could be 
turned to providing atomic weapons. 122
 Carter announced restrictions. He continued with an 
embargo on the export of equipment or technology that would 
permit uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing. In effect, 
he flouted the NPT’s provision that the developing world be given 
access to nuclear technology. 
 Such realpolitik was hardly a novelty. What was much more 
remarkable was that Carter also scaled back and restructured 
American nuclear activities in line with his non-proliferation 









on the grounds that, while it extracted the full energy from 
uranium fuel, it could also be adapted to extract plutonium 
or weapons-grade uranium for use in bombs. He worried that 
continued reprocessing in the US would both create more 
material that might be diverted to weapons, and encourage the 
spread of reprocessing technology around the world.
 It’s true that the halt to reprocessing came in the wake 
of recession. Cancelling new power stations also lowered future 
requirements for nuclear fuel, making reprocessing a much less 
attractive economic and technical proposition than it had been. 
Yet if Carter was right, the world’s leading superpower could not 
trust its own institutions to look after nuclear materials within its 
own borders. 
 That went further than mistrust of the East. It marked a 
new level of unease about the whole idea of nuclear power.
 Since Carter’s era, America, Britain, the UN and the IAEA 
have used all aspects of uranium extraction and refinement, 
along with the production of fissile plutonium in nuclear reactors, 
as a means of restricting the sovereignty of Pakistan, India, 
North Korea, and of course Iraq. More recently Britain, France 
and Germany have tried to set controls on Iranian fission, 
while the UN has also upbraided Brazil and South Korea for 
their experiments. A discreet veil has been passed over Israel’s 
200 nuclear warheads, although even here there are fears 
of proliferation.
Operational risks: Three Mile Island  
and The China Syndrome, 1979
Early on the morning of 28 March 1979, there was a mechanical 
failure in the cooling system of Unit 2 of the power station at 
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania. Overheating led to venting of 
radioactive gases to the atmosphere and, later, the release of 
liquid waste to the Susquehanna River. However, no workers 
were injured.
 Among those living close by during the accident, a 1998 
follow-up of more than 30,000 found ‘no consistent evidence 























had a significant impact on the overall mortality experience of 
these residents.’ 124 In 1945 alone, at Hanford, Washington 
State, America’s plutonium production facility had secretly 
released more than 10 million gigabecquerels of radioactive 
iodine into the atmosphere – an enormous amount (one 
becquerel equates to one decay per second). By contrast, 
official estimates suggest that Three Mile Island released less 
than 550 gigabecquerels. 125
 After Governor Richard Thornburgh’s advice to evacuate 
pregnant women and children within a five-mile radius, more 
than 100,000 people jammed the roads – 50 per cent of 









the population of Three Mile Island. 126 In the aftermath, 
regulatory oversight of the entire US nuclear industry was 
restructured and expanded.
 By coincidence, the movie The China Syndrome was 
released within two weeks of the accident. It starred Jane Fonda 
as an investigative journalist who makes contact with a whistle- 
blowing engineer at a nuclear power station. She goes on to show 
safety taking a back seat as short cuts are made to maximise 
profit, with the corrupt collusion of government regulators. The 
media’s corporate backers, meanwhile, put on pressure to stop 
the story coming out.
 That the film was so readily taken up as a means of 
understanding real events showed that Hollywood’s account had 
successfully gripped the public imagination. The mass panic that 
greeted the accident formed a stark contrast to the reality, in 
which the accident caused no casualties. Just five years after 
the Watergate scandal of 1972-4 ended in Nixon’s resignation, 
the conviction that we are not told the truth took firm hold.
 Europe also saw a reaction against nuclear power, above 
all in Germany, where in the late 1970s opposition assumed the 
scale of a mass movement. In Germany, Green activists gained 
an international following for their yellow bumper-sticker logo of 
a smiley sun and, in various translations, their slogan ‘Atomkraft? 
Nein, Danke!’. In 1980 they formed a political party. 
 In later years, Germany’s social-democratic party, the 
SPD, took on a Greenish hue, and diminished the influence 
of Green political organisation. Nevertheless, the international 
impact of German environmentalism in the realm of theory 
was considerable. Hans Jonas, a philosopher, attacked nuclear 
energy for helping our old friend, ‘energy gluttony’, while more 
broadly prioritising the survival of future generations over 
hopes in progress. 127 Meanwhile, the sociologist Ulrich Beck 
interpreted society as manufacturing ‘invisible risks’ – above all, 
those associated with nuclear power. 128
 On his own terms, at least, Beck was fortunate. The 
publication of his key work, Risk Society, occurred in the same 























Chernobyl, 1986: too little technology,  
too little economic development 
At 1.23am on 26 April 1986, reactor number four at the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, three kilometres south of Pripyat, 
Ukraine, exploded. The accident happened as new emergency 
procedures were being tested. For 10 days fire raged, releasing 
a cloud of radioactive material through the wrecked roof that 
spread across Europe, raining out caesium and iodine.
 Chernobyl was without doubt the worst nuclear accident 
in history. It drove a third of a million people from their homes. 
But was it, as the British philosopher John Grey alleges, a 
warning against human hubris? 129 It’s important to understand 
Chernobyl for what it was. What exactly happened? 
 According to Greenpeace, Chernobyl resulted in 200,000 
deaths in the years 1990-2004 alone. The organisation links the 
disaster to respiratory disease, endocrine problems, premature 
ageing, and psychological disorders, among others. Significantly, 
it also claims that ‘the worst is yet to come’. 130 
 The Chernobyl Forum, a group of experts brought together 
by UN agencies and the governments of Ukraine, Belarus and 
Russia, came to a different conclusion. It noted 50 deaths 
amongst workers and among ‘liquidators’ brought in to clean up 
the accident. The Forum estimated that there would eventually 
be another 4,000 fatal cancers in the most exposed population. 
In less exposed populations the rate of cancer increase will, 
at less than 0.01 per cent, be undetectably small. Still, there 
are also non-fatal consequences: liquidators suffering from 
cataracts, and about 4,000 thyroid cancers amongst children. 
The latter are highly treatable, albeit with severe long-term 
side effects. 131
 Chernobyl was a very serious disaster. Things could have 
been much worse: immediately after the explosion, winds blew 
radioactive material away from Pripyat. 132 But before examining 
the matter more closely, we should ask: what accounts for the 









200,000 and the Chernobyl Forum’s 50? 
 The Chernobyl Forum started with what’s known about 
radiation and the exposure of the local population. Rightly, 
however, it also factored in:
the rise in diagnoses of cancer following from intense •	
post-accident surveillance
the effect that the subsequent collapse of the Soviet •	
Union in 1989 had on local health. 
A helicopter decontaminates the 























Greenpeace also noted the uncertainty inherent in estimating 
health impacts. But it then used the concept of uncertainty as 
an excuse to blame every ‘unexplained’ problem on Chernobyl. 
Instead of proceeding on the basis of science, it began from the 
premise that the explosion explained every ill. 
 What should people make of the real Chernobyl? Its 
consequences were typical of a disaster in a poor country. When 
a plant making pesticides in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India, 
released a toxic cloud over surrounding slums in 1984, 3,000 
people died overnight. A further 15,000 may have died in later 
years, and tens of thousands were affected. 133 
 Mining in China also kills. In 2004, more than 6,000 
people died in accidents. 134 
 Chernobyl was less deadly than Bhopal or Chinese coal 
mining, but is analogous in that all three disasters would likely 
neither have happened, nor led to such grave consequences, had 
there been better control technologies based on more substantial 
investment. The loss of life happened in industries forced to 
function in cash-strapped contexts: they were not the result of 
inherent defects in the industries themselves. 135 Also important 
is the broader economic and political context. To protect their 
thyroids, children in Pripyat were given iodine pills within hours of 
the explosion. In Belarus, things happened differently. There the 
authoritieslet children drink milk contaminated with iodine-131 
for a week. 136
 The consequences of a Chernobyl in the developed world 
would be limited by ‘containments’ – formidable concrete and 
steel walls surrounding reactors, giving them their characteristic 
spherical shape. Containments have always been standard in 
the West. According to physics professor at the University of 
Pittsburgh, Bernard L Cohen, accident analyses since Chernobyl 
show that if there had been a US-style containment, ‘none of the 
radioactivity would have escaped, and there would have been no 
injuries or deaths’. 137
 The lesson of Chernobyl is the need for more technology 









After 9/11, fear of terrorist attacks on reactors
Since its birth, nuclear technology has generated runaway 
disaster scenarios. After 9/11, however, policymakers began 
to take worst-case thinking about nuclear matters much more 
seriously than they had in the past. Fears of terrorist attacks on 
power stations rose up the agenda.
 Curiously, a new consensus emerged. Anti-nuclear 
campaigners, once suspicious of government security measures, 
now worried as much as the state about terrorist attacks on 
nuclear reactors. ‘Imagine a world without New York City,’ instructs 
Robert F Kennedy Jr, Senior Attorney for the Natural Resources 
Defense Council in the US. He continues that terrorists have 
already done that imagining:
‘In November 2002, the FBI warned that Al Qaeda sleeper 
cells could be planning attacks on US nuclear power plants 
near our largest cities to try to inflict “severe economic 
damage and maximum psychological trauma”.’ 138 
In the same vein, Helen Caldicott, president of the Nuclear Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, DC, claims that the design for 
an atomic bomb can easily be found on the Internet – and that 
a trip to a hardware store will allow miscreants to ‘complete’ 
nuclear arms production. 139
 Sensible security measures are just that: sensible. But, 
as with security checks at airports, people need to ask whether 
such measures do any real good, or whether they merely prevent 
people from getting where they need to go.
 A terrorist attack on a nuclear power station is unlikely 
to be catastrophic. Of containments, a review published in the 
journal Science pointed out: ‘No airplane, regardless of size, can 
fly through. This has been calculated in detail and tested in 1988 
by flying an unmanned plane at 215 m/s (about 480 mph) into 























‘To tell people that they and the Earth are in mortal danger 
from events that cannot cause significant public harm is 
to play into the hands of terrorists by making a minor 
event a cause for life-endangering panic.’ 140 
The Devil’s Trinity today (1): 
accidental releases of radiation
The key contemporary charges made against nuclear power 
concern accidents, proliferation, and waste. Fear of accidents is 
the most straightforward to deal with. 
 Today, mankind has developed technologies that are 
mature enough to make nuclear power safe enough. Since the 
1960s, in fact, Western technology has been in place to contain 
the accident that occurred at Chernobyl.
 Fastening not on low risks but on major consequences, 
Greens can always imagine a catastrophic scenario. An unlikely 
chain of events is always possible. But as the politics of 
precaution reveal (see Chapter 3), a Doomsday can be dreamt up 
for any technology.
 What matters is not what is possible, but what is 
significantly probable. Here, the historical record supports 
the idea that contemporary nuclear power is safe. The most 
notorious accident in the West, Three Mile Island, killed nobody – 
with technologies that are now more than 30 years out of date.
 Newly built nuclear power stations will be even safer 
than those in operation today, if only because materials and 
electronics are better. Components are more standardised, and 
thus more reliable. Designs have improved, and incorporate new 
safety devices.
 ‘Passive safety’ features shut down reactors by relying 
on natural forces such as gravity and thermal expansion, 
making them more reliable. The name Westinghouse gives 
the generation of reactors it is building in China is AP1000 
standing for ‘Advanced Passive’ reactor. This is the company’s 









safety principles cover the isolation of its core and its cooling 
mechanisms. Westinghouse claims the following advances: 141
The AP 1000: claimed percentage  
reductions on previous designs 142
reductions on previous 
designs, per cent
Number of safety-related valves 50
Amount of safety-related piping 80
Amount of control cable 85
Number of pumps 35
Volume of earthquake-proofed building 45
Reactor safety, however, is not just a matter of fewer parts to go 
wrong and better technology. Without good leadership, as well as 
good staff motivation, training, and professionalism, high levels 
of safety will never be achieved. Management competence and 
the pursuit of shareholder value are questions for every industry, 
and the nuclear sector should certainly be held to account on 
these issues. But poor safety practices don’t automatically 
adhere to the nucleus.
 Nevertheless, the nuclear industry feels itself on the back 
foot here as everywhere else. Again and again, it emphasises the 
need for a ‘safety culture’ in nuclear plants and – needless to say – 
among nuclear workers. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
no less, wants ‘a work environment where management and 
employees are dedicated to putting safety first’. 143
 Yet in the end safety cannot really come first. After all, 
if the nuclear industry’s overarching objective really did become 
safety, nuclear power stations would have to be shut down 
– just in case.
 Safety can never be an afterthought. But neither can it 
become a substitute for the central purpose of an organisation 
or a society. In the case of nuclear power, the central purpose 























 That Westinghouse brands its new breed of reactors 
around their safety features suggests that it has its priorities 
wrong. To be satisfied with building any reactor so long as it’s 
safe shows a poor imagination. What the world needs now are 
Advanced Productivity reactors. 
 Of course, reactors need to be safe. But Advanced 
Productivity is the kind of inspiring mission that can ground 
discipline, teamwork, insight and a properly watchful attitude 
toward safety.
 Safety demands more than simply following rules 
and ticking boxes. It requires a workforce with high morale. 
Ultimately, that will depend on the support nuclear power finds 
in society. When friends, neighbours and the media regard 
reactors as beneficial, commitment to safety on site will be that 
much stronger.
The Devil’s Trinity today (2): unbridled proliferation 
In the Carter years, fears of nuclear proliferation put the brakes 
on nuclear energy, both inside and outside the US. With the 
end of the Cold War, those fears shifted from the nuclear arms 
race of the superpowers to the ‘asymmetric warfare’ – nuclear 
included – waged by rogue states, terrorist networks and 
aberrant individuals. As Secretary of State James Baker III put 
it, proliferation of one sort or another was going to be ‘perhaps 
the greatest security challenge of the 1990s’. 144 This view was 
bound to have consequences for nuclear power. 
 The idea of rogue individuals setting off nuclear devices 
goes back, as we have seen with Fred Cook, to 1961. Then, in 
1985, a week or so before he approved the sale of arms through 
Israel to Iran, President Ronald Reagan famously cast the latter 
as the main example of outlaw states run by ‘the strangest 
collection of misfits, looney tunes and squalid criminals since 
the advent of the Third Reich’. 145 Finally the end of the Cold War 
allowed a new synthesis of nuclear roguishness to be imagined 
and feared. People were told that with nuclear proliferation, the 









 By 1989, the end of political certainties, burgeoning 
globalisation and the rise of the Internet seemed to make for 
an unpredictable world. In 1990, America’s Arms Export Control 
Act targeted states aiding or abetting ‘an individual or groups 
in acquiring unguarded nuclear material’. 146 Individual Russian 
scientists, disgruntled with Boris Yeltsin’s rule, were going to 
leave the country with bags of nuclear materials for sale on a 
world black market. Superguns, designed by Canadian rogue 
scientist Gerald V Bull, were going to give Saddam Hussein’s 
state nuclear weapons with a range of 1000km. 147 
 In January 1994, in a speech to European politicians, 
Clinton formalised the doctrine of rogue states. 148 In the 
aftermath of 9/11, George W Bush sought to connect Al Qaeda, 
a rogue network, to a rogue state – Iraq. Notoriously, it was 
argued that in Saddam Hussein’s rogue state, there were going 
to be weapons of mass destruction. Some of them, too, were 
going to be nuclear, being based on ‘yellowcake’ uranium ore 
drawn from Niger. 
 Everyone now knows that fears of rogue elements 
have proven unfounded. But while conspiracy theorists still 
wax indignant over the dodgy intelligence dossiers that led up 
to the Iraq war, something seems to have escaped them. When 
Bush and Blair talked themselves into believing their worst-case 
scenarios about Iraq, a culture obsessed by nuclear proliferation 
ensured that they could also talk quite a lot of other people 
into their war. 
 Fears of nuclear proliferation are quite widely embedded 
nowadays. These fears impede nuclear technology, which the 
world urgently needs to put to work. 
 The US is now keen to see nuclear energy taken up around 
the world, but it remains fearful of proliferation. Its Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP) has a convoluted scheme to give 
developing nations nuclear power with no ‘user serviceable parts’, 
so that they will have no access to the nuclear fuel that might 
be reprocessed into weapons. 149 GNEP’s statement of principles, 























of the best available fuel cycle approaches for the efficient and 
responsible use of energy and natural resources’. 150   
 Those are appropriate goals for international co-operation.
 But a whole four out of the GNEP’s seven principles are 
concerned with limiting proliferation. These include: enhancing 
IAEA safeguards, creating a viable alternative to the acquisition 
of sensitive fuel cycle technologies, proliferation-resistant 
reactors appropriate for developing countries, and recycling fuel 
in a proliferation-resistant manner. 
 Such schemes make it difficult to get the most out of 
nuclear power. They also perpetuate a world divided between 
nuclear haves and have-nots. What the developing world needs 
is not proliferation-resistant reactors, but the best kind possible.
 GNEP is supposedly dedicated to the development of 
nuclear energy. Yet though its main bias is in fact to limit the 
spread of nuclear technologies, even this has not been enough 
for its critics. In June 2008, the US Congress abolished funding 
for the GNEP on the grounds that the risks of nuclear proliferation 
made it a bad idea. 151
 In fact any truly developed country wanting nuclear 
weapons cannot easily be stopped from getting them. As three 
experts in international relations and diplomacy write, more 
than 40 countries today have the wherewithal to make fuel for 
peaceful nuclear power, ‘but this easily can be modified to make 
material for nuclear weapon’. 152
 Whether nuclear weapons spread, and whether that’s a 
problem, are political, not technical issues. But a foreign policy 
built on denying most of the world access to modern technology 
is immoral and unsustainable.
 The pattern of nuclear tensions in the world began, as 
we saw, with the Manhattan Project. Tensions certainly exist 
today. It’s also true that if North Korea or Iran acquired a 
nuclear weapon, it would change the balance of power with the 
West. But it isn’t true that nuclear weapons are the source of all 
these tensions.









are so irrational as often assumed. Just as the interests of their 
rulers differ from those of their subjects, so do their interests 
differ from those of the West. But there are few grounds for 
believing that they have a strong motive to begin a nuclear war.
 Efforts to stop proliferation in developing countries cannot 
be compatible with real economic advance there. It isn’t just 
uranium that’s required to make a bomb: heavyweight computers, 
sophisticated electronics and advanced materials are needed 
too, as well as a strong infrastructure. Therefore efforts to stop 
proliferation can know few limits. The attempt to prevent Iraq 
obtaining nuclear weapons involved controversy over aluminium 
tubing. And under UN resolution 661, the export of pencils to 
Iraq was limited to certain quantities. 153 Perhaps the graphite in 
them might be used in a reactor. 
 The attempt to stop nuclear proliferation through 
restricting access to technology can only end in large parts of 
the world not developing to the extent that they should.
 The world will have to solve the problems of international 
relations. But it can’t just wait in hope for the benefits of civilian 
nuclear energy. 
 When more energy helps speed developing countries out 
of poverty, the world just might become a more peaceful place.
The Devil’s trinity today (3): waste, its disposal, and 
the problem of future generations
For many people, the killer argument against nuclear energy 
remains waste. Governments have dithered over approving new 
reactors. But that is as nothing compared to their record on 
nuclear waste.
 In the US, studies for a waste repository at Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada, began in 1978. When, in June 2008, the Department 
of Energy submitted a 10,000 page, 12-volume application for a 
licence, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission responded with the 
view that it anticipated completing a safety analysis and giving 
an answer sometime before… 2013. 154 























James Flynn and Mark Layman published the results of four 
surveys of Americans – 3,334 people in total. In each survey, 
respondents were asked freely to associate words with the idea 
of a nuclear waste repository. Slovic and his colleagues reported 
that the responses revealed an aversion so strong, it could not 
justly be labelled a simple dislike. 155
 Perhaps that’s not a surprise. But as good social scientists, 
Slovic and his colleagues took nothing at face value: 
‘One might expect to find associations to energy and its 
benefits – electricity, light, heat, employment, health, 
progress, the good life – scattered among the images. 
Almost none were observed.’ 
People were asked about a nuclear waste repository rather than 
waste itself. As a result, the researchers expected, ‘following the 
predominant view of experts in the this field, to find a substantial 
number of repository images reflecting the qualities “necessary” 
and “safe”’.  Yet as it turned out, most respondents did not form 
such images.
 Slovic and his colleagues offered two explanations for 
what they had found:
1. The ‘sprouting’ of nuclear power in the aftermath of  
 Hiroshima 
2. Public fears and opposition to nuclear waste disposal  
 plans could be seen as a crisis of confidence. 
The team described the latter as ‘a profound breakdown of 
trust in the scientific, governmental and industrial managers of 
nuclear technologies.’
 As this chapter has shown, both points are important. They 
confirm that history, more than physics, chemistry or biology, is 
what makes nuclear power so much the object of hysteria.
 We add two further points. First, any and all waste today 









associated with nuclear waste conjure questions about the long-
term future.
 How present generations relate to the future is a question 
that society no longer has easy answers for. Without a sense of 
progress, that human beings can make the world a better place 
for their descendants, people can slip all too easily into focusing 
on the dark side of the future.
 Here the worst-case scenario thinking of the Precautionary 
Principle finds a grander canvas on which to paint. Projected 
thousands of years into the future, there is even less of a sense 
of reality to constrain fantasies of disaster.
 
Let’s get precise about the longevity of radiation
Spent nuclear fuel contains a mixture of components – some of 
which only lose their radioactivity after hundreds of thousands 
of years. These are timescales beyond everyday imagining; yet 
it’s worth remembering that they describe how long it takes 
for radioactivity to decay completely, not how long it takes to 
become tractable. In fact, spent fuel is actually less radioactive 
than uranium ore after ‘just’ 10,000 years. 156
 Cadmium, mercury and lead, by contrast, have chemical 
toxicities that persist forever. Compared with nuclear waste, too, 
these naturally occurring elements are much more prevalent on 
the Earth:
Longevities and quantities of some toxic substances




Uranium 235 703,800,000 41,279























Contrary to the expectations that follow from the Precautionary 
Principle, mankind is not in the process of continually discovering 
new problems with radioactive waste. Its hazards have been well 
understood for decades. Indeed, what has happened over the 
years is that while technological advances have made nuclear 
waste easier to manage, there has been a decay of rational 
discourse about it.
 Actually, it is human fears that have taken nuclear waste, a 
resource that can be reprocessed into new fuel, and transformed 
into a problem for which there is no solution.
 
Fusion deserves a higher level of commitment
At present, nuclear energy is based on fission: the breaking up 
of large atomic nuclei into smaller parts. An alternative prospect 
is fusion: the joining together of light nuclei such as hydrogen, 
helium and lithium. This process is what powers the sun and 
the stars.
 For 50 years, fusion has held promise as a theoretical 
possibility that is potentially cleaner and capable of producing 
more fuel than conventional nuclear energy. But the practical 
engineering of fusion has proved a big challenge.
 Fusion energy has been released on Earth in hydrogen 
bombs. But for energy generation, it needs a more controlled 
release. So far, efforts have been focused on containing 
the nuclear reaction in a special ‘magnetic bottle’, which is 
suspended away from the walls of the reaction chamber. This 
is the approach taken by the ITER project, a $9.3 billion joint 
international R&D effort in which the EU, Japan, China, India, 
Korea, Russia and the US are partners.
 Other strategies to controlled fusion include inertial 
confinement, an approach taken by the European-led HiPER 
project, which uses powerful laser beams to confine the fuel. 
While these methods have proven to be less popular than 









That said, the difficulties of controlling the release of energy, such 
as designing materials that can survive the harsh conditions of 
the reaction chamber, remain formidable. 
 Another problem is to do with funding. The pressure on 
science funding is to show that research will have an immediate 
payoff. For fusion scientists, that can mean overselling the 
practical benefits of their research over long time scales that are 
necessarily speculative.
 Given these facts, it is unlikely that fusion will make a 
real contribution to energy before the middle of the 21st century. 
A better approach would be for society to have more confidence 
in funding basic research. If that can be done right, Energise! 
believes that, after 2050, the fundamental advances 
will be in place to make radical energy technologies such as 
fusion a reality.
Summing up this chapter 
The physics of nuclear power give every reason to favour it 
as a key component of energy supply in the future. However, 
politicians and officials in the West, and especially in Britain, 
are broadly unable to muster strong arguments for nuclear 
power. They neglect how reactors are the flat-out, low fuel cost 
energy workhorses of today and tomorrow, ready and able to 
meet the world’s demand for energy right now. Instead, they 
promote nuclear power in terms of it not generating CO2, or as 
an insurance policy against turbulence in the East.
 Renewables will always beat nuclear into submission in 
that kind of contest.
 Barack Obama’s policy on nuclear energy is instructive 
here. For him the merit of nuclear reactors is modest: since 
they account for more than 70 per cent of America’s non-carbon 
generated electricity, eliminating them would make it unlikely 
that he could meet his goals around climate. But expanding 
US nuclear power is, for Obama, another matter. Following the 
precedent of Carter, Obama says he will make ‘safeguarding 























priority’.  That must be fixed before another reactor is built in 
America. An alternative to Yucca Mountain must also be found, 
because Obama rejects it as a site for nuclear waste. Meanwhile, 
waste stored at current reactor sites should be contained with 
the best technology available. 159  
 Sensible prudence coupled with traditional American 
commitment to high technology? Perhaps. Yet it seems that 
Obama will make the difficulty of long-term storage of nuclear 
waste reason enough to abandon plans for new reactors for the 
foreseeable future. Of nuclear waste, Obama has said in an 
interview that 
‘... if we could figure out how to store it safely, then I 
think most of us would say “That might be a pretty 
good deal”.’ 160 
Yet here he wrongly blurs the distinction between long-term 
storage, which will be taxing but not intractable, and the shorter-
term variety, which has long been sorted out. 
 Just before expressing his hopes for nuclear, Obama’s 
fears and uncertainties ran away with him. In the same interview, 
he said:
‘Right now we don’t know how to store nuclear waste 
wisely, and we don’t know how to deal with the safety 
issues that remain, and so it’s wildly expensive to pursue 
nuclear energy.’ 161
But right now it isn’t wildly expensive to pursue nuclear energy: if 
nuclear is so expensive, why is the East so keen on it?
 Nuclear power started off with the best of hopes. But in 
the 1970s it received a blow that, in the process, also hit the 
whole reputation of science. Looking back on the generation 
of British who had gone to Oxford, Cambridge or the LSE 
between 1919 and 1951, the brilliant English academic 









science, its members 
‘… heard the rumble of discontent. They believed scientists 
improved the quality of life, but their successors were 
at first sceptical and then hostile…. Then in the 1970s 
ominous signs appeared. Those in CND who wanted 
to ban the bomb now wanted to dismantle all nuclear 
power stations. Physics was no longer a neutral subject 
and physicists could no longer plead that they were the 
dispassionate observers of a power whose use for good or 
evil depended on politicians.’ 
‘For the left,’ Annan continued, ‘science became an aspect of 
American imperialism.’ 162
 The rancour around nuclear power and science took a long 
time to mature; yet it’s possible to see the very first beginnings of 
it around the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why? Because 
use of atomic weapons didn’t just usher in the Old Scientism, 
but also contained within itself the possibility of a counterattack 
against both the military and the civilian use of nuclear physics. 
 The counterattack emerged within Western societies and, 
indeed, within Western elites.
 With radiation and nuclear weapons tests together 
forming the logical and historical link between anti-war and anti-
reactor feeling, the world has for decades conferred a mystical 
and Faustian significance on the atomic nucleus. As a result, 
the power of that nucleus has been politically transmuted into a 
bizarre and seemingly autonomous force, stripped of the social 
relations that surround it. The nucleus is held to be intrinsically 
dangerous. Though the word ‘proliferation’ is usually focused 
on the East, its repeated deployment also suggests that the 
military use of the nucleus is an unstoppable reaction all its own 
– something not subject to the whims of mankind.
 During the Cold War, fear of a nuclear strike embraced 
the schoolroom and the fall-out shelter, and sometimes took the 























the Cold War, fear of global warming has come to embrace still 
more spheres of human life: the home, the car and the plane. 
Yet importantly, the anti-nuclear dissent of the past has proved 
to be a preface for today’s conventional wisdom about climate 
change. The trump card of anti-nuclear activists is the doctrine 
that future generations will hate the current one for imposing 
upon them irreversible nuclear waste. And the trump card of 
climate alarmists is similar: the shocking selfishness of human 
beings today should not be allowed to impose an irreversibly 
hotter planet on future generations. 
 Always dogged by dissent, the Old Scientism began to 
develop cracks by 1975. However, it took the end of the Cold 
War to give dissent the upper hand. 
 As we saw in Chapter 3, the IPCC was already up and 
running by this time. Worry about climate change now had inter-
governmental support; and with that support, the New Scientism 
was born. The New Scientism had much more elite backing than 
the old anti-nuclear dissent. 
 Today’s critics of nuclear power find it hard to put science 
on a pedestal the way climate obsessives do. Where the two 
groups overlap is giving a special place to uncertainty. Uncertain, 
nightmarish leaps in climate find a parallel in the uncertain, 
nightmarish effects of low-level radiation. 
 What the New Scientism retains from the New Left 
is the hatred for science and technology. Instead of faith in 
science’s exhilarating interventions in the natural world, science 
is summoned as something that must be personally obeyed 
(climatology), or something that must be feared and, implicitly, 
wound up (nuclear physics).
 Chapter 5 turns to fossil fuels. In it we show that mankind’s 
working up of nature’s creations is no more a Faustian bargain 
than is nuclear power.










To understand the table of ratings that follows, it’s important to 
know the basics of nuclear reactor design.
 In a reactor, energy is released when the nuclei of uranium 
atoms break up. The atomic nucleus is made up of two types 
of particle, protons and neutrons. The splitting of a large 
nucleus such as uranium results in two fragments, each 
consisting of about half the original nucleus, together with 
some excess neutrons.
  The extra neutrons are the key to energy generation. They 
play two roles. First, by colliding with further uranium nuclei, they 
trigger further splits and sustain a chain reaction. Secondly, they 
carry off much of the energy.
  A reactor’s coolant prevents it overheating through 
absorption of the energy from the neutrons and nuclear 
fragments. The energy captured is then used to generate steam 
to turn an electric generator.
  The main distinctions between different reactor designs 
revolve around the coolant used. Water and gas are the options 
used at present, while designs using molten salt and molten 
metal are under development. 
 A second important choice of technique with reactors 
concerns the way in which the speed of neutrons is regulated 
between collisions. Most commonly, graphite is incorporated in 
some way as a moderator of neutron speeds. An alternative is a 
reactor that works with neutrons working at higher speeds. It’s 
this that accounts for the word ‘fast’ in some reactor names.
  A final alternative is nuclear fusion. 
 Between the different kinds of reactors listed in the table 
below, nuclear energy could be providing 25 per cent of world 
electricity by 2050. If world electricity quadrupled between 2000 
and 2050, then 25 per cent of electricity in 2050 is the same 
as all the electricity produced in 2000. Our plan calls for about 
2000 new power stations, worldwide, by 2050, or almost one a 























 If the UK invested in proportion to the number of its 
inhabitants, it would build a reactor roughly every two years – 
that is, about 10 power stations by 2030. The real ambition 
of our plan, however, lies in the idea that every country 
should do the same. China would have to build 20 times as 
many, or 200 by 2030.
 At the moment, the Chinese authorities expect to build 
only 150 new reactors by then; but the country’s plans keep 
getting revised upwards and, if present trends continue, will 
very likely beat our target. What we are suggesting is that the 



















/ Boiling Water 
Reactor
1970-1990 5 per cent Existing technology Does not handle 
fuel and waste 
generation well
Does not integrate 






2025-2045 20 per 
cent, when 
combined with 






Burns many fuel 











2020-2040 20 per 
cent, when 
combined with 




Long periods (10 
years+) between 
refuelling






2025-2045 20 per 
cent, when 
combined with 
other types of 
reactor
Efficiently burns 
fuel without need 




Solves a problem 
that is not critical
Sodium Cooled 
Fast Reactor
2025-2045 20 per 
cent, when 
combined with 
other types of 
reactor
Can use waste 







2020-2040 20 per 
cent, when 
combined with 
other types of 
reactor











2020-2040 20 per 
cent, when 
combined with 
other types of 
reactor
Can produce heat 
for CHP, hydrogen 
production, and 
water purification
Will be outclassed 
by flexible fuel 
handling of gas 
cooled fast 
reactors 
Fusion Reactor after 2050 less  
than 1 per 
cent
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Is nuclear power intrinsically uneconomic? 
An enduring charge made against nuclear power is that it has 
always promised to be cheaper than other kinds of energy, but 
has never delivered on that promise. For critics this makes it 
intrinsically uneconomic. In fact, however, the accusation says 
more about those who level it than their target.
 First, given the widespread historical amnesia that afflicts 
society nowadays, it’s worth getting nuclear’s development in 
perspective. Because of its late arrival on the energy scene, 
nuclear is a young industry – and, in considering its economics, 
allowances need to be made for this. Since Calder Hall, the 
civilian nuclear sector has grown up very fast. It’s
 
less than half as old as the oil sector •	
less than a third as old as the natural gas sector •	
about a fifth as old as coal. •	
As large-scale, intricate technologies go, nuclear’s growth has 
occurred at an extremely rapid pace. 
 Second, a whole variety of reactor models has been 
experimented with, slowing maturation and thus economic 
viability. Of course, that’s to be expected of any new 
industrial sector. But there’s something else as well: nuclear’s 
military origins not only made it a profoundly national affair, 
impeding international collaboration for years, but also distorted 
its development, leading to an above-average number of 
false starts. 
 With nuclear, modest economies of scale only really 
emerged in the 1960s, when PWRs matured as a reliable 
and reproducible design. Given its 16 per cent share of world 
electricity supply, nuclear can be said to have gone from nothing 
to something substantive very quickly. Of course, nuclear industry 
boosters have made silly claims for it in the past – above all, 
that it would be ‘too cheap to meter’. But that should not blind 























 Third, it’s only after examining the ways in which nuclear’s 
opponents systematically exaggerate its risks that a rounded 
judgment about costs can be made. Irrational opposition leads 
to spiralling costs – only for Greens to turn round and say ‘I told 
you so’. 
 Fourth, environmentalists exhibit double standards 
around state subsidies for nuclear. It’s true that over the years 
and even today, nuclear has enjoyed some significant support 
from the state. But what kind of energy generation is free from 
such support? Greens attack nuclear, and also fossil fuels, for 
the featherbedding they get from the state. Meanwhile, free-
marketeers one-sidedly attack renewables on the same grounds. 
The truth is that the state assists all forms of energy generation. 
Nuclear is by no means exceptional in this regard. 
 Finally and most importantly, nuclear power is 
characterised by technological advance, which has lowered and 
will continue to lower its costs. This sounds obvious; but like their 
inspirations Malthus and Marshall (see Chapter 2), nuclear’s 
opponents don’t incorporate technological development into 
their political economy. Alternatively, Greens are hopeful that 
costs will come down with, say, solar power, but do not extend 
that hope to nuclear. 
 Again, double standards are apparent here. Because 
the very thought of interference with sub-atomic nature, and of 
dealing with radioactive waste, is anathema to them, Greens 
don’t entertain the idea that more sophisticated nuclear 
technology brings lower electricity prices. On the contrary: to 
improve nuclear is, for its enemies at least, a contradiction in 
terms.
 Actually nuclear has improved, despite the fact that 
opportunities for reaping economies of scale have so far proved 
rather limited. With fewer than 500 reactors working in the 
world today, making reactors in large batch runs, with modular 
components produced in still greater volumes, remains a task for 
the future. 









Greens’ biggest complaint is about the costs of decommissioning. 
In addition to wastes produced during operation, the power 
station itself must be taken apart at the end of its life and 
radioactive components disposed of. All the steel structures that 
contained the fuel and coolant are radioactive waste.
 The arguments that we have made above apply.
 It is hard to get an accurate idea of just how much 
decommissioning will really cost. In July 2008, newspapers 
reported an internal audit claiming that the financial affairs 
of the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority were subject 
to ‘inherent risks’, that budgetary problems were plagued by 
‘misunderstandings, unminuted meetings and lack of sufficiently 
trained staff’. Over 12 months, cost estimates for dealing with 
Britain’s waste had risen by £10bn to £83bn. 163 
 With nuclear, today’s precautionary climate is putting an 
upward pressure on costs of waste disposal. Inflationary problems, 
however, knows no upper limit. These kinds of problems, however, 
have long been known to afflict large government projects – 
regardless of whether they involve radiation.
 There are private sector alternatives to direct government 
funding, such as prepayment, a sinking fund, or the purchase 
of insurance. But since the Crash of 2008, none of these is 
guaranteed to operate smoothly.
 Given the quantities of electricity generated, the costs of 
decommissioning are not so large. Managed properly, they should 
probably run to a few hundred million pounds per reactor. That 
represents a fraction of a penny per kilowatt hour generated.
 There are other ways to bring down costs: economies 
of scale, reactors with longer lives, and clever recycling of 
contaminated steel from old to new power stations.
Let’s get precise about the size of nuclear waste
Because uranium has such a great energy density, both the 
volumes of fuel going into reactors and the volumes of waste 
coming out are small. So despite the fierceness of its radioactivity, 























for society to solve. The physical scale of nuclear waste is nothing 
compared to, say, the Channel Tunnel. 
 Nuclear waste management is certainly a complex and 
particularly dangerous business, demanding professionalism, 
teamwork and calm. But that only makes it like many other 
important endeavors in life.
 The UK has a historic legacy of nuclear waste that, in 
volume terms, is estimated to total 476,900m3. 164 But how 
much is that? Take the cube root of 476,900m3, and it’s 78 
metres. In other words, all the existing nuclear waste in the UK, 
generated over more than 50 years, occupies about the same 
envelope as 27 floors of Canary Wharf Tower, east London. 
 And new waste promises to be pretty modest too, for 
modern nuclear plants don’t make much. Though it has since 
insisted that it only deals with existing waste, the UK’s official 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management has suggested 
that if the country’s current level of nuclear capacity were 
replaced with new-build, the volume of existing waste stocks 
would increase by about 10 per cent. 165 In that case, the UK 
would have to add 36 x 36 x 36m of nuclear waste – an envelope 
equivalent to fewer than three more floors of Wharf Tower.
 Furthermore, more than 95 per cent of the radioactivity in 
existing waste is concentrated in high-level waste, spent fuel and 
plutonium. These components make up just 15,900m3, or 3.3 
per cent of total packaged waste volume. 166 Altogether, that’s 
less than one floor of Canary Wharf Tower. 
 To store such a modest amount of nuclear waste is not 
beyond British engineers. The alternative is to concede that, in 
the 21st century, handling these amounts of waste is beyond the 
wit of man.
Taking a position on radiation standards 
For practical regulatory purposes, the ‘linear no threshold’ model, 
makes sense. However, a look at radiation standards shows that, 
under the influence of different politics, the same science of 









 The first federal radiation standards in the US were 
based on the 1956 work of the National Academy of Sciences’ 
committee on the Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation 
(BEAR). 167 The standards began to bring under control the 
very high exposures produced by the rush to create a nuclear 
weapons industry.
 But their distinguishing feature was that the standard for 
the maximum exposure for workers was set at 50 mSv, 10 times 
higher than the maximum for the general public. The nuclear 
industry and the AEC complained that without this measure, 
standards would be impractical.
 Our view is that the 1956 maximum for the public is broadly 
right. It is a little above, but nevertheless broadly comparable 
with natural background levels of radiation. Unlike, say, smoking, 
the effects of natural background radiation are so small, they 
enough that they cannot be disentangled from the multitude of 
complex processes that lead to cancer. The same will be true of 
an increment from artificial radiation. This is a level of risk that 
most people are happy to take in return for the benefits of a 
technological society. 
 The maximum public exposure of 10 mSV is in any case 
only relevant to the few individuals who, for whatever reason, 
accidentally come into close contact with nuclear wastes. Most 
people living within 50 miles of nuclear power station, for 
example, will receive more like 0.0001 mSv per year.
 There seems no reason, however, why levels for workers 
should be higher than those for the general public. It’s possible 
to imagine emergencies in which workers might be exposed to 
high levels. But there’s no reason why routine work in the nuclear 
industry should be more dangerous than any other occupations.
 In 1977 the International Committee on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) helped drive a major revision of radiation standards. 
In practice, the maxima for workers were lowered to match maxima 
for the public, while allowing for exceptional circumstances.
 That seems to us appropriate. But by 1977, appropriate 























caution. In a seminal if controversial paper, three researchers 
came up with new evidence of cancer among workers at 
Hanford. 168 Alongside the new standards, therefore, the ICRP 
developed the philosophy that exposure should be As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable, or ALARA.
 Sensible? Perhaps. But by omitting any mention of a 
limit below which there is no concern, ALARA opened the door 
to regulating lower and lower levels of radiation. ALARA could 
always be that little bit lower, even if the quantities of radiation 
dealt with are far lower than the natural levels that people are 
exposed to in everyday life.
 Just as some statements of the Precautionary Principle 
specify that measures should be ‘reasonable’, so does ALARA. 












































When environmental campaigners attack 
carbon, they use the word as a synonym for fossil fuels.  
 They argue that:
1.   Coal-fired power plants generate more CO2 per unit of 
energy than any other source of energy. Such plants 
promise to reinforce China’s status as the world’s top 
emitter of GHGs. Coal supplies may be around for two 
centuries or more, but it’s certain that burning coal 
accelerates global warming. Burning coal is a danger to 
the planet, so we should leave all of the world’s coal in the 
ground, right now.
2.  Dependence on natural gas leaves Europe hostage to 
unstable regimes, especially in Russia and the Middle 
East. Gas supplies may be around for quite a few decades, 
but already gas is a threat to national energy security.  
3.    Like gas, oil is also threat to energy security – and not 
just in Europe, but also in the US. On top of that, oil is 
the fossil fuel that’s most rapidly being depleted: supplies 
will only be around for a very few decades. Thus the world 
faces, or has passed, a peak of supply. One way or another, 
humanity faces peak oil.
Environmentalism perceives fossil fuels as an addiction (see 
Chapter 2). It especially condemns the repeated use of oil for 
personal transport in cars and planes. 
 In fact, fossil fuels are the largest and most versatile 
energy source that humanity has ever mastered. And even better 
will be their more broadly based successors, the carbon-based 

























Sticking up for carbon, seeing CO2  
as more than just a problem
For climate change activists, fossil fuels prompt a simple 
worldview: cut carbon out. But the reality will be different. The 
world will never move into a ‘low carbon’ economy. Instead, it 
will one day control CO2, put it to work, and, through a variety 
of industrial recycling techniques, organise a New Carbon 
Infrastructure.
 With a New Carbon Infrastructure, the versatile chemistry 
of carbon, as distinct from CO2, can be made to generate new 
transport fuels (and, as it happens, new materials). The world will 
not have entered a New Carbon Economy – but the quantity and 
quality of carbon-based fuels will be unrestrained by the Earth’s 
fossilised endowments.
 Fuels that come from fossils are not the only source of 
carbon-based fuels. Biofuels, which are based on agriculture 
and are now the subject of an outcry, are in fact the modern 
era’s first mass-scale transport fuel that does not rely on fossils. 
Far from lamenting society’s alleged addiction to fossil fuels, the 
energised citizen will proclaim that carbon-based fuels will come 
from both old and new sources. They will come from: 
The fossilised remains of living organisms1. , which, 
many millions of years ago, through the process known 
as photosynthesis, used sunlight to pull carbon atoms 
out of atmospheric CO2, string them together with 
hydrogen extracted from water, and so grow and create 
hydrocarbons. These fossils have stored energy for tens of 
millions of years in the chemical bonds among the carbon 
and hydrogen atoms that make up coal, natural gas and 
oil. 1
Crops, plants and algae2.  – living organisms which 
perform photosynthesis to grow, and can be harvested 
and processed into new, artificial hydrocarbons. 









of crops, plants, algae and other living organisms. 
Biotechnology will speed the growth of these life forms 
and speed their absorption of CO2. It will also help 
mankind make artificial fuels that are easy to process, 
have high energy densities, are compatible with existing 
infrastructure, and are convenient to employ.
 The artificial synthesis of hydrocarbons4. , using solar 
or other forms of energy (nuclear, geothermal), to make 
new hydrocarbon fuels. Artificial synthesis is still in the 
laboratory, but in principle it means playing the same 
trick as photosynthesis, only without relying on living 
organisms.
Like it or not, the burning of coal will remain an important source 
of electricity. For a long time to come, residential, commercial 
and industrial heat will be supplied by gas. Eventually, however, 
carbon-based fuels will find their majority application in personal 
and freight transport. Indeed, the high energy density of carbon-
based fuels gives them great prospects in transport – prospects 
which ensure that a future of purely electric forms of transport is, 
with the exception of trains, somewhat remote.
 The idea of generating more energy through human 
thoughtfulness and ingenuity applies to carbon-based fuels as 
much as to any other. And if people can be energised by that idea, 
they’ll need to 
stick up for carbon, a wonder element•	
present CO•	 2 as an opportunity, and not 110 per cent a 
problem. 
CO2 is a problem. But by managing it carefully, the world need 
not deny itself the remaining benefits of fossil fuels.
 The world has a lot to look forward to with carbon-based 
fuels. In the future, old and new hydrocarbons will power a whole 
lot more human and freight transport, and will especially assist 
























 The West frets about China sourcing fossil fuels from 
Africa – fuels with which China will generate electricity, mobility 
and CO2. More broadly, the West frets about fossil fuels and 
East-West relations. It worries that Asian demand will
revive high energy prices once the recession has lifted•	
fast deplete the Earth’s remaining stocks of oil. •	
But against these rather exaggerated dangers, unleashing the 
human energy and the mobility of billions in the East is a prize 
worth aspiring to.
 This chapter looks first at coal. Then it moves to gas, 
before turning to the biggest source of anxiety: oil. 
Coal: the most maligned fuel
Coal is disparaged as the dirtiest of fossil fuels. In Britain, the 
Institute of Public Policy Research, a New Labour think-tank, 
believes that the building of new coal-fired plants in Europe 
should, at least temporarily, be limited. It points out that: 
Denmark has banned new coal plants since 1990•	
Canada will insist that such plants be equipped with CCS •	
from 2018 
California’s emissions performance standards now dictate •	
that any new coal-fired plants are built either with CCS or 
with CHP. 2
In Washington, DC, another think-tank, the Center for Global 
Development (CGD), takes a similar view. CGD senior fellow 
David Wheeler describes the Tata Ultra Mega project, a 4 GW 
coal-fired power plant at Mundra, Gujarat, India, as ‘obsolete, 
unnecessary, ultra-dangerous for the planet’. 3 And in Australia, 
Professor Tim Flannery, a best-selling author on climate change, 
hates coal. He’s outraged at the ‘irresponsibility’ of those who 
burn it to supply his country with electricity. 4









investment banks – Citigroup, JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley – 
announced standards that would make it harder for companies 
to receive financing to build new coal-fired in the US. The 
banks said that a government-regulated cap on emissions was 
inevitable, that such a cap would greatly add to the cost of 
electricity generation, and that, as banks, they would encourage 
energy efficiency and renewables before giving their support to 
new coal-fired power plants. 5 
 Given all the innovations that were made in investment 
banking before the Crash, it’s striking that Citigroup, JP Morgan 
and Morgan Stanley could not bring themselves to support 
technological innovation in and around coal-fired plants. These 
institutions sought measures that were more to do with finance 
and markets than with useful energy infrastructure. While they 
gave the usual support to energy efficiency and renewables, the 
three banks did not have it in them to mount an aggressive plan 
on CCS.
 Wall Street banks put themselves in the vanguard of the 
fight against coal in the US. Yet all over the world, and above 
all in Asia, coal, with or without CCS, will continue to power the 
world well into the 21st century. 
No coal, no future
Once, coal brought power to the steam engines of the industrial 
revolution. It provided warmth, too, in domestic heating. Today, 
it powers electricity and is more and more industrial, rather than 
residential, in application. In 2005 there were just over 700 
billion tonnes of reserves of hard coal and lignite in the Earth. 
North America had about 200bn, Russia and its environs had 
150bn, India and China 75bn each, and South Africa, 40bn. 6 

























Estimated proportion of electricity generated by coal 













Coal can certainly be dirty. Much – although not all – of the 
smog that blights Chinese industrial cities originates in coal 
burning. Just like the London smog that was ended by the 1956 
Clean Air Act, coal in China causes problems when burnt in small 
boilers, or for domestic heating. The solution is a shift to gas and 
electricity. 8   
 Cheap and abundant, more and more of the world’s coal 
will tomorrow be used to generate that electricity. Coal will also 









Burning coal better 
Coal pollution can simply be cleaned up, without an increase in 
efficiency. On the other hand, when coal is burnt more efficiently 
than in the past, it burns cleaner: less coal is used to produce 
the same amount of energy. Historically, four broad techniques 
have been applied around these two approaches.
 In the West, filters and scrubbers have had no effect 
on either efficiency or CO2, but have cut the rest of the pollution 
contained in the flue gas exiting from coal-fired power stations. 
Filters are used to remove small particles from that gas – 
including those containing heavy metals such as lead. Scrubbers 
remove the sulphur dioxide that would otherwise cause acid rain: 
typically, limewater sprays are used to dissolve it. Scrubbers 
have also been developed to remove the mercury from coal. As 
the East develops, it will fit more filters and scrubbers.
 In pulverisation, coal for use in power stations is ground 
into particles smaller than a millimetre in diametre. That allows 
for fast, efficient combustion. Pulverisation is now a standard 
technique for new coal power stations. 
 To get the most out of pulverisation, combustion burns the 
particles while they are suspended in a jet of air. This technique 
has yet to become standard.
 Supercritical technology brings steam to turbines at 
very high pressures and temperatures; ultra supercritical refers 
to still higher temperatures and pressures. In these zones, the 
distinction between liquids and gases vanishes, and heat energy 
is turned into electricity very efficiently. 
 Britain’s first supercritical plant, at Kingsnorth, Kent, 
remains a controversial proposal (see below). But in China, 
more than 60 ultra-supercritical generators are already under 
construction. The government’s chief planning agency, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), has said 
that all future coal-fired units rated above 0.6 GW must meet 
ultra-supercritical standards. 9 New steels are a key technology 
























 Integrated Gas Combined Cycle power stations will take 
coal and convert it into carbon monoxide gas for combustion. 
That allows for turbine systems to be more efficient. Waste 
heat from IGCC stations can easily be fed into combined heat 
and power. IGCC could also be integrated with coal-to-liquids 
technology or hydrogen production.
IGCC plants could produce a variety of fuels and chemical 
products alongside heat and electricity, pointing the way to the 
New Carbon Infrastructure. Mark Jaccard, environment and 
resource management professor at Simon Fraser University, 
Vancouver, believes that multipurpose IGCC plants could not only 
be financially viable, but also exciting for engineers to design. 10 
As yet, however, they remain on the drawing board.
Representative figures for the performance of 





coal per hour, kg, 
for an output of 
500MWe
Subcritical pulverised 34.3 208,000
Supercritical pulverised 38.5 184,894
Ultra-supercritical pulverised 43.3 164,000
Subcritical fluidised 34.8 297,000
IGCC 38.4 185,376









 As coal’s non-GHG pollutants are cleaned up, so the CO2 
that coal generates will become a larger issue. It’s true that CCS 
can remove CO2 from the waste stream of power stations and 
store it away from the atmosphere; but, like IGCC, CCS is still at 
a primitive stage. 
 Investment in both technologies is urgently needed if a 
new round of coal-fired plants is not to face opposition. But 
there is hope, all the same. At Imperial College, London, Jon 
Gibbins and Hannah Chalmers believe that there’s a need for two 
learning cycles before full-scale adoption of CCS. They envisage 
a first tranche of demonstration projects quickly implementing 
a range of concepts at capacities of between 100 and 500 
MW. A second, larger tranche would consist of semi-commercial 
projects in which industry pursues those designs most suitable to 
its needs. Working with a timescale of four years for construction, 
and longer for the learning of operational lessons, Gibbins and 
Chalmers argue that, with full political and economic backing, 
CCS could become standard – at least in the developed world – 
by the 2020s. 12
 
Billions need coal (1): problems beyond climate 
When Greens worry about coal, they worry most of all about 
China. They are right when they point to the dramatic rise in coal 
burning in China. To build just one coal-fired power plant every 
week, let alone the two more often cited, adds up over a year to 
the equivalent of the whole of the UK’s generating capacity. 13
 There is, however, something of a rush to judgment about 
Asia and coal. 
 Separately from the issue of CO2 emissions around the 
burning of coal, Joseph McConnell and Ross Edwards at the 
Desert Research Institute (DRI), Reno, Nevada, have traced the 
presence of the toxic heavy metals thallium, cadmium and lead 
in the Arctic. Analysing an ice core extracted in Greenland, the 
two scientists found that, contrary to expectations, the Atlantic 
sector of the Arctic revealed markedly decreased coal burning 
























of the 20th century. This was a result both of improvements in 
combustion technology in the West, and of a shift from coal to 
oil and gas as the primary fuel source there. 
 In their conclusions, McConnell and Edwards made an 
important flourish. They hypothesised that thallium, cadmium 
and lead are currently increasing in the Pacific sector of the Arctic, 
because of ‘pollution from rapidly growing Asian economies 
predominantly fuelled by coal combustion’. 14
 Now, it may be that Asia is set to repeat the ill effects of 
burning coal that were once seen in Europe and North America. 
China’s rapid catch-up of the West, after all, has sharply raised 
levels of pollution. But the record confirms that Europe and North 
America have been able to cut coal-related pollution – and not 
just by burning less of the stuff. 
 The very speed of China’s advance also means that it’s 
unlikely to go on building or operating the same old coal-fired 
plants – complete with heavy metals emissions that are headed 
for the Arctic – for decade after decade. Sooner or later, countries 
like China and India will begin to cut, rather than increase, the 
pollution they generate through the use of coal.  
 China and India need not endure the protracted 
industrialisation that Western countries had to go through more 
than a century ago. By historical standards, the East, now fast 
into coal, is likely to be fast out of it. 
Billions need coal (2): the effect on climate
In 2007, the top climate change official at the UK Foreign Office, 
John Ashton, came out into the open with the self-seeking 
argument that Greens have long made about China and the 
world’s climate. Rich nations, he said, had to set an example of 
low-carbon development for China to follow. 15 
 Such a statement evokes the fake generosity and moral 
rectitude of an imperious parent in relation to an errant child, 
and is no doubt apprehended as such in China. But in fact the 
patronising tone is entirely out of place. If anything, it’s the 









 It’s China that has pushed ahead with new coal technology. 
A recent retrofit of the 1 GW Gaobeidan power station, which 
alone provides a tenth of Beijing’s power and a third of its hot-
water heat, has begun to strip out a small fraction – less than 
one per cent – of the CO2 in the station’s exhaust gas. 
16
 That isn’t much. The process only involves carbon capture, 
and doesn’t run to the storage part of CCS. But before critics 
thumb their noses, there are three points to note:
1. A reduction of one per cent in CO2 emitted is infinitely more 
than what’s happening around UK coal-fired power plants
2. With CCS technology in its infancy, it’s significant that a first 
step toward it seems to be happening in the East, rather 
than in the West
3. From the time of announcing the retrofit, China took only 
nine months to commission, design, build and complete it. 
For Greens, tablets of stone from the Science of Climate 
Change suggest that the growth of Eastern economies could, 
now the Bush years are over, be the world’s most dangerous 
example of anti-social behaviour. Of course, to cover their backs, 
British Greens like to implicate the West in China’s misdeeds, 
pointing to the factories it has set up there. Inadvertently mixing 
biochemistry, ethnicity and carbon footprints, Greenpeace UK 
director John Sauven likewise insists that: 
‘The average Chinese emits just 3.5 tonnes of CO2 per year, 
whereas Britons emit nearly 10 tonnes and Americans 20 
tonnes.’ 17 
Meanwhile the WWF urges China to pay for the negative 
externalities caused by burning coal through an energy tax – 
imposed by the authorities in China, presumably, and certainly 
‘applicable to all consumers of coal’. 18
 In effect, this is a call for millions of Chinese to pay 
























coming from the panda-friendly WWF, a $134m organisation 
headquartered in prosperous Gland, Switzerland. 19
British Greens mobilise against coal
In September 2008, a British jury listened to evidence on the 
gravity of global warming. NASA’s James Hansen, who had 
made a special visit from the US to Maidstone, Kent, addressed 
the court. After that, the jury acquitted six climate change 
campaigners.
All smiles: the Kingsnorth Six outside 










 The Kingsnorth Six had been arrested after taking action 
against the plans of E.on to build a new coal-fired power station 
next to the company’s existing plant at Kingsnorth. That the 
design of the station would allow it to accommodate CCS in the 
future had not dissuaded the protesters. In their protest climb of 
a 200m high company chimney, they had caused £30,000 of 
criminal damage; but the jury decided by a 10:2 majority verdict 
that there had been no criminal intent. 
 Environmentalists savoured the moment. In their account 
the common people, through the courts, had registered what 
could prove a turning point both for Green activists and for 
choice of technique in UK energy supply. As the environment 
correspondent of the London Guardian wrote:
‘In the past decade, prosecutions of protesters against 
GM crops, incinerators, new roads and nuclear, chemical 
and arms trade companies have all collapsed after 
defendants argued that they had acted according to their 
consciences and that they were trying to prevent a greater 
crime. Greenpeace itself has a four-nil record against the 
crown using the same defence and was widely known 
to be seeking a jury trial to present complex arguments 
about coal and climate change.’ 20
‘The public,’ said one solicitor specialising in environmental 
matters, ‘is increasingly speaking through the courts.’ He 
went on:
‘Politicians and companies have not understood that most 
people now understand the issues. There’s a feeling that 
government and the authorities have not been paying 
sufficient heed, and that the courts are righting the 
balance.’ 21 
In a truly Dickensian manner, ‘mobilisation’ against coal in the 
























a mobilisation not just against global warming, but also against 
more energy. 22
 In this, the Kingsnorth affair typifies the democratic 
rhetoric and authoritarian content of environmentalist hostility to 
coal-fired power generation.
Coal’s defenders favour autarchy, and are complacent
Those who defend coal in the US do so, predictably, on the 
grounds of energy security. The American Coalition for Clean 
Coal Electricity (ACCCE) proclaims:
indigenous supplies of coal in the US mean that ‘we do not •	
have to rely on foreign imports from politically volatile parts 
of the world’
Coal-to-Liquid (CTL) technologies, in which coal is converted •	
to high energy density fuels for transport and other 
applications, can form a substitute for foreign oil, if the latter 
is priced at $54 or higher – ‘based on a US Department of 
Energy formula’. 23 
Arthur Scargill goes even further than the ACCCE in his desire 
for coal-based autarchy in energy. He believes that, if 250m 
tonnes of indigenous deep-mine clean coal were produced each 
year, Britain could extract from it ‘all the electricity, oil, gas and 
petrochemicals that our people need’. 24 Here, by implication, 
CTL can rid Britain of all dependence on foreign gas and oil.
 These visions of a coal-laden, oil-free future are ridiculous. 
America and Britain cannot go back to the 19th century. The oil 
industry and the globalisation of oil supplies are facts of life.
 The ACCCE claims that the US coal industry has spent 
$50bn reducing emissions per billion kilowatt-hours by 74 per 
cent. That’s not too bad; but the advance must be measured over 
all of 30 years – from 1970 to 2000. 25 It represents relatively 
slow progress. 
 Equally, it’s all very well for the ACCCE to say that several 









projects into clean coal around the US, ‘each one breaking new 
ground and helping pave the way for an energy independent 
future’. A more pertinent opinion is probably that of James F 
Roberts, chairman and CEO of Foundation Coal Corporation, as 
expressed to a Senate summit on energy on 13 September 
2008. Roberts said that the $3.5 billion spent on CCS in the US 
over the previous decade was ‘wholly inadequate’. 26 
 Roberts was right. In 2007, US coal mining had an annual 
turnover of more than $25bn. 27 Coal-fired power stations in the 
US bought most of the coal produced – but these purchases of 
supplies formed only part of their general turnover. From 1998 to 
2007 in the US, it’s clear that R&D spending on CCS, performed 
by electricity generators reliant on coal, equated to less than one 
per cent of electricity sales. More importantly, actual progress 
with CCS, as we shall see shortly, has been slow.
 Roberts added a further barb to his indictment. From 
2003 to 2008, in just five years, the Bush administration 
had gone from planning to equip a 275 MW coal-fired 
power station with CCS, at the cost of $1.8bn, through to cancelling 
the project. This was despite the significant fact that FutureGen, 
as the scheme was called, enjoyed some financial support 
from China, India, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. And 
what  did Roberts have to say about this? He called the US 
Department of Energy’s decision to withdraw funding for 
FutureGen ‘incomprehensible’. 28
 Barack Obama’s election policy on energy committed his 
administration to developing, through public-private partnerships, 
five commercial plants with CCS. But delay with these could 
well occur. Certainly, the US coal sector has been enormously 
unsuccessful in moving both itself and Washington toward clean 
coal. It took the financial crisis of 2008 for US legislators to 
agree to put less than $3bn into clean coal and CCS. 29
 It’s a similar story in CTL technology. As the ACCCE points 
out, Germany and South Africa have been gasifying coal and 
turning it into low-sulphur diesel and jet fuel for decades. But 
























 The quantity of fuels made from CTL methods will never 
be enough to drive more than a fraction of transport in future. 
But, like clean coal, CTL has suffered from neglect. 
 The backers of these technologies seem to be as 
complacent and as sleepwalking as their detractors.
 
 
CTL: converting coal to liquids
CTL technology was initially developed by the pariah economies 
of pre-war Germany and post-war South Africa. Both countries 
had access to coal, but not to oil. Then, in the 1980s, 
the US government  funded the now-forgotten Synthetic 
Fuels Corporation, in a bid to push America toward energy 
independence. 
 With the advance of science, chemical engineers gradually 
became more practised in transforming carbon from solid to 
liquid forms. Still, despite more than 50 years of work in the 
area, the Guardian newspaper helpfully opened a recent story 
on CTL with the sober remark: ‘Energy companies are planning 
to revive a polluting technology developed by the Nazis to 
replace dwindling supplies of oil with synthetic fuels derived from 
coal’. 30
 A first route to liquefaction begins by converting coal 
to carbon monoxide gas and then to liquids. Known as the 
Fischer-Tropsch process, this technology is also used in IGCC. A 
second, more recent technique is direct liquefaction. Here coal 
is dissolved in a solvent in the presence of hydrogen.
 CTL technologies are expensive. However, should demand 
for oil outstrip supply, they could form a useful backstop. 
 Since the 1970s, South Africa’s Sasol has pioneered 
industrial-scale CTL facilities. In China, the Shenhua Group has 
more recently launched a direct CTL plant in Inner Mongolia, and, 
in partnership with Sasol, has commissioned a feasibility study 
for an indirect coal liquefaction plant in Ningxia Hui, a much 
smaller autonomous region south of Inner Mongolia. 31 









of oil a day. However, this is very little compared with an all-
China consumption figure in excess of seven million barrels. 
What’s more, China’s NDRC has put further CTL projects on hold, 
describing them as ‘a technology-, talent- and capital-intensive 
project at an experimental stage with high business risks’. 32
 These developments confirm that CTL will likely remain a 
niche technology. It will never be the mainstay of oil production.
Coal and CCS
Given that CO2 causes problems in the atmosphere, why not 
capture it and store it away from the atmosphere?
 One reason is the vast amounts of CO2 a power station 
generates. Pollutants such as sulphur dioxide form only a small 
part of flue gases, and are therefore relatively easy to remove. A 
500 MW coal power station, however, produces about three Mts 
of CO2 a year. In total, the CO2 emissions made by US coal-fired 
plants amount to 1.5 Gt per year – three times by weight, or a 
third by volume, of the natural gas annually transported through 
America’s gas pipelines. 33 
 Applying CCS to even a fraction of CO2 emissions will be 
a major effort. Furthermore, unlike nuclear power, renewables or 
even measures improving energy efficiency, CCS can only clean 
things up: it can never add to the generation of electricity. 
 However, as the world first increases consumption of coal, 
and then makes a transition away from it, CCS is both technically 
feasible and likely to figure prominently in coming decades.
 The expense of CCS derives from both the capture and 
the storage of CO2. Driving CCS itself requires a ots of energy. 
To bury their CO2, both IGCC coal plants and also gas power 
stations will require between 10 and 25 per cent more energy 
than they would need without CCS. As for CCS on conventional 
coal-fired electricity plants, it will requite as much as 40 per cent 
more energy. 
 For conventional coal power, capture happens by 
























chemicals known as amines. But there is potential to improve on 
ammonia. Omar M Yaghi, professor of chemistry at the University 
of California in Los Angeles, has created exotic substances 
composed of molecular-scale tunnels that can trap CO2. 
34
 After the CO2 has been captured from waste, it’s released 
in pure form for storage. Today, the kind of storage that’s most 
straightforward and developed involves pumping the captured 
CO2 underground. In a brilliant address to scientists in London 
in 2007, Peter Styles, director of the Research Institute for the 
Environment, Physical Science and Applied Mathematics at the 
University of Keele, pointed out that while the world emits 25 Gt 
of CO2 each year, the geological capacity exists to store no fewer 
than 11,000 Gt. 35
 As Styles noted, CO2 can be compressed and pumped 
down into a variety of geological formations, including oil and 
gas fields that have largely been used up, coal beds that are 
too difficult to mine, or aquifers – underground rocks which are 
porous and saturated with water. 
 Oil and gas companies already have experience with 
this technology. CO2 is already pumped into oil reservoirs – not 
primarily for environmental reasons, but rather to increase 
extraction by forcing more oil out. A similar technique could be 
used with coal seams that have not been mined. When CO2 is 
pumped into coal, the process releases methane, which can be 
used as fuel. Meanwhile the CO2 is retained underground.
 To make a difference to climate change, the CO2 stored 
should stay put for many centuries. For safety, there should be 
no large sudden leaks that might poison the local population. If 
stored in an aquifer, the CO2 should not dissolve toxic metals, 
only to flow upward to contaminate surface ground. 
 To meet these requirements, CCS will need more research. 
However, given that geological formations have trapped 
hydrocarbons such as natural gas for hundreds of millions 
of years, finding suitable sites that can safely contain CO2 for 
millions of years shouldn’t be too difficult. 









power stations, people shouldn’t be afraid of the extra energy 
inputs that process demands. What matters is the ability to 
make energy cheaply – so that mankind can afford to spend 
more energy on cleaning up the energy it generates.
 In Britain, CCS has suffered from the same stop-go 
bungles as the FutureGen project in the US. 36 But how far away 
is the general application of CCS? A straw poll at a Royal Society 
workshop on CCS, held in London 2007, found that the majority 
of those present believed that non-commercial CCS could be 
demonstrated at large scale by 2014, with commercial operation 
achieved between 2016 and 2020. 
 As a report on the workshop later observed, these 
‘challenging’ targets 
‘… can only be achieved if the urgency expressed by some 
spreads to become a demand of the majority.  Experienced 
practitioners warned that the remaining technical, 
economic, policy, regulatory and legal issues must be 
addressed simultaneously and with determination.’ 37
That’s the right spirit. But at the moment capture and storage 
are being developed separately, and full CCS is being applied at 
only a few locations around the world, such as Statoil’s Sleipner 
West gas field in the North Sea. 
 To make CCS real will take much more investment.
Summing up on coal 
The surprising thing about coal is how dependent the world still 
is on it. Coal remains the leading source of electricity in Europe, 
and has a prominent role in most parts of the world. In the US, 
concerns about GHGs forced the delay or cancellation of more 
than 50 proposed coal-fired power plants in the 12 months to 
March 2008. Yet at the same time, US exports of coal were, 
before the Crash of 2008 at least, tipped to reach $3.75bn. 38
The world has been burning more coal, and the proportion 
























1990, to 29 per cent in 2000 and an astonishing 41 per cent in 
2007. 39 Indeed, these figures look set to rise higher still, given 
that China will continue to burn more and more coal for at least 
the next 20 years.
 The immediate prospects for coal, then, are largely 
Chinese. So it’s in China that clean coal technologies will have 
their greatest opportunity.
In a further 20 years’ time, three developments are likely. 
First, the most rapid phase of expansion in Chinese demand 
for energy will be over. Second, China will be rich enough 
to invest in cleaner forms of energy. Third, renewable energies 
will be cheaper and more effective. For all those reasons, 
Chinese emissions of CO2 from burning coal are likely to peak 
in the 2030s. 
Other parts of the developing world are likely to follow 
a similar path. Economic growth in India, and perhaps Africa, 
could be too fast for nuclear power and cheap renewables to 
meet burgeoning demand for energy.
In 2007 India burnt less coal than China did in 1971. 40 
However, India has now embarked upon a rapid expansion in 
coal burning. To the extent that there’s an economic take-off in 
parts of Africa, an increase in the use of coal can be expected 
there, too.
In developing countries, coal’s low cost will tell in its favour, 
For all its faults, no other method is available to lift hundreds of 
millions out of poverty.
With the real growth in coal use outside China still to come, 
China’s advances in clean and efficient coal technology promise 
to have international application. If China can bring CCS in line 
by 2020, it will be in a strong position to lead the subsequent 
cleanup of those parts of the world that are still industrialising. 
In the West, it’s likely that the generation of coal power 
stations that’s to be built over the next decade may be the last. 
As a result, CCS may well prove a purely stopgap measure, since 
after 2030, electricity generation with fuels other than coal will 









Still, coal does not deserve the Kingsnorth protesters. 
Like many things in life, it is not ideal; but also like many things, 
it can and should be changed. To wish coal away is to imagine 
that America, China, India, Germany, Poland and South Africa 
can do without it. They cannot.
By making a special issue of coal sootiness, those who 
vilify it reveal their own snootiness. Determined to set an example 
to the world, the EU has declared CO2 emissions targets that 
already pose particular difficulties for its new, coal-dependent 
members in Eastern Europe – beginning with Poland. Isn’t it 
likely that the EU will adopt a still more supercilious policy further 
East, in relation to China and India?
Critics of coal quickly lose sight of its useful aspects. They 
likewise neglect the human circumstances, and the jobs, that 
accompany the mining and burning of coal. More than 50 years 
ago, George Orwell wrote eloquently about that side. 41 
Coal is what we make it. With a combination of clean 
technologies, including CCS, it can be not just an inescapable 
source of electricity for years to come, but also one that will have 
less and less of an effect on the Earth’s atmosphere.
The Green campaign against coal is a negative one, 
focused on fear that runaway coal burning will destroy the world. 
Greens would do better to ask why people burn so much coal. 
The world will move away from coal, but will do so over decades 
rather than overnight. Shutting down the combustion of coal 
would be shutting down the lives of billions.
History shows that burning coal better makes a big 
difference to pollution. Today’s coal technology is better than that 
of the past, but still crude compared with what’s to come. Coal 
will be used in new ways as part of the New Carbon Infrastructure. 
Coal burnt underground or in IGCC power stations will provide not 
just energy, but also hydrogen that – as we discuss below – will 
be combined with other forms of carbon to make new fuels. 
In the New Carbon Infrastructure, too, even the CO2 that’s 
sequestered underground through CCS may be put to work one 
























Not much natural about natural gas 
Natural gas, or methane, is the least contentious of the fossil 
fuels, primarily because it burns cleaner than coal or oil, and 
produces less CO2 per unit of energy. Among OECD countries, 
natural gas provides an increasing share of energy for heating, 
cooking and electricity generation, accounting for 22.6 per cent 
of all primary energy in 2007. 42 
 Gas is much sought after. Until the Crash of 2008, prices 
rose alongside those of coal and oil. Supply was tight, and 
demand buoyant – especially from Asia, and everywhere from 
electricity generation. Driving barely seven per cent of the EU’s 
electricity in 1990, gas is likely to account for 25 per cent of it 
in 2010. For Italy and the UK in 2020, the figure is forecast to 
be 60 per cent. By 2010, gas-fired electricity in the EU is set to 
surpass that made by nuclear power stations, standing second 
only to power derived from coal. 43
 Natural gas doesn’t escape Green criticism. While its 
GHG emissions are lower than those associated with coal and 
oil, they are significant: even now there’s work to be done to cut 
them, by developing commercial applications for the 150 billion 
cubic metres (bcm) of the world’s gas that’s still flared, or simply 
burnt off at the top of stacks. Some environmentalists also 
predict peak gas. Above all, both officials and Greens worry that 
Europe’s rising dependence on natural gas, and on imports of 
gas, makes it vulnerable to threats and actions by Russia, which 
has the world’s largest reserves, and already exports enough gas 
to Europe to account for 24 per cent of its consumption. 44 
 In the EU, aged nuclear- and coal-fired power stations are 
scheduled to close. The EU’s targets for renewable energy may 
not be met. Thus the IEA reckons that EU imports of gas will rise 
from 320 bcm in 2004 to 540 bcm in 2020, by which time they 
will take no less than 77 per cent of electricity supply. ‘Gas and 
electricity security,’ the IEA observes, ‘will become increasingly 
intertwined.’ 45 
 Gas is therefore a sensitive issue and, after the dispute 
between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, sensitivity to 









 Europe’s feeling that gas from somewhere else is a threat 
to national security is especially pronounced in Britain. There, by 
2020, imports of gas are officially predicted to rise to about 80 
per cent of the total gas used. Predictably enough, the main way 
in which the government seeks to reduce this ‘dependence’ to 
60 per cent is 
‘… directly by reducing demand for gas i.e. in heating 
our homes; but also indirectly by reducing demand for 
electricity so reducing the need for new gas-fired power 
stations.’ 46
 
Here, gas security is held up as a national call for energy 
conservation.
 In 2016/17, UK import capacity from Norway could 
represent some 16 per cent of peak supply capacity. In the same 
year, gas coming from the Continent could represent 14 per cent 
of peak supply capacity, with Russia merely one among a range 
of nations sitting behind these imports. The British government 
insists, then, that the UK ‘is not significantly dependent on any 
single country supplying to the EU market’. 47 At the same time, 
it worries that Britain will be 
‘… more exposed to the risk and impact of any overseas 
disruptions to energy supplies as supply routes become 
longer and across more countries.’ 48
The fear is, then, that dependency on gas is at the heart of 
Britain’s general lack of independence in energy. In the view of 
Jill Kirby, an adviser to the Conservative Party and director of the 
Centre for Policy Studies, the UK’s a soon-to-be-yawning ‘energy 
gap’ will be compounded by its dependence on gas bought from 
Europe, Russia and the Middle East. 49
 As much as coal in climate change negotiations 
and American revulsion against dependence on foreign oil, 
























Europe – Britain included. Yet in fact the story of gas effectively 
illustrates how innovation can create new sources of energy supply. 
Because of technological developments in its transmission and 
distribution, there’s now a nascent global market for natural gas, 
not just a collection of large regional markets. While geological 
dispositions of natural gas obviously remain important, there’s 
less and less that’s natural about the production and delivery 
of natural gas. 
A shifting dash for gas won’t readily  
exhaust reserves of the stuff
Natural gas has been found alongside oil since drilling began in 
the 19th century. Yet until relatively recently, gas was regarded 
as a waste product. The problem was that natural gas was hard 
to transport. As a result, it was often simply flared or pumped 
back into the ground.
 It was only after the Second World War that advances in 
the metallurgy of steel made large-scale natural gas pipelines 
a practical proposition. Even so, gas is harder to pump through 
pipes than oil. The construction of very long pipelines over 
thousands or miles, like the construction of deep-sea pipelines, 
remains difficult.
 After the oil shocks of the 1970s, increased interest in 
natural gas led to the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
Here natural gas is cooled until, at a temperature of –160° C, it 
liquefies, allowing it to be transported by specialised container 
ships. Today the top LNG exporters are Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Qatar. Liquefaction was first applied at Arzew, Algeria, in 1964. 
The liquid gas was exported to Europe. Then, in October 1969, 
another milestone was passed when a shipment of LNG left 
Alaska for Japan. 50 
 By the 1980s, a second technological advance came to 
gas in the shape of combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT). Here, 
gas is mixed with air and burnt in a turbine similar to a jet engine. 
Rotation of the turbine turns a generator. The trick played with 









process is then used to heat water to steam, which is used to 
turn a second, steam turbine. That increases the efficiency of 
the whole process from about 30 per cent to more than 50 per 
cent, almost doubling the amount of electricity produced from a 
given amount of gas.
 CCGT technology was not just efficient; it was well suited 
to relatively small scale, incremental increases in electricity 
production – increases from one to a few hundred megawatts. 
With liberalisation of the energy industry in the 1980s, small 
independent producers flocked to join the market, serviced by 
businesses such as Enron that sold them the gas. Between 
1987 and 1993, the share of new world electricity generating 
capacity taken by CCGT rose from 10 more than 35 per cent, 
with orders filled by companies such as GE, Siemens, ABB and 
Westinghouse. 51
 Across the world there was a ‘dash for gas’ – above 
all in Britain, where drilling under the North Sea added to its 
attractions. But today the dash for gas has slowed up a little 
in the West, as European electricity generators replace old gas-
fired plant, diversify their sources of energy, and concentrate on 
vertical integration – following the path of the Franco-Belgian 
group Suez, which sources, transports and makes electricity 
from gas. 52
 Demand for gas has shifted to Asia, the Middle East and 
Russia. Perhaps the Crash of 2008 will moderate that demand; 
but, well before it, there were Green warnings about peak gas. In 
2004, when the noise about peak oil was beginning to become 
audible, Julian Darley, founder of the Post Carbon Institute, 
claimed that it was possible that the world could have to suffer 
‘a gas peak-plateau somewhere between 2010 and 2025’. 53 
 Since then, peak gas has become the less media-worthy 
cousin of peak oil. 
 In fact, there’s no immediate geological limit to the 
availability of gas. Competition between Russia and Norway to 
open up the Arctic Circle, for instance, is a sign that the market for 
























Survey’s 2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal suggests that 
the Arctic Circle, which encompasses six per cent of the Earth’s 
surface, has gas reserves of 1.67 trillion cubic feet. 54 That’s 
equivalent to a whopping 47 thousand bcm, or more than 100 
times the EU’s current annual imports of gas.
 Take the Norwegian Snøhvit (Snow White) gas field in the 
Barents Sea. It began production in September 2007. It contains 
193 bcm of gas, with production expected to extend until 2035. 
Statoil discovered the field in 1984, but development only began 
in earnest in 2002. Production takes place 145km offshore, but 
no fixed or floating offshore structures are needed. Instead, wells 
on the sea floor at depths from 250 to 345 metres pipe gas to 
an onshore facility where it’s liquefied before being taken abroad 
by oil tankers. About 700,000 tonnes of CO2 extracted with the 
gas is pumped back underground each year. 55
 In the longer term, there are vast amounts of what are 
termed ‘unconventional’ sources of natural gas, including gas 
absorbed in coal beds•	
trapped at high pressure in impermeable rocks•	
trapped at high pressure and dissolved in underground •	
aquifers
in the form of so-called methane clathrates – ice which, •	
found under or on the ocean floor, traps methane within its 
crystal structure.
With these sources, gas is (or will be) hard to extract. But in 
the US, gas extraction from sedimentary rock, or shale, in the 
middle of the continent and the Appalachian Basin, is on the up. 
It has risen rapidly in the past six years, and great potential is 
seen in the Rocky Mountains. 56 
Gas as poor European energy security 
For followers of the Precautionary Principle, both gas pipelines 
and LNG are a bad idea. A new pipeline being laid under the 









the objection from Greenpeace that it involved ‘huge risks’. 
Greenpeace said: ‘We do not know what will happen when the 
 seabed is disturbed’. 57  
 LNG suffers from even more vigorous protests. Across 
both Europe and America, wrangles over planning have delayed 
the development of LNG. 58 Typically enough, LNG terminals for 
offloading the gas are seen as potential targets for terrorists. 59 
 In the case of Russia, tactics with customers have been 
harsh, as when Gazprom cut off supplies to the Ukraine in 2005-
2006. 60 Yet Europe’s underinvestment in the infrastructure of 
gas has had much more serious consequences than Russian 
‘blackmail’. In the UK in 2006, a cold snap led to a quadrupling 
of prices and forced cutbacks for industrial users. Yet that was 
down not to Vladimir Putin, but to the closure of the UK’s main 
facility for storing gas. 61 
 Even where problems go beyond those of capacity, 
expanding supply can only ease tensions. It’s hardly surprising 
that British officialdom fears being caught out by foreign gas 
producers. Compared with the levels of 2005/6, more than 
5.5bcm of new gas storage is under construction, planned, 
or proposed – so doubling UK gas storage capacity by 2005. 
However, as the government concedes, this expansion of storage 
is only going to happen ‘if projects are not unduly delayed by 
planning, technical, or other factors’. 62
 Politics in Britain today makes that a big ‘if’. The serious 
investment in gas infrastructure that’s needed may well 
be further delayed by the Crash of 2008. Yet for Britain and the 
rest of Europe, there is simply no alternative to turning abroad 
for gas supplies.
The globalisation of gas 
After an offshore earthquake in July 2007, Japan shut down its 
seven nuclear reactors at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa and kept them 
shut. To make up for its lost nuclear power, the country Japan 
proved ready to pay high prices for LNG cargoes, In turn, Japanese 
























 This globalisation of the market for gas needs getting in 
perspective. In 2006, about 4.8 bcm, or six per cent of the Atlantic 
region’s production of LNG, was diverted to Asian markets. The 
following year, similar diversions reached 12.5 bcm. However, 
although LNG afloat can be promptly diverted to different global 
buyers in a way that gas in pipelines cannot, LNG represents only 
seven per cent of global gas sales, compared to 15 per cent for 
seaborne coal as a proportion of global coal sales, and 48 per 
cent for seaborne oil. 64 
 The globalisation of gas is in its infancy. Yet it is 
inescapable. As Ed Crooks, energy editor of the Financial Times, 
has laconically observed:
‘As is widely appreciated in continental Europe, the EU 
cannot simply cut itself off from Russian gas, or even 
reduce demand… Geography and economics dictate that 
the EU is dependent on Russia for gas, whether politicians 
like it or not.’ 65
Given these facts of life, why does gas security so obsess 
Western elites? Why, for instance, is Petroleum Economist 
magazine able to sell simple maps of existing East-West gas 
pipelines in Eurasia for as much as £295 each? 66 
 The answer is that pipelines control the gaze of European 
officials not because of their intrinsic qualities, or those of 
oil, but on account of a different reason altogether: Europe’s 
historically fractious political relationship with Russia. The right-
wing Heritage Foundation, Washington, argues that it’s through 
gas that Russia has been ‘consolidating its grip on the economic 
lifeblood of Europe’. 67 But as the hackneyed idea of gas as 
economic lifeblood suggests, methane cannot easily be held 
culpable for poor East-West relations.
 Russia is assertive toward Europe in gas because that’s 
one of the few levers it has. As a US State Department official 
notes, abbreviating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Russia 









like expand NATO and put missile defence in Poland’. 68 Russia 
needs to diversify its customer base for gas, and signed a deal 
with China in 2006 to do just that. Feeling competition from 
Nabucco, a 3,300km pipeline through which the EU hopes to 
bring gas from the Caspian region to Austria, Russia plans to 
bring gas to Europe through new pipelines. 
 Given the impact of the Crash of 2008 on the Kremlin, 
however, Russia will be in little position really to dictate terms to 
Europe on gas. Norway and Algeria will anyway add new pipelines 
to rival Russia’s.
 To harp on about Europe’s poor security in gas is to 
turn the clock back. The globalisation of gas may be slowed by 
protectionism, but is broadly unstoppable. Three aspects of the 
development of LNG clearly show this. 
 First, LNG projects in Sakhalin Island off Russia’s Pacific 
coast, in Yemen and in Tangguh, Indonesia, only obtained 
approval because each could promise customers in both Eastern 
and Western markets. Second, it’s estimated that LNG will make 
up about 20 per cent of OECD gas supply as soon as 2010, and 
14-16 per cent of global gas demand by 2015. 69 Third, the 
global average shipping distance for LNG has increased. In 2000, 
it was 5700km; in 2006, it was 6400km, and in 2007 it was 
6700 km. It could be more than 8000km in 2010. 70 
 In South Korea, Samsung is building Q-Max tankers, each 
of which will carry more than a quarter of a million cubic metres 
of LNG, twice as much as standard tankers today. 71 
 Today gas is less and less a regional business. More and 
more, it’s an international one.
Summing up on gas
Demand for gas will continue to rise in both the developed and 
the developing worlds. In the past 20 years, gas has established 
itself as a significant component of energy supply, replacing coal 
and especially oil in electricity production. In the next 20 years 
gas will hold, if not increase, its share of electricity generation.
























greater role in the making of electricity, the major application for 
gas will prove to be heating. Burning gas directly for heat is more 
efficient than burning gas for electricity and then using electricity 
for heating. Just as importantly, many people will prefer to cook 
on flames, and find gas heating more convenient than electric.
 Gas will retain its role for heat in the developed world, and 
will also be applied in the developing world, where many millions 
still rely on wood, dung or coal fires.
 Today’s big supplies of gas will be supplemented by new 
unconventional sources, and sources that lie in places more 
distant than those that have yielded gas thus far.
 Gas will also become part of the New Carbon Infrastructure. 
As we discuss below, it will be used to upgrade oil sands into 
liquid fuels. Gas will be converted into methanol for use in fuel, or 
as an alternative to liquefaction. There will also be new sources 
of gas – from coal, and from biomass.
 Altogether, gas has a great future. Nevertheless, fears 
about it run deep in Europe. Gazprom has an agreement with 
Equatorial Guinea to develop an LNG plant; also, with the Nigerian 
state National Petroleum Corporation, with whom it signed an 
agreement in September 2008 to work toward a joint venture to 
produce and transport gas. Finally, Gazprom’s chairman, Alexei 
Miller, hopes to hold three or four meetings a year of the world’s 
leading gas producing states: Russia, Iran and Qatar. 72
 These developments fill European leaders with 
consternation. It’s important to note, however, that neuroses 
about Russian and gas pipelines, though longstanding, have 
a very contemporary twist. They’re to do with the general 
apprehensions of a new century. They relate to that sensitivity to 
global disruptions which was so heightened by 9/11. 
 In 1997, the experienced American geo-strategist 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, discussing what he called the Eurasian 
‘chessboard’, devoted special attention to what he called ‘The 
Global Zone of Percolating Violence’, an ovoid region stretching 
from Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia in the south west 









worried Brzezinski in those days? Was it gas pipelines – or oil 
supplies, for that matter? No, what worried him was the fact 
that about 25 states were in his Zone, that they were ethnically 
and religiously heterogeneous, that they were politically unstable, 
and that some of them were in the process of acquiring nuclear 
weapons. Neither gas nor oil figured anywhere in Brzezinski’s 
200-page book. 73
 Today, by contrast, the chessboard that’s discussed in 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central 
Asia is all about gas and oil. 
 When Russia cut off gas to Ukraine, the effects in Europe 
lasted only days. Nevertheless, the incident was taken as a signal 
of European vulnerability. It’s rarely remembered that, with the 
Ukraine, Russia’s ambitions were mainly about ending Soviet-era 
subsidies for gas, and instead selling it at market prices. They 
had little to do with the Kremlin enforcing regional- or super 
power status. In fact, Russia and the Ukraine quickly negotiated 
a new contract. That Europe felt the need to turn this relatively 
mundane incident into a melodrama gives a strong sign of the 
worry that surrounds gas today.
 Gas and the grids it moves around have come to a 
prominence that cannot just be put down to economic factors. 
For all the insecurity associated with Russian gas in Europe, the 
bigger insecurity is about the times, the EU’s poor leadership, 
and about what it is to be a European.
Nothing fascinates catastrophists like oil
Unlike nuclear and renewable energy, oil, the largest of the 
three industries, has, since the 1960s, boasted a serious semi-
popular literature. 74 And although, as we shall see, the data 
on oil is widely held to be suspect, it’s certainly voluminous. 75 
Yet in 2004-5 there was an outpouring of new, more critical 

























1.  Industry insiders who had gone over to apocalyptic – if not 
apoplectic – visions of the future 76
2.  Professional journalists who had belatedly discovered that 
big Western oil companies are guilty of nefarious practices, 
particularly in the Middle East and elsewhere 77
3.  Academics who had become concerned about the advent 
of peak oil. 78
Although the oil industry is very large and influential, it is the 
critics of that industry, rather than its advocates, who today 
dominate publishing on it. There are no confident defences of oil 
to be found in today’s bookstores. 
 Critics of oil also have some purchase on the cinema 
nowadays. Paul Thomas Anderson’s There Will Be Blood (2007) 
told the story of a monstrous oilman. A year before it, A Crude 
Awakening: The Oil Crash (2006), an 85-minute Swiss colour 
documentary and winner of many awards, featured the survivalist 
lawyer Matthew Savinar, kitted out in camouflage fatigues, with 
a massive supply of bottled water behind him. It also featured 
just about every prominent and respectable opponent of oil, in a 
compilation of prejudices about it. 79
 For a black viscous fluid, oil is now surrounded by a 
remarkable sociology. So fascinating and supposedly imminent 
is the prospect of peak oil, in fact, that critics under its spell have 
extended the concept to predict the demise of coal within little 
more than half a century. 80 Indeed Richard Heinberg, whom 
we met in Chapter 2, has covered all the bases – uranium 
included – in his deliriously titled collection of essays, Peak 
Everything (2007). 81 
 What has brought about this remarkable sociology?
Standard Oil vs the little guy
Restricted consumption within the US, the English socialist JA 
Hobson said in 1902, accounted for big American capitalists in 
































engaging, too, in the policy of imperialism (again, see Chapter 2). 
But there is another historic factor in contemporary narratives 
about oil, and it too relates to Hobson’s era. 
 Founded in 1870, Standard Oil became within 10 years the 
largest refiner in a cartel that controlled nearly 90 per cent of US 
refining capacity. In 1879, after lobbying by small oil producers, a 
Pennsylvania Grand Jury indicted John D Rockefeller and several 
of his associates on charges of criminal conspiracy. Recovering 
from that successfully, Standard Oil became in 1882 the first 
US organisation to form a trust – a unified company, run from a 
central office as a legal entity, by a board of trustees in whose 
hands were placed the stock of all the companies owned or 
partly owned by Standard Oil. As Daniel Yergin remarks, the legal 
concept of the trust developed by Standard Oil was a response 
to the judicial and political attacks made on the company in the 
late 1870s and early 1880s. 82
 By 1888, John D Rockefeller’s life work had become a 
vertically integrated multinational corporation. Over the next 
decade, America met with strikes, financial panic, economic 
depression and war. Yet Standard Oil still managed to generate 
a special kind of disgust. 
 Before and after the turn of the century, McClure’s, the 
mass-circulation magazine that began the movement known as 
muckraking journalism, paid $4000 a piece for a famous series 
of articles critical of Standard Oil written by the respectable 
Pennsylvanian biographer Ida Tarbell. 83 From then on, mass 
American suspicion of trusts focused strongly on Standard 
Oil. In particular, distaste for the company reached a climax in 
1911, when the US Supreme Court broke the company up. The 
Court’s judgment, indeed, was hailed as a victory for the 
anti-trust cause. 
Rapacious rascal: Standard Oil’s John D 
Rockefeller, around 1885. Through assiduous 
legal and organisational changes, Rockefeller 
inadvertently made oil come to symbolise 










 During the Gilded Age and before the First World War, 
then, the broad American movements known as Populism and 
Progressivism viewed the Rockefeller dynasty and Standard Oil 
as the pivot of rapacious, unjust monopoly power. As Alabama 
University professor Tony Freyer notes in his fine study of the 
regulation of big business in the UK and US, by 1888 the clout 
wielded by trusts was regarded as a threat to the citizenry by 
Democrat and Republican alike. 84
 Interestingly, America’s bipartisan regulation of Standard 
Oil and the trusts in defence of ‘the little guy’ was not the path 
preferred by socialists in Britain. While they eventually favoured 
taxes on excess corporate profits and controls on product 
prices, men like Hobson, Sidney Webb and, later, Ernest Bevin, 
saw ‘combinations’ as efficient, inevitable, and a step toward 
state ownership. 85
 These things are worth remembering now, even though 
US anti-trust regulation in the early part of the 20th century 
was very different from the fearful and pervasive ‘consumer 
protection’ that informs the state’s attitude to energy companies 
today. The record suggests that antipathy to Big Oil, while 
partly grounded in worries about its effects on foreign policy, 
begins also from American reaction against trusts and large 
companies. 86 In both cases, the anger aroused had little to do 
with oil as a commodity. 
 The anti-trust reaction against oil was broadly conservative, 
too. As the historian Richard Hofstadter has pointed out, the 
chief themes of the muckraking approach that fanned it were:
1.  Evil-doing by respectable people is the real character of 
American life – corruption is everywhere
2.  The mischief demands better laws
3.  Everyone must take personal responsibility for dealing with 
the mischief.
For Hofstadter, the sense of universal personal responsibility 
























Protestant in outlook, and accompanied by copious amounts of 
personal guilt about the state of the world. 87
 Altogether, then, oil has had a special and negative 
significance for every American given to impulsive anger and lazy 
thought about capitalism. This is a historical factor in today’s 
opposition to oil – important, but quite distinct from modern-day 
causes of loathing. 
After 9/11: Saudi conspiracy, deep doo-doo security, 
uncertain reserves – but a certain peak
There are three salient features of the new critique of oil, as 
distinct from the old one.  
 First, in the wake of 9/11 and the second Iraq war, 
conspiracy theories swirled around oil, George W Bush and 
the Saudis. 
 In 2004, Fahrenheit 9/11, a film by the mudslinging 
director Michael Moore, became a particularly popular version 
of these theories. Moore’s montage made a multitude of vague 
allusions. Foremost among them, however, was a penetrating 
idea: that Bush’s personal involvement in the Texas oil industry 
relied on money from the Saudis and from the Bin Laden family. 
 The cognoscenti gave Fahrenheit 9/11 a Palme d’Or at 
the Cannes film festival, as well as a 15-minute standing ovation. 
The film went on to gross more than $250m around the world. Yet 
the links Moore adduced between oil, US foreign policy and the 
Saudis are little help in any attempt to understand the political 
and economic impact of oil. And that deficiency is shared by all 
the other accounts of the Iraq war that see oil and its agents 
simply as an endless Machiavellian intrigue. 
 The man who inspired Fahrenheit 9/11 was the 
distinguished East Coast journalist Craig Unger. In 2004, 
Unger published House of Bush, House of Saud: the Hidden 
Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful 
Dynasties. 88 In it he traced a total of $1.4bn sent by the House 
of Saud to individuals and entities tied to the Bush family, 
































‘Even if the president were somehow immune to the fact 
that in large measure he owed both his personal and 
political fortunes to the Saudis, it would be astonishing if 
he did not fall prey to a kind of groupthink as to who they 
really were… Never before has an American president 
been so closely tied to a foreign power that harbours and 
supports our country’s mortal enemies.’ 89
Here is a literal, economic and psychological panorama of a man 
whose oil interests have led him to sup with the Devil. Similarly, 
Unger holds that the post-war relationship between the US and 
Saudi Arabia ‘was a coarse weave of money, power, and trust.’ 
He concludes that the ‘real story’ behind Bush’s War on Terror is 
‘full of startling paradoxes and subtle nuances’. 90
 This portrait of Texan and Saudi oil is painted with a broad 
brush. Stephen Gaghan’s movie Syriana (2005) also sums up 
the contemporary mood of unfocused oilophobia. In Syriana, the 
viewer is disorientated, as crucial details of the film are left unclear. 
Syriana concludes with American militarists in dark suits taking 
out Prince Nazir, a top liberal Arab opponent of oil dependency 
– remotely, from a darkened room with screens back in the US. 
The only point that is unambiguous is that collusion between 
the US government, oil companies and corrupt Arab leaders is 
leading to recruitment of terrorists among the desperate poor, 
somewhere ‘over there’. 
 The second aspect of the new critique of oil is to do with its 
dangers to the environment and to international relations. We saw 
in Chapter 4 how nuclear power lost its purely economic status 
in the late 1970s, when it began to be apprehended primarily as 
a risk. With oil, this process only really accelerated much later – 
after climate change had entered the public eye, and after 9/11 
Misleading movies: film director Michael 
Moore. Fahrenheit 9/11, his indiscriminate 
collection of conspiracy theories about 9/11, 
Bush and the Saudis, helped give oil a new 









had underlined the instability and general peculiarities of Saudi 
Arabia. Since 2001, however, establishment figures have come 
to share with oil’s critics both a visceral revulsion against oil as 
a dirty man-made substance, and a geopolitical approach to 
it that talks up energy security, but boils down to doom and 
more doom. 
 According to Juan Pérez Alfonzo – a co-founder of OPEC, 
no less – oil is the ‘excrement of the devil’. 91 On the other side, 
Senator Richard Lugar, a Republican, claims that addiction to oil 
represents a six-pronged threat. It encompasses: 
1. Vulnerability to natural disaster, war and terror
2.  Competition with rising nations such as China and India
3.  Being held hostage by nations such as Russia, Iran and 
Venezuela 
4. Corruption and funding of authoritarian regimes
5.  Climate change
6.  Impoverishment of the developing world through rising 
energy prices. 92 
  
On both sides of the indictment, oil is invested with a spectacular 
ability to wreak havoc.
 Third, there is deep uncertainty about the state of oil 
reserves, particularly in the Middle East. At the same time, 
uncertainty about oil reserves coincides with a deep sense of 
certainty that a transition past a peak of finite and increasingly 
scarce oil supplies is underway.
 In climate matters and in nuclear affairs, there is a pervasive 
sense that outcomes can never be certain (see Chapters 3 and 
4). The same applies to oil. For Matthew Simmons, perhaps 
the most persuasive peak oiler, ‘the concept of “fact” becomes 
problematic when the Saudi Arabian oil industry is concerned’. 93 
Looking at Saudi Arabia’s largest oilfield, Ghawar, and the state-
























‘Given all the uncertainties that still surround Ghawar’s 
complex reservoirs, how can Saudi Aramco boldly 
advertise… that they can accurately predict Ghawar’s 
performance for the next 50 years?’ 94 
Simmons is right to be sceptical about forecasts prepared by 
Saudi Aramco. But poor forecasts are not just the handiwork 
of that firm, or even of an opaque OPEC, but also of the IPCC’s 
Working Groups II and III (see Chapter 3). They are also the 
handiwork of Western firms and governments, on oil and on 
every other subject. 
 Simmons wants to catalyse ‘urgently needed energy data 
reform’, so as to reduce uncertainty about the future of oil. 95 
But about one thing he is certain:
‘… the outlook for the future that Saudi officials broadcast 
for all to hear is simply too sanguine for the realities that 
are now emerging. As Saudi Arabian oilfields age and the 
world’s need for oil steadily rises, the probability increases 
month by month, year by year, that we are approaching 
an oil-curtailing twilight in the desert kingdom that has 
provided the greatest single contribution to the world’s oil 
supply at the least expensive cost.’ 96
In Chapter 3 we saw that climate zealots highlight scientific 
uncertainty as a means of confirming the certitude that 
disaster could strike at any time. With peakoilers, the same 
stretched logic is evident. 
 We’ll spend no more time on conspiracy theories about 
oil and the Saudis here. We’ll deal with oil’s dangers to the 
environment in our later discussion of transport – the key 
application for oil, and, as we saw in Chapter 1, a key contributor 
to the growth of CO2 emissions. For the present, we turn to oil 










Is oil a commodity like any other, or is it the key 
factor in the world economy?  
Of all the goods in the world, oil is the most traded. Like any 
material thing, it has its idiosyncrasies. But just as it’s wrong 
to believe that oil is a commodity like any other, it’s wrong to 
believe that people now live in a ‘petroleum economy’. 97 Like 
labour, services, IT and weapons, oil plays a very important role 
in many modern economies. An all-determining role, however, 
escapes it.
 Oil is too often picked upon as a commodity with a special 
force to it. For Greens, resources such as oil are a gift from 
nature. They lose sight of the actions that have gone into turning 
oil into a true resource for humanity. As a result, they imagine 
that it’s oil itself that has created modern economies. 
 We’ve already mentioned that the West’s recession of 
1973-4 was too deep to blame simply on the OPEC oil embargo 
of that time (see Chapter 4). Serious recessionary trends had 
afflicted the West anyway for some years before that episode. 
After it, making a scapegoat of oil sheiks for the economic 
downturn was a useful device for Western elites; but as Financial 
Times journalist Toby Shelley acutely points out, there’s more 
than a little evidence that the US in fact supported OPEC’s 
campaign to raise oil prices in the early 1970s. 98
 The argument that an abundance of oil for an 
underdeveloped country is bad news – that it creates a ‘paradox 
of plenty’ and a ‘resource curse’ – rests on a wider exaggeration 
of oil’s all-conquering powers. 99 The millionaire currency 
speculator George Soros has been particularly assiduous in 
promoting this point of view. In Oil Wars (2007), London School 
of Economics professor of global governance Mary Kaldor, 
a colleague of Soros, joins with Stanford University’s Terry Lynn 
Karl in arguing that the reliance of states such as Iraq and 
Nigeria on oil money creates a culture of ‘rent seeking’, in which 
an authoritarian elite can bypass any need for a social contract 
























offered by oil wealth undermines real economic activity and so 
creates dysfunctional societies.
 In fact an oil-rich nation cannot be cursed with too many 
natural resources, for the simple reason that oil is not a natural 
product. To discover and extract oil from the ground requires 
sophisticated technology – which is why it was only available 
in small quantities before the 20th century. After extraction, 
oil requires more work to turn it into something useful. When 
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans and its environs in 2005, it 
was refinery capacity as much as pumping capacity that, after 
the disaster, limited the supply of useful fuel.
 Nations such as Saudi Arabia have become reliant on 
oil. But this is a symptom of their prior underdevelopment and 
their position in the world economy. The problems experienced 
are not caused by oil. That’s why the discovery of oil was not a 
catastrophe for economies such as the US or Britain.
Oil and war, 1898-1951
Access to oil has been important both as a resource for fighting 
and as a motive for fighting. Generally speaking, the gravity of 
war and the significance of oil to mobilisation have tended to 
make commentators overestimate its significance in peacetime, 
and even during ‘peaceful’ years of preparation for war.
 Oil’s significance as a military resource first became 
apparent during the First World War. It is well known that Winston 
Churchill moved the British navy to oil power in 1911 in a bid 
to stay ahead of Germany. Oil made possible new technology in 
aircraft, submarines, and in the tanks that broke the stalemate 
of the trenches.
 How far the clashes on the fields of Europe were driven 
by the motive of trying to expand imperial control of oil is a 
rather different matter. When the Bolsheviks seized power 
in 1917, they made public secret treaties on war aims. Most 
famously, the Sykes-Picot Agreement mapped out a carve-up 
of the Ottoman Empire, dividing the territory of what is now Iran 









 Clearly part of the First World War was about the whole 
commercial future of the Middle East and, within that, the prospect 
of profit from oil, as well as further Western industrialisation and 
motorisation through oil. Even so, in those days coal was arguably 
more important than oil. After the war, France’s occupation of 
the Ruhr confirmed coal’s centrality to European economies and 
to foreign policy. Indeed it can be argued that only the European 
Coal and Steel Community, signed in 1951, finally resolved 
European tensions around coal. 
 In the lead-up to the Second World War, America’s 
embargo on exports of oil to Japan played a decisive part in the 
latter’s attack on the US Navy at Pearl Harbour, as well as in its 
imperial expansion into the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies. 
Here Japan’s motive was less profit from oil, and more oil as 
an essential technical material for industry, motorisation, and 
the military. 
 Just as Churchill’s commitment to oil is well known, so do 
writers on oil like to cite how, in the Second World War, Hitler 
would not relieve his tanks at Stalingrad, which were short on 
fuel, with troops summoned from oil-rich Baku. 101 Here, however, 
oil was much more resource than motive for fighting.
 What comes out of these different episodes is that oil has 
been a motive, but certainly not the motive, for major conflict. 
Was it much of a motive in the Spanish-American war of 1898, 
the Boer War of 1899-1902, or the Russo-Japanese conflict of 
1905? No. Did it play a bigger role in later years? Yes. But in 
every case the specificity of a war’s origins and conduct, plus 
oil’s role as motive and resource, has to be taken into account. 
 There is no law at work that suggests that war is immanent 
within oil reserves, refineries or pipelines.
Oil and war, 1946-1989
Since the Second World War, the Middle East has seen its share 
of conflict and intervention by outside powers. But in this period, 
oil has actually played a rather minor role. The ideological rhetoric 
























national independence movements, were more important. 
Military methods and NATO were also critical, although as direct 
rule by colonial powers fell into disrepute, so military occupation 
became a poor way to ensure control over resources.
 According to the distinguished American dissident, 
Noam Chomsky, 
‘If the Middle East didn’t have the major energy reserves 
of the world then policymakers today wouldn’t care much 
more about it than they do about Antarctica.’ 102
Perhaps Chomsky was merely being flamboyant, but he still 
doesn’t convince. Nobody lives in Antarctica. By contrast, parts 
of the Middle East boast not just oil, or even construction and 
financial services, but also a fledgling renewables industry (see 
Chapter 6). When the West plans for war around the Middle East, 
it considers the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has begun to 
establish a regional market big enough for its six members to 
hope to establish the production of consumer goods.
 During the Cold War, conflict centred on struggles for 
national independence waged against disintegrating empires. 
These struggles were played out against a background of 
animosity between the US and Soviet Union. At the same time, 
the US also asserted leadership over rivals in the capitalist world. 
Integrating Germany into the Atlantic Alliance, for instance, made 
NATO’s first secretary general, Lord Ismay, famously remark that 
the organisation’s purpose was ‘to keep the Americans in, the 
Russians out, and the Germans down’.
 Some of the most significant conflicts of the Cold War 
pitted the West against insurgency in Algeria, Angola, Cuba, 
Kenya, Korea, Malaya, Nicaragua, Vietnam and Zaire. It’s this 
broader context, too, that is essential for understanding Cold 
War conflict in oil-rich countries.
 In 1953, Iran’s nationalisation of the British Anglo-
Iranian Oil company led to the US and Britain overthrowing 









1956, Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal also led to 
intervention by Britain and France. The US opposed the action. 
The significant difference in outcome between the two cases 
had little or nothing to do with the fact that Iran, unlike Egypt, 
is endowed with oil. Nor did it have to do with the fact that 
much of the world’s trade, including that in oil, ran and still runs 
through Suez – not Iran. In both cases, too, the West felt that 
Middle Eastern expressions of nationalist independence were 
intolerable. Yet what proved decisive was that with Egypt’s 
President Nasser, Eisenhower preferred to confirm the status of 
Britain and France not as victors, but as decidedly junior partners 
in the Atlantic Alliance.
 Was oil a motive in Churchill’s 5 March 1946 declaration 
about an Iron Curtain between East and West? Was it a motive 
in Harry Truman’s presentation, to Congress on 12 March 1947, 
of the Truman doctrine on containing communism? Was oil the 
key factor in America seeing the Eastern Bloc brought to its 
knees in 1989? In every case, oil was not the key factor.
Today’s ‘ethical’ wars have had little link with oil
Was oil, then, an American motive in prosecuting the first Gulf 
War of 1990-91? It was quite an important motive: together, 
Iraq and Kuwait accounted for a fifth of world oil supplies. But 
in retrospect, what was of greater importance was the need for 
the US, in triumphalist mood after the Cold War, nevertheless to 
assert its supremacy to the whole world. Oil or no oil, it had to 
do that, for it no longer had the powerful and global legitimising 
framework of the Cold War. What always escapes those who 
reduce war to oil is the importance of war to politics, and in 
particular its importance to the credibility of governments in the 
eyes of their electorates.
 Even before 1992 and America’s ostensibly humanitarian 
mission to Somalia, the supremacy sought in the first Gulf War 
wasn’t really a material one. Philip Hammond, reader in media 
and communications at London South Bank University, notes 
























and its allies would obey not the amoral dictates of realpolitik, 
but the moral and ethical imperative to intervene against 
illegitimate regimes. 103 Nevertheless, those who dissented from 
the first Gulf War were largely oblivious to this. On the streets, 
they reduced the war to variants of the slogan ‘Hell No! We won’t 
go! We won’t fight for Texaco!’. 
 It took 9/11 for there to be a real explosion of critical 
publishing about oil and war. After that, oil was more and more 
discussed, not just as vital to economic affairs, but also as 
prime mover in international and military conflict. The US invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001, and of Iraq in 2003, only deepened 
this trend.
 In many ways today’s fingering of oil as a source of war 
is an ironic development. Today, war is more the continuation 
of fearful politics by other means than it is conscious, rational 
strategy based on material interest. At just this moment, however, 
a widely approved but cynical determinism suggests that most if, 
not all, military manoeuvres originate in oil. 
 Just between 1993 and 1999, Bill Clinton’s administration 
fired more than 900 cruise missiles in anger, or an average of 
one every three days. Fewer than 500 were used in Iraq, 79 in 
Afghanistan and Sudan, and more than 300 in Kosovo. 104 While 
Clinton promised to focus ‘like a laser’ on domestic matters, 
he spent plenty of time pursuing ostensibly humanitarian 
interventions abroad, most notably in Yugoslavia, but also in 
Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia. 
 All these American adventures – even those in Iraq – were 
not propelled by oil. They started primarily from a restless, self-
conscious, vapid and technocratic quest for national and ethical 
validation on the international stage. 105 Subsequent Western 
attempts at state-building, in Iraq and elsewhere, were of a piece 
with this. At Westminster University, professor of international 
relations David Chandler writes in his Empire in Denial: the 
Politics of State-Building (2006) that such attempts were about 
Western governments trying to disassociate themselves from 









 Altogether, the flexing of Western military muscle 
today is usually based on fear, and an accompanying search 
for a sense of purpose. It is not much based on a search for 
precious commodities. 
 The anxieties about Al Qaeda that arose after 9/11 explain 
much of George W Bush’s desire to remove Saddam Hussein. 
No doubt, too, it’s the inability of leaders such as George W Bush 
and Tony Blair to provide a coherent account of their motives for 
a second foray against Iraq that has led liberals to searching for 
a hidden motive – US desperation to secure oil from Iraq. 
 Life would be simple if Bush had gone to war in Iraq just 
because family money demanded it, or just because America 
needed oil. In reality, though, the motives for war in the 21st 
century differ from those of the 20th. Saddam Hussein could not 
have withheld oil from the world market for long. It was not oil 
that made Bush go to Iraq, but wider considerations – the first of 
which was fear.
Oil and tension in Central Asia
For its critics, oil’s omnipotence doesn’t stop in the Middle East. 
It also applies to Central Asia. 
 In May 2001, Hampshire College professor Michael 
Klare popularised the idea of wars based on a struggle for 
resources. 107 Demand for key materials, Klare argued, was up; 
resource scarcities had emerged; and disputes about resources 
had multiplied. Whether it be oil in the Gulf and the South China 
Sea, or water, minerals and timber elsewhere, resources were 
irrevocably associated with war.
 Central Asia also loomed large in Klare’s account. Back 
in 1997, he pointed out, the Clinton administration had engaged 
seriously with Central Asia. It had declared a need for the US to 
diversify its supplies of energy, and courted Azerbaijan in that 
cause. In southern Kazakhstan, it had held war games with 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, ostensibly to show US 
support for these three countries remaining sovereign states. 
























the US sent troops to Afghanistan, set up bases in Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan, and sent advisers to Georgia to train the military 
there. As if taking their lead from Klare, therefore, two authors 
now took these developments to indicate a search for and desire 
to guard the oil of Central Asia.  
 In 2002, refreshing a late 19th century category used by 
British diplomats, German journalist Lutz Kleveman published 
The New ‘Great Game’: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. Here, after 
extensive travels, Kleveman focused on Central Asia not as an 
arena in which Britain and Russia jockeyed for access to the 
riches of India, as they had done in the old ‘Great Game’ of 
the 19th century, but on Central Asia as a site for oil and gas. 
Kleveman also devoted a chapter to Georgia, insisting that the 
aim of president Eduard Shevardnadze from 1993 onward was 
‘… nothing less than Georgia’s reestablishment as the 
centre of a new Great Silk Road, linking Europe with Asia, 
as it did in the Middle Ages.’ 108 
In the next year, Washington journalist Paul Sperry, in his 
aptly named Crude Politics, concurred. Like Kleveman, Sperry 
attributed the war against the Taliban to the Bush administration’s 
desire to open up… a new Silk Road, in the shape of a gas 
pipeline through Afghanistan. 
 The concern with Central Asia did not stop there. In 2004, 
Michael Klare refined his thesis. Blood and Oil: How America’s 
Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us reworked Kleveman’s title to present 
hydrocarbons as sanguinary once more. In the same vein, London-
based journalist Dilip Hiro followed up later with Blood of the 
Earth: The Global Battle for Vanishing Oil Resources (2007). 109
 A new game, a new road, and more blood: the same 
themes keep on reappearing. In his earlier book, Klare drew 
attention to
Clinton’s stated desire to make US foreign policy •	










The US military’s playing up of its capacity to protect the •	
flow of vital resources, a capacity readily grasped by the 
American public. 110
For his part, Kleveman also drew attention to Vice President Dick 
Cheney’s earlier National Energy Policy report, which identified 
the Caspian – along with Africa and parts of the Western 
hemisphere – as an opportunity to ‘lessen the impact of a supply 
disruption on the US and world economies’. 111 
 Yet just as it’s foolish to read off military US dispositions 
from the oil underneath the boots of occupying troops, so is it 
foolish to take at face value those statements of Clinton and 
Cheney that upheld the significance of Central Asian oil. While 
Cold Warriors used to bang on about the communist menace 
in the past, few today would take that as a convincing account 
of why the West was so militarily active in the Third World during 
the Cold War. 
 No doubt the top politicians and military figures who have 
since stressed the importance of oil have meant what they said. 
That, however, doesn’t imply that oil was really either the main 
impetus to war, or the enduring motive of military strategy in 
practice. What warriors say about oil or anything else is important; 
but what they end up having to do is even more important.
 To his credit, Klare differentiated between America’s 
posture in the Cold War and its posture since. But for him the 
change amounted to ‘what might be termed the economisation 
of international security affairs’. In the Cold War, America had 
subordinated its national interest to far-flung global alliances and 
the containment of communism. By contrast, since the Cold War, 
self-interest, economic and technological dynamism and, above 
all, supplies of vital resources had predominated. 112
 This is wrong. Oil no doubt remains a factor in military 
deployment, both as resource and even as motive. But if anything, 
international security affairs have recently been dominated more 

























With oil and war, history does not repeat itself
However much they protest otherwise, critics of the Bush years 
do tend to see today’s wars as a repeat of the past. Yet as we’ve 
seen, if oil played a weighty role in conflicts before the Cold War, 
it was a role that was also circumscribed. 
 Writing in 2005 on ‘Geopolitics Reborn’, Klare argued that 
competition between the US, Russia and a newcomer – China – 
in the Gulf and around the Caspian Sea, 
‘… comes under the rubric of geopolitics – that is, the 
struggle between rival powers for control over territory, 
natural resources, vital geographic features (harbours, 
rivers, oases), and other sources of economic and military 
advantage.’ 113
Klare observed that the US and Russia had established military 
bases in the Caspian, and that China had conducted joint 
military exercises with outlying Kyrgystan. On top of military 
power in the Gulf and the Caspian, US neoconservatives were, 
Klare observed, apt to ‘acknowledge the energy dimensions’ of 
major geopolitical contests. Recognising the importance of oil, 
the three great powers had bolstered political and military ties 
with key oil suppliers, so increasing mutual suspicion and setting 
off a new round of geopolitical competition. Klare went on:
‘This competition touches practically every major oil-
producing area in one way or another, but it is in the 
Persian Gulf/Caspian Sea region that it will almost certainly 
assume its most explosive form. With some 70 per cent 
of the world’s known petroleum reserves and a vast 
potion of its natural gas reserves, the region is destined 
to become, in Brzezinski’s words, the grand chessboard 
on which Washington, Moscow and Beijing will play out 
their struggle for primacy.’ 114









 For Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), the English 
Fabian, geographer and inventor of the idea, geopolitics 
embraced not just natural features, but also national equipment 
and organisation, military power on land, and military power on 
sea. In particular, Mackinder felt that trans-continental railways 
were ‘now transmuting the conditions of land-power.’ 115 But for 
resource determinists, natural features tend to have the last 
word – so much so that Zbigniew Brzezinski, whom we earlier 
saw failing to make any mention of oil or gas, is hauled up, along 
with his grand chessboard, to vindicate the idea that oil and gas 
networks are really what war is all about now.
 In all of these hip accounts of oil as a wellspring of armed 
combat, the specificities of each engagement are smudged 
over, and the general propositions made are ahistorical. Those 
propositions are well summarised, therefore, by the sentence 
with which British journalist Andy Stern opens Who Won the 
Oil Wars? (2005): 
‘Since the birth of the modern oil industry in the middle 
of the 19th century, the pursuit of oil has brought out 
three characteristics of mankind: greed, corruption and 
belligerence.’ 116 
Yes, and love of money is the root of all evil too! In general, Stern 
links war to oil in a timeless manner. Unsurprisingly he finds that 
Standard Oil, Texaco and Texan oil billionaire John Paul Getty 
were all in league with the Nazis. 117 Today, he goes on, 
‘The Middle East, with two-thirds of the world’s oil, has 
tensions high. So the US, Europe, Japan, and increasingly 
China and India, are seeking new sources. In a rerun of the 
race to colonise the developing world in the 19th century, 
these major powers are now competing for access to the 
oil of West Africa and Central Asia. Another flashpoint is 
the South China Sea, where six countries have laid claim 
























In this all-too-monolithic reading of history, oil is always present 
and somehow, through human nature, causes violence. As Terry 
Lynn Karl insists in A Crude Awakening, oil is a magnet for war; 
it starts war; it prolongs and intensifies war. The conflict around 
Darfur in the Sudan is, she says, about oil. Likewise, oil was the 
reason for the First World War, and secure cheap oil has been 
the basis of US foreign policy since 1945.
 Altogether, repeats – with differences – of imagined 
past military joustings over oil tend to mesmerise Western 
commentators. Inevitably, after new Great Games, new Silk 
Roads and Grand Chessboards, there are new flashpoints and 
chokepoints around oil. 
Oil in Sudan and Nigeria
Terry Lynn Karl is not alone in attributing war in Sudan to oil. Andy 
Stern repeats her stance, saying that ‘Chinese companies supply 
the Sudanese military with arms, tanks and helicopters to clear 
civilians from the oilfields, as well as fighting anti-government 
militias’. 119
 But John Ghazvinian, a journalist who has travelled around 
Africa, takes a more nuanced view. Despite the unwavering title 
of his book, Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil (2007), 
Ghazvinian does offer some resistance to ‘yellow peril’ rhetoric 
about China in Sudan. China relies on Sudan for nearly 10 per 
cent of its imported oil, he notes; but unlike Western oil firms, 
Chinese ones are only just starting out in Africa, with oilfields 
that are mostly depleted. Of the debt relief, scholarships and 
infrastructure that China has offered Africa, he observes,
‘China’s ability to turn relatively small amounts of cash 
into tangible results, along with its strict regard for state 
sovereignty, are, for Western governments who still prefer 
to attach painful conditions to almost any interaction they 
have with African states, perhaps the most galling aspects 









Sadly, even these reasonable remarks rather miss the point. 
 The main conflict in Sudan lies in the west of the country, 
in Darfur. Sudan’s oil lies in the south. What makes war in Sudan, 
however, isn’t oil, or, as Stern imagines, the self-evidently 
outrageous fact that China ‘has opposed a UN resolution for 
sanctions against the Sudan.’ 121 What makes war there is the 
absence of a coherent state. It’s the lengthy failure of Khartoum 
to gain legitimacy with the Sudanese that explains both the 
trouble around oil in Sudan, and the country’s descent into war.
 Oil didn’t bring about the conflict in Sudan. Neither did 
it by itself incite separatist elements in Nigeria to force, in 
June 2008, the closure of Bonga, Shell’s flagship deepwater 
oil production and storage facility 120km off Nigeria’s coast. 
As Carl Mortishead, world business editor of the London Times, 
points out, Nigeria’s navy is ill equipped and unable to patrol the 
seas around Bonga; and though NATO has yet to take action 
on deepwater platforms off West Africa, ‘officials have proposed 
seconding warships to the area.’ 122
 Wealthy Nigeria is not basket-case Sudan. But while 
oil provides separatists in both countries with a convenient 
target, it’s the lack of popular support for the central authorities 
that turns the distribution of natural resources into a question 
of violence. 
No peak oil yet
The idea that conflict is driven by oil is reinforced by the idea that 
oil is now becoming scarcer.
 In April 2001, America’s Council on Foreign Relations 
concluded that though the world would not run short of 
hydrocarbons ‘in the foreseeable future,’ there was a grave 
problem of underinvestment. 123 In 2001 that was still the 
consensus. For years, petroleum geologist Colin Campbell and 
petroleum engineer and consultant Jean Laherrère had predicted 
serious difficulties; but even as late as 1998, their conclusions 
























‘The world is not running out of oil – at least not yet. 
What our society does face, and soon, is the end of the 
abundant and cheap oil on which all industrial nations 
depend.’ 124
However, Kenneth Deffeyes cracked the consensus in September 
2001 with his book Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World 
Oil Shortage. Since then, fear of peak oil has certainly been 
climbing. By 2005, as oil prices began to rise, the theory went 
mainstream.
 In February 2005 the Hirsch report, commissioned by the 
US Department of Energy, warned that a peak could occur within 
20 years, and that coping with it would be ‘extremely complex, 
involve literally trillions of dollars and require many years of 
intense effort’. 125 Among oil companies, Chevron went furthest 
in acknowledging peak oil. Under the slogan ‘Will you join us?’, a 
Chevron advertising campaign warned that
‘… many of the world’s oil and gas fields are maturing. 
And new energy discoveries are mainly occurring in 
places where resources are difficult to extract, physically, 
economically and even politically.’ 126
People must, said Chevron, ‘start by asking the tough questions.’
 In April 2007 the international Society of Petroleum 
Engineers held a conference in San Antonio, Texas. Promoting 
the conference, the SPE announced:  
‘We are now producing the second trillion barrels of oil, 
and in about 50 years we will have consumed all of that… 
how are we going to get the next trillion?’ 127
It was, and remains, a good question to ask. In fact, things 
could turn out more urgent than the SPE’s 50-year timescale. At 
present rates of consumption, the world will consume a trillion 









after the Crash of 2008.
 According to theorists of peak oil, the next trillion barrels 
of oil are all there is in the world, and the crisis is now.
 Such pessimism isn’t appropriate. What is appropriate is 
to start investing in technologies that will help human society 
find and exploit the third trillion barrels of oil that the SPE was 
searching for. 
 Four techniques will get us there. In increasing order of 
significance, these techniques are: 
1.  Extraction of more oil from existing fields
2.  Discovery of more oil 
3.  Unconventional oil, such as oil sands
4.  Biofuels.
Partisans of peak oil are correct that none of these techniques, on 
its own, is a full solution. However, peak oilers also underestimate 
all four – especially biofuels.
 Can new technologies assist, first, in the extraction of 
more oil from existing fields? For Simmons, the world is reliant 
on old supergiant fields such as Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar, which 
has been producing since 1951. Moreover, technology has failed 
to bring about a real rejuvenation over the past 30 years:
‘Horizontal drilling, multilateral well completion systems, 
intelligent wells, 3-D seismic, and computer-generated 
reserve simulation... have in some instances allowed 20 
to 30 percent more of original oil-in-place to be ultimately 
recovered… None of these technical breakthroughs 
created an “oilfield fountain of youth”.’ 128
Simmons is right that new technology cannot stave off depletion 
forever. It’s also true that while new technology will squeeze 
more out of existing fields, diminishing returns set in: the more 

























 There’s no reason to believe, however, that technological 
progress must be slower in the next 30 years than it was in the 
past 30. If rates of recovery from oilfields can be raised from 35 
to 45 per cent, almost a third more oil will be produced.
 Second, new technology will aid in finding altogether new 
oil. For many peak oilers, all the big discoveries of oil are firmly 
in the past and prospectors have looked everywhere on Earth 
worth looking – or at least have looked in so many places, it’s 
possible to make an accurate estimate of how much oil remains 
to be discovered. 
 Yet there continue to be large finds. In 2007, those 
included Jidong, off the coast of China (up to 1.2 billion barrels), 
and Tupi, 160 miles off Rio de Janeiro (up to eight billion barrels). 
The Brazilian find is not just a lucky accident. Back in the 1980s, 
Brazil began to look for oil deep offshore, at a time when nobody 
else had thought to look. The first big find opened up brand new 
prospects for exploration. 129
 Most well known are the finds off the coast of Angola 
and in the Gulf of Mexico. Now, with Tupi, deep water drilling 
technology could pay off for Brazil, too.
 There are also places to look closer onshore. A talking point 
in the 2008 presidential election was that, mostly for ecological 
reasons, and despite eight years of George W Bush supposedly 
in the pocket of the oil industry, the US has voluntarily placed 
much of Alaska, the western Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific and 
Atlantic coasts off limits for exploration.
 The latest technology has not been applied in countries 
such as Iran, Cuba or Sudan. On top of that, the limits 
to production and exploration in Iraq can hardly be said to 
be geological.
 Third, recent years have seen an increase in the production 
of hydrocarbons from unconventional sources. As we noted in 
our discussion of coal, if there is a shortfall in oil, coal to liquids 
offers some redress. On top of that, there is the oil available 
from oil sands (see below). In 2003, the US Energy Information 









Canada’s reserves of conventional oil. 130 
 Fourth, biofuels could substitute for oil very profoundly. 
That’s why we give them a more extensive treatment later in 
this chapter.
 
There’s oil in them there hills
Oil sands and their less important cousins, oil shales, are 
geological deposits of organic material that have not experienced 
enough heat and pressure to transform them into oil. That work 
of transformation has to be finished off by human industry. 
 Oil sands, sometimes known as tar sands, are made up 
of a mix of bitumen consisting of the thickest component found 
in conventional oil. Between them, Canada’s Athabasca, East 
Alberta, and Venezuela’s Orinoco contain greater deposits than 
all known reserves of conventional oil. Already, of the 87 million 
barrels of oil produced each day in 2007, about 1.6 million came 
from Canada’s sands, which have seen increasing production 
since the 1960s. About 600,000 barrels also came from 
Venezuela’s sands, in which investment is more recent. 131
 While there’s plenty of them, oil sands are hard to get out 
of the ground, and need much more refining than conventional 
oil. Oil sands can sometimes be mined from the surface. The 
heavy tar-like bitumen then needs separating from the sand it’s 
mixed with. Deeper deposits take even more work. Too viscous 
to flow directly out of the ground, oil sands need to be extracted 
by a process such as heating by steam injection. Then, once out 
of the ground, they need much more refining than conventional 
oil if they’re to produce usable petroleum products.
 All this makes oil sands a more expensive source of energy 
than conventional oil. Greens worry that, more than conventional 
oil, producing workable fuels from oil sands and shales requires 
vast amounts of water – and of energy in the form of natural gas. 
They also worry that oil from oil sands generates more CO2 than 
conventional oil.
 These are not insurmountable problems. Moreover, 
























unconventional resources shows that peak oil will not be a sharp 
cut off. Estimates suggest there could be more unconventional 
oil than all the conventional oil in the world. 
 In the long term, then, oil will not vanish. It will just become 
harder to extract. 132
 Second, the more complex it becomes to pursue 
unconventional oil, the more attractive alternatives such as 
biofuels will become.
 
Hubbert’s peak: an old theory  
makes its mark in new times
M King Hubbert, a geologist with Shell, was the first to develop a 
theory of peak oil. In 1956 Hubbert predicted the future course 
of US oil production. 133 Forecasts of the demise of oil have a 
long history of being wrong, but Hubbert turned out to be right: 
oil production from the continental United States did peak in the 
early 1970s, and then began to fall. It should be noted, however, 
that Hubbert failed to anticipate the discovery of oil in Alaska, and 
offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Both of these finds have partially 
offset the decline in oil production for the US as a whole.
 Hubbert’s theory starts by trying to estimate the total 
amount of oil that will ever be recovered from the ground. It then 
makes the assumption that when the halfway point is reached, a 
decline in the rate of production will set in. Even if there is plenty 
of oil remaining in the ground, the theory states that it will be too 
difficult to find and extract for production to be expanded at all 
easily. The decline of the world’s available oil resources is, finally, 
predicted to have dire consequences, especially if economic 
growth expands demand for them even higher. 
 Many economists are sceptical of peak oil, claiming that 
estimates of the total amount of oil in the ground are determined 
by how much money it has been worthwhile to invest in searching, 
rather than by comprehensive geological knowledge. Peak oilers 
reply that this shows that economists have never studied geology.
































same year, suggesting that the following five years could, as a 
consequence, bring war, famine and death. 134
 Obviously, the cult of Hubbert today cannot be put down 
to his original forecast for the US eventually coming true. What 
has happened, rather, is that passing the year 2000, and 
the general discussion of tipping points (see Chapter 3), have 
contributed to the sensation that mankind is going over a hump 
of some sort – that it is downhill all the way from now. Until very 
recently, the soaring price of oil also contributed to the feeling 
that oil’s moment of true scarcity had arrived.
 Dr Richard Pike, chief executive of the Royal Society of 
Chemistry and a man with 25 years’ experience in the oil industry, 
adds another factor that explains the popularity of theories 
of peak  oil today. When oil companies estimate their future 
reserves, Pike says, they do so on a very conservative basis – 
namely, that the reserve has been discovered, is recoverable, 
and is 90 per cent certain to be exceeded. But to demand this 
level of certainty of every oilfield, as statutory bodies such as 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission do, is to exclude 
many oilfields that, on the balance of probabilities, could well 
yield useful results. To add up all the estimates of reserves in a 
simple arithmetical manner does no justice to the bell-shaped 
curve of probabilities that more accurately describes fields that 
are proven, probable and merely possible.
 Thinking about what fields will yield in this more generous 
but actually more realistic manner, Pike believes that there could 
be two trillion barrels of conventional oil left on the planet, rather 
than the 1.2 trillion that is usually taken as given. 135
Prophet of peak oil: Marion King Hubbert, 
a Texan, early on during a long career at  
Shell. Contemporary society’s sense of loss 










Summing up on oil
From the late 19th century onwards, the price-fixing practices 
of Rockefeller and his allies made American opinion see oil as 
a dishonest conspiracy, worthy of state regulation. But as we 
have seen, today’s hatred of oil is very much linked to popular 
perceptions of the dangers that surround the Middle East. Before 
9/11, there were certainly fears about what the US was getting 
into. But after 9/11, the personal connections between the Bush 
family and Saudi oil gave the Democratic Party an easy and 
popular means of attacking the Republican Party. 
 Despite its manifest weaknesses, many now take the 
link between oil and war as self-evident. Thus, writing about 
the Georgia-Russia clash of 2008, Rafael Kandiyoti, professor 
of chemical engineering at Imperial College and author of 
Pipelines: Oil Flows and Crude Politics, contended that ‘from 
the beginning, oil and gas transmission has been at the centre 
of this conflict’. 136 Yet as Kandiyoti’s book rightly observed, the 
spread of NATO membership into the Baltic States, Eastern 
Europe and Central Europe has also been a big factor in Russian 
strategic considerations in recent years. 137 No doubt Georgia is 
one place where oil and gas can move from East to West; but 
to Moscow, NATO and its missiles in Poland, as well as the 
policies of Georgia’s leader, were probably just as important as 
oil, if not more so.
 It’s sad that the Middle East and Russia, sources of oil 
supply, are so much cast as bogeymen. Yet China and India are 
also now set to become villains – because of their demand for 
oil. The rise of state-backed national oil companies (NOCs) in 
Russia, China, India and elsewhere has very much unsettled the 
old international oil companies (IOCs). 
 The IOCs – oil ‘majors’ such as Exxon Mobil, BP, Total and 
Shell – rather resent NOCs such as Norway’s StatOil, Algeria’s 
Sonatrach, Mexico’s Pemex, or Brazil’s Petrobras. They are also 
nervous about the alliances firms like these have struck with 
























But in relation to Russia (Lukoil and Yukos), China (PetroChina, 
CNPC) and India, feelings run higher. The first section of The 
New Competition for Global Resources (2008), a report by the 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and Wharton Business School, 
University of Pennsylvania, contains important pointers for the 
international tensions that are likely to surround oil in future. 138 
 Rick Peters, a senior partner at BCG and a former leader of 
its energy practice, points out that, given the advent of Chinese 
and Indian competition against Western companies, nations 
which own oil are now able to secure more favourable terms for 
their resource than those which obtained in the past. 139 From 
Wharton, management professor Mauro Guillen is sanguine 
about the market opportunities for Western engineering firms 
out to supply Chinese and Indian NOCs on their home turf in 
Asia. But Guillen’s fellow management professor, Witold Henisz, 
is scathing about Chinese oil companies in Africa, saying that, 
compared with IOCs, they ‘have worse labour practices, invest 
less in the community and are more tolerant of corruption’. 140 
While Exxon Mobil, Shell and BP ‘have made great efforts to 
improve their external stakeholder relations,’ Henisz says, ‘the 
Chinese and Indians,’ he insists, ‘have a lot of catching up to do.’ 
He goes on:
‘They need to think about an oilfield as not just something 
to take, but about their need to be partners and their 
need to take a more inclusive and holistic view about 
what they are doing in a place like Angola or Sudan, and 
how to manage that process. They are far behind Western 
companies in those realisations and in the development 
of those capabilities; that will be a big struggle for them in 
the medium term.’ 141
Oh really? For ourselves, we don’t doubt that new Asian oil firms 
can be as rapacious as Western ones. But we also think that 
BCG’s Peters is nearer the mark when he hints that oil owners 









the fact that they face a wide choice of oilfield developers 
nowadays. By itself, that won’t ensure that Russian and Asian 
oil firms win every contract. But the chances are that oil-owning 
nations won’t roll over and play ball with Western IOCs the way 
they did for many decades. They will demand, and have been 
demanding, that oil developers contribute to local economies, 
engage in technology transfer, and have something to offer all 
the way from exploration through to retailing. 142
 So there is even more for the West to fear, if it wants 
to. Not every oil-owning state is run by a regime akin to that 
organised by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. But we can expect that 
oil, like coal and gas, won’t just be a useful source of energy for 
many years to come, but will also serve – again like coal and gas 
– as a stick with which the West will try to beat the East.
 Demand for liquid fuels will continue to grow – driven, 
as we discuss next, by transport. In the short and medium run 
that demand will be met by oil. Oil will therefore continue to be 
big business. 
 To find and extract continuing amounts will require greater 
and greater investment. Oil from the Arctic or deep offshore 
won’t come cheap. Beneath the ups and downs of market 
sentiment, that will tend to put upward pressure on the price of 
oil. Of course, high costs will not be the rule in locations where, 
as in Saudi Arabia, oil is still easy to extract. In such places, then, 
large profits will be made.
 New technology will continue to be applied to finding oil 
and getting it out of the ground. A continuing increase in raw 
computer power will help in finding oil, as seismic data are used 
with greater and greater sophistication to reconstruct images 
of underground reservoirs. As for drilling for oil, new technology 
is already being applied so that extractors can sense the 
environment of the drill bit, better steer the drill, cut through 
rock more efficiently, clear wells, seal off unwanted leaks and 
generally stimulate the flow of oil.
 For all these advances, ‘conventional’ oil production may 
























pumped; but those nations with easy access, such as members 
of OPEC, show little interest in flooding the market.
 In 2005, oil production stood at 84.3m barrels per day. 
Of that, 81.9m were conventional oil, 1.7m extra heavy oil and 
bitumen (for example, oil sands), 0.1m consisted of coal to 
liquids, and O.5m were biofuels. 143
 By 2030 the world could be using an extra 30-40m 
barrels of oil a day. Much of that growth will come from gas-to-
liquids, coal to liquids, oil sands and shales. But even more will 
come from biofuels.
Transport is why oil matters
Oil’s principal use is in transport. From the end of the 19th 
century, oil spread to become a source of heat, light, electricity 
and motive power for transport. By the mid-20th century, it had 
become the key to modern economic development. But from 
then on, as electrification began its ascent more fully than before 
the Second World War, new sources of energy such as nuclear 
power and natural gas became more significant. The use of oil 
became concentrated in the transport sector: it was used to 
make fuels for motor vehicles. In 1950 the share of US oil used 
for transport was 54 per cent. It rose steadily to 60 per cent 
by 1980, and by 2001 reached 69 per cent. 144 The underlying 
reason is not just that carbon fuels – petrol, diesel and jet fuel – 
pack a lot of energy, but also that they pack it into a small space, 
with a small weight. 
 While much of the world’s energy supply has gone 
electric, that hasn’t happened with aeroplanes, ships or – above 
all – cars. The reason is simple. Where electricity can easily be 
delivered, it’s by far the most convenient source of energy. The 
problem with electric transport is that vehicles that are meant 
to go anywhere need to carry their energy supply with them; but 
electricity is hard to store.
 To see the difference that the capacity to deliver electricity 
makes, think about electric trains. An electric vehicle probably 









on board in a battery. But a train such as the Eurostar, which 
runs from London to Paris, has electrical power delivered to it. 
It weighs 815 tonnes and travels at 300 km/h (186 mph). A 
container truck driven by a diesel engine carries its own fuel. It 
need not stick to a fixed electrified route. It typically weighs only 
44 tonnes and travels at less than 100 km/h (60 mph).
 The Toyota Prius shows that new transport technology will 
be about getting more from carbon fuels, not abandoning them 
altogether. The Prius uses a battery based on a material called 
nickel metal hydride (NiMH). But the Prius isn’t an electric car. 
It’s a hybrid, meaning that as well as battery-driven motors, it 
has a petrol-driven engine which it uses to charge up its battery. 
The Prius still takes on board all its energy in the form of petrol. 
The electrical system makes the fuel go further by allowing it 
to be used more efficiently. Regenerative breaking, for example, 
means that instead of throwing away energy when you put 
on the brakes, batteries get recharged. You can also get a lot 
more energy out of the same fuel just by running an engine 
at its optimum rate. By adding back or sucking in power, an 
electric motor can keep the engine running at its sweet spot. 
That dramatically increases efficiency, even though the battery 
doesn’t add any new energy overall.
 To avoid using petrol, a hybrid car would need large 
enough batteries to store energy for an entire journey. The snag 
is, however, that current battery technology just isn’t up to the 
task. The NiMH material stores energy at a density of 250 kJ/kg 
(measured by weight), or 360 kJ/litre (measured by volume). That 
contrasts very vividly with petrol, which has an energy density 
of 44,400 kJ/kg or 34,800 kJ/litre. A battery to store as much 
energy as an equivalent fuel tank would have to be a hundred 
times as large and heavy.
 The lesson is that oil, in its various refined forms, is an 
excellent store of energy. Whether we burn carbon-based fuels 
in internal combustion engines, jet engines, or fuel cells, they 
























In transport, as elsewhere, efficiency isn’t enough
Individual cars will become more efficient, but in aggregate will 
demand more fuel. Amory Lovins complains that, in 2003, the 
average new American light vehicle had 
‘… 24 per cent more weight, 93 per cent more horsepower, 
and [a] 29 per cent faster 0-60mph time than in 1981, 
but only 1 per cent more miles per gallon... America’s 
light-vehicle fleet today is nearly the world’s most fuel-
efficient per ton-mile, but with more tons, it uses the most 
fuel per mile of any advanced country.’ 145
What Lovins sees as a problem is, in fact, Americans being able to 
travel around more. As we have already mentioned (see Chapter 
1), increases in energy efficiency tend to be accompanied by 
increases in energy use. Better performance is a good thing. 
Most of the time, perhaps, people don’t need the extra space 
and power of an SUV. But if they have it to hand when they do 
want it, without having to take special measures, that’s a good 
thing, too.
 The other great hope of the Greens is public transport – 
buses and rail. Public transport undoubtedly has an important 
role to play, especially in cities, where it can often be the most 
convenient means of getting about. But it’s just impractical to 
think that more public transport will mean less consumption 
of energy. As statistics show, the convenience of the car is 
enormously popular. 
 In the US, the number of passenger miles travelled on the 
highways rose from 2.6 trillion in 1980 to 4.9 trillion in 2005. 
Meanwhile, the number of passenger miles travelled by train 
rose much more modestly – from 44 billion to 55 billion. This 
cannot be blamed entirely on a lack of service, even in the US. 
Between 1984 and 2006, the number of train stations served 
there rose from 1,822 to 2,975. 146
 Even in the UK, with all its European inclination toward the 









kilometres travelled by cars, light vans and taxis rose from 388 
to 686 billion, or 77 per cent. For rail, which has recently enjoyed 
a bit of a boom, the comparable figures were 35 billion and 55 
billion, or an increase of 58 per cent. 147
 It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that much of the 
enthusiasm for public transport today is motivated simply 
by hatred for a thing – the car. In Britain, Green campaigning 
journalist George Monbiot, for instance, puts Margaret 
Thatcher’s road-building program on a par with the breaking of 
the unions and the dismantling of the welfare state. He muses 
that ‘it is strange to see how the car has been overlooked as an 
agent of political change’. 148
 For Monbiot, the car has brought about an unwelcome 
shift to individualism. But this is to give an inanimate object the 
power of social forces. After all, making transport convenient 
through cars might more accurately be seen as overcoming 
distance and bringing people together. There are road hogs, and 
possibly even a little road rage; but lack of consideration for 
others is also sometimes evident on public transport. In fact, the 
level of cooperation on the roads can exceed that on a train or a 
bus, and is generally admirable.
 While public transport deserves proper investment, most 
of the time it isn’t a serious competitor to the car. The rise of 
the car should not be feared, but rather celebrated. Of course, 
transport planners can make mistakes with roads, traffic lights 
and all the rest. But the activities that surround driving tend to 
reflect, rather than cause, the moods of society.
 
The future of the car: internal combustion,  
fuel cells and the role of hydrogen
As options contrasted with the internal combustion engine, 
fuel cells are often spoken of in the same breath as hydrogen. 
And with both fuel cells and hydrogen, the assumption is that 
transport will become clean. 
























 The key technology in a car takes the chemical energy in a 
fuel and converts it into the kinetic energy of forward motion. The 
Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) that made motor cars practical 
was developed at the end of the 19th century, most significantly 
in Germany by Nikolaus Otto, Gottlieb Daimler, Wilhelm Maybach 
and Rudolph Diesel.
 In an ICE, fuel is mixed with oxygen and ignited. The 
energy released is captured in the motion of a piston, which is 
driven by expanding hot gas. Transmission and gearing take the 
mechanical energy of pistons and deliver it to wheels. 
 The most common fuels used with the ICE are standard 
gasoline and diesel. In both areas, ICE technology continues to 
improve. Homogenous compression charge ignition (HCCI) is a 
good example. It’s based on precise control of conditions, so 
that fuel ignites uniformly and simultaneously at just the right 
moment. That can reduce nitrous oxide pollutants and increase 
efficiency by 10 per cent or more.
 Many fuels can be used in an ICE, including ethanol and 
even hydrogen gas. After a century’s concentration on petrol and 
diesel, some of these fuels don’t get a second look today, which 
is a pity. Instead, fuel cells are now being discussed as never 
before. 
 We have already explained that electrical batteries suffer 
from poor energy density. But if an appropriate source of high 
energy density fuel can be converted into electricity, then 
turning wheels with electrical motors, rather than with controlled 
explosions, might have a future.
 Like ICEs, fuel cells convert energy in a fuel into motion. 
Again, the fuel is combined with oxygen. However, with fuel cells 
there’s no flame of combustion. Instead, the fuel is chemically 
broken apart as it passes through a special plastic membrane, 
and the resulting energy is captured electrically. The electricity 
can then run through wires to electrical motors powering a car’s 
wheels.
 Known membranes work best with hydrogen as a fuel. 









methanol and ethanol: indeed, these direct methanol fuel cells 
are presently being developed as replacements for batteries in 
phones, cameras and portable computers. Another option is to 
convert a fuel such as methanol into hydrogen before feeding 
it into a fuel cell. Such indirect fuel cells have also been built, 
although they involve added complexity.
 Vehicles based on fuel cells may come into serious use 
in a decade or so. At present, however, it looks likely that they 
will be outclassed by hybrids. But even with fuel cells, hydrogen 
is unlikely to be the fuel of choice. Compared to other gases, 
hydrogen is hard to handle, both for storage on board a vehicle 
and in pipelines and filling stations. Liquid hydrocarbons are 
much easier to deal with.
 It is also sometimes forgotten that although hydrogen 
is carbon free, and so releases only water at the point of 
consumption, it has to come from somewhere. Hydrogen is a 
manufactured fuel that’s only as clean as the energy that goes 
into producing it.
 For fuel cells used in transport, manufacturing a fuel 
such as methanol would make more sense than manufacturing 
hydrogen. That’s the problem with all those alluring visions of 
a hydrogen economy. 149 Using nuclear or solar power to make 
hydrogen will be important. But that hydrogen will mostly be 
used industrially in combination with carbon, as in the upgrading 
of oil sands, or in the production of fertiliser.




Greens fear the growth of cars in the East 
The whole world needs more petrol. January 2008 saw the 
launch of India’s cheapest ever car: the Tata Nano. Ratan Tata, 
responsible for seeing the car to market, explained that although 
























‘… if we want to build a people’s car, it should be a car 
and not something that people would say, Ah! That’s just 
a scooter with four wheels or an auto rickshaw with four 
wheels or not really a car... people wanted a real car and 
not something that someone would say was not a car, this 
is half-a-car or three-fourths of a car.’ 150 
So they do. ‘My first reaction when someone says they need to 
buy a car is to say don’t buy it... But people are buying cars, I 
cannot stop them’, lamented Greenpeace India’s Soumya Brata 
Rahut. 151
 For energy writer and consultant Andrew McKillop, there 
are natural limits not just to human population, but also to the 
number of cars on the planet. Denouncing what he is pleased to 
call ‘The Chinese car bomb,’ McKillop argues that the increase 
in cars in China and India means that these two nuclear-armed 
powers, along with another in the shape of the US,
‘… are ever more likely to fight among themselves, or 
confront EU importers, including two nuclear-weapons 
states, for the last oil reserves on the planet.’ 152
Dramatic stuff – but having accused China of presiding over an 
explosion just waiting to happen, why not add more pejoratives? 
Somehow the growth of annual car sales in China, which slowed 
to fewer than six million in the wake of the Crash of 2008, is 
supposed to lead to a world war. No matter that sales of six 
million represent just half a per cent of China’s population: for 
the enlightened Green, this is half a per cent too many.
 It’s much more likely, in fact, that China will be making 
cars in volume to export to Europe; already some GM Buicks 
are designed in China and exported to the US. India also plans 
to begin its first major car exporting effort to Europe. Finally, 
after spending $2m on a controlling stake in a Norwegian maker 
of polymer lithium ion batteries, Tata Motors hopes to bring its 









 Asia will export cheap cars to Europe, and UK car workers’ 
jobs could go. Meanwhile, China plans to build an extra one 
million kilometres of road before 2020. 153
 As transport becomes more Chinese, so China can expect 
to meet with more criticism.
Aviation: progress portrayed as child abuse
Worldwide, the number of air passengers more than doubled 
between 1985 and 2005: from 896 million to 2,022 million. 
The average length of those journeys rose too, from 1500km 
to 2000km. Freight – including all those food miles – grew 
even faster, from 40 billion to 510 billion tonne-kilometres. The 
International Civil Aviation Organisation expects growth over 
the next 20 years to continue at a similar rate, with the fastest 
happening in Asia. 154
 In the 1950s, the jet set consisted of the rich and famous. 
In the 1990s, easyJet and Ryan Air opened up air travel to 
millions. For some, the objection to cheap flights seems to be 
that they put the wrong sort of people aloft. George Monbiot 
found an alternative objection: flying across the Atlantic was as 
unacceptable as child abuse. 155 
 Aviation will see advances in efficiency. For Rainer von 
Wrede, director of environmental affairs at Airbus, a new aircraft 
should have 15-25 per cent less fuel consumption than the plane 
it’s going to replace. Better engines, improved aerodynamics and 
lighter strong materials are in the works. 156
 These goals are achievable. At the Farnborough Airshow 
in July 2008, General Electric launched a development of a 
new engine for jets carrying 150 or fewer passengers. Using 
advanced materials, new cooling technology, fuel mixing and 
aerodynamics, GE aims for a 16 per cent efficiency increase 
over the GE90-115B engines that power the Boeing 777. 157
 Meanwhile, Pratt & Whitney announced that its new 
engine, the Geared Turbofan PW1000G, had successfully taken 
flight, with an increased efficiency of 12 per cent. 158
























by more flying. When told that new airport runways will make 
for more efficient flying, Greens are right to point out that more 
flying means more CO2 overall. 
159  
 Though aviation adds to climate change, mankind should 
not take that as a pretext for abandoning flying, one of the 
noblest advances of the 20th century. What is needed here are 
some technological fixes. Nevertheless, Friends of the Earth has 
already made up its mind about aviation. It holds, very simply, 
that ‘the fast growth in air flights can not be maintained without 
causing climatic disaster’. 160
 It’s wrong to write technology off the agenda in this way. 
When Virgin made a test flight from London to Amsterdam, 
running on oil from coconut and the babassu palm tree, one 
Greenpeace activist complained that it was a ‘massive piece of 
spin and greenwash’. 161 But a month later, Continental Airlines 
announced that it was working with GE and Boeing on a biofuel 
flight for 2009. 162 In May 2008 Airbus got together with JetBlue 
Airways and Honeywell to suggest that biofuels could provide 
30 per cent of aviation fuel by 2030. 163 Inevitably, there is also 
keen interest from the US military. 164
 Fuel producers are also working on biofuels for aviation. 
Based in San Francisco, Solazyme makes kerosene from algae. 
Today, that’s the only biofuel to meet the standards for regular 
Jet A fuel – but other high-flying biofuels are on the way. 165
Biofuels: from Beauty to the Beast and back again
At one time, Greens favoured biofuels over fossil fuels. Fossil 
fuels are formed from the fossilised remains of dead plants and 
animals that have been exposed to heat and pressure in the 
Earth’s crust over hundreds of millions of years. They produce 
billions of tonnes of CO2 each year when burnt. Biofuels, on the 
other hand, are derived from raw plant matter and add no net 
CO2 to the atmosphere when burnt. In fact, the photosynthetic 
plants used in the production of biofuels remove as much CO2 
from the atmosphere as biofuels release when they’re burnt.









grass cuttings, domestic refuse, charcoal and dried manure. 
When raw biomass is in a suitable form such as firewood, it can 
be burnt directly in a stove or furnace to provide heat or raise 
steam. This is known as ‘traditional biomass’. However, the World 
Health Organisation has rightly decried the burning of traditional 
biomass, saying that, around the world,
‘… indoor air pollution from solid fuel use is responsible for 
1.6 million deaths due to pneumonia, chronic respiratory 
disease and lung cancer… In high-mortality developing 
countries, indoor smoke is responsible for an estimated 
3.7 per cent of the overall disease burden…’ 166 
Biomass is also increasingly burnt in modern power stations, 
alongside coal. But this practice is unlikely to have a long-term 
future. Biomass isn’t the most efficient way of capturing the 
sun’s energy. As the first table in Chapter 6 shows, area for 
area, the energy in biomass is much less than that contained in 
sunlight. Instead of converting biofuels to electricity and losing 
energy in the process, it makes sense to use solar technologies 
to generate electricity.
 The virtue of biomass is that, once processed into biofuels, 
it stores energy in the form of hydrocarbons – and it is only these 
light but punchy kind of fuels that can be used in road or air 
transport. Processed biofuels are very similar to existing liquid 
fuels such as petrol or diesel. All of these fuels were originally 
organic, and their basic carbon molecules are the same.
 The main biofuel in use today is ethanol, which is known 
as a ‘first generation’ (1G) biofuel. Ethanol is produced by growing 
crops that are high in sugar. In the US, ethanol is produced from 
maize, whereas in Brazil, where production is more efficient, it’s 
made from sugarcane. In both cases the ethanol is produced 
using yeast fermentation, similar to the way in which alcohol is 
produced in beer. 
 The other main biofuel in use today is biodiesel. Derived 
























rock oil. Europe gets most of its biodiesel from soybeans grown 
in sunny Indonesia. 
 A second generation of ethanol is planned. This 
cellulosic ethanol uses non-food crops or inedible waste 
products to produce the same end product, but first breaks down 
the cellulose or lignocellulose that makes up the body of plants 
into sugar for conversion to ethanol. That makes the process far 
more efficient than 1G ethanol.
 As a fuel, ethanol is fine, but not ideal. It has a slightly lower 
energy density than petrol and it mixes well with water, which is 
a disadvantage for a fuel. It is also corrosive to pipelines.
 However, ethanol does have a higher octane rating than 
petrol, meaning it burns more easily. Indeed, it has been regularly 
blended into much US fuel in the 1990s for its ‘better burn’, and 
for its ability to meet clean air standards. 167  What’s more, car 
engines can easily be adapted to run any combination of ethanol 
and regular petrol.
 One alternative to ethanol is butanol. Butanol produces 
more energy than ethanol and allegedly can be burnt ‘straight’ in 
existing gasoline engines – without modification to the engine or 
car. It is also less corrosive and less water-soluble than ethanol. 
 Many investigative groups are now working on 
biotechnology-assisted biofuels – 3G. In January 2008, 
Professor James Liao’s group at the University of California, 
Los Angeles, showed that the fast-growing bacterium E. coli 
could be engineered to produce a variety of possible fuels, 
including butanol. 168 
 The biofuel industry is still in its infancy. It continues to 
rely on plants that have been developed for food production. 
Still, research is beginning on non-food plants that are adapted 
to produce cellulose rapidly, and that will grow on marginal land 
with minimal inputs of water and fertiliser. Also, notwithstanding 
the improvements in genetics and agronomy that are surely to 
come, miscanthus, a tall growing grass, has been identified as a 
promising candidate for cellulosic ethanol production. 









growing of biomass and its fermentation into fuel. This may go 
beyond improving the growth and utility of plants and, separately, 
improving yeast. Process improvements may well be combined 
to produce algae or bacteria that photosynthesise light in a way 
that directly produces fuel. 
 
 
Craig Venter: a modern Prometheus
J Craig Venter knows how to shake things up. While many 
innovators have lost their sense of urgency and vision, Venter 
is not among them. He is clear where his urgency originated: 
drafted to Vietnam as an 18 year old in 1967, he worked 
as a medic in a US navy hospital. ‘I had to learn in real time 
what triage actually meant’, he has explained. ‘I dealt with 
the death of thousands of men my age. It was a life-altering 
experience.’ 169 
 Venter entered medical research, but, frustrated with the 
slow pace of advance, he founded a private institute and then a 
private company, Celera Genomics, to lay out the sequence of 
the human genome. 
 Celera attracted furious accusations of privatising genetic 
knowledge. Perhaps some were justified, but it did light a fire 
under publicly funded scientists. When the complete human 
genome was unveiled in 2000, the breakthrough came at least 
three years ahead of schedule.
 Venter has continued to make spectacular scientific 
advances – and lots of money. His grandest ambition, however, 
is to solve the world’s energy problems. His plan is not just to 
modify an existing organism, but also to build a synthetic organism, 
a bacterium, from the ground up. That way, the capacity to 
produce fuel – or food, or medicines – can be designed in to 
organic materials.
Genius of genetics:  the entrepreneur  
Craig Venter. His hope is to bring biology  
































 ‘For the first time, God has competition’, complained 
Green campaigners on hearing of the plan. 170 Venter replied: 
‘We are not afraid to take on things that are important just 
because they stimulate thinking… We are dealing in big 
ideas. We are trying to create a new value system for life. 
When dealing at this scale, you can’t expect everybody to 
be happy.’ 171
Transport will get its fuel through high-tech farming
The plausibility of biofuels depends on raising the efficiency of 
agriculture. Because they make use of so much land, biofuels 
are attacked for causing deforestation and, above all, for pushing 
up the price of food. The only people in favour of biofuels are 
said to be farmers eager for new subsidies.
 Critics have even claimed that when you add up all the 
energy that goes into growing a crop, you get out less than you 
put in. 172 There may be a bit of truth in this, especially with 
regard to 1G ethanol production from maize. But done right, with 
more sophisticated agricultural technology, there’s no doubt that 
biofuels will provide plenty of energy in the future. 173 And as 
we show below, there’s enough land around to accommodate 
biofuels.
 Mechanising world agriculture will help motorise world 
society. Mechanisation both saves labour and makes most 
efficient use of other inputs. In Brazil, cane is still cut by hand 
with machetes. Even when fields are burnt before harvesting, to 
clear them of snakes and destroy razor-sharp leaves, the work 
isn’t just difficult, but unpleasant and dangerous. 
 In 2007, a Brazilian government team freed 1,000 
labourers from servitude at the hands of an ethanol producer. 
At the time, the company defended itself on the grounds that 
its workers were paid ‘good wages by Brazilian standards.’ 
174 But given that its economy is relatively dynamic, Brazil’s 
























cultivation fundamentally. Brazilian sugar cane is gradually being 
mechanised. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of workers 
cutting cane fell from 1.2 million to just 700,000. 175
 Over the next few years, machines will substitute for 
hundreds of thousands of cane workers. In São Paulo state, for 
example, around 144,000 cutters will be replaced by machines 
that cost about $600,000 each and harvest the crop more 
quickly and cost effectively. Each will do the work of about 100 
cane cutters, who earn $500 per month. 176
 Many suggest that mechanisation is being driven by the 
worries that ethical consumers in the West have about poor labour 
conditions. 177 But it seems more likely that mechanisation is 
being driven by concern for the bottom line. That’s why investment 
is happening all the way through the process of production, from 
the development of new varieties of cane and new planting 
conditions, through to refineries and the commercial exploitation 
of waste products. 178
 Agricultural technology is important to the developed world. 
Global positioning systems and computer control have given rise 
to the concept of precision agriculture, which treats crops and 
soils within an accuracy of one centimetre. 179 With the right 
technology, however, tropical countries could still become more 
productive than the developed world. In the sunlight they receive, 
they have an edge in natural conditions that cannot be replicated 
by artificial means. This is the path that Brazil is travelling.
 In the least developed countries, by contrast, improving 
basic transport is still the main means by which to increase 
agricultural production. Without roads, refrigeration and other 
methods of food preservation, food goes to waste before it can 
reach market.
 Greens don’t just attack the use of such techniques 
in the Third World. They also campaign against genetically 
modified seeds, pesticides, factory farming, food packaging, the 
preservation of food by irradiation, and increasing land use. On 
every front, they prefer to go organic.
 In fact, though, industrialised agriculture will both 









Land enough to grow both food and fuel
It’s myopic to accuse biofuels of squeezing agriculture off the 
landscape. There is plenty of land around for both kinds of crops 
to prosper.
 The world already has more high quality food than ever 
before. Per head per day, world consumption of food increased 
from 2300 kilocalories (kcals) in 1961-3, to 2800 in 2001-3. 
In the developing world, it rose from 1950 kcals to 2650 kcals. 
Importantly, it was not just the calorific content of food that 
changed, but also the types of food consumed. In the developing 
world, diet moved away from cereals, pulses and tubers, toward 
meat, dairy and fruit: 
The changing composition of world food intake 180
per cent calories, 
1961-1963










Although the world has seen a small absolute fall in the 
consumption of cereal per head, that’s a sign of the advent of 
more balanced diets, not a food crisis. 181 
 Despite all the progress in food, far too many countries 
have been left behind. But the problem in those countries is 
conflict, not shortage of resources. The places that have seen 
the largest increases in the number of malnourished are in the 
war-torn regions of Africa and the Middle East. Between 1990/2 
and 2001/3, the world’s largest national increase in hunger, 
























malnutrition tripled from 12 million people to 36 million.182
 There have been increases in agricultural output. Yet once 
again these have been achieved more by increasing yields than 
by using additional land. America’s yield of soybeans, for instance, 
rose by 16 per cent from 1979 to 1995, and then by another 15 
per cent in the shorter period between 1995 and 2007. Its yield 
of corn for grain rose by 58 per cent between 1974 and 1990, 
and then by another 29 per cent between 1990 and 2007. 183 At 
present, the US is so productive that it’s a net exporter of food. 
 There’s no technical reason why productivity in the 
developed world should not continue to increase, or why the 
developing world should not match it.
 In developing Asia progress is already happening; but, thus 
far, sub-Saharan Africa is being left behind. Between 1960 and 
2005, the yield of cereals in the developed world rose from 0.84 
to 2.16 tonnes per hectare. In East Asia, yields rose from 0.48 
to 1.8 tonnes per hectare, closing most of the gap between the 
developing and developed worlds. In sub-Saharan Africa, yields 
did less well, rising from just under 0.4 tonnes to just over 0.4 
tonnes per hectare. 184
 The most important technological input into food 
production is fertiliser. Nitrogen is most critical, followed by 
phosphorus and potassium. High technology can ensure not just 
the right nutrients, but also the right proportions.
 Improvement of crop varieties had especially good results 
in Asia’s green revolution. But in many other developing countries, 
figures confirm that crops have not yet been created especially 









Application of farming technologies  
in the Third World 185
per cent irrigated 
land, 2002




kg of nutrients per 
hectare, 2002
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 24 13
Latin America 11 59 81
South Asia 39 77 98
East Asia 29 85 190
Pesticides, herbicides, growth hormones and antibiotics are all 
carbon derivatives of oil. They all still have a greater contribution 
to make to high-productivity agriculture.
 Even without the continuing advance of productivity in 
agriculture, there would be no shortage of land in the world – 
land to grow both food and biofuels. At the end of June 2008, 
the EU abolished the compulsory set aside of 10 per cent of 
farmland. 186 Environmentalists warned that the decision ‘could 
be one of the worst disasters for wildlife for 40 years’. 187 
Similarly, in the US, Greens have lobbied for strict enforcement 
of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which keeps 
land out of production. 188 Indeed, in July 2008, the National 
Wildlife Federation won a lawsuit that blocked the Department 
of Agriculture from opening 24 million acres of CRP land to 
additional haying and grazing. 189
 In reality, releasing more land should open up a more 
dynamic future for the countryside. A large part of that future will 
be the production of biofuels. 
 
Summing up on transport, biofuels and agriculture
Transport will be harder than electricity to make carbon-neutral. 
For that reason it will continue to attract Green hostility. 
























will slow the transport-related growth of emissions, but will not 
reverse it. As prices fall, hybrid technology will become standard, 
first of all in the developed world and, in time, globally. But it will 
take several decades before hybrids make up a majority of new 
sales, let alone of the whole vehicle fleet.
 Plug-in hybrid cars have much to recommend them. 
Though they still rely on liquid hydrocarbons for long journeys, 
and for quick refuelling, plug-in hybrids can be recharged from 
the grid. They can therefore benefit from electricity that’s clean 
and cheap. But while modification from existing hybrids should 
be relatively straightforward, plug-ins are only now beginning to 
enter production. Their first real test looks likely to be as a fleet 
of 200 taxis in Shenzhen, China. 190
 Rising emissions are not a reason to cut back on transport. 
Eventually, the use of biofuels and electricity will allow transport 
to have little net impact on emissions of CO2.
 Driving, shipping and air travel will demand liquid 
hydrocarbon fuels. At present, demand is met by fossil fuels, 
and it will take decades for the new biofuel industry to gear up. 
But as the world heads toward 2050, biofuels will supply an 
increasing proportion of liquid fuel.
 Use of biofuels has been rising. In the US, the Renewable 
Fuel Standard programme required that, by 2007, the proportion 
of fuel ethanol deployed in cars be at least four per cent. 191 
Before the scare, in 2008, about biofuels driving up the cost of 
food, the EU adopted a target of 10 per cent biofuel by 2020. 192 
India has adopted a target – possibly too ambitious – of using 20 
per cent biofuel by 2017. 193 
 The final pace at which biofuels will be adopted will depend 
on the rate at which the technology develops, but at present 
penetrations of about 10 per cent by 2020 look reasonable. By 
the middle of the century, biofuels could grow to cover a majority 
of transport fuel. 
 On this scale, the growth of biofuels will transform the 
Earth’s landscape. They will affect the already productive Western 









Rating different sources of biofuels
Source Intermediate 
product
Processing method Period of 
take-off
Cereals (maize / corn, 
wheat, etc)
Sugar Breakdown of starch 2005-2010
Sugar beet Sugar Sugar refining 2005-2015
Sugar cane Sugar Sugar refining 2005-2025
Cellulosic cereals  
(maize / corn, wheat, etc)
Sugar or lignocellulose Sugar from breakdown of 




Sugar or lignocellulose Sugar from breakdown of 
cellulose in whole plant
2015-2035
Woody plants (willow, 
poplar)
Sugar or lignocellulose Sugar from breakdown of 




Sugar or lignocellulose Could be genetically 
programmed to break itself 
down into useful products
2020-2040
Soy, rapeseed, palm oil Vegetable oil or 
lignocellulose
Pressing seeds for oil 1995-2005
Jatropha Vegetable oil or 
lignocellulose
Pressing seeds for oil 2010-2020
Algae Vegetable oil or 
lignocellulose
Pressing seeds for oil 2025-2045
Agriculture and industrial 
woody waste
Sugar or lignocellulose Sugar from breakdown of 
cellulose in whole plant
2010-2030
Domestic and food 
organic waste
Vegetable oil or 
lignocellulose





Sugar or vegetable oil 
or lignocellulose or 
direct production of 
fuel products
Combined chemical and 
biological processing. 
Could be genetically 
programmed to break itself 

























Advantages Disadvantages Generation Rating 
now / 10
Rating for the 
future / 10
Builds on existing 
technology
Stepping stone to future 
technologies
Inefficient.
Plant optimised for 
food, not fuel
1G 2 1
Can be grown in wide 
range of climates
Less efficient than 
cane
1G 3 2
Very efficient source 
of sugar
Requires tropical sun 1G 6 5
Stepping stone from first 
to second generation
Plant optimised for 
food, not fuel
2G 3 5
Can be optimised for 






Long term plantations 
inflexible
2G 3 7
Greater flexibility and 





Builds on existing 
technology.
Stepping stone to future 
technologies
Plant optimised for 
food, not fuel
1G 2 1
Can be optimised for 
fuel rather than food
Underdeveloped 
technology. Long term 
potential not clear
1G 4 4
Easy to handle Very different from 
existing agriculture. 
Energy from algae 
will require serious 
innovation
2G 2 5
Usefully recycles existing 
waste
Limited supply 2G 2 3
Limited supply and 
hard to centralise
1G 1 1
Potentially most flexible 
and efficient











Biofuel Starting material Production
Ethanol Sugar Biological fermentation
Butanol Sugar Biological fermentation 
with use of genetic 
engineering
Synthetic petroleum Sugar Biological fermentation 
with extensive genetic 
engineering
Biodiesel Vegetable oil Chemical processing
Methanol Lignocellulose Chemical processing
Dimethylether (DME) Lignocellulose Chemical processing
Fischer-Tropsch biodiesel Lignocellulose Chemical processing
























Advantages Disadvantages Rating now/10 Rating for the 
future / 10
Builds on existing 
technology in beverage 
industry
Corrosive, mixes with 




with existing distribution 
infrastructure.





High energy density Complex production 
technologies, still to be 
developed
2 8
Use in existing engines.
Potentially adaptable for 
use in aircraft
Limited supply of 
starting material
4 3
Can be used in fuel cells.
Application in consumer 
gadgets
Toxic. Low energy 
density.
Needs development of 
fuel cell vehicles
2 5






Use in existing engines













Europe look set to be drawn back into production. 194 The most 
dramatic shift could come in the parts of Africa that, like Brazil, 
enjoy tropical sun. If those regions can begin to industrialise, 
that could open up a whole new era in biofuel agriculture.
 Altogether, as the productivity of food production increases 
alongside a booming biofuel sector, it’s possible that, by the 
middle of the century, rather more land will be used for fuel than 
for food. One method that would cut the amount of land needed 
to make biofuels is to create other biofuels through the offshore 
farming of aquatic bacteria and algae. 195
 Either way, biofuels will help the world become more 
mobile. The two tables above summarise our view of the 
prospects facing different sources of biofuels, as well our view of 
the prospects facing different kinds of biofuels as end-products.
 
Toward a New Carbon Infrastructure
Of more than 100 elements in the periodic table, only carbon 
has an entire branch of chemistry – organic chemistry – devoted 
to it. It’s no accident that the chemistry of life is based on carbon. 
In creating living organisms, evolution has shown the remarkable 
uses to which carbon can be put.
 Tomorrow, human beings will go further in exploiting 
carbon, both in making new carbon fuels and in gradually taking 
control of the natural carbon cycle.
 The petrol in a car mostly consists of molecules based 
on a backbone of between five and 12 carbon atoms strung 
together. Diesel and jet fuel are based on chains of between 10 
and 15 atoms. All these compounds are found in crude oil, which 
formed the basis of most transport fuels in the 20th century. But 
in the 21st century, transport fuels will come from a much wider 
variety of sources, including the
breakdown of the large bitumen molecules in oil sands•	
breakdown of even larger coal molecules (CTL) •	
conversion of oil shale to oil•	

























conversion of sugar, cellulose, lipids or other biomass to •	
liquid fuels (biofuels).
It’s a similar story with natural gas. Methane is a single carbon 
molecule with four hydrogen atoms attached. In the 20th century, 
it was obtained by refining raw natural gas. In the 21st century, 
however, methane will also come from
breaking down large coal molecules (coal gasification)•	
converting sugar, cellulose, lipids or other biomass •	
(biogasification).
How, though, will liquid fuels and gas participate in a New Carbon 
Infrastructure?
 Today, by far the biggest part of oil and gas is consumed 
for energy. But oil and gas also provide the raw materials for the 
production of plastics, as well as the production of fine chemicals 
such as pharmaceuticals. For this reason, the two fuels together 
are rightly known as the petrochemical industry.
 The rise of biofuels, however, will turn petrochemicals into 
what might possibly be termed petroagrichemicals. That’s why 
the chemical giant DuPont has teamed up with BP working on 
biotechnologies – and why the giant agricultural producer Cargill 
has moved into plastics. 196
 The greater integration of the energy sector with the 
chemical and agricultural industries will open up opportunities 
for new fuels beyond petrol, diesel, methane and coal. Ethanol is 
the first of these new fuels, and biobutanol will be the next. The 
development of fuel cells may see compounds such as methanol 
put to work, too. As a result, future refineries will have to become 
more and more flexible in their outputs.
 The commonality between oil, gas, chemicals and biofuels 
is that each is built on carbon – judiciously combined with other 
elements. Yet with climate change comes the need to manage a 









 At first sight, prospects here do not look very promising. 
It’s true that CO2 is, in the first instance, a waste product. But 
when two of the planet’s most eminent scientists recently penned 
a reminder to the world not to forget long-term fundamental 
research in energy, they identified the chemistry of CO2 as a key 
area for work. ‘For decades,’ they wrote, ‘there has been little 
research, whether fundamental or exploratory, in this area; it 
was considered a solved problem.’ 197
 One of the first results of renewed work on CO2 will be 
improved technology for its capture. That will allow it to be 
sequestered away from the atmosphere. Beyond the CCS 
technologies that this chapter has already discussed in relation 
to coal, there are other possibilities. One is to process CO2 into 
rocks of calcium carbonate – chalk, or marble – that can easily 
be stored, or even used as construction materials. 
 These technologies will help human beings manage the 
planet’s carbon cycle. However, CO2 will not just be stored, but 
will also be put to work. It will be used to fertilise the growth of 
new plants for food and fuel.
 The full intricacies of the biology that can ‘fix’ or extract 
carbon from the air have yet to be unravelled. The process will 
rely on 
molecules that can harvest light and focus energy into a •	
reaction centre that splits up water to produce hydrogen 
a complex system of membranes and enzymes that can •	
use the energy produced to manufacture hydrocarbons 
from CO2.
By understanding that biology better, it will be possible to make 
plants, bacteria and algae produce more and better biofuels. 
 Improved methods of producing hydrogen, together with 
insights into the chemistry of joining carbon atoms from CO2, 
may however allow the same process to be done better, and 
without any biology at all. The energy to power such artificial 
























plants engage in photosynthesis. But other forms of energy, 
such as nuclear or geothermal, would work just as well. 
 In any case, such a system would give human beings 
simultaneous control over both the carbon cycle, and the 
production of carbon-based fuels. Far from heading toward a 
low carbon economy, therefore, the world will see an emerging 
web of industrial uses for carbon, building up into a New Carbon 
Infrastructure.
 
Can algae save the world?
That was the question asked by an exhibition at the Science 
Museum, London, in Spring 2008. The exhibition drew on the 
work of Carol Turley, a microbial ecologist at the Plymouth 
Marine Laboratory, and an earlier paper by Turley gave a scholarly 
preface to it.  198
When plants take up carbon from the atmosphere, the 
carbon is usually returned to the air when the plant dies and 
decays. An exception occurs when plant material is buried, which 
is what happened with the ancient forests that form today’s 
coalfields. 
The natural process of carbon burial, however, is slow. To 
remove the carbon that burning fossil fuels would generate in a 
century would take millions of years. Yet it may still be possible 
to increase the rate at which biomass is buried. 
 That’s where algae come in. We have already mentioned 
the promising possibility that marine algae might be farmed and 
harvested for biofuels. The plan here is different: algae on the 
surface of the ocean first absorb CO2, then sink to the bottom of 
the ocean, taking their carbon with them.
 The Southern Ocean around Antarctica has been identified 
as an area in which only a single nutrient, iron, appears to 
be missing. Simply adding a small quantity of iron may vastly 
stimulate algal growth. Experiments have been carried out on a 
small scale, showing that there is a real effect. 199









a scheme could be made to work in practice. Could the system 
scale up? Will dead algae sink, or will they be consumed by other 
marine life so that the carbon stays in circulation? Will there 
be knock-on effects, reducing carbon uptake elsewhere in the 
ocean? At present all that can be said is that experiments are 
cheap relative to the potential long-term gains.
 The fertilisation of the world’s oceans is particularly galling 
for Greens. After all, it’s being pursued by commercial enterprises 
– most notably Climos, of San Francisco. 200
 Any scientific results produced by a commercial 
organisation should be scrutinised with a sceptical eye. Typically 
enough, though, Greenpeace and others seem keener on 
stopping experiments in ocean fertilisation than on keeping an 
open mind about such experiments. 201
 
Summing up this chapter:  
Obama, cheap oil, and New Carbon
Around the negotiations on climate change in Copenhagen 
in December 2009, coal will certainly dominate the West’s 
arguments with China and India. The interpretation of national 
and general security in Western Europe will undoubtedly revolve 
more around Russian gas. Last and most importantly, the 
presidency of Barack Obama has long been billed as one that will 
take climate change seriously. For that reason, and – even more 
– on grounds of energy security, Obama will pay special attention 
to fossil fuels and, in the first place, Middle Eastern oil.
 Obama’s will be the energy presidency as much as the one 
that has to mend the US economy. Obama has already promised 
that energy efficiency and conservation around fossil fuels will be 
a major feature of his programme for US economic revival. For 
him, energy efficiency is ‘the cheapest, cleanest, fastest energy 
source’. 202 His appeal on energy will be a personal one, in the 
sense that it will ultimately be more about Americans’ everyday 
conduct than it will be about technological innovation. Obama 
























America and Americans cutting back on energy use.
 The starting-point for Obama’s strategy in energy isn’t 
energy innovation, but a federal system for capping and trading 
CO2 emissions in the US. 
203 More broadly, his efforts will be 
spent on
1. ‘Inclusive’ international diplomacy aimed at regaining 
 international prestige for the US on climate matters
2.  Driving a hard bargain on carbon-based fuels made in, 
 used by, or generally sought by, Brazil, Russia, India and  
 China and their NOCs
3.  Humanitarian interventions as a perceived means of 
 shoring up US energy security in the Middle East, Central 
 Asia and elsewhere
4.  A domestic programme that will devote ‘substantial   
 resources’ to repairing US roads and bridges, but will also 
 call for ‘significantly more attention to investments that 
 will make it easier for us to walk, bicycle and access other 
 transport alternatives’. 204
Obama’s election platform on energy, New Energy for America, 
covered the emissions levels he would like to see. The platform 
referred to carbon, rather than CO2, as the thing needing to be 
reduced. It was only a slip, and one that is made quite commonly, 
too; but, in an election platform for the US presidency, one might 
expect more precision. 
 Reflecting today’s zeitgeist, Obama has some fundamental 
disagreements with carbon-based fuels, for all their merits.
 He has admitted that the prospect of ‘no coal’ is an 
illusion, and has said that CCS is right in principle. But he has 
added, rather notoriously, that with a cap and trade system on 
US GHGs, the rigours of the market mean that ‘if somebody 
wants to build a coal-powered plant they can; it’s just that it will 
bankrupt them, because they’re going to be charged a huge sum 
for all that greenhouse gas that’s being emitted’. 205









in Ohio before the 2008 election, he charged that China’s coal 
burning had brought pollution and even some deaths to The US. 
He said that ‘we’ – Americans – should figure out how to clean 
‘their’ coal up. For good measure, he added: ‘No coal plants here 
in America’. 206
 Many commentators have remarked upon Obama’s 
protectionist tendencies. These certainly apply to gas and oil: 
in those sectors, he wants to promote the supply of domestic 
energy, rather than the foreign sort. Obama takes a particularly 
belligerent line on oil. He has said:
 
‘We cannot sustain a future powered by a fuel that is 
rapidly disappearing. Not when we purchase $700 million 
worth of oil every single day from some the world’s most 
unstable and hostile nations – Middle Eastern regimes 
that will control nearly all of the world’s oil by 2030. Not 
when the rapid growth of countries like China and India 
means that we’re consuming more of this dwindling 
resource faster than we ever imagined. We know that we 
can’t sustain this kind of future.’ 207
Few know whether, when, by what means and by how much 
Obama will really be able to reduce US ‘dependency’ on oil from 
the Middle East. But we do know that he is so fearful about 
energy security that he wonders out loud about America being 
‘held hostage to the whims of tyrants and dictators who control 
the world’s oil wells’. And we do know that, in the simplistic 
manner of peak oilers, Obama believes the world’s oil to be 
‘rapidly disappearing’. 208
 It’s over oil that Obama has most comprehensively adopted 
the environmentalist credo.
 In his election platform, Obama said that a small portion 
of the receipts generated by auctioning allowances to emit would 
be used to ‘support the development of clean energy, invest 
in energy efficiency improvements, and help develop the next 
























that this list of causes included efficiency measures, renewables 
and carbon-based fuels, exactly how small was Obama’s portion 
of cash?
 The answer was $15bn a year; not much, compared 
to George Bush’s $700bn bailout for US banks. Some of the 
money would go, Obama’s platform said, on helping put one 
million plug-in hybrid vehicles on America’s roads by 2015. 
But converting the White House’s fleet of cars to plug-in – 
to ‘show government leadership’ – would take priority over the 
mass market. 210
 To assist the retooling of US car plants so that they can 
build new, fuel-efficient cars, Obama’s platform promised them 
just $4 billion of tax credits. No doubt, since his election and 
the crisis in Detroit, Obama will now be more expansive. Still, 
his platform already made clear that, as with oil, the dynamic of 
his policy was broadly toward a more autarchic America. The 
old $4 billion, after all, was meant to ensure that the new fuel-
efficient cars could be ‘built in the US by American workers rather 
than overseas’. 211
 Obama may or may not understand the difference 
between CO2 and carbon. But whatever he thinks, carbon will 
remain central to the world’s energy system – and especially its 































the potential of wind, 
solar, water and 
geothermal power. Even 
more than nuclear or 
fossil fuels, flows of 
energy around and inside 
the planet need working 
on at scale. Do that, and 
enormous quantities of 




























Worldwide, more wind turbines
were installed in 2007 than existed at all in the year 2000. The 
94 GW of wind power in operation in 2007 provided about 1.3 
per cent of the world’s electricity – a perceptible and growing 
part of global energy production. 1
 By contrast with wind power, however, the shares of 
global energy production held by the other three main kinds 
of renewable energy – solar, water and geothermal – are truly 
insignificant. 
 Set against the results so far achieved, the current interest 
in renewables might be considered misplaced. Measured by 
future potential, however, things stand differently. As the 
insightful Vaclav Smil, distinguished professor at Manitoba 
University, points out, even a fraction of the two per cent of solar 
energy that drives the world’s winds would be enough to power 
human civilisation. 2 Hurricanes unleash more energy than the 
bombing of Hiroshima. Each year, the sun floods the Earth with 
more than 50,000 times the energy that was generated by the 
world’s electricity power stations in 2000.
 The gigantic potential of wind and solar doesn’t mean that 
putting them to work is easy. But it does show that humanity’s 
problem isn’t one of limited natural resources. The energy is out 
there. Renewable energy is limited only by humanity’s political 
will and engineering talent to capture it.
 It’s time ‘renewables’ grew up. In this chapter, we’ll 
sometimes use a better word for them: astronomicals.
Environmentalists often group renewables together by what they 
are not: not nuclear and not fossil fuels. But this is a limp logic 
with which to greet a clutch of terrific possibilities. 
 The word ‘renewable’ is also limp. Nobody is trying to 
renew the sun, like mankind will renew supplies of carbon-based 
fuels through the New Carbon Infrastructure. 
 










 So what benefits, exactly, do renewables offer?
 Wind, solar, water and geothermal sources of energy have 
one thing in common: they’re about capturing continuous flows 
of energy over the Earth as an astronomical entity, not mining it 
as a stock of geological fuels. Flows of energy from the sun drive 
the Earth’s winds, which also supply waves with power. The sun 
is the force behind the water flowing to hydroelectric dams, while 
the moon’s actions on the Earth’s seas give the tides power that 
can be captured. As the heat of the Earth’s deep radioactive 
rocks and molten mantle escapes into the cold of outer space, it 
can be drawn upon to provide geothermal power.
 The physics of wind, sunlight and water also produce no 
waste – giving them a slight advantage over nuclear power, where 
waste is tricky but can be handled, and a big plus over fossil 
fuels, which necessarily produce CO2. And geothermal power? 
Chemically, the hot water it produces does contain dissolved 
minerals, so it needs a bit of waste management. 
 The most important benefit of all four techniques, however, 
is that each can generate enormous supplies of energy. The 
energy available from the Earth as a member of the solar system 
is truly astronomical. 
 Collecting that energy, however, can be difficult. Apart from 
its stupendous size, what characterises the energy contained in 
the wind, sunlight and water is its diffuseness – the fact that it is 
spread so thinly compared with the needs of mankind. It’s useful, 
first, to compare the amount of energy generated by different 
techniques over a square metre: the energy available from coal 
fields, oil fields and power stations is far more concentrated 
than that available from renewable sources. Then it’s useful 
to compare the different energies generated per square metre 
with the energy demands, per square metre, made by different 




















Energy and surface area: selected sources, Watts 
generated per square metre 3
W/m2
Coal fields, oil fields, power stations 1000-10,000
Solar in, say, the Sahara desert 250 or more
Solar, global average 168
Tides, upper parts of rivers 10-50
Wind 5-20
Lower parts of rivers just above 1
Biomass, geothermal below 1
Energy and surface area: selected final uses, Watts 
consumed per square metre 4
W/m2
High rise buildings up to 3000
Steel mills, refineries 300-900
Supermarkets, office buildings 200-400
Homes, modest manufacturing/service facilities 20-100
The sun can muster quite a lot of energy per square metre, but 
even in tropical zones it lacks the concentrated clout of fossil 
fuels. With what Smil calls ‘indirectly harnessed solar flows’, the 
energy available for a given surface area is weaker still.
 That’s an important result. Because humanity needs a lot 
more cheap energy, what’s available from wind, sun and water 
must be collected over a wide area and linked to major grids 
if it is to be put together into a decent sized supply – let alone 
transmitted somewhere else. 
 It’s true that geothermal energy contrasts with the energy 
in the wind, sun and water. Geothermal sources of heat, like 
deposits of uranium or of the fossil fuels, are rather concentrated: 
they can be drawn on in locations as tight as 100m2. In all four 
cases, however, the amount of energy that can potentially be put 









 We saw in Chapters 1 and 2 that changing personal habits 
in the home, even across every household in society, provide few 
savings in energy and in CO2 emissions. We saw in Chapter 5 
that the energy density of carbon-based fuels will continue to 
make them a very big part of the future of transport. The same 
harsh facts apply to attempts to engage in the microgeneration 
of energy in the home through wind or solar power. Leaving aside 
all those people who live in blocks of flats with small roof areas 
per head of population, capturing astronomical flows of energy 
at a personal level is a fool’s errand. 
 Technologically, too, wind turbines have already gone way 
beyond the individualist gesture to neighbours and the planet, as 
this table shows: 
Progress in grid-connected  
wind turbines, 1992-2008, kW
Date Specification
1992 50-200 peak capacity;  
300-750 was best economically 5
Late 1990s 1000 was the peak on the  
market; most models rated at 500-750 6
2003 General Electric: 3600  
offshore. Diameter 110m 7
Early 2008 Germany’s Enercon: rated at 6000,  
may reach 7000 or more. Diameter 126m 8
In IT and elsewhere, miniaturisation can be a wonderful thing. 
But with renewables, things are very different. The miniature 
approach, for example, of British Conservative Party leader David 
Cameron and his wind turbine would be laughable if it wasn’t so 
sad (see panel). 
 Renewables are astronomical flows of energy. They make 
grand amounts of power available, but very often over expanses 
of the Earth that, though not of astronomical size, are grand 
grand in scale as well 




















A wind turbine for every home? Forget it
With wind power, bigger is better. In 2007 Conservative party 
leader David Cameron installed a D400 Stealthgen wind 
turbine as part of a £150,000 green makeover of his house in 
Kensington, West London. The £3,000 turbine was estimated to 
save him £72 a year on electricity. 9
 Used afloat, the application for which it was designed, the 
D400 has been highly rated by Practical Boat Owner magazine.10 
But with boats at sea, wind turbines have two competitive 
Setting a dishonest example: Tory chief 
David Cameron goes Green, April 2006. The 









advantages. First, there are no electricity grids on water; second, 
there’s often a good supply of wind.
 Over London, by contrast, wind speeds only reach about 
20 kilometres per hour. 11 However, the D400 is rated for optimal 
output of 400 Watts in a wind of just less than 60 kph. So 
because wind power rises with the cube of wind speed, the 
D400 will produce a measly 40 Watts in London – barely enough 
to power a light bulb. 12
 In 2006, a Green photo opportunity of Cameron on a 
bicycle unravelled when it emerged that a chauffeur-driven 
car had followed him so as to carry his papers. A Conservative 
spokesman explained that ‘if he could carry all of the boxes of 
documents for work on his bike, then he would’. 13 
 Cameron’s home windmill turned out to have just as little 
to do with the practicalities of reducing CO2 as his bike trip. The 
machine was removed after less than a week because planning 
permission had specified that it should have been attached 
to his chimney rather than to the adjacent wall – where it was 
actually installed. 14
 Within cities, where the majority of the world’s population 
now lives, wind energy on a domestic scale can only be described 
as a folly.
The geometry of renewables 
Coal, oil and gas tend to be concentrated in particular fields, and 
the energy in them is distributed widely. Apart from geothermal, 
renewables, as we’ve seen, are different. Before they can 
distribute energy, they first have to take it in over large expanses 
of land or water. 
 In some cases, it’s true, natural geography can be used to 
concentrate renewable energy. Wind farms in special locations 
can whip up a fair bit of electricity. However, solar water heating, 
concentrated solar power and photovoltaic panels can only take 
advantage of latitude. 



















it is for wind. With dams, energy originates from the evaporation 
of water by sunlight. That evaporation lifts water high into the 
sky, where it falls as rain, joins rivers flowing down toward the 
oceans, and so gives up energy. A dam works by intercepting 
the flow. It makes use of the way sunlight lifts water above sea 
level. By channelling a flow through turbines, a dam sets to work 
the energy given up by water as it falls back to Earth. And by 
strategically placing dams across suitable valleys, water can be 
collected from an entire river basin. The water that falls as rain 
right across the basin will, in turn, have been evaporated over an 
even wider area. In this way a dam concentrates at a single point 
solar energy that originally fell on open water or forests.
 Tidal and wave power also take advantage of natural 
geography. Inlets and estuaries can give the tides and the waves 
a special force.
 Hot springs, geysers, and volcanoes are traditional, 
concentrated sites for geothermal energy. In enhanced or 
engineered geothermal, by contrast, a special hole is drilled and 
rocks are cracked using hydraulic pressure. Cracking allows water 
to flow through several cubic kilometres of rock, picking up heat. 
  Then, a second well is drilled, allowing water pumped 
underground to return heated to the surface; so in this 
more artificial form, geothermal energy is also somewhat 
concentrated.
Prospects in brief
While wind will shortly become a significant part of the world’s 
energy supply, solar technology is not as mature as wind turbines. 
Only in a decade’s time will it start to provide a significant part 
of energy supply.
 Among renewables, hydroelectric power has developed 
the furthest. In the form of dams, then, it’s the Green source 
of energy most disliked by Greens. Hydroelectric still has 
considerable scope for expansion; but Greens turn the usual 
practical difficulties around big hydro into the escapist chimeras 









Because the moon moves the sea from high to low tide and back 
again, that motion can be used to turn turbines. As for waves 
at sea, which are mostly driven by wind, a variety of mechanical 
devices has been constructed to use their motion as power to 
turn an electrical generator. Even more than tidal power, though, 
wave power is still at an experimental stage.  
What environmentalists see in renewables
Environmentalists don’t really see wind, solar, water 
and geothermal as massive sources of energy. Their 
‘renewables’, rather, are meant to renew the world morally 
– by leading it away from industrialism and modernity.
 In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, led by former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, internationalised debate on sustainable 
development. The Commission wrote that most renewable 
energy systems 
‘… operate best at small to medium scales, ideally suited 
for rural and suburban applications. They are also generally 
labour-intensive, which should be an added benefit where 
there is surplus labour. They are less susceptible than fossil 
fuels to wild price fluctuations and foreign exchange costs. 
Most countries have some renewable resources, and their 
use can help nations move towards self-reliance.’ 15
In fact these characteristics are not inherent in astronomical 
sources of energy, but represent Green value judgements about 
what is ethically correct. Facilities for harnessing astronomically 
sized amounts of energy don’t necessarily work best when 
decentralised, and they’re no more inherently labour-intensive 
than other sources of energy. Just like cars, windmills can be 
built manually, or by robot. In use, too, renewables facilities 
should demand as little attention as possible.
 Environmentalism prefers renewables to be labour-



















automation use up more natural resources. Because renewables 
are an emerging technology, they provide environmentalism 
with a blank canvas upon which to project its fantasies. But 
for us, progress is measured by the saving of human labour, by 
convenience; and as it happens, astronomical flows of energy 
can be less labour intensive than other energy technologies – 
provided they are organised at scale. 
 The World Commission was right about the price of 
renewable energy fluctuating less than that of fossil fuels. This 
is because most of the investment renewables require is made 
upfront. But this outlay is itself subject to price fluctuations. In 
2008 Shell passed off its withdrawal from the 1 GW London Array 
wind farm by blaming rising materials prices. 16 Just between 
2005 and 2008, those prices may have risen 48 per cent for 
offshore turbines, and 74 per cent for onshore ones. 17 
 The World Commission’s final plaudit for renewables – that 
they move nations toward self-reliance – has emerged as one of 
the most significant. 
While grids are seen as dangerous, renewables are 
backed as good for energy security
Many environmentalists want households to do enough 
microgeneration of renewable energy to go off grid. They believe 
that such a tactic represents a challenge to the status quo. In 
fact, it’s not just them who entertain foolish hopes of energy 
independence; the government, the military and businesses all 
do the same.
 Chapter 5 discussed how governments now mistrust 
long supply chains for gas and oil, believing them a threat to 
geopolitical equilibrium. The same localist apprehensions about 
energy security do much to explain both official nervousness 
about grids, and official enthusiasm for renewables.
 In Chapter 1 we met Amory Lovins. Back in 1976, Lovins 
put down a marker against grids – they were, he said, ‘a likely 









‘The scale and complexity of centralised grids not only 
make them politically inaccessible to the poor and weak, 
but also increase the likelihood and size of malfunctions, 
mistakes and deliberate disruptions. A small fault or a few 
discontented people become able to turn off a country. 
Even a single rifleman can probably black out a typical city 
instantaneously.’ 18 
In 1982 Lovins followed up with a book, Brittle Power: Energy 
Strategy for National Security, in which he pioneered the idea 
of the vulnerability of the US energy system – grids very much 
included. 19 
 After 9/11, Lovins republished the book, and many others 
came to see grids both as targets for terrorists, and as a means 
of spreading disaster. Meanwhile, the RAND Corporation warned 
about Networks and Netwars. 20 Then, reflecting on the North 
American blackout of 2003, one physicist explained: 
‘The power grid could be a metaphor for our modern 
scientific world…[it] has become so complex that no one 
fully understands it…. Complexity leaves us vulnerable to 
natural disasters and simple human blunders, as well as 
low-tech terrorist attacks.’ 21
Not content with feeling prone to victimhood through the foreign 
manipulation of gas and oil, establishment experts join with 
environmentalists in fearing that wide-area grids within a nation 
such as the US merely increase risks.
 In 2005, when thinking about terrorism, the 
European Commission proposed the need for EU-wide 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) protection, identifying energy and 
transport as key areas. The Commission noted that damage 
to infrastructure in one country could have consequences 
elsewhere, claiming that such an untoward turn of events 



















the Internet) and market liberalisation (eg in electricity 
and gas supply) mean that much infrastructure is part of 
a larger network. In such a situation protection measures 
are only as strong as their weakest link.’ 22
In the US, too, military experts like to magnify the ‘knock-on’ 
problems around infrastructure, using this argument as a device 
to talk up renewables. At the Naval Postgraduate School in 
California, Ted G Lewis enthuses over wind and solar power at 
the level of every home and office, and indicts grids. He argues 
by analogy:
‘Just as the personal computer has reduced dependence 
on large, centralised mainframe computers, distributed 
generation may be able to decrease and perhaps even 
eliminate dependence on the unreliable and vulnerable 
middle of the grid.’ 23 
The convergence, around energy security, between 
environmentalism and the US defence establishment was 
apparent even before Obama’s election consecrated the 
marriage. Robert James Woolsey Jr is one example. Director of 
Jimmy Carter’s Central Intelligence Agency between 1993 and 
1995, Woolsey became an enthusiast for any source of energy 
other than oil, favouring ethanol as alternative as early as 1999. 
Today he has photovoltaic panels on the roof of his home and 
drives a Prius with a bumper sticker saying ‘Bin Laden Hates 
This Car’. 24 
 In fact, localist dreams aren’t yet likely to trump the need 
to maintain national and international supplies of energy. As 
Woolsey concedes elsewhere, his policy is not national energy 
independence for the US, ‘because,’ as he puts it, ‘there’s 
nothing wrong with our importing natural gas from Canada’. 25 
In the same way, nobody at all rational argues that it’s time to 
abandon grids. 









and now in his 80s, Pickens nevertheless launched a nationwide 
advertising blitz on 8 July 2008, attacking America’s addiction 
to overseas oil as a danger to national security. Pickens wants 
22 per cent of America’s electricity to be generated by wind, and 
the gas it displaces put to work in cars. He’s completely against 
America continuing to entangle itself in international grids of oil 
pipelines and tankers.
 It’s all very patriotic. But Pickens is himself building the 
world’s largest wind farm in the Texas Panhandle; so though he’s 
against international grids, he’s all in favour of the US electricity 
grid. Thus, to ensure profits on his venture, he wants it expanded 
and modernised. 26 And he’s already had a result. Within two 
weeks of his advertising campaign, the Texas Public Utilities 
Commission decided to put $5bn into transmission linking wind 
farms in West Texas and the Texas Panhandle to the electric grid, 
and then to Austin, Dallas and Houston. 27
 No man is an island. The desire for insularity in personal 
energy supply is as silly as that for autarchy in the national sort. 
Talking up the local is a very backward argument for tapping 
flows of energy that are of astronomical proportions. It will not 
encourage the scale of investment that renewables demand. 
Renewables as freedom: a bogus idea
Hermann Scheer is a Social Democrat member of Germany’s 
Bundestag. He argues that renewables can provide people with 
‘autonomy,’ and freedom from subordination to outside forces:
‘The goal must be to make energy available in a way 
that is self-determined… energy must be free and 
independent of external constraints, free of opportunities 
for blackmail and outside intervention, used according to 
decision making criteria of one’s own. In the long run, all 
these dimensions of energy autonomy are possible only if 
renewable energy is used.
 ‘The counter-plan to energy autonomy would be to 



















system in order to contain it and keep it under control. 
 ‘Renewable energy facilitates an independent 
way of life that corresponds bet to human needs for 
individual and social self-determination and, thereby, to 
the “programme” of liberal democratic societies.’ 28
Here choice of technique in energy supply is made into a moral 
matter. 
 Scheer argues that what he calls a ‘specialised energy 
business’ – commercial energy delivered from somewhere else  – 
is required least of all for heating and cooling buildings, and need 
only be mounted on a regional scale so as to provide electricity 
on top of that made through ‘self-production’. 29 But in fact the 
reality of energy production and use is very different from what 
he says.
 Taking advantage of  the world’s division of labour to deliver 
energy from somewhere beyond the home, village or town opens 
up more freedom for self-development, not less. Spending days 
collecting firewood might eliminate ‘opportunities for blackmail’ 
by energy firms, OPEC and Russia; but it would also eliminate the 
opportunity to spend time doing something more worthwhile.
 Anyway, self-determination and dependence on others 
can be mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive. People are 
often at their strongest when they are linked to others.
 
 
Wind: a long gestation, followed by impetuous growth 
Wind power has been used for centuries: first for sailing, then for 
grinding corn in windmills. To help form the Netherlands, wind 
power was set to pumping water. In the 20th century, wind has 
been used to power electrical turbines.
 In 1923, the left-wing British biologist John Haldane 
could already see the potential of wind power. For Haldane, it 
was axiomatic that the exhaustion of the world’s coal and oil 
fields was ‘a matter of centuries only’. But Haldane took issue 










‘Four hundred years hence the power question in England 
may be solved somewhat as follows: The country will be 
covered with rows of metallic windmills working electric 
motors which in their turn supply current at a very high 
voltage to great electric mains. At suitable distances, 
there will be great power stations where during windy 
weather the surplus power will be used for the electrolytic 
decomposition of water into oxygen and hydrogen. These 
gasses will be liquefied, and stored in vast vacuum 
jacketed reservoirs, probably sunk in the ground. ... In 
times of calm, the gasses will be recombined in explosion 
motors working dynamos which produce electrical energy 
once more, or more probably in oxidation cells.’ 30
Haldane was an all-too-rare visionary. He saw that, particularly 
on an island like Britain, wind turbines could play an enormous 
energy-generating role.
 In the first half of the 20th century, windmills were still 
commonly used in rural areas; but as grid connections spread, 
they fell out of use. After the Second World War, cheap oil and 
then hopes in nuclear power pushed wind off the agenda. With 
the oil embargo of 1973, there was renewed interest; but soon 
wind was forgotten in the West’s ‘dash for gas’. 
 For 20 years development took place, but application was 
weak. Different materials for blades were tried. Steel proved too 
heavy, aluminium suffered from metal fatigue, and eventually 
carbon fibre turned out best. Different designs were also tested, 
such as turbines with vertical axes and, instead of the familiar 
three-bladed horizontal sort, turbines with one, two, four and 
many blades. But throughout the 1970s and 1980s, reasonable 
contributions by wind to power supply were confined to places 
such as Denmark and California.
 The UK’s first commercial wind farm opened in 1991 at 



















decade, however, worldwide wind power has expanded 10 times. 
Even 10 years ago, wind was little more than a curiosity in the 
global energy mix. But today it has become a dynamic, high-tech 
industry. That’s no mean achievement – and it backs up the 
optimism we have about astronomicals.
 In February 2007, the Braes O’Doune wind farm opened 
in Scotland, taking Britain’s capacity above 2 GW. Putting in the 
first Gigawatt of wind energy capacity took the UK 14 years: 
putting in the second, just 20 months. 32 
 If wind is to make a significant difference in future, the 
Gigawatts will have to come faster still. Right now in the UK, 
they’re being added quite slowly – at the rate of about 1 GW 
every 27 months. 33 Worldwide, however, the accelerated pace 
of change with wind today is clearer.
World wind energy capacity, GW 34












Next to Denmark, Germany has been the historic leader in 
wind power since the 1970s. In 2007, it had more than 22 
GW, and the US had 15.5 GW. However, the US, Spain and 
China respectively added 5.2, 3.5 and 3.3 GW in 2007, while 









September 2008 it was reported that the US, taking advantage 
of the fact that it has much higher wind speeds than Germany, 
had for the first time surpassed Germany in the amount of wind 
energy it generated. Total installed capacity would also rise by 
7.5 GW to more than 24 GW by the end of that year. 36 
Spinning more strongly – with more snags fixed
Turbines are now bigger and punchier; but the future will see 
even larger ones. In April 2008 the UK Crown Estate, which owns 
almost all the UK territorial seabed out to 22km, announced that 
it would buy the world’s largest offshore turbine, a 7.5 MW, 163m 
high prototype from Clipper Windpower, California. 37 The turbine 
is being developed in Blyth, Northumberland, where Clipper will 
centre its European operations – supported by a grant of £5m 
from the One Northeast regional development agency. 38
 Installing turbines offshore certainly demands 
sophisticated engineering. But at present, the limit to bigger 
turbines comes from the need to transport blades to the site 
of installation – something that’s much more easily done at sea 
than it is over land. In deliberating where to build new facilities 
for testing blades, the US Department of Energy’s National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory noted the importance of access 
to waterways in its decision to build at Boston harbour in 2009 
– as well as at Ingleside, Texas, which enjoys access to shipping 
routes through the Gulf of Mexico. 39
 The world’s installed base of wind turbines is big enough 
for lessons to be learned from it. Detective work has tracked 
down the origin of mysterious lapses in performance of turbines 
after heavy winds: the fouling of blades by insects. 40 Improved 
blade design and materials have since been put to work on the 
problem.
 Accumulation of ice also disrupts aerodynamics, as do 
collisions with particles carried in the wind. Here too, solutions 
such as heating blades and new blade coatings are being 
pursued – but much remains to be done. 41



















for progress in gearboxes and generators, and in controlling the 
yaw and pitch of the blades so as to keep them facing the wind 
and running at the right speed. Still, the power electronics that 
can cope with fluctuating demand and cleanly integrate wind 
into the grid has also been developed. With the first wind farms, 
the easiest solution was to build a switch that would cut off the 
grid connection at any sign of trouble. As wind has built up on a 
larger scale, the need to keep wind online has emerged. Fulfilling 
that need means building electronics that can smooth out peaks 
and troughs in energy – whether these originate in the turbines 
or in the grid. 42 
Scale, grids and factories are vital to wind turbines
With wind engineers gaining more and more experience, 
operations and maintenance costs are falling, and technologies 
are moving forward. The real question is whether, after the Crash 
of 2008, wind can continue to grow at a rapid pace. Consider 
the statistics on wind power capacity provided by the World Wind 
Energy Association: 
Forecasts of world wind energy capacity, GW 43




2005 54 70 120
2006 74 90 160
2007 94 109 170
So far, paper forecasts for future expansion have risen year on 
year. But it’s a moot point whether wind turbines can keep up 
with these forecasts in the real world. What principles should 
energised, clear-eyed enthusiasts for wind seek to have 
followed?
 The total sum T Boone Pickens will invest in wind power 
will be $10bn. Over 81,000 hectares, his 2,700 turbines will 









green,’ Pickens told the London Guardian: ‘My business is making 
money, and I think this is going to make a lot of money’. 44 
 In 2007 Texas overtook California as the leading US 
producer of wind energy. Planting windmills in its open spaces has 
created a flow of royalties to ranch owners, and has pushed up 
the price of land. 45 But California is not to be outdone: in March 
2008, Southern Edison California announced the construction 
and upgrading of more than 400km of high voltage transmission 
lines. This will connect up Los Angeles and the California power 
transmission grid to 4.5 GW of wind power generated in the 
Tehachapi mountain area. 46
 Whether or not he eventually turns a profit, Pickens 
confirms in practice the significance of scale. He is right to make 
his initiative on wind a truly massive one – equivalent to a square 
28km x 28km, with 100 turbines in a line for each kilometre 
travelled along on a side of that square. That kind of investment 
is necessary if the major amounts of electricity that society 
needs are to be made available without too much expense.
 Second, both Pickens and Southern Edison are right to 
highlight the importance of grids. Without grids, wind-based 
electricity has no chance of getting to the skyscrapers and 
industries that will need it. Indeed, Britain alone may need to 
invest about £10bn in pylons and cables by 2020. 47 One of the 
major reasons: the government says it wants 14 GW of onshore 
wind and 14 GW of offshore by that time. 48 
 By the M74 motorway near Abington, south Lanarkshire, 
Scotland, Scottish and Southern Electricity will be adding to the 
transmission tasks of Britain’s Grid. It will be building Europe’s 
largest onshore wind facility – a £600m, 152-turbine farm 
generating 456 MW. Meanwhile, offshore wind farms will need 
entirely new grid connections.
 There is, however, a third thing that wind needs, if it’s to 
keep up its impetuous rate of growth. Wind needs advanced 
factories capable of manufacturing large numbers of turbines, 
complete with different transformers for different national grids. 



















Ditlev Engel, CEO of Denmark’s Vestas, the world’s biggest player, 
says of his company and of each turbine it makes: ‘we are no 
stronger than the last delivered component out of the 8,000 
components’. 49
 Some of the operational failures of large turbines have 
been put down not to design, but to human error in the lay-up 
and checking of composite blades. More automation should fix 
that. 50 The production of wind turbines, like the production of 
wind energy, is a matter of scale and technological advance. And 
just as wind energy depends on grids, so wind turbine production 
depends on long, coordinated supply chains. 
Suzlon: India’s wind energy giant
Wind turbines have become a matter of heavy engineering. 
As a result, Indian and Chinese manufacturers have become 
important to the future of wind power. 
 Suzlon Energy is an Indian company which not only 
manufactures wind turbines, but also buys the land for them, 
installs them and operates them. In 2007, it had a 10.5 per cent 
share of the world market for wind power.
The world’s top wind turbine manufacturers, 2007 51
Company World market 
share, per cent




Vesta 22.8 1978 Denmark
GE Wind 16.6 2002 US
Gamesa 15.4 1993 Spain
Enercon 14.0 1984 Germany
Suzlon 10.5 1995 India
Back in 1995, Tulsi Tanti, a textiles manufacturer based in 
Gujarat, western India, founded the firm in 1995 because of 
his dissatisfaction with his country’s power shortages. Tanti 
entered the wind business just to supply to his own operations; 









renewables, wind power had secured him a $10 billion fortune 
and the number 10 spot on the Forbes list of richest Indians. 52
 Suzlon gained its first contracts within India, but soon 
began to make a global impact. In 2001 it formed its first overseas 
subsidiary in the Netherlands. In 2002 the firm obtained its first 
order from the US, and in 2003 opened an office in China. In 
2006 Suzlon took over Hansen Transmissions, Belgium – the 
world’s second largest manufacturer of turbine gearboxes. The 
following year the firm outbid France’s Areva to buy Germany’s 
REpower. 53 By 2008 Suzlon was operating in 20 countries. 54
 Manufacturing in the East and acquiring established firms 
in the West are two strategies that have allowed Suzlon to apply 
new technologies and consolidate market share. The company 
has also brought the manufacture of blades and nose cones to 




The rapid growth of wind power has led to controversy. Those 
who instinctively mistrust the Green agenda feel uncomfortable 
with the spread of giant wind turbines across the countryside. 
The turbines appear a physical manifestation of Green politics, 
towering overhead. It’s a testament to the power of the 
environmentalist agenda that even its opponents feel that their 
arguments against the wind turbine must be couched in terms 
of it wrecking the landscape and killing birds.
 The beauty, or otherwise, of wind turbines, and of the 
new pylons that will connect them up, is a subjective question. 
Greens find them graceful and elegant; others object that they’re 
ugly. This is a ridiculously narrow way to evaluate a new energy 
technology. 
 As for birds, if wind really is the solution to human energy 
needs, should they really have a veto? The more powerful 
turbines are, the more slowly their blades turn, and so the 
more modest is their threat to birds. Wind only acquired its 



















badly positioned Californian machines back in the 1980s and 
1990s. The latest evidence, collected around two wind farms in 
the fens of East Anglia, is that farmland birds are not affected 
by wind installations – even if birds in upland and coastal 
locations are. 56
 In fact, objections to wind go deeper than aesthetics 
and ornithology. In April 2008 Scotland’s government rejected 
plans for what would have been Europe’s largest wind farm on 
the Isle of Lewis, the largest island in the Outer Hebrides. The 
formal reason given was that the land was protected under 
the European Community Birds Directive, and that birds could 
suffer. 57 However, Jonny Hughes, head of policy at the Scottish 
Wildlife Trust, had something to add:
‘We welcome renewable energy, but the moor will be lost 
forever. We have looked after it, grazed it, dug it, walked 
it and known it for centuries. We are tied to the land. We 
are inseparable from the moor.’ 58
In feudal times, what Hughes calls being ‘tied to the land’ wasn’t 
a choice. Today, crofters in the Outer Hebrides are not compelled 
to submit to a Lord; they volunteer to submit to nature. Since 
they actually live on the Isle of Lewis, perhaps it’s right that they 
should decide what’s done there. But they’re hardly peasants 
being thrown off the land by the Terrible Tartan Turbines. After 
all, they’ve turned crofting into a lifestyle, and persist in speaking 
Gaelic. 
 Their rejection of wind is a microcosm of wider attitudes 
that exist all over Britain.
 Ultimately the reason that Greens are hostile to big wind 
is that it holds the promise of progress, right now. When wind 
power is made available as a reality, environmentalist enthusiasm 
tends to fade, and all sorts of reasons are offered for why wind 
turbines – and indeed astronomical sources of energy generally – 
are a bad idea. That’s the reason Hughes fell back on the excuse 









 Hughes added that a ‘staggering’ 800,000 hectares of 
Europe’s land was converted to artificial surfaces between 1990 
and 2000. 59 But Europe is a big place: it covers more than a 
billion hectares. Even if Hughes’ figure were taken at face value, 
growth of ‘artificial surfaces’ would take up, over the next century, 
less than 1.3 per cent of Europe’s land.
 Of course there is even more space available offshore. It’s 
more expensive to build and maintain turbines out at sea than 
on land, and also more expensive to transmit electricity from 
sea to grid. Yet the sea doesn’t just offer more space, but also 
stronger and steadier winds than those on land.
 It’s likely that wind turbines will eventually move so far 
offshore that, instead of being mounted on the sea bed, they 
will float, anchored to the seabed by tethers in a similar fashion 
to oil and gas platforms. Today’s offshore turbines typically stand 
in water 20 metres deep or less. The development of floating 
systems will open up the continental shelf for turbines, out to 
distances of hundreds of kilometres. 60
 The idea of floating turbines was first suggested in the 
1970s, but is only now receiving renewed attention. Paul D 
Sclavounos, Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Naval 
Architecture at MIT, has worked with colleagues to design 
hurricane-proof floating steel and concrete blocks that can be 
anchored as deep as 200 metres of water. 61
 The fact that turbines are big is bound to bring practical 
problems. Britain’s Ministry of Defence has objected that offshore 
wind farms interfere with its radar. But this is really nothing more 
than a dispute over who pays for the necessary upgrading of the 
MoD’s system. 62 
 What large infrastructure project does not have a multitude 




















Next generation wind: high altitude kites 
Turbines have developed incrementally, becoming larger 
and moving out to sea to take advantage of stronger, more 
consistent winds. But the next generation of wind energy offers 
a more radical innovation. The really strong, consistent winds are 
available at high altitude, kilometres above sea level, where no 
turbine tower can hope to reach. Here speeds are three or more 
times faster than on land, and power outputs are 30 or more 
times higher. 
 Attached by tether to the ground, kites will one day 
harness that energy.
 The force generated by a kite pulling on a tether can be 
used to turn an electric generator. A variety of systems are under 
development: Makani Power in California, Laddermill at Delft 
Technical University in the Netherlands, and KiteGen, in Milan, 
are already active.
 The most promising configuration in the short term 
appears to be similar to a yo-yo. A 100 MW generator could have 
50 kites attached to the top 5km of a 6.5km cable. The power is 
then generated as the kites heave the last 500m of the cable up. 
The clever part of the design is controlling the kites into a pattern 
that continually loses and then gains altitude, generating power 
with each gain. 63
 
 
Solar: in the right places, a great long-term future
Solar energy doesn’t yet match even the modest scale of wind. 
Yet the activity around it, the basic research already undertaken, 
and the sheer amount of energy available in sunlight suggest 
that solar could one day outdo wind. 
 Today, investment in solar isn’t driven by commercial 
imperatives. Government subsidies and obligations on suppliers 
have created a market, especially in Germany and Japan (see 
panel). The challenge for solar is to break out of subsidies – in 









equator and have clear skies. 
 As it becomes commercial, solar’s applications in Arizona 
and Spain are likely to overtake those in Germany and Japan.
In familiar style, solar already has environment-minded detractors. 
 In May 2008, the US Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) put on hold 130 applications for leases covering 4000 
of the 500,000 square kilometres it manages in the Western 
US – much of them for patches of desert ideal for solar power. 
The BLM proposed a two-year assessment of solar’s impact on 
vegetation and wildlife such as the desert tortoise and Mojave 
squirrel. It also worried about how the relatively tiny amounts 
of land round power stations could be reclaimed after those 
stations reached the end of their working lives. 64
 Just a few weeks later, however, the BLM bowed to 
pressure and lifted its moratorium… while still demanding a 
site-by-site assessment. As Rhone Resch, president of the Solar 
Energy Industries Association, bitterly noted, the BLM had  ‘yet 
to lease a single acre of land to the solar industry’. 65
 It’s likely that, as solar scales up to make a real contribution, 
it will come under further attack.
 
 
Renewables and the proper role of the state 
If it’s ever to be cheap, the scooping up of astronomical flows of 
energy requires both state-supported basic research, and risk-
taking private development. Yet modern capitalism seems to 
prefer to support renewables through the roundabout, ineffectual 
methods of state subsidy and regulation.
In 1995, Japan provided a 50 per cent subsidy for •	
 domestic PV installations on roofs. The subsidy 
 gradually  fell to zero in 2005. The intention was that, by 
 then, Japan’s PV industry would be self-sufficient; and 
 solar installations  did drop from $11,500 per peak kW 
 to $6,000. 66 However, installation numbers fell in 2006, 



















Under what are known as feed-in tariffs, electricity utilities •	
 in Germany have, since 1999, been compelled to pay a 
 fixed price for renewables supplies from anyone who 
 produces them. A similar regime applies in France and 
 Spain
The UK’s Renewables Obligation (RO), made nearly five •	
 years after New Labour’s election manifesto commitment 
 to ‘a new and strong drive to develop renewable sources 
 of energy,’ demands that utilities obtain 9.1 per cent of 
 their electricity from renewables today, and 15.4 per 
 cent by 2015/16. Along with exemption from a government 
 Climate Change Levy, the RO should provide renewables 
 suppliers with ‘up to’ £1bn a year by 2010. 67 That’s less 
 than one thousandth of the UK’s GDP
In the US, the federal Production Tax Credit, instituted •	
 under the 1992 Energy Policy Act, pays an income tax 
 credit of two cents per kilowatt-hour. After the PTC 
 expired in the past, US renewables production faltered in 
 2000, 2002, and 2004 – which is why the putative expiry 
 of the PTC at the end of 2008 saw renewables 
 suppliers mount a desperate defence of it. 68
There are three outstanding features of state intervention in 
renewables: 
1. How much the cash involved means to suppliers
2. How little the cash involved represents relative to the 
 national economy
3. How much the Precautionary Principle has made 
 governments avoid their proper responsibility to plan 
 ahead and finance fundamental science and technology. 
The thoughts of Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the OECD, are 









their energy R&D, ‘because pricing carbon will likely not be 
enough to bring about the R&D spending we need’. Yet to boost 
renewables, he has a whole list of other proposals: investment 
incentives, tax measures, preferential tariffs, quantitative targets 
or obligations, and tradable certificates for meeting such targets. 
And Gurría insists that governments should use these policy 
tools ’carefully’, and avoid picking technology ‘winners’. 69
 Perhaps the government should indeed not pick technology 
winners. But in retrospect, Concorde looks like it was a better 
horse to pick than those financial institutions rescued by the US 
Federal Reserve Bank in 2008. The Fed picked proven financial 
losers, not likely high-tech winners.
 Today Western policy on energy supply is completely 
dominated by the idea that governments should never do very 
much in technology. Even Obama’s enlarged, post-election 
programme of Green investments is more about creating jobs 
and avoiding imports of oil than it is about a careful selection of 
renewables on their own merits. 
 So long as the mantra of the state not picking winners is 
allowed to go unchallenged, it ought to be clear that that’s only 
an irresponsible get-out from putting any kind of government 
money anywhere near renewables research.
 
The minimum size of a solar unit is considerably smaller than that 
of a wind turbine. Solar technologies are much more modular 
than other renewables, so the concept of local generation can 
sometimes make sense. The evidence from Beltsville, Madison in 
the US, however, is that solar installations are set to get bigger. 
 From that town, North America’s largest solar energy 
services provider, SunEdison, has built a fast-growing business 
in the supply, installation, operation, finance and maintenance 
of solar power. The scale on which the firm works is far larger 
than a domestic dwelling. SunEdison will build, own and operate 
a 1.2 MW electricity generating plant near Wilmington, North 



















energy to, Progress Energy, a utility. 70 The company is also 
trying to integrate no few than 3300 utility industry standards 
into its work. 71
 Beyond utilities, SunEdison’s typical installations supply 
several hundred kilowatts to ‘big box’ stores or car parks. However, 
General Motors will put a 1.2 MW Sun installation – 8,700 panels 
over nearly three hectares – on the roof of its transmission 
assembly plant in White Marsh, Baltimore, Maryland. 72 
 GM’s roof-mounted solar panels are just one example of 
a wider trend. Anxious to show off their Green credentials, many 
organisations have tried to rally staff around a programme of 
energy conservation in buildings. The GM example suggests that 
facilities management around large buildings, at least, might do 
better to install renewables-based generators of 1 MW or higher 
(see panel).
Renewables in the workplace
In this book we have concentrated more on energy issues around 
households, consumers and personal transport than on energy 
issues around employers and employees. That’s for a reason: 
facilities managers, employers and the state have tended to 
approach workplace energy in a way that turns it into a matter 
of employee consumption and responsibility. In other words, the 
agenda at work is made into something very akin to the agenda 
in the home. 
 Interest in the workplace generating energy is much 
lower. In commercial and public buildings, the whole discussion 
on energy is about conservation, efficiency, regulation, tracking 
and metering energy use and GHGs, and changing employee 
behaviour in line with all of this. Insofar as workplaces are thought 
about as sites for energy generation, this is done in terms of the 
need for a stand-by supply should the grid for any reason fail.
 In the UK in 2008, as part of the implementation of the 
EU’s Energy Performance of Buildings Directive of 2003, both 









have Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) accompany their 
construction, sale or rent. All public buildings larger than 1000 
square metres were similarly required to have Display Energy 
Certificates, covering their operational use of energy, on public 
view. As the government puts it, ‘Acting on an EPC is important 
to cut energy consumption, save money on bills and help to 
safeguard the environment’. 73
 In the future, space planners and facilities managers will 
use IT-based building management systems to try to coordinate 
the human utilisation of buildings in time and space with the 
energy taken by workstations, meeting rooms and lighting. The 
tendency will be to trace how individuals, teams or departments 
use energy – and it’s already mooted that our old friend, carbon 
footprints (see Chapter 2), may be traded accordingly.   
 In this petty, penny-pinching conception, the highest 
goal is for workstation users to be able to check their personal 
energy profiles on control panels that are nicely designed into 
their furniture.
 It is all very well – but a more constructive alternative 
is already available. Although there is every case for large-
scale renewables projects to be done in special locations by 
specialised companies, workplaces of a certain size and scale 
may also have a role to play in working with and supplementing 
the national grid with renewable energy that they generate on 
site. 
 In an open-handed spirit, Energise! is prepared to 
entertain any workplace-based generation of energy above a 
very modest 1 MW. Actually 10 MW is more sensible, and 100 
MW would represent a real contribution; but we will settle for 
1 MW.
 Here the news could have been good. In Britain in October 
2007, the telecommunications firm BT offered electricity 
generating companies the chance to build 250 MW of wind 
farms on its many industrial sites, and sell the electricity back to 
BT. The aim was, by 2016, to generate electricity worth up to 25 



















 At the time, Ernst and Young, which advised BT, was 
convinced that UK energy companies would be very interested. 
For investment in renewables, an E&Y spokesman enthused, 
‘There is a wall of capital out there’. But since the announcement, 
there has been no news from BT. 74
 Whatever the final fate of this promising project, the sad 
thing about it was brought out by Hanif Lalani, BT’s group finance 
director. BT decided to shoot as high as 250 MW not because 
of the intrinsic merits of harnessing astronomical flows of energy, 
but because it was coming under pressure about – you guessed 
– its carbon footprint. ‘Our customers are very clear’, said Hanif 
Lalani. ‘They want us to develop products and services using 
clean energy’. 75
 So far, renewable energy for workplaces has shown two 
things. First, the preference for conservation and for cutting 
costs is larger than that for innovation in renewables supply. 
Second, around GHGs there are already in place strong elements 
of duress that force organisations such as BT to make strenuous 
adaptations to those ‘customers’ – in the first place, the state 
– who behave with, and demand of others, the due amount of 
Precautionary Principle. 75
 Within certain limits, it can make sense for large 
organisations to learn how to generate their own energy. But 
renewables in the workplace can never substitute for grid-
delivered electricity, nor should they try to. Their contribution 
cannot be about assuring business continuity: even before 
the Crash of 2008, the mere survival of business dominated 
the management mind far too much. Neither should they be 
ineffectual baubles, trying to prove corporate social responsibility, 
strengthen the company brand and all that.
 No, the contribution of renewables in the workplace is 









Passive solar: architecture as passivity 
With ‘passive’ solar energy, humans use the sun’s rays directly, 
without converting them into another form of energy. Passive is 
the least promising solar technology: it’s about energy efficiency 
and conservation more than energy supply. 
 The case of pure passive solar occurs when buildings are 
made with windows that face south. That makes them warm up 
in winter. Usually, however, such buildings are also designed so 
that the natural airflow around them – solar power at one remove 
– provides good ventilation and cooling. These ideas have been 
developed furthest in Darmstadt, Germany, and have led to the 
PassivHaus standard. 
 As architecture, passive solar energy has acquired 
the status of orthodoxy. Uruguayan architect Rafael Vinoly’s 
proposed redevelopment of the Battersea Power Station site in 
south London, which includes a giant chimney to obviate the 
need for air conditioning, is based on passive principles.
 Those principles are fine in themselves. In the hands of 
Green architects, however, they all too often impose unnecessary 
and clumsy design constraints. The shape and orientation of a 
building, the locations of its windows, the thickness of its walls, 
the construction materials in its roof – these should not be 
dictated by the need to save energy.
 The more extreme variants of passive design are anyway 
far from passive in what they demand of a building’s occupants. 
The UK government’s endlessly complex, endlessly updated 
Code for Sustainable Homes, first published in 2006, wants new 
buildings airtight, so that heat cannot escape from them. 76 But 
what if people feel like opening a window? And what about the 
extra expense? 77
 The amounts of energy involved with passive solar are 
small, and hard to bring under control. With passive solar, you 



















Heated water is fine, but Concentrated  
Solar Power is far superior
Above passive solar stands solar water heating. While high 
temperatures are needed to generate electricity, warming water 
and buildings is relatively easy. Even in temperate zones, solar 
water heating, a simple, low-tech solution, has been a success. 
It will continue to be deployed, especially for applications such 
as swimming pools. 
 Greens tend to get over-excited about the spread of solar 
water heating – particularly to China. It’s true that in Rizhao, a 
city of three million in northern China, a third of the population 
uses solar water heating. 78 But Rizhao is poor; with greater 
wealth, the popularity of solar water heating will likely decline 
there.
 Solar water heating will remain a niche affair. But 
concentrated solar power, or CSP, is different. Because it 
generates electricity, CSP has the long-term potential to be a 
universal application, even if only about 500 MW is installed 
worldwide today. 79 
 The main kind of CSP is Solar Thermal Energy Generation 
(STEG), in which heat is used to drive turbines. Steam-powered 
turbines are key to electricity generation, so the obvious way to 
turn sunlight into electricity is to use it to heat water into steam. 
The snag is that even in the tropics, the midday sun doesn’t 
generate much steam. 
 Everyone, however, has seen a convex lens concentrate 
sunlight to set paper alight at Fahrenheit 451º. The large-scale 
concentration of solar energy is a little different from this. It’s 
most practical and cheapest if done with giant concave mirrors. 
Unlike lenses, mirrors need not grow thicker as they get larger. 
Engineering a support underneath a large mirror is easier than 
holding up a giant lens around its edges. 
 With mirrors as with large reflecting telescopes, mountings 
can track the sun as it moves across the sky, all the while 









ways of configuring the mirrors in CSP: 
1. Solar troughs look like pipes cut open lengthways. A long 
straight tube runs along the focus of parabolic mirrors; 
down it runs heat-absorbing oil. By the time the oil hits 
the far end of the tube after exposure to the sun’s rays, it 
can reach temperatures of 400º C
2. Solar dishes have the same geometry as satellite dishes. 
They follow the sun in two dimensions across the sky. A 
generator placed at the focus of a solar dish can make 
use of temperatures of up to 750º C
3. Power towers are large arrays of mirrors focusing energy 
on to a single central point set on a high tower. Europe’s 
first opened in Spain, near Seville, in 2007. There, more 
than 600 mirrors focus on a tower 115m high, generating 
11 MW. 80
As with wind energy, CSP enjoyed a burst of investment in 
California in the early 1980s, followed by a lull. Nevertheless, 
between 1984 and 1990 the Israeli-American company Luz built 
a network of nine parabolic trough power stations north of Los 
Angeles, with a total generating capacity of 354 MW. 81 
 Today there is renewed interest in CSP. Torresol Energy, a 
60:40 joint venture between Spanish engineering group Sener 
and Masdar, Abu Dhabi’s state-backed renewables fund, will 
build two 50 MW parabolic solar trough plants in Seville and 
Cadiz, Spain, as well as a 17 MW power tower near Seville, at 
a cost of ˆ 800m. The aim is to standardise technologies so as 
to globalise CSP. 82 Meanwhile Stirling Energy Systems, Phoenix, 
Arizona, has filed an application to build a 750 MW, 30,000-dish 




















Tower of power: Solar Two, an experimental 
Concentrated Solar Power plant in the Mojave 
desert, California. Backed by Boeing, Bechtel and 
others, Solar Two generated a modest 10 MW of 
electricity during its life from 1996 to 1999. Heat 
storage was performed through the use of molten 









 The main limitation of CSP is that unlike plain photovoltaics 
(PV), it can only bring direct sunlight into focus. While PV will 
work even on an overcast day, clouds are bad news for CSP.
 Even so, that leaves a large fraction of the world where 
CSP has high potential. There are opportunities in Mexico; parts 
of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil; Southern Africa as far north 
as Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania; a swathe across 
all of North Africa, the Middle East, Pakistan, parts of India and 
Western China; and in Australia. As for Southern Europe, some 
hope to see 30 GW of STEG installed there by 2020. 84
Desertec: CSP in the deserts  
of North Africa and the Middle East 
Perhaps the most ambitious plan to develop CSP is Desertec, a 
scheme drawn up for the Sahara and the deserts of the Middle 
East by the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Corporation 
(TREC). In 2003 the Club of Rome, the Hamburg Climate 
Protection Foundation and the National Energy Research Center 
of Jordan founded TREC. In 2007 Prince Hassan bin Talal of 
Jordan outlined the Desertec concept to the European Parliament. 
The idea is to install CSP in North Africa and the Middle East to 
generate power for these regions, and, by 2050, to transmit no 
fewer than 100GW of electricity by high voltage direct current to 
southern states within the EU. Waste heat from CSP could be 
used for desalination, and wind turbines in Morocco and around 
the Red Sea would also contribute to the total output.
 First proposed by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, the 
Union for the Mediterranean, a group of EU member states 
and countries with Mediterranean coastlines, could provide the 
framework for realising Desertec. At a technical level, the project 
looks promising: if solar energy is ever really to fulfill its promise, 
it will need to be implemented on the sort of scale envisioned by 
Desertec.
 Interestingly, TREC has already tried to protect itself from 



















to exploit Africa. Its argument, however, is weak: because solar 
energy is unlimited, its owners can’t be exploited. 85   
 Things are not so simple. European interests could well 
dominate not just financing, but also installation and operation. 
The terms of trade for the northward export of electricity will also 
be critical. But despite these potential difficulties, and despite 
Desertec’s rather disparate backers, Energise! wishes it well.
Photovoltaic panels:  
the solar power with the greatest potential
With PV, human beings have arrived at the solar technology with 
the best long-term prospects. PV panels are devices that convert 
light directly into electricity. 86
 Demand for PV has been growing for 30 years. Between 
1977 and 2007, it rose at a compound rate of 34 per cent 
per year. 87 That adds up to a big difference between visions 
of a solar future in the 1970s and real investment today. The 
industry today is thousands of times larger, and on the verge of 
contributing significant amounts to world energy.
 It’s easy to grow fast from a base of nothing. Growth in the 
1980s amounted mostly to watches and calculators. But in 2004, 
through another feed-in tariff, German legislators guaranteed a 
minimum price for PV-generated electricity. 88 Then PV began an 
even bigger boom, growing by 41 per cent in 2006 and by 55 in 
2007. 89 Historically, first-generation (1G) solar cells arose from 
two sectors: IT and satellites. 
 In 1940, at Bell Laboratories, Russell Ohl discovered the 
first PV silicon cell purely by chance while trying to build a detector 
for radio waves. 90 Bell Labs quickly saw the significance of Ohl’s 
work, and it was through building on it that Walter Brattain, John 
Bardeen and William Shockley invented the semiconductor 
transistor in 1947. From the beginning, then, solar cells have 
developed in parallel with electronics.
 The first real application of solar power came, typically 









Vanguard 1, the fourth artificial satellite to be launched in the 
Sputnik era. In satellites, cost was little problem, and only small 
quantities of cells were needed. 
 How do PV cells work? To make chips, silicon has to be 
‘doped’ with small amounts of impurities. P-type impurities, such 
as aluminium or boron, carry extra positive charge. Impurities 
such as phosphorus or arsenic, which carry a negative charge, 
are called n-type. The switches in computer chips that can turn 
flows of electrons on and off are built from clever combinations 
of p and n type regions.
 PV cells are also built from doped silicon. A solar cell, in 
fact, is essentially nothing more than a p-n junction. As a result, 
the PV industry has largely grown out of the semiconductor 
industry. The world’s leading manufacturer of PV is Sharp, a 
company that developed its expertise in the process of making 
memory chips. 
Second-generation PV
With 2G solar cells, things are different. Still based on p-n 
junction technology, they’re built around solar power rather than 
computer power. 2G cells still use doped semiconductors; but 
instead of crystalline silicon as a base material, they depend on 
options more suited to solar power.
 A first set of 2G devices comes under the general name of 
thin-film photovoltaics. A key advantage of thin films is that they 
use less silicon than 1G devices. Until 2004, PV could survive 
using discarded silicon from the computer industry. Since then, 
the boom in PV has created a major shortage of new silicon, 
which is refined by stripping sand of oxygen. 91
 One approach to thin films uses amorphous silicon. In 
the crystalline silicon that’s used in microchips, all the atoms 
are arranged in a very regular pattern. In amorphous silicon, by 
contrast, atoms are more jumbled up, but the material can more 
easily be laid down in a thin film on glass.
 The world’s largest semiconductor company, Applied 



















down the pixels on to liquid crystal display screens so that they 
deposit amorphous silicon instead. CEO Michael R Splinter has 
conceded that in 2007, the solar panel part of the company’s 
business was ‘pretty much nothing’ In 2008, however, he 
thought it would be worth between seven to 10 per cent of 
Applied Materials’ worldwide business. ‘We think the market for 
solar panels is very big, around $2.5 to $3 billion in business for 
us by 2010’, he said. 92
 In 2008 other leading semiconductor firms seemed to 
share Splinter’s upbeat view. Intel spun out a silicon cell company, 
SpectraWatt, and made a $38m investment in a German thin 
film firm, Sulfurcell. 93 National Semiconductor announced new 
technology that, it said, maximises solar cell output even when 
part of the cell is shaded or dirty. 94 In 2008 it was also anticipated 
that a new wave of investment in silicon refineries would soon 
come on line in China and South Korea. 95 Meanwhile, on the 
roof of its plant in Zaragoza, Spain, GM will install nearly 10 times 
as many solar panels based on amorphous thin film technology 
as it will with conventional solar in Baltimore. NASDAQ-quoted 
Energy Conversion Devices, Michigan, US, which specialises in 
amorphous thin films,  hopes that its subsidiary United Solar 
Ovonic will generate up to 12 MW from the Zaragoza site, which 
at nearly 19 hectares is claimed to be the largest rooftop solar 
venture in the world. 96 
PV without silicon
Amorphous silicon is only the beginning for thin film technology. 
Although it’s cheaper than crystalline silicon, it’s relatively 
inefficient at converting light into energy. In other thin film 
regimes, silicon is abandoned altogether. By using different 
base materials on the two sides of the p-n junction, the divide 
between the two can be made sharper (‘hetero-junctions’ rather 
than ‘homo-junctions’). That allows a greater proportion of light 
falling on the cell to be converted into electricity.
 First Solar, which launched on NASDAQ in 2006, has 









had manufacturing capacity to produce, annually, cells capable 
of generating 495 MW. By the end of 2009 it plans to raise this 
figure to 1 GW. 97
 Global Solar is the leader in Copper Indium Gallium 
Selenide (CIGS) systems. For some years, its manufacturing 
capacity was modest; but in 2008, its US facilities quadrupled 
in size, and the firm opened an additional factory in Germany.
 One of the most impressive 2G technologies is Nanosolar’s 
system for manufacture of CIGS cells. Founded in Silicon Valley 
in 2002, the firm’s factories have adapted the roll-to-roll printing 
technology of the newspaper industry. In 2008 Nanosolar raised 
$300m from investors, including EDF and AES Corporation, 
another major power firm. 98 Also in 2008, IBM announced a 
deal with Japanese semiconductor equipment manufacturer 
Tokyo Ohka Kogyo to develop and license thin-film solar cells 
able to convert 15 per cent of incident sunlight into electricity, 
compared with current CIGS efficiencies of 8-12 per cent. 99  
 Another 2G technology is multi-junction cells. These 
overcome the problem that each material used in a solar cell only 
efficiently extracts energy from a fraction of the spectrum. Light 
that is toward the red end of the spectrum is poor at generating 
current, while some of the energy in colours more toward the 
blue end is also wasted. Multi-junction technologies get around 
these limitations by stacking different cells on top of each other 
so as to make efficient use of the whole spectrum.
 The main drawback with multi-junction cells is their expense. 
That problem can be mitigated, however. In Concentrating 
Photovoltaics (CPV), tracking mirrors focus a very large area of 
sunlight not to make heat to drive a turbine, as in STEG, but 
rather on to a very small area of multi-junction cells. 
 In northwest Victoria, Australia, Solar Systems is 
constructing the world’s largest photovoltaic power station using 
CPV. It will concentrate light by a factor of 500 on to multi-
junction cells. Rated at 154 MW, it will cost A$420m. A$295m 




















 As of August 2008, the US National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) holds the record for the multi-junction cell 
that extracts most energy from sunlight. The thickness is just 
a fifteenth that of a conventional design. The cell derives its 
capacity to absorb light from mismatches in the alignment of 
atoms between layers. In the laboratory, under a light intensity 
equivalent to 326 suns, the device converted 40.8 per cent of 
the light energy into electricity. 101 The technology is currently 
being commercialised by Emcore, based in Albuquerque. 102 
 CPVs need cooling. In May 2008 IBM demonstrated 
technology adapted from the cooling of computer chips for use 
with concentrated solar. In a test, IBM used liquid gallium-indium 
metal to cool chips exposed to a light intensity equivalent to 
2300 suns. 103
 A third generation of solar cells is presently coming out of 
the laboratory. 3G PV is built on a number of technologies: dye-
sensitised solar cells, quantum dots and polymer systems.
 In 2008 only 1 GW of thin film solar capacity was 
produced. But in the summer before the autumn financial crisis, 
at least, Travis Bradford, a leading industry commentator, raised 
his forecast of production in 2012 to an amazing 9 GW for thin 
film photovoltaics alone. 104 
 If the world has any luck between now and 2020, solar 
energy will be able to add scores of GW each year, making it into 
a substantial contributor to global energy.
Hydroelectric power: time Africa had its own
Among all the technologies that take advantage of astronomical 
flows of energy, hydroelectric power is the only one that already 
makes a substantial contribution to world energy supply. It 
accounts for 90 per cent of all power generation by renewable 
sources. 105
 Hydroelectricity has been in use as long as the electrical 
grid has existed. In 1896 Thomas Edison’s General Electric 
collaborated with George Westinghouse using Nicola Tesla’s 









Niagara Falls into the growing North American grid.
 Perhaps the most spectacular pre-1939 construction was 
the Hoover Dam. Built in the desert on the border of Arizona 
and Nevada, it was completed in 1935. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal undoubtedly accelerated construction. The Hoover Dam 
generates 2GW of power, exporting mostly to Los Angeles and 
other Californian cities.
 Hydroelectric dams can generate spectacular amounts of 
energy. On the border of Brazil and Paraguay, the Itaipu dam is 
the largest power station of any sort in the world. Negotiations 
between the two countries in the 1960s led to construction 
beginning in January 1975. By 1978 the course of the Paraná, 
the world’s seventh largest river, was diverted. The Itaipu’s 
reservoir began to fill in 1982, with power production beginning 
in 1984. By 1991 all 18 electricity generators were online, with 
a total capacity of 14 GW.
 In 2006-7, two more generating units were installed, 
allowing operation at full capacity even during maintenance. 
Altogether, the Itaipu provides more than 90 per cent of 
Paraguay’s electricity and 20 per cent of Brazil’s.
 Environmentalism tends to prefer small-scale hydroelectric 
to dams on the scale of Hoover or Itaipu. ‘Small hydro’, as it’s 
called, can produce anything up to a few megawatts. It’s often 
promoted as a means to rural electrification. 
 We think the opposite. In hydroelectricity, the more 
ambitious goal of connection to a centralised supply should be 
pursued. 
 Big dams generate a lot of electricity efficiently. They 
demand big grids. More importantly, the urbanisation of developing 
countries makes both big dams and big grids essential.
 In the big picture, cases where small hydro is truly 
appropriate will remain niche applications.
 Where there is a real case for new hydroelectric power 
is Africa, whose rivers and waterfalls contain a vast and mostly 
unexploited energy. It has been suggested that a new dam on the 



















Inga 1 and 2 – could provide 39 GW. The African Development 
Bank has allocated $15.7m to study the idea. 106 The South 
Africa Development Community (SADC), the New Partnership 
for African Development (NEPAD) and the World Energy Council 
(WEC) have listed Grand Inga as a priority project. 107 But since it 
could cost $80bn, its future remains uncertain. 
 In June 2008 the WEC assembled possible financers in 
London. It concluded that while the Congo should get a 4 GW 
dam,  Inga 3, quite soon, for the 40 GW Grand Inga, ‘all actions 
need to be put in place to start the development phase by at 
least 2015, in order to get the first kWh around 2025–2030.’ 108 
That seems to us to be a thoroughly complacent schedule.
 There is potential for large hydro beyond Africa. In Tajikistan, 
one of the world’s poorest countries, the proposed Rogun dam 
would be the world’s highest, at 335 metres.
 According to the IEA, hydropower could double in output 
by 2050, reaching no fewer than 1700 GW of capacity. And 
according to the WEC, if every region exploited its hydroelectric 
potential to the same extent as Europe, then Africa would see 
a ten-fold increase, Asia a three-fold increase, South America a 
doubling, and the United States a 10 per cent increase. 109
Greens and the social impact of dams 
The industrialisation of China and India has been accompanied 
by the building of large dams. But projects such as the Three 
Gorges complex in China and the Narmada dam in India have 
proven unpopular with Greens. Dams displace local people, who 
see few of their benefits, say Greens. They destroy wildlife, or 
make animals die young. To add to their sins, dams create GHGs: 
when reservoir basins are flooded, rotting vegetation gives off 
methane.
 With Grand Inga in Africa, the WEC has tried to deal with 
Green objections, and repeats again and again that it is about 
‘promoting the sustainable supply and use of energy for the 









The Hoover Dam, 48 km southeast of  
Las Vegas, generates electricity equivalent 
to two conventional electricity plants. By 
modern standards of hydroelectric power, 



















1 and 2 has not seen local people properly compensated for being 
moved out. Nor have they been properly resettled, employed by 
dam companies, or even provided with electricity. That’s why 
the WEC promises, in the case of future dams at Inga, to make 
a comprehensive social and environmental development and 
management plan ‘in a participatory manner with the affected 
communities and all the stakeholders’. 110   
 These words are none too convincing. Yet nor do 
Green arguments persuade, either. From Berkeley, California, 
International Rivers, a $2m environmentalist organisation, adds 
to the WEC’s worries about Grand Inga. International Rivers says 
that Three Gorges, put forward as a model for Grand Inga, has 
been merely one of several large dams marked by huge cost 
overruns and corruption. At Inga itself private interests from 
overseas would benefit from local land giveaways. Transmission 
costs have been underrated, and maintenance has been non-
existent. 111 
 For ourselves, we’ve no doubt that most of the grievances 
and imbalances reported are completely genuine. After all, 
Chinese officials themselves have had second thoughts about 
Three Gorges. But problems with foreign investors, with the 
displacement and compensation of local people, with them 
getting a share of the electricity produced, and with maintenance 
– these are problems of politics and wealth. They are not at all 
intrinsic to the energy performance of dams. These problems 
are a reason to fight for more equitable politics, not a reason to 
oppose dams.
 In its mission statement, International Rivers 
says: ‘We oppose destructive dams and the development 
model they advance.’ 112 Yet though it may seem churlish to say 
so, dams do not advance any development model. That tends to 
be something that people do. Of course, planners of big projects 
can wreak havoc, and not just with dams. But like coal (Chapter 
5), a dam is what we make it. Loss of wildlife and the generation 
of GHGs are small penalties compared with the benefits of a 









distance transmission, that’s a point in favour of building big 
dams in Africa wherever they makes sense.
 In its pursuit of African oil, China frequently offers to build 
big dams as a sweetener. For instance, it plans to construct and 
pay for a 2 GW, $1.5 billion dam in the Mambila Plateau, Nigeria, 
so that, in return, it can import Nigeria’s oil. 113
 As China strikes more new oil deals in Africa, expect to 
see a new level of Western hostility to dams being built there.
 
From the tides and the waves: good for  
some places, but no solution for the world
There’s plenty of energy in the motion of water flowing around 
the oceans. It’s estimated that the motion of the tides alone 
dissipates about 2500 GW worldwide. 114 But as with other 
renewables, the difficulty is converting this enormous quantity 
into energy suitable for human consumption.
 Energy from the tides can be captured in two ways: 
1. In tidal barrages, or tidal ranges, dams or artificial 
 lagoons form reservoirs that get filled to a very high 
 head at full tide. Energy is generated by turbines as 
 the water vertically builds up (‘flood flow’ generation) and 
 drains down in release back to the sea (ebb flow 
 generation), in a manner similar to hydroelectric power
2. In tidal stream generation, or tidal currents, a watery 
 version of wind power, fast, horizontal flows of water in 
 narrow straits drive turbines directly. Although water 
 currents move more slowly than wind, water is much 
 heavier, which in terms of the energy that could be 
 generated, more than compensates for the slowness. 
In contrast with wind flows, the movement of the tides is highly 
predictable for years ahead, although availability does follow a 



















least, long lengths of coastline.
 The world’s only existing tidal barrage is on the River 
Rance, in northern France, generating 250 MW of electricity. 
Larger projects are certainly possible. A barrage on the Severn, 
one of the world’s best sites, could generate up to 8 GW or more 
of electricity. 
 Tidal stream generation is even more experimental than 
tidal barrages, but first estimates suggest that the UK could 
derive 2-7 GW from it.  In 2008 the world’s first seabed-mounted 
tidal turbines were installed by OpenHydro, Dublin, in the Orkney 
Islands. A 1.2 MW facility was also installed by Marine Current 
Turbines, Bristol, in Strangford Narrows, Northern Ireland. 115 
 According to a 2007 review of UK literature on tidal power, 
much of the UK tidal stream resource is concentrated in the 
Pentland Firth and the Channel Islands, and is mostly 40m deep 
or more. Once tidal streams around Rathlin Island, Northern 
Ireland and Mull of Galloway are added to Pentland Firth and the 
Channel Islands, however, perhaps five per cent of UK electricity 
demand could be met. Tidal streams in the South West, and 
especially in the Bristol Channel, would cater for another 10-16 
per cent. In the Eastern Irish Sea, both tidal stream and tidal 
barrages might be able to handle another six per cent.  116 
 The geography of the UK makes it one of the best 
prospects for tidal power. For that reason, the potential of tidal 
elsewhere has not been so comprehensively assessed. It also 
means that for the rest of the world, tidal can only meet much 
lower proportions of electricity demand.
 Like tidal power, wave power needs long lengths of 
coastline; unlike it, wave power is driven by winds, and lies at 
a very low level of technological development. The first modern 
proposal for use of wave energy came from Stephen Salter, an 
engineer at Edinburgh University in 1974, in the wake of the oil 
crisis. 117 Salter’s ‘nodding duck’ design featured a string of large 
canisters, each weighing hundreds of tonnes, which pumped oil 
through a hydraulic system as they bobbed in the waves. The 









 Funding was killed, some hinted, after the UK 
nuclear industry lobbied against his proposal behind closed 
doors. 118 Perhaps this is true; but low gas prices in the 1980s 
and 1990s may also have made development of the Salter duck 
unattractive. 
 Wave power may eventually make a useful contribution 
in places that have lots of coastline – for example, Scotland, or 
Hawaii. However, it seems doubtful that it will make a much of a 
contribution on a world scale. 
 At present the most advanced design from a commercial 
point of view is the Pelamis, which is more snake than duck. Four 
30m lengths flex at the joints as waves move past them. As in 
Salter’s duck, the flexing is used to generate pressure and then 
electricity. Three Pelamis snakes are in operation off the coast 
of Portugal, and generate a total of 2.25 MW. 119
 More deployments of Pelamis are planned worldwide, and 
the device could be deployed alongside offshore wind, making 
use of common grid connections. The Anaconda, a snake-
like rubber tube that bulges with water when a passing wave 
squeezes it, may also have potential. 120 But in the round, there’s 
just not enough usable energy in the waves for them to make big 
difference to world energy supply. 
Geothermal: bubbling under 
Geothermal is one of the least developed energy sources, but has 
great potential. Finally, today it’s beginning to get the attention 
it deserves. 
 The Earth’s internal heat comes mainly from the natural 
radioactivity of its rocks. Although the radioactivity only exists 
at a low level, it’s hard for heat to escape from underground, so 
high temperatures can build up. Without this heating, the Earth 
would long ago have frozen solid.
 Averaged across its surface, the flow of heat from the 
Earth’s is a miniscule 0.06 Watts per square metre. 121 That would 
be too thinly spread to make geothermal a practical source of 



















higher than average. Because of this wrinkle, geothermal energy 
has been used on a small scale for millennia, in the form of hot 
springs. 
 Electricity was first produced from geothermal energy at 
Larderello, Italy, in 1904, where heat from the rocks had been 
widely used for several decades in the boric acid industry. The 
success was repeated in Japan in 1919. Then, in 1921, John D 
Grant drilled a well at The Geysers holiday resort, California. He 
An eruption at Castle Geyser, Yellowstone 
National Park, US. The force of geothermal 
energy can be enormous, even without the 










produced 35 kW of electricity to power the place. 122
 As with wind, geothermal energy was little more than a 
curiosity until after the Second World War. Even then, it went 
through several decades of slow development rather than 
dynamic growth.
 It was 1960 before the first commercial geothermal 
electricity entered operation, built by Pacific Gas and Electricity 
at The Geysers, California, and generating 11 MW. The 1980s 
and 1990s saw the sporadic construction of geothermal plants 
around the world – from Hawaii to Iceland. Between 1990 and 
2005, installed generating capacity rose from 5.8 to 9 GWe. In 
2005, the leading countries in geothermal energy were the US, 
at 2.5 GWe, the Philippines, at 1.9 GWe, and Mexico, at 0.9 
GWe. For its small number of inhabitants, Iceland put in a strong 
performance at 0.3 GW. 123 
 A complex of power stations at The Geysers is now the 
largest geothermal producer of electricity in the world, generating 
0.9 GWe. 124 But geothermal provides even more power – 15 
GWt worldwide – in the form of heat. Here China, Iceland, Turkey 
and the US are the leaders. 
 In Turkey, fossil fuels are rare but tectonic shifts are 
frequent. Geothermal heating and (especially for tourists) hot 
springs have appeal: already geothermal sources for such direct 
use amount to more than 1 GWt, and latest estimates put 
Turkey’s geothermal capacity as high as 3.7 GWt. 125
Beyond natural springs and geysers 
To go beyond natural springs and geysers, wells must be bored 
so that pressurised water can be pumped down in to hot rocks. 
Heated water returns through a second nearby well. The heat 
can be used directly for district heating or industrial processes. 
Alternatively, it can make steam to turn an electric generator. 
 A 2006 study by a Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
team led by chemical engineering professor Jefferson W Tester 
has done much to put geothermal in the spotlight. 126 The report 



















 Even where flows of it are low, heat can accumulate in 
rocks over millennia. In this case, heat can be extracted without 
waiting for the flow of geothermal energy to reheat those rocks 
from below. Power here comes from a stock, not a flow of heat.
 To get at that heat, the MIT team enthused about enhanced 
or engineered geothermal systems (EGS), in which hydraulic 
pressure is used to create cracks in hot rocks, so that water 
to be heated can flow around in great volumes. The MIT study 
estimated that the energy that could be practically mined in this 
way in the US amounted to about 2000 times the country’s 
annual consumption of primary energy in 2005. With technology 
improvements, the economically extractable amount of useful 
energy could multiply by a factor of 10 or more, thus making EGS 
possible for centuries. It’s the prospects of enhancement that 
supported the MIT report’s optimistic conclusions. By allowing 
access to larger and deeper volumes of rock, enhancement 
will free geothermal from the need to rely on those few natural 
formations in which heat comes near the surface.
 Though geothermal is insignificant on a world scale, useful 
lessons have been learned from it. Hot fluids from geothermal 
wells, for instance, contain a cocktail of dissolved minerals: 
handling them well requires sophisticated engineering. But 
decades of experience have contributed to a gradual build-up 
of novel technologies. In 2000, Toshifumi Sugama, a chemist at 
the US Department of Energy’s Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
won an award for a new kind of cement for well walls and a 
new plastic coating that protects steel heat exchangers from 
corrosion. 127 In California, technology now exists to extract 
dissolved minerals so as to stop pipes scaling up, and to gather 
useful items such as zinc and high purity silica. 128
 Geothermal can also benefit from the oil sector’s 
techniques of geological surveying, drilling wells and pumping 
fluids – not to mention the sector’s legal and logistical capacity 
to handle underground resources. 
 On the other side, as a relatively unexplored field, 









oil drilling nor can be applied to it. Potter Drilling aims to break 
up rock with spallation, which for many years has used drills 
and a supersonic flame jet in an air-filled hole to break up and 
remove crystalline rock – and to mine iron ore. In 2009, Potter 
aims to field-test a prototype of spallation based not on hot 
air, but on hot water. That should make for faster drilling, more 
stable drill bits and boreholes, and the ability to reach depths of 
9km – ‘ultimately allowing geothermal energy to be developed,’ 
Potter says hopefully, ‘anywhere on the planet’. 129
 Potter is backed by $4m from Google. The company claims 
that its rock-piercing capabilities could also come in handy in the 
disposal of nuclear waste and the sequestration of CO2 .
 With the African Rift Geothermal Facility (ARGeo), the 
World Bank, Germany’s Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the 
government of Italy, UNEP and others hope to bring geothermal 
power to the East African Rift Valley, which runs from the Red 
Sea to Mozambique. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea are interested. In Australia, too, there are hopes that 
geothermal will be able to provide 2.2 GW by 2020. 130 
How to overcome intermittency (1): energy storage
The most important sources energy – wind and solar – suffer from 
the drawback that they’re not on all the time. They’re intermittent. 
If astronomicals are to become an effective source of energy, 
this drawback will have to be solved. Several approaches are 
available.
 At present intermittency can be dealt with by building 
‘spinning reserve’. This means keeping fossil fuel stations – 
typically gas – running and ready to take up the slack when 
inputs of renewable energy are weak. Critics of renewables point 
out that if you have to build enough fossil-powered plants to 
cover possible failures, then there isn’t much point in renewables 
in the first place.
 There are two fundamental strategies for a better solution. 
Either the energy from astronomical sources can be stored, or it 



















 The idea behind energy storage is simple. When energy is 
plentiful, it can be used to build up supplies. Then, when winds 
slow or the sun stops shining, the stored energy can be used.
 As Chapter 5 showed with transport vehicles, storing 
electricity isn’t easy. Luckily, storage is easier at a power station 
than it is in a car.
 Whether generated from fossil fuels or from renewables, the 
main way that electricity is stored today is by using hydroelectric 
dams. When excess power is generated, usually at night, dams 
are put into reverse. That’s done either with pumps, or by turning 
the generation turbines the other way. In this manner water is 
pumped back up into the reservoir. Then, when power is needed 
in the day, there’s plenty of reserve for generation.
 Beyond pumped storage, a variety of new technologies for 
electricity storage are under development, including flywheels, 
batteries, compressed air and superconducting coils.
 The most promising of these is compressed air storage. 
In this system, excess electricity is used to pump air into a store 
such as an underground cavern or disused gas field. When 
electricity is needed, the air is released and used to turn a 
turbine, sometimes in combination with a gas burning system.
 While the concept has been around for several decades, 
the rise of wind energy has now won it serious attention, as with 
the formation of Energy Storage and Power of New Jersey in 
August 2008. 131
 For concentrated solar thermal, there is another option. 
Although electricity is hard to store, heat can be retained for 
longer periods. One technique uses giant tanks of salt that 
can be heated into a molten state during the day and retain 
sufficient heat to produce steam for electricity generation at 
night. 132 The solar tower planned for Seville also does that. 133 
Another technique, under research for more than 20 years at the 
Australian National University and now being deployed by Wizard 
Power, uses a closed-loop thermochemical system for ammonia 
dissociation and synthesis. 134









of new technologies are under development, including flywheels, 
batteries, compressed air and superconducting coils.
How to overcome intermittency (2):  
bigger grids, more devices
The second strategy for solving intermittency is to build bigger 
grids, with more devices to capture astronomical flows of energy. 
The wind may not always blow for a single power station; but 
when it doesn’t, it will be blowing elsewhere. Over a wide area, 
then, grids even out supply. The wider the area connected up, 
the more predictable average output becomes, as fluctuations 
in different places tend to cancel each other out. 
 Bigger grids also make demand for energy more even 
and easy to forecast. Demand from a single house is relatively 
unpredictable: it all depends when you decide to plug in the hair 
drier or kettle. Demand from a million houses, by contrast, is 
much easier to plan for, even though not every home, office or 
factory switches power on or off at the same moment.
 Astronomicals call forth a need for bigger electricity grids 
for another reason. Like fossil fuels, they’re often not strong 
where they’re needed. But unlike fossil fuels, they cannot be 
transported by pipeline, railway truck or ship. Instead, wind or 
solar power must be converted into electricity – electricity that 
grids move to locations where it’s needed.
 We have shown that Greens prefer small, local systems. 
But rather than leading down the path towards energy security 
and personal self-reliance, investing in renewables properly will 
mean more interconnection between bigger grids – grids that 
cross wider areas and indeed more national borders.
 As turbines become larger, offshore locations are likely to 
become more significant for wind. For solar energy, cloud-free 
deserts are good news if they are as close to the equator as 
possible. A future European electricity supply might partially rely 
on wind energy from the North Sea and Atlantic, and, as we have 
seen, on solar power imported from deserts in North Africa and 



















in scope, and would likely also include massive facilities for 
pumped storage in mountainous Norway and Switzerland.
 In the US, solar energy will be generated in the barren 
deserts of Arizona and New Mexico. As well as offshore, wind 
will be generated in a central corridor running from Texas up 
through Nebraska and the Dakotas. But that will need a new grid 
to link these sparsely populated areas to the large conurbations 
in which most people live.
 New grids will benefit from new technologies. High-voltage 
direct current (DC) lines, for example, offer two advantages. First, 
less energy is lost in transmission. Second, DC is less susceptible 
to blackouts.
Greens and transmission losses
In their dogmatic desire to identify renewables with 
decentralisation, Greens like to point out that decentralising 
electricity supply has the advantage that less money needs be 
spent building transmission lines – and that transmission losses 
will also be reduced, since electricity will no longer have to travel 
long distances. 
 Up to a point, that’s true. If the cost of solar power can 
be reduced to near that of grid-generated electricity, then 
decentralised solar systems ought indeed to save a few percent 
of electricity by having to transmit only to local, rather than 
national users. In turn, that ought to give solar a competitive 
edge. 
 In 2007, however, Sun Edison founder and solar enthusiast 
Jigar Shah went too far in this argument. Shah attacked the 
building of a $1.8bn transmission line from West Virginia to 
Maryland as a ‘subsidy’ to the US coal industry. 135 
 That was unfair. Realistically, decentralised generation 
will never mean widespread independence from the grid. Local 
sources of wind and solar energy will still need grid connections 
for when the right weather isn’t forthcoming, and for when 









the extent that decentralised generation has a role to play, the 
grid will be upgraded to make such generation more workable.
 If anything, accommodating renewables will mean 
costly new investments in updating grids. That’s fine. But when 
advocates of renewables calculate their output prices, they 
should take into account that these prices will be inflated by 
necessary investments in a centralised grid.
  
 
Renewables as a great  
technological fix – if built at scale
 The growth of renewables has been profoundly influenced by the 
rise of Green politics. If it weren’t for the Greens, as we saw in 
Chapter 4, it’s probable that nuclear energy would by now have 
become the world’s main source of electricity. However with 
things as they are, renewables – especially wind – have become 
significant industries. They’ve made substantial technological 
progress, fostered their own generation of engineers, developed 
professional supply chains and standards, and integrated 
themselves into the future of grid planning.
 But now that a real renewables industry exists, many 
environmentalists are uncomfortable. As renewables are readied 
to become successful technological fixes, they undermine the 
environmentalist demand that people change their lifestyles and 
their whole relationship with nature.
 As for us, we’re adamant that the exploitation of 
astronomical flows of energy is something that energised citizens 
should support.  Exploitation will depend on more investment 
than that which has come so far from government and industry. 
It will also mean abandoning a Green vision: that of the small-
scale, independent production of energy as a kind of personal 
lifestyle choice. Finally, it will mean adopting a high-tech, capital-
intensive approach to the production of renewables equipment.
 Both physical and economic considerations point toward 
the need for scale. The sheer quantity of energy demanded by 



















tends to reduce the fraction of energy lost in conversion,  •	
to friction, heat and the like
 has a disproportionately positive effect. Larger systems  •	
can handle faster flows of wind and water – and energy  
is delivered in proportion to the cube of that speed.
On top of this, the intermittency of renewables argues for 
connections to large-scale grids and against attempts at local 
independence. 
 From the physical point of view, efficiency in renewable 
energy almost always points toward a need for scale. But the 
logic of scale from an economic point of view is even stronger 
and more basic. Both in and beyond energy, building at scale 
takes advantage of the most important wealth-creating process: 
human cooperation.
 One of the first to appreciate this point was the Scottish 
economist Adam Smith. Smith was studying a very different 
society from today’s, one where mechanisation was only just 
beginning to emerge. Some of his specific examples are therefore 
dated. But the growth of the extent of the market, together with 
the humanistic climate of the Enlightenment, did allow Smith 
to understand the importance of cooperation. In his famous 
discussion of the division of labour in Chapter 2 of The Wealth of 
Nations, he wrote:
‘By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition 
half so different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from 
a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, or this last 
from a shepherd’s dog. Those different tribes of animals, 
however, though all of the same species, are of scarce 
any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is 
not in the least supported either by the swiftness of 
the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by 
the docility of the shepherd’s dog. The effects of those 
different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or 









into a common stock, and do not in the least contribute 
to the better accommodation and conveniency of the 
species.’ 136
Some might object that Smith sees human cooperation only in 
‘barter and exchange.’ That’s true, but doesn’t negate his basic 
point. In highlighting cooperation, a uniquely human capacity, 
Smith undoes contemporary prejudice, which sees people as not 
much better – if not a whole lot worse – than jumped-up dogs.
 For Smith, ships and barges expanded the market and 
thereby the division of labour. In energy, then, today’s ships and 
barges are grids, and in particular electricity grids. 
 Grids will be essential, but so will the social forms of co-
operation. Smith thought that the development of markets was 
a natural product of technology such as shipping and roads 
that brought people together. Today, a subtler picture is drawn: 
markets and other institutions of co-operation are thought to be 
more variable, and to develop historically. 137 Nevertheless, in 
all cases it’s cooperation, and through that centralisation, that’s 
allowed productivity to develop.
 Without a division of labour and cooperation, people would 
be scrabbling around all day trying to find the energy they needed 
to pursue their lives. At the same time the two factors create 
an opportunity and motivation for professional energy engineers 
to concentrate all their efforts on the improved production of 
more energy. Not only do they have the time and resources 
necessary for innovation centralised in their hands, but also, 
with production on a large scale, quite small improvements will 
be worthwhile, and large improvements are unlikely to outstrip 
national and international demand in the long term.
 Centralisation, like technology generally, is not inherently 
anti-democratic. In 1976, Lovins wrote:
‘In an electrical world, your lifeline comes not from an 
understandable neighbourhood technology run by people 



















an alien, remote, and perhaps humiliatingly uncontrollable 
technology run by a faraway, bureaucratised, technical 
elite who have probably never heard of you. Decisions 
about who shall have how much energy at what price 
also be-come centralised – a politically dangerous trend 
because it divides those who use energy from those who 
supply and regulate it.’ 138
In this petit-bourgeois vision of neighbourhood energy as lifeline 
from ‘people you know,’ Lovins mistook the defects of capitalist 
democracies as defects of centralised energy supply. Of course 
many people find themselves thwarted by faraway bureaucrats. 
But that’s a problem that grows out of politics, not out of energy 
technologies.
 Some of centralisation’s more elitist opponents fear it will 
enforce what they call the tyranny of the majority. That’s their 
problem. Still, there can be no doubt that
the planning of major renewables installations often •	
proceeds without proper discussion, yet is also slow and 
bureaucratic 139 
attempts by mandarins in Whitehall to ‘nudge’ people •	
into microgenerating tiny amounts of energy through 
renewables make little sense, and are offensive. 
The answer to these difficulties, however, is to energise 
democracy, not to oppose centralisation. There’s no magic 
formula or technical solution to the problem of balancing the 
needs of centralised energy generation against the conservation 
of wilderness, or the objections of minorities. The only chance of 
success is to have an informed citizenry energetically engaged 
in democratic debate.
 If that seems like wishful thinking, that’s because an 
alliance of technocrats and Greens has presented energy as a 
set of incontrovertible choices imposed by science and nature. 









Summing up this chapter
When thought through carefully and implemented on an 
ambitious scale, astronomical sources of energy will show just 
how clever 21st century human beings can be. 
 Naturally, politicians and environmentalists make a lot of 
noise about the need to make major investments – especially 
in wind. In the summer of 2008, Thomas Friedman (whom we 
chastised in Chapter 2) caught presidential candidate John 
McCain running TV commercials that featured turbines, whilst 
McCain failed to show up at no fewer than eight Senate votes 
on whether or not to continue with tax credits for investment in 
technologies such as wind. 140 
 So long as the world’s need for much more energy is 
downplayed, and the need for energy conservation, energy 
security and off-grid contrivances is played up, the real potential 
offered by astronomicals will not be realised. A particular joke 
in the 21st century is for fans of astronomical flows of energy to 
plead a nationalist case for it. Why? Because the renewables 
sector is already a globalised industry:
Two Chinese  wind turbine manufacturers, Goldwind  and •	
Sinovel, add a further 4.2 and 3.4 per cent world market 
share to Suzlon’s 10.5 141
In 2007, no fewer than four Chinese solar firms listed on •	
the New York Stock Exchange 142
Abu Dhabi’s interests extend beyond Spain. Masdar •	
will operate a major thin film photovoltaics factory in 
Erfurt, Germany. Masdar’s owner, Mubadala Development 
Company, has formed a partnership with General Electric 
around renewables research and finance in the UAE. 143
Renewables cannot provide energy autarchy: they already 
amount to an international business. A worldwide and reasonably 
integrated division of labour exists with them, too. 



















like a stable sector. It had few venture capital or private equity 
players, plenty of asset financing, and strong mergers and 
acquisitions, with deals worth $7.2bn between September 2006 
and September 2007. 144 One year later, though, and America’s 
First Wind could no longer rely on more than $200m of Lehman 
Brothers’ financing. 145
 Lehman had also taken 10 and seven per cent stakes in 
Clipper Windpower and in Ormat Technologies, a specialist in 
geothermal energy. Certainly, renewables have had to rely on 
sources of finance that now look questionable. Yet until as late 
as the summer of 2008, hundreds of millions of dollars were 
still pouring into thin film solar energy: not just to Nanosolar, 
which we mentioned above, but also to Colorado’s AVA Solar and 
California’s Miasolé. 146
 It is as fruitless to speculate about the future financial 
shape of renewables as it is to guess how much electricity 
generated from them will eventually cost. What is certain, 
however, is that the new, post-Crash enthusiasm for investment 
in renewables has a strongly nationalist aspect to it. After his 
repudiation, during his election campaign, of oil tyrants and 
dictators, Obama went on:
‘Or will we control our own energy and our own destiny? 
Will America watch as the clean energy jobs and industries 
of the future flourish in countries like Spain, Japan, or 
Germany? Or will we create them here, in the greatest 
country on Earth, with the most talented, productive 
workers in the world?’ 147 
All the Greens’ high hopes in decentralisation can only lead to a 
flag-waving finale.
 What is also certain is that renewables have to work 
with each other, and with other sources of energy. At Clipper 
Windpower, CEO James Dehlsen points out that most wind 
energy is generated at night – and that though household 









more electric-orientated cars would be an excellent application. 
Meanwhile, one consultant critic of the Pickens Plan insists 
that, without large-scale storage of wind power, only gas 
can meet America’s demand for air conditioning on hot, still 
afternoons. 148
Taking the long view on renewables 
Wind energy will see explosive growth over the next 20 years. By 
2030 wind could be generating one fifth of the world’s electricity. 
The trend will be towards larger turbines, further offshore. After 
2030 growth will likely continue but share of generation will stay 
constant. Further offshore, turbines will be mounted on floating 
platforms rather than on the seabed. Kites may also be able to 
offer vastly improved performance.
 Solar energy will undergo rapid development over the 
next 10 years, with development and deployment of many real-
world systems and billions of dollars of investment. This will 
lay the basis for massive expansion in the period 2020-2040. 
Generation of electricity by photovoltaics and concentrating solar 
power has even greater potential than wind. By 2040 it could be 
generating one quarter of the world’s electricity.
 Hydroelectricity will maintain its share of electricity 
generation even as world demand grows. By 2050 it may still 
be providing a tenth of much larger world demand. Africa has 
the potential to construct the world’s largest power station using 
hydroelectric technology. 
 Wave and tidal power will continue to undergo 
development. Without unforeseen breakthroughs, they will be 
significant on a regional scale, but niche technologies on a 
global scale.
 Geothermal may have great potential in the long term. 
Over the next decade much basic development and exploration 
remains to be done. If this results in wide commercialisation over 
2020-2040, geothermal could be one of the largest sources 
of electricity. While the development of goethermal is furthest 



















quarter of the world’s electricity.
 Grids will continue to become more international. In the 
short-term, high voltage DC transmission lines and computer 
control will be critical. Superconducting cables are an example 
of an innovation that is entirely plausible in principle but rather 
unpredictable in detail.
 Energy storage systems including batteries, thermal 
storage and compressed air will be developed and deployed in 
parallel with wind and solar energy.
In the table below, we present the third and last series of our 
ratings for selected energy technologies.
        The ratings in the table should not give the reader a false 
sense of precision. Might wind provide 35 per cent of electricity 
by 2050, or solar 15 per cent? Quite possibly.
 In the table, we have entered question marks when a 

















Wind 2010-2030 20 per cent Relatively cheap. 
Already developing 
and can be rolled 
out quickly
Need for energy 




2020-2040 5 per cent Relatively cheap 
and easy to roll out
Thermal storage 
better developed, 
but still needs 
progress.





2020-2040 20 per cent Abundant. Can 
be decentralised 
and expanded in 
modular units where 
appropriate
Need for 
energy  storage 
to overcome 
intermittency
Hydroelectric Already mature 10 per cent Dual use for water 
management. Can 
be used for energy 
storage
Limited by the 
need for suitable 
sites.
Tidal Could begin 
expansion now
probably less 





Wave Unclear if it will 
take off
probably less 





Technology not yet 
demonstrated
Geothermal 2030-2050 20 per cent Power available on 
demand
































Continuous growth is  
size from kW to several 
MW. Will likely growth 
in size to >5 MW per 
turbine. Will move further 
offshore. Installation in 
water deeper than 20m 
likely




















1G: Past and present. 
Crystalline silicon. 
2G: now until 2020 or 
beyond. Amorphous 
and polycrystalline 
silicon, thin film. 3G: dye 
sensitised cells, organic 
materials, quantum dots, 
multijunction cells
Silicon processing, 
supply chain from 
mining to refining for 
tellurium, indium and 







Continued possibility for 
larger and higher dams
Concrete and 
construction materials
Civil engineering 8 8
Not yet clear. Projects 
such as the Severn 
barrage need to be 








technology not yet 
demonstrated





Key to future takeoff will 
be Enhanced Geothermal 
Systems that fracture 
hot dry rocks allowing 
fluid to flow through



































Human activity has 
unintentionally had an 
enormous effect on 
climate. Now it’s time to 










Technology as alien and malign: between the 
wars, Karel Capek’s dystopian play Rossum’s 
Universal Robots had a worldwide influence. 

























Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein, or the modern 
Prometheus (1818) suggested that human power over nature 
could lead to tragedy. Then, a century after Shelley’s lone doctor 
foolishly experimented with human body parts and electricity, 
Karel Capek’s play Rossum’s Universal Robots – performed 
in London in 1923 – mixed biology with large-scale industrial 
processes, and had the resulting worker androids turn against 
their manufacturer.  
 Movies soon developed the same theme. Man became 
subordinate to machine in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927), Stanley 
Kubrick’s 2001 (1968), and James Cameron’s The Terminator 
(1984). Still later, even software engineers in the world of IT had 
become nervous. As the 21st century began, Sun Microsystems 
founder Bill Joy argued that genetics, nanotechnology and 
robotics could conspire together to rid the planet of mankind. 1 
 Today, environmentalism fears that continued 
industrialisation could warm the planet enough to annihilate it. 
Yet the world should resist such dystopias. 
 Unwittingly, a growing but chaotic civilisation on Earth 
has changed the planet’s climate. Now, with a more conscious 
approach, people can gain still more civilisation by adopting a 
less chaotic energy regime.  
 An economic and technological programme for universal 
energy supply would have a broad political effect, too. It would 
energise humanity, by organising enough cheap energy for 
people to lead richer and freer lives. 
 We must put energy in perspective, however. Just as 
questions of energy cannot be reduced to climate change, neither 
can the fate of the world be reduced to energy. Innovations in 
energy supply need to accompany innovations in other sectors, 
if the root causes of backwardness around the world  – and of 
genuine environmental degradation  – are to be tackled. 
 Alongside other investments, though, energy can help 
humanise the planet and make it a delight to live on. Human 
beings are multi-talented. 









human beings can do more than just survive. They can make 
the environment a place where they can better realise their 
potential.
 This chapter shows that:
 
Energy firms and the state have abdicated responsibility for •	
technological advance, preferring displacement activities 
in finance and elsewhere.
This abdication isn’t peculiar to the energy sector, but •	
general to capitalism today. Environmentalist theory, 
however, represents it as a virtue.
Adapting to climate change isn’t as desirable as developing •	
a 30-50 year gale of new-generation technologies, in 
energy and elsewhere, aimed at transforming the planet 
in a human direction.
To meet the world’s needs means to recover a sense of human 
capabilities in innovation, both in and beyond the energy sector. 
 It’s vital that people get serious about basic scientific 
research conducted entirely for its own sake. In March 2008, 
Britain’s Science and Technology Facilities Council announced 
that it could no longer finance Cheshire-based Jodrell Bank, one 
of the world’s leading centres of radio astronomy. As The Times 
noted, the proposed saving of £2.5m a year was equivalent to the 
grants and subsidies paid out to the Prince of Wales in 2007. 2
 In 2008, the heir to the British throne gets more funding 
than research into fundamental aspects of the universe. There’s 
no predictable or measurable ‘pay-off’ for basic physics, so it’s 
left to languish. In 2004, the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) showed just how much nuclear fusion 
is valued in Britain. In its largest ever grant allocation, the EPSRC 
lavished £48m on the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) at 
its Culham site in Oxfordshire. Over four years, this amounted to 
just £12m a year. 3
 People need to know how contemptuous Western elites 
























Baby you must drive my car: Prince Charles, deep Green heir 
to the monarchy in the UK and no fewer than 15 other 
sovereign states, including Canada, Jamaica, Australia, New 
Zealand and Papua New Guinea. In 2008 Charles let it be 
known that, as King Charles III, he would depart from the 
practice of previous British monarchs and go  ‘speaking out’ on 
matters of importance. Can he hope to address the US 
Congress so as to raise its awareness of global warming?
already met, used the opening of the CERN Large Hadron 
Collider experiment in Geneva in 2008 to suggest that it was ‘all 
very well’ to search for fundamental particles, but that ‘we need 
to pull people towards perhaps the bigger challenges where the 
outcome for our civilisation is really crucial’ – in other words, 









 This is very wrong. To get a great deal more energy, the 
world needs to do a great deal more basic science research – 
including particle physics research. In the long term, research 
driven by curiosity lays the basis for radical innovations, in energy 
just as much as in any other sector.
 It’s tragic that King can see no higher aspiration for 
science than to assure survival.
Research, investment and the Enron paradigm
In 1969, Robert Rathbun Wilson, the US physicist who built 
Fermilab, the world’s highest-energy particle accelerator 
laboratory, addressed the Congressional Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy. Rhode Island Senator John Pastore asked Wilson 
to spell out what research into high-energy particle physics would 
do to improve the defence of the United States. 
 Wilson gave a reply that went down in scientific history. 
Fermilab, he said, had ‘nothing to do directly with defending our 
country, except to make it worth defending’. 5 
 Civilisation needs to recreate the pride in human curiosity 
that Wilson evoked. Research into the secrets of the nucleus, like 
earthbound or space-bound technology that improves mankind’s 
grasp of the cosmos, is worth defending in its own right – even if 
it brings no benefits to energy supply.
 That said, we’ve no doubt that such research will, over 
the course of the 21st century, help the world put together some 
impressive advances in the generation and transmission of 
energy.
 In Chapter 1 we highlighted the West’s slothful record on 
innovation, especially in energy. As the IPCC’s Working Group 
III puts it, atechnology and R&D response to the challenge of 
climate ‘has not occurred’. 6
 In the US, weak investment by general business is the 
context for dismal investments in energy R&D, whether public 
or private. Between 1959 and 2007, the ratio of gross private 
investment to America’s GNP hovered around 15 per cent. By 
























of gross fixed investment to GDP mostly exceeded 25 per cent. 
In China in 2004, the ratio of total fixed capital formation to GDP 
was an astonishing 41 per cent. 7 Worse, from 1999 to 2005, 
US outlays on non-residential equipment and software dropped 
from 55 to 45 per cent of gross private fixed investment, while 
those on housing rose from little more than 25 per cent to nearly 
40 per cent.  8
Enduring example: Enron’s preference for 
finance over actually supplying energy remains 
an inspiration to energy firms the world over. 
Here, workers carry out boxes from the 
company’s Houston HQ after it declared 









 US investment has tilted toward housing and, since 
2005, toward commercial property. The main innovations have 
been in finance, not engineering or energy. In the US but also 
beyond, ‘new product development’ often has little to do with 
technological innovation, and everything to do with new forms of 
finance. And nowhere has the broad financialisation of the firm 
and of industry been clearer than in energy. 
 The practices of Enron – once the world’s largest firm 
trading energy and America’s seventh biggest corporation – have 
proved more exemplary than exceptional. Just as Enron started 
out mainly in gas pipelines and ended up mainly in financial 
instruments known as derivatives, so the ‘business models’ 
favoured by energy firms today tend to focus on streams of 
revenue, not streams of fuel 
 Derivatives are ways of betting on the price movements of 
a thing rather than buying the thing itself. 9 During the post-war 
boom, one could bet on the future price only of basic commodities 
such as wheat. But in 1972, the collapse of fixed rates of 
exchange for currencies led the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
to offer international businesses the chance to speculate and 
especially insure themselves through bets on currency futures. 
Then, in 1974 and 1978 respectively, gold and energy futures 
began to be traded. 
 Today’s market for derivatives, however, only emerged in 
the 1980s, when the discipline of risk management expanded 
out from corporate finance departments into every aspect of 
business practice. 10 It was in the 1980s that the desire to 
hedge against the future price of everything – currencies, interest 
rates, raw materials, the stock market – established burgeoning 
derivatives markets not just on exchanges, but also among 
private parties.
 In the late 1990s, Enron began to offer derivatives related 
to energy prices and future weather conditions over the Web. In 
this way it was able to capitalise on investors’ fears. Meanwhile, 
the relative weakness of US business investment, again born of 
























Enron to borrow – at low rates of interest.
 Enron went bankrupt on 2 December 2001. But risk 
aversion and plentiful cash persisted. As a result, other energy 
derivatives traders filled Enron’s place, while traditional energy 
concerns such orientated their operations toward finance in a 
big way. Indeed, as Vijay Vaitheeswaran, energy correspondent 
for the Economist presciently put it in 2003, ‘the heart and soul 
of Enron’s strategy (minus the fraud of course) is alive and well 
in energy circles’. 11 
 When Enron’s former chief executive and chairman, the 
late Kenneth Lay, was convicted of fraud and conspiracy in 
May 2006, Representative Michael Oxley, co-author of the bill 
that became known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, was 
forthright. The end of Lay’s trial, Oxley said, would mark ‘the end 
of a dark era’. But in fact the darkness continues today, because 
even genuine suppliers of energy now have the same impulses 
as Enron. 
 Enron’s final CEO, Jeffrey Skilling, pioneered the doctrine 
that its old physical assets were not worth having. All that was 
important was revenue streams. And this remains broadly the 
doctrine of energy companies. Just as governments have wanted 
to break up monopolies in energy and insisted that energy utilities 
should not own power stations, so utilities have been happy to 
sell their assets – or through Special Purpose Vehicles, get them 
off the balance sheet. The result is that many firms in today’s 
energy sector pay little attention to energy supply or innovation. 
 Energy assets are bought and sold as financial instruments, 
not as instruments for raising output, increasing productivity, or 
lowering carbon emissions. As electric power industry veteran 
Jason Makansi makes clear in his book Lights Out (2007), about 
40 per cent of power generation in the US is not financed, built 
or operated by utilities. The upshot is:
‘Financial engineering takes precedence over physical 
engineering. With respect to the electricity system, the 









and selling assets than they are investing in those assets 
for the long term. When you’re playing for the big money 
in this game, short-term return on increased transactions 
always trumps long-term investment in upgrading – or 
even maintaining – infrastructure.’ 12
As Makansi also notes of the US, it isn’t just power plants that 
change hands: so do gas and electric utilities. Since the 1980s, 
the energy sector has helped deepen capitalism’s general 
preference for corporate acquisitions over innovation. 13 Even 
in Europe, where national energy champions remain strong, 
acquisitions have multiplied. 14 Meanwhile investment banks 
such as Goldman Sachs exchange billion-dollar titles to future 
revenue streams from energy; and, through energy traders, 
corporate buyers of energy play energy markets so as to exact 
the maximum cost savings. 
 Is all this financialisation of energy just a product of its 
deregulation? No. 
 In 1986, Margaret Thatcher privatised British Gas. There 
followed a decade of UK energy privatisations. After that, the 
EU gradually let independent power companies compete with 
state-owned energy firms for large clients, then small ones, and 
– most recently – for householders. 
 Yet privatisation, liberalisation and increased competition 
were never equivalent to deregulation. Many Europeans think 
of America, and especially Texan oil, as a free-market brawl. 
But US capitalism, its banks and its energy sector have long 
been regulated. Indeed, after the Crash of 2008, the regulation 
of banks went into overdrive. On top of the Keynesian ‘mixed 
economy’ of the Cold War, in which taxes on private employers 
helped fund state-run industries and services, the private 
production of energy now occurs in a context of growing state 
regulation, legislation, intrusions and enforcement.
 In that kind of context, genuine innovations in energy 

























A dry run for energy services: turning complaints 
about energy into… a state service
In The Culture of Complaint (1993), the Australian critic Robert 
Hughes brilliantly attacked a divisive trend: approaching politics 
as a plaintiff or a supplicant victim. 15 
 Consumer complaints about energy utilities were not 
among Hughes’ chosen targets. Nevertheless, but he implicitly 
anticipated how, in 1998, complaining about utilities became 
institutionalised. In New South Wales, Australia, six electricity 
suppliers and one transmission company set up an Ombudsman 
to handle complaints. 16 In Ontario, Canada, the Ontario 
Energy Board became officially responsible for investigating all 
complaints about energy. 17 
 In 1999, Britain’s Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(OFGEM) was formed. Today, it declares the protection of 
consumers its ‘first priority’. In 2000, too, the British government 
also established Energywatch, a watchdog whose mission was 
‘to get the best deal we can for energy consumers’. 18
 Posturing politicians like to present the consumer as 
vulnerable to rapacious energy utilities, always out to rip people 
off on prices and skimp on customer service. But the purpose 
of this right-on populism is only to help the state more easily 
insinuate its policies into people’s heads and homes. 
 Once complaining about energy is given state sanction, 
there’s no stopping it. Thus in 2005, Britain’s House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee, chaired by rightwing Conservative 
MP Edward Leigh, complained about Energywatch. Only two per 
cent of Britons, Leigh protested, had heard of Energywatch. It 
hadn’t supported complaints vociferously enough. 19
 Today energy in the UK builds on this cloying approach 
to social cohesion. Energy is more about the state ‘protecting’ 
helpless householders than it is about leaps in the productivity of 
energy production. Every aspect of the household’s consumption 









Energy services distract from energy  
supply – and help the state control lifestyles
With energy services, the supply of power and heat to a home 
or organisation is nothing compared to the multi-faceted service 
relationships that electricity and gas utilities now want with their 
customers. Forget kilowatts and kilojoules; think billing, call 
centres, web sites and IT systems for customer relationship 
management. Utilities now believe that their task is to increase 
customer loyalty, stop customers defecting to other suppliers 
(‘churn’), flaunt Green credentials, and build trust – not just with 
consumers, but also with state regulators.  
 Here, energy utilities are very similar to retail banks and 
telecommunications providers. In Europe, 
‘… a product that was once a basic commodity – electricity 
– is getting a marketing makeover and is being sold with 
dynamic pricing, special offers and tailor-made deals. 
Some companies are offering the electricity equivalent of 
weekend minutes, special offers for Saturday and Sunday 
when overall demand is lower.’ 20 
This is what energy innovation has now been largely reduced to 
– discounts for use at weekends. 
 Of course, consumer lobby groups and governments insist 
that energy utilities adopt particular price regimes, and call on 
them to display thoroughly ethical conduct, transparency and all 
the rest. But for householders, problems – though by no means 
insuperable – often lie elsewhere. Often, genuine differences 
between energy providers are hard to discern, bills impenetrable, 
call centres lethargic, sales calls legion, junk mail enormous, 
and meter inspections a hassle. In the UK, even those websites 
that claim to clarify the confusion can end up adding to it. 21
 In energy services, the ghost of Enron lives on. It’s possible 
to be in the virtual, financial energy business more than in real 
























more sinister than frilly marketing and pricing: a state intent on 
reforming the behaviour of the citizen at home.
 In 2003, the British government crowed that, rather than 
simply selling electricity and gas, 
‘Energy services focus on the outcome the customer 
wants – such as warm rooms and hot water – and offer 
the most cost-efficient way of achieving it. Under an 
energy services contract a supplier might, for example, 
install insulation or a more efficient boiler in a customer’s 
home, and recoup the investment through the quarterly 
bill over, say, 3 to 5 years. The householder uses less 
energy as a result, and the savings on the energy bill are 
used to repay the cost of the measures. So, worthwhile 
home improvements are installed with no upfront cost 
to the householder, who benefits from a warmer, more 
comfortable home and lower energy bills for years to 
come once the initial investment has been repaid. Some 
have called this approach selling “negawatts” instead of 
“megawatts”.’
In sum, ‘Energy services could help to overcome consumers’ 
reluctance to invest in energy efficiency improvements’. 22
 In fact, it was Amory Lovins who, at the end of the Cold 
War in 1989, announced the idea of negawatts – counting up 
reductions in energy use as if these amount to increases in 
energy supply. 23 But what Lovins’ negawatts mean today is that, 
instead of innovations in energy supply, there’s a labour-intensive 
government drive to: 
patch up Britain’s ageing housing stock to make it more •	
energy efficient










The ostensible purpose is to save money and household CO2 
emissions – although as Chapter 2 mentioned, less than 15 
per cent of Britain’s CO2 comes directly from houses. The real 
purpose is to overcome the British consumer’s rather proper 
‘reluctance’ to suffer disruptive home improvements for little 
financial or environmental benefit.
  
 
Why UK householders won’t go Green 
In the summer of 2008, the UK householder’s bill for energy 
was set to top £1300 – high not just for the poor, but for 
middle-class homeowners too. 24 In the autumn of the same 
year, Gordon Brown announced a £1bn initiative to go about 
‘helping people make long-term savings through cutting the cost 
of energy through insulating, draught-proofing, getting better 
heating in their homes and taking all the conservation measures 
that are necessary’. 25 Indeed Brown aimed at the insulation of 
all Britain’s homes, where practical, by 2020. 26
 The problem is that going Green in home energy means 
more than just adding insulation. 27 
 Insulating walls and roofs does indeed cut fuel bills. 28 But 
done without controlling moisture vapour and without improving 
ventilation, the result is condensation and mould. It’s impossible 
to properly renovate homes without disruption and expense, as 
15 years of German research into a housing concept free of 
central heating – the Passivhaus – shows. 29
 Nor will insulation alone meet the ‘zero carbon’ 
requirement of Level 6 of the government’s Code for Sustainable 
Homes – an extraordinary regulation demanded of all new 
UK homes in 2016, and of all new commercial buildings in 
2019. 30 To maximise energy efficiency means redesigning 
complete building envelopes to incorporate heat recovery through 
mechanical ventilation systems. 31 In practice, that would require 
making houses with integral air-conditioning, or ‘active houses’.
 Insulation is one thing on which British state policy is 
























through wind turbines or solar panels, for instance – is another. 
 To achieve significant CO2 savings through microgeneration, 
officialdom has conceded, householders must export the 
electricity they generate domestically at prices equal to those 
offered on the National Grid. For that highly unlikely prospect, 
each household will need three separate meters to collect data 
on electricity imports, exports, and generation. 32 More recently, 
one government energy quango has discovered that between 
10 to 80 per cent of new homes may not be able to meet the 
current definition of ‘zero carbon’. 33
 People are right to suspect that insulation and 
microgeneration may turn out to be a fool’s errand. No wonder 
the government finds them ‘reluctant’ to change their behaviour, 
even when it insists that efficiency measures are ‘demonstrably 
cost effective’. 34 
  
The British state wants to change the population’s behaviour. It 
wants energy utilities to become expert not in energy innovation, 
but in loft insulation. 35 Utilities in the UK, therefore, now focus 
on new kinds of billing, ‘smart’ meters to measure home energy 
usage, and on assisting households in the microgeneration of 
energy. Strategies like this, a White Paper argues, help suppliers 
develop ‘alternative business models’. 36 
 What, though, is meant by this phrase? After all, the 
respect Fortune magazine paid to such models allowed it to 
name just one firm as America’s Most Innovative Company in 
each of the six years from 1996 to 2001. 
 That firm was Enron. And what Fortune held to be so 
innovative about Enron was its alternative business model: the 
practice of trying to make money not through energy supply, 
but through IT-based derivatives markets, in energy and other 
sectors.
































Today’s theoretical crisis around innovation
According to Fortune, Gary Hamel is the world’s leading expert 
on business strategy. He’s certainly charismatic – and he’s often 
acute. Back in 2000, he observed:
‘Spin-offs, de-mergers, share buybacks, tracking stocks, 
efficiency programs – all these things release wealth, but 
they don’t create new wealth. Neither do mega-mergers. 
These strategies don’t create new wealth because they 
don’t create new markets, new customers, or new revenue 
streams.’ 37
Hamel was right. The flatlands of finance have preoccupied 
Western multinationals – much more, we might add, than the 
stormy seas of the laboratory. But alongside this unfortunate 
trend, theories of innovation have also grown more conservative. 
Even Hamel has a little bit of form here, through his notoriously 
uncritical praise for the ‘grey-haired revolutionaries’ at a certain 
American company: you guessed it, Enron. 38 
 To understand how someone as clever as Hamel could 
make the same judgment as Fortune, we must go back to the 
20th century brain most associated with casting technological 
innovation in a progressive economic role: the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950). Beginning with him, we can 
hope to understand today’s theoretical crisis around innovation 
– the cultural context for the contemporary paralysis of energy 
innovation in practice.
Guru’s guru: Gary Hamel. Probably the most 
brilliant management thinker now that Peter 
Drucker is dead, Hamel nevertheless got in a 









Schumpeter’s ‘gale of creative  
destruction’ vs business models
Publishing his classic book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
in the US in 1942, Schumpeter showed himself a stronger 
advocate of technology than Veblen. 39 It wasn’t hard to be 
impressed by the technological advances achieved by America 
in wartime: for example, Schumpeter intriguingly noted that 
corporate ‘safeguarding activities’ such as insuring or hedging 
were not only about long-period contracts in advance, but 
also about patents and ‘temporary secrecy of processes’. 40 In 
Schumpeter’s day, one hedged with technological innovations, 
not just financial ones. 
 When, however, he famously described capitalism as 
being in a ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’, Schumpeter 
wasn’t just reflecting on technological advance during the war. 
Competition with and the destruction of commercial rivals now 
occurred, Schumpeter argued, not by price, product quality or 
sales volume, but by a new, ‘powerful lever’ behind long-term 
improvements in output and cheapness: new consumer goods, 
technologies and methods of production or transport, as well 
as new markets, sources of supply and forms of organisation. 
Thus technology formed only a part of Schumpeter’s approach 
to economic development. 41 
 We agree that technology is only a part – today, an 
underrated part – of economic development. Similarly, when 
Hamel upheld in 2000 both ‘non-linear’ innovation in and the 
continuous improvement of the basic components of a business, 
as well as continuous process improvements in its complete 
system, we believe that he captured three important aspects 
of innovation. Nor do we fret about his fourth aspect, which 
Theorist of innovation: the social-democratic 
economist Joseph Alois Schumpeter. Briefly 
Austria’s minister of finance after the First World 
War, Schumpeter moved to Harvard in 1932, 

































was both radical and systemic: ‘business concept’ innovation. 
Within the confines of inter-firm competition, above-average 
profits may indeed come not from directly confronting rivals, but 
from avoiding them – by offering the customer big, innovatory 
differences from what is already on the market. 42
 But in a world of governments, not just firms, innovation 
cannot be reduced to inter-firm competition. Worse, in Hamel’s 
framework, variety ‘in all components of the business model’ 
tended to relativise the role of technology in innovation. Indeed, 
while Hamel held that Schumpeter’s gale of creative destruction 
had become a hurricane, 43 he missed the key change in the 
weather: top managers’ enthusiasm for alternative business 
models of a very financial type. And that was why Hamel eulogised 
Enron’s ‘new core competences’ in fields ‘such as finance, law, 
insurance, credit analysis, and energy market analysis’. 44
 Hamel also applauded IKEA and Virgin Atlantic as 
‘innovators’ that were ‘not technology pioneers’. Innovation in 
business concepts, he argued, often had:
‘… little to do with new technology… Technology, especially 
IT, is available to all. The question is whether you can 
apply that technology in a unique way.’ 45
But technology isn’t available to all. IT isn’t, as Nicholas Carr 
argues, a commodity like electricity – although it would be good 
if electricity itself were to remain in cheap and plentiful supply. 46 
In both IT and energy technologies, as in others, there is scarcity. 
But the scarcity is not of precious natural resources, but of great 
knowledge, investment and ambition.
 Today’s experts in innovation give a nod to R&D; but they 
add and implicitly prefer just about any other stratagem to it. In 
2008, a committee of US academics and top CEOs (Microsoft, 
IBM, 3M, UPS) defined innovation as: 
‘The design, invention, development and/or implementation 
























organisational structures, or business models for the 
purpose of creating new value for customers and financial 
returns for the firm.’ 47
Here business models have the last word, and innovation can 
mean whatever you want. The only reference to energy reported 
on is Wal-Mart’s ‘stretch’ goals of a 25 per cent more efficient 
trucking fleet in three years and a 20 per cent reduction in energy 
use in new stores in four years. 48
 To reach these goals, Wal-Mart will no doubt have to make 
more Green changes than it has already done. But to represent 
measures to improve energy efficiency and conservation as the 
same as innovation – that really is a stretch.
 
 
A brief history of business models 
Too many of today’s ‘new’ business models turn out to be very 
familiar ways by which firms can enhance revenue streams – 
without making much technological innovation. The ways are 
familiar because they derive, ultimately, from the realm of 
finance. 
 
Type of model Example Date
Nearly free media Ochs, Pulitzer, Hearst 1890
Blades, not razors King Gillette 1905
Easy credit Henry Ford around 1911
Hire purchase Radio Rentals 1950s, 1960s
Software and consumables Xerox Corporation Hewlett-Packard, Sony 1960s
Subscriptions AOL 1980s
Pay As You Go  Mobile phones 1990s
Pre-payment meters Energy utilities 1899, 2000s 49










These models have in common:
a limited amount of genuine technological innovation•	
a stress on expensive, high-margin consumables and •	
software 
an attempt to drive up switching costs on the part of users •	
(‘lock-in’ to proprietary systems)
a reliance on advertising, branding, retailing, franchising •	
and more or less regular ‘hits’ on users’ finances.
Mobile phone companies, digital TV broadcasters and Internet 
Service Providers have scores of formulae for their subscriptions 
and call rates. In energy, utilities do something similar. The net 
result, however, has been consumer annoyance that, for all 
the babble about payment regimes, basic service can often go 
wildly wrong. 
 
User-centredness and open 
innovation: cop-outs from R&D
The revered management consultants Booz Allen likewise 
downplay R&D. After long experience and exhaustive enquiries, 
Booz Allen confirmed in 2008 that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between corporate expenditure on R&D 
and corporate financial performance. Yet R&D is, by its nature, 
an unpredictable affair – so why would spending on it tally nicely 
with a firm’s market performance? 
 We’ve seen that R&D, and especially energy R&D, has 
long been stagnant in the West. Exactly at this moment, however, 
Booz Allen proposes that ‘just throwing money’ at R&D ‘isn’t the 
answer’. 50 
 In fact, throwing money at energy R&D would make a 
change. But a culture of passing the buck to others has made 
taking responsibility for investments in R&D as exceptional in the 
energy sector as it is in other sectors. 
























that any source of innovation is valuable so long as it does not 
emanate from a company’s own efforts in technology. Like 
business models, dogmas of user-centred, open, outsourced 
and networked ecosystems of innovation are always presented 
as new intellectual breakthroughs. But with the same old ideas, 
breathlessly expressed, there’s also the same old insouciant 
tone about innovation’s technological aspects. 
 With the rise of the PC and of Apple in the 1980s, both 
Americans and Europeans have called for products, systems and 
the innovation process itself to orientate more to ‘users’. 51 But 
while energy suppliers, like other firms, still have plenty to learn 
about their customers, the logic of user-centred innovation in 
energy today is for governments to shrug off their duty to provide 
for the macrogeneration of energy, and instead leave households 
to engage in microgeneration.  
 What user-centredness means in energy, Gordon Brown 
made clear in his UN speech on stand-by lights (see Chapter 2). 
Brown boasted that, in the UK,
‘(W)e are pioneering risk based regulation… only on the 
basis of risk will we demand information, form filling and 
inspection.
  ‘We are recognising too that even the most 
basic addition of information can play a powerful role 
in making self-driven change happen: providing people 
with their right to information enables them to meet their 
responsibilities for environmental change.
  ‘In Britain… we are now piloting better labelling 
on electric goods and smart meters in home.’ 52
Here ‘responsibilities for environmental change’ are to be 
exercised by consumers. Governments must merely label and 
meter popular energy use so that people can engage in ‘self-
driven’ change. 
 In fact, copping out of technological initiative in favour 









trend first upheld by America’s Henry Chesbrough. In his 
Open Innovation (2003) and Open Business Models (2006), 
Chesbrough argued that large, vertically-integrated firms needn’t 
reinvent the wheel, but should instead rely on others to innovate 
for them. Innovation must change from ‘closed’ to ‘open’, basing 
itself on a ‘landscape of abundant knowledge’ that lay well 
beyond central research labs – knowledge lying with customers, 
yes, but also with other companies, suppliers, universities, 
national laboratories, industrial consortia, and start-up firms. 53
 Chesbrough missed the point that the world still confronts 
not a knowledge economy, but rather a relative scarcity of 
knowledge. Instead, by praising sources of innovation external to 
the firm, he upheld the outsourcing of innovation. 
 That was music to the ears of the large, vertically-
integrated firms that still dominate the world’s energy sector. 
They do precious little of their own R&D. Among energy firms 
that in 2006/7 led the sector in the R&D, the average ratio of 
R&D to sales is dismal:
How much R&D groups of energy firms did on average 
in 2006/7, as a percentage of sales 54
Sector Average R&D  
as a percentage  
of sales
Firms
Electricity 0.9 AREVA, EdF, Korea Electric Power 
(EP), Tokyo EP, Kansai EP, Chubu EP, 
Vattenfall, Hydro-Quebec, Kyushu 
EP, Tohoku EP, Taiwan Power, EP 
Development, Chugoku EP, ENDESA, 
British Nuclear Fuels
Gas, water & multiutilities 0.3 RWE, Suez, GdF, Veolia Environnment, 
Osaka Gas, Tokyo Gas, Nalco
Oil and gas producers 0.3 Royal Dutch Shell, TOTAL, Exxon Mobil, 
Petroleo Brasiliero, PetroChina, Gazprom, 
BP, China Petroleum & Chemical, Eni, 
Statoil, ConocoPhilips, Norsk Hydro, 

























Networked ecosystems of innovation
Shortly after Chesbrough’s works were published, McKinsey 
agreed with him. Noting how firms worldwide expected big 
revenues from licensing their intellectual property (IP) out to 
others, McKinsey argued conversely that it was vital to license in 
ideas from the outside. 55
 Outside in or inside out, McKinsey’s focus on the market 
for technology licenses highlighted money-spinning transactions 
in IP more than the hard job of applying it. As McKinsey observed, 
companies licensing in IP from outside ‘not only develop better 
products but also gain a better understanding of IP markets.’ 56
 For us, the business drive toward outsourcing grows 
not just from concerns about costs, but also from a broader 
sensitivity to the risk of doing things in-house. However, 
outsourcing itself is also felt to carry serious risks. 57 That’s why 
Business Week, noting ‘the new not invented here syndrome’ 
among US IT firms, soon worried about them perhaps going too 
far in outsourcing innovations from Asia. 58 Others contended 
that innovation couldn’t all be outsourced. 59 Nevertheless, 
the general consensus on innovation today is to discover and 
rediscover the open sort. 60
 Even in insightful works on innovation, business models 
retain their allure. 61 Meanwhile innovation, when open, is vaunted 
as happening through networks. 62 And though government 
support for open innovation might differentiate between large 
and small firms, it should also focus on ecosystems of firms. 63 
Openness is also favoured inside the firm – between departments 
and across functions. Lastly, innovation is often presented as a 
combination of existing technologies. 64
 In energy, combination can indeed help innovation. 
But combining energy technologies demands hard work and 
resolution. It cannot be a substitute for in-depth, specialised 
knowledge and investment in particular disciplines. 
 As with our old friend Alfred Marshall, today’s fondness for 









an emphasis on wealth created not directly, but through factors 
external to the firm. The premises are that 
the world has become a knowledge economy•	
the knowledge that counts is available, but just needs to •	
be distributed, or networked, more sensibly. 
Yet people no more live in a knowledge or network economy 
than they live in a consumer society. Knowledge is the basis for 
innovation, but the fact is that the world doesn’t have enough 
of that either. People never lived in the atomic age or the space 
age. They are not engaged in life after the oil crash; 65 nor, as 
we have said (see Chapter 5), are they about to move into a 
hydrogen economy. 66
 Open, networked ecosystems of innovation represent a 
disingenuous reading of the field through the spectacles of IT and 
of biology. There’s no reason why technological and other kinds 
of innovation should resemble the flow of electrons around a 
physical grid, and no reasons why the conscious, human activity 
of innovation should emulate the unconscious, Darwinian world 
of random mutation and natural selection. 
 Analogies and metaphors are all very well. But only in 
today’s dumbed-down society can they successfully pass as 
theories. As we’ll see, 
to present innovation in ecological terms is a new twist on •	
an old myth. Indeed, the illusion that the Earth’s ecosystem, 
rather than human activity, is the key source of wealth is 
now deeply embedded in mainstream economics
genuinely innovative physical grids – in IT, but also beyond •	
it – are more important to a humanised planet than 
























Does today’s boom in wind turbines amount  
to a Schumpeterian gale of creative destruction?
Creative destruction, Schumpeter said, should be assessed 
over decades or centuries. 67 But in a footnote, he also wrote 
of ‘discrete rushes’ of the new, ‘separated from each other by 
spans of comparative quiet’. 68 Either way, do renewable forms 
of energy today amount to a gale of new consumer goods, 
technologies and methods of production or transport? Do they 
also amount to a gale of new markets, sources of supply and 
forms of organisation? Are we in a gale of the New, except that 
the new New is Green? In commercial competition, is it a case 
of who’s Greenest wins?
  These are difficult questions to answer. However, taking 
the period until 2050, and given everything we have said 
about the weakness of energy R&D and the financialisation of 
energy, some things are clear. The process of investing in Green 
technologies has already been going for about three decades, 
and has certainly received a boost in the most recent few years. 
However, the world is still at the very beginning of what promises, 
on current form, to be a lengthy process. The conservationist 
impulses and suspicion of human achievement and technology 
that characterise many environmentalists mean that the Green 
revolution in many people’s minds is still much bigger than the 
Green investment on the ground.
Some clear differences have also emerged between the 
early part of the 21st century and Schumpeter’s time. 
Schumpeter was pointing to the way in which the 
destructive side of capitalism, with its periodic recessions, had a 
positive role to play in clearing away the old as the new took its 
place. Yet today, the process of creative destruction is broadly 
not about market forces killing off older businesses to make 
space for new ones. Instead, it’s about regulation. 
In energy, on the side of creation, renewable technologies 
have gained and will continue to gain a foothold, not so much 









more often when the state mandates their use. Chapter 6 has 
shown that more than just the market is at play. While the 
wind sector is now becoming more independent of the state, 
it gained its start through state subsidies. It still depends a lot 
on mandatory targets for renewable energy set by the state. 
Solar has also relied on state subsidies, particularly in Germany 
and Japan, but it still isn’t economic. As we have seen in Chapter 
5, bioethanol gained its spurs with the help first of the Brazilian 
government, and then, in the EU, with measures organised 
from Brussels.
On the side of destruction, older energy businesses feel 
pressure not so much through market forces and competition as 
through a continuous ratcheting up of regulation.
 As yet, little destruction of old energy supply industries 
has taken place. To write off existing functional assets is expensive. 
If renewable energy was so cheap it simply put coal, gas and oil 
out of business – that would be real creative destruction. But 
the world’s miners, extractors and operators of conventional 
power stations are not about to lose all their jobs. The IEA points 
out that, without early retirement, three quarters of projected 
electricity output in 2020, and over half in 2030, will come from 
power stations operating in 2008. 69
No doubt some coal, gas and oil companies will go under 
in the current economic downturn. However, the general rule in 
the past has been long-term underinvestment more than outright 
closure. It would be easy to pin all the blame for underinvestment 
on regulatory difficulties. Nevertheless, the rise of regulation 
does act so as to reinforce today’s business models, which see 
new investment in physical infrastructure as a last resort.
It’s also true that shareholders are unlikely to complain if 
minimal investment results in shortages that force up prices.
In energy, there isn’t a real storm of new Green products 
and processes. Sometimes thoughtful, large-scale developments 
really do happen – but there are plenty of quack remedies 
out there too. Energise! has no doubts about the potential, in 
























highlighted the barriers to that kind of innovation. But so long 
as precaution and environmentalism dominate the thinking of 
society, today’s boom in wind turbines is unlikely to assume the 
dimensions of Schumpeter’s gale.
Energy conservation and IT
The International Telecommunications Union reports that 
IT ‘contributes’ about 2.0-2.5 per cent of worldwide GHG 
emissions. 70 And in and around UK private and public sector 
IT departments, the priority now given to reducing energy 
consumption has reached absurd new heights. 71 IT departments 
put pressure on vendors to build energy-efficient hardware. The 
facilities managers who run the buildings that house IT are also 
obsessed with cutting energy use. Meanwhile human resources 
departments add ‘buying Green’ to the criteria by which they 
appraise managers, all the while fervent in their hope that the 
War Against Climate Terror will prove a cause that every member 
of staff can rally around.
 Much of today’s agenda in IT is about energy-efficient 
hardware, processing-light software, server packaging and server 
disposal, and turning the lights out on data centres. None of 
these items, however, exemplifies Schumpeter’s gale of creative 
destruction. Though a whirlwind of uncritical acceptance of 
energy conservation has certainly overwhelmed IT managers as 
much as other professionals, saving money on the £3m that a 
typical data centre runs up in annual energy costs isn’t the kind 
of innovation Schumpeter had in mind. 
 In California it’s true, IT gurus now put money on all-
electric cars succeeding petrol or electric hybrids. Google CEO 
Eric Schmidt has offered a plan – backed up by investment 
by Google’s philanthropic arm – to get all US electric energy 
from renewables in 20 years and eliminate half of petrol 
consumption. 72 Meanwhile, Shai Agassi, a former president of the 
software giant SAP, has raised $200m to build an infrastructure 
of electric battery-swapping stations. 73









important innovations. But today’s parsimony and breast-beating 
about power for IT herald neither the emergence of a new sector, 
nor the radical reorganisation of an old one.
What the examples of energy innovation associated 
with IT show is that it’s only when innovators move beyond the 
narrow realm of consumption and efficiency that big gains are 
really there to be made. 
The pace of Green innovation is grindingly slow 
Take, as another example, BP Alternative Energy – BP’s non-fossil 
fuel activities. Founded in 2005, BP Alternative Energy was going 
to be accompanied by investments of $8bn over the following 10 
years. That sounded a lot; but from 2004 to 2007, BP’s total 
revenues and other income grew from just under $200bn to 
more than $291bn. Purchases, production and manufacturing 
expenses accounted for most expenditures; profits rose from 
$25bn to more than $30bn. 74 Whatever it’s measured against at 
BP, the £0.8bn invested each year by the company in Alternative 
Energy is chickenfeed.
 Let’s now inspect the record of the US, often a laggard 
in applying environmentalist policies on energy, and also of 
Germany, which has long prided itself on its leading role. Is there 
clear evidence of a Schumpeterian dynamic in either country’s 
energy sector?
 In the US, from the end of 2002 to the end of 2007, 
wind power notched up annual increases in generating capacity 
that averaged an impressive 29 per cent. But in generating an 
estimated 48 billion kWh in 2008, wind accounted for barely 
one per cent of US electricity supply. 75 Though no nuclear power 
stations are being built in the US right now, even Barack Obama’s 
boost to renewables is unlikely to build capacity the way coal and 
























Before Obama: planned capacity additions from  
new generators, by energy source, 2007 through 
2011, GW 76 
Source 2007      2008    2009     2010  2011
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0
Coal 1,679  920 12,611 6,839   7,649
Natural Gas 9,891 12,896 11,050 7,569 4,622
Petroleum 255 1 835 50 0
Renewables 5,714 2,032 350 217 56
Total 17,552 16,432 25,617 14,675 12,833
Renewables 
as percentage 
of total extra 
generating 
capacity
32.6 12.4 1.4 1.5 0
Here renewables were scheduled to take an important 33 
per cent of planned capacity increases in 2007. But after 
that, their contribution to increments in capacity was set for 
relative decline. 
 Looking at renewables in the production of US primary 
energy, the long-term prognosis of the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), again drawn up before Obama’s election 
victory,  was pessimistic: 
US: EIA 2008 projections for the production of primary 
energy, reference case, 2006-2030, quadrillion Btu 77
Source 2006 2010 2020 2030
Nuclear 8.21 8.31 9.05 9.57
Coal 23.79       23.97 25.2 28.63
Dry Gas 19.04 19.85 20.24 20.0
Petroleum 13.16 15.03 15.71 14.15
Renewables 6.71 8.48 11.42 13.57













Of course, these forecasts are highly debatable. They may reflect 
the modest environmentalist ambitions of the Bush years; but 
in the wake of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
December 2007, the EIA revised its growth forecasts upward for 
non-hydroelectric renewable energy. 
 Obama will ramp up renewable energy more rapidly still. 
But it will be very hard for him to leave a legacy such that, by 
2020, renewables take, say, a 20 per cent market share of US 
production. Yet only such a pace of development would really 
qualify for the cachet ‘Schumpeterian’. 
 What about Green cars in the US? Here there is rapid growth 
– but once again, from a very low base. The market share among 
new US cars taken by petrol or electric hybrids rose by more 
than 27 per cent over the year to January 2008. But hybrids still 
amount to little more than two per cent of new US car sales. 78 
The case of renewables in Germany
In Germany, renewables take more than 10 per cent of electric 
power generation, and GHG emissions are down by 17 per cent 
since 1990. Plans for 2020 are for: 
renewables to take 25 per cent of electricity supply – •	
not least, because nuclear power, which supplies more 
than a quarter of Germany’s electricity today, is due to 
end in 2025
GHG emissions to drop by as much as 40 per cent from •	
1990 levels.
It might, then, seem obvious that a Schumpeterian gale is 
underway. If German nuclear power is indeed wound down, for 
example, that would amount to creative destruction – if not by 
the market, then by popular disapproval.
 Yet for once, McKinsey’s observations may be right here. 
Authors from three of the company’s German offices suggest 
that the emissions reductions achieved so far follow ‘almost 
























emission power and industrial sectors of the old East Germany. 
The reunification of Germany in 1989 and the drawn-out changes 
in the East afterward had what McKinsey describes ‘a big one-
time effect’. 79 
 So, the end of the Cold War did bring a kind of Schumpeterian 
gale of creative destruction to East Germany. Energy and other 
plants were closed, or re-equipped, and the energy efficiency 
of industry improved. McKinsey also notes that Germany now 
has a strong opportunity to export Green technologies abroad 
– another sign of a gale. But as the consultancy adds, bringing 
more renewables and fewer emissions to Germany will be 
harder in the future than it has been in the past. Carbon 
capture and storage could make a big difference, but popular 
opposition to the infrastructure of CCS might stop that difference 
being made. 80
 
How Green are the world’s banks? 
In October 2007, Deutsche Bank’s asset management division 
appointed Mark Fulton to an exciting new role: that of Climate 
Change Strategist. By October 2008, the enthusiasm of division 
global head Kevin Parker for investing in Green infrastructure 
was still more palpable: carbon in the atmosphere had reached 
an 800,000 year high, and global warming might be ‘only a few 
years away from the point of no return’. 81
 So far, however, funereal banker alarmism about global 
warming has been matched only by caution about backing 
renewables at scale. A January 2008 report by Ceres, an alliance 
between investors and Greens, found that 23 out of 40 US 
and non-US banks surveyed mentioned climate change in their 
latest annual shareholder reports, and that the sample as whole 
published no fewer than 58 research reports on the subject just 
in 2007. ‘What this report can say with certainty’, it reassured 
itself, ‘is that climate change has galvanised the attention of the 
banking community’. 82









Deutsche Bank published an update of its thinking. By then, 
however, Mark Fulton had postponed the tipping point for ‘self-
sustaining global warming’. It was now ‘perhaps only 15 years 
away’. Perhaps that was why Deutsche’s new White Paper, 
Economic stimulus: the case for “Green infrastructure”, Energy 
Security and “Green” jobs, had kind words for improvements 
in the US electric power grid and funding for technologically 
proven renewables – but nothing to say about Deutsche Bank 
backing such projects. Instead, the bank strongly proposed a 
radical innovation in the US: the formation of… a Green National 
Infrastructure Bank. 83
 
Assessing the charge of ‘Greenwash’
From the practice and theory of innovation, through the examples 
of IT, BP, America, Germany and the world’s banks, there is 
little evidence that a Green, Schumpeterian gale of creative 
destruction is truly about to sweep through the world economy. 
But if big business hasn’t really yet gone Green, are all the 
advertisements and the bankers’ research reports on climate 
change just so much Greenwash – a cynical outburst of rhetoric, 
unmatched by genuine actions? 84
 In fact the accusation of Greenwash, though right about 
the low level of Green investments in practice, is itself too 
cynical.  When, in 1995, Greenpeace succeeded in whipping up 
an international campaign against Shell’s plan to dispose of its 
Brent Spar oil storage and tanker-loading buoy in the North Sea, 
it was a turning point in the evolution of Western elites. While 
Greenpeace filmed the offending buoy for £300,000 from bright 
orange helicopters, and went on to spend a further £1m on public 
relations around the whole affair, the children of Shell executives 
in Northern Europe were harassed in school playgrounds. Forty-
something Shell managers sensed that they were losing touch 
with society, and in the first place, with youth. From then on, 
their motives embraced not just profits and the bottom line, but 
























 That desire is real – whatever Green critics say. If Green 
technologies have yet to amount to a Schumpeterian gale, that 
isn’t because capitalist fat-cats are greedy or silver-haired creeps 
who are always on the take and always keeping great innovations 
in the filing cabinet because of a still greater short-term interest 
in profits. To explain sclerotic energy innovation, it’s glib simply 
to ‘follow the money’ behind the elite’s actions. 
 A hand in the till, a demanding Wall Street, a hoarding 
of super new technologies, the credit crunch – none of these 
things begin to explain what has retarded the drive toward 
innovation in the West. Rather, Energise! has highlighted how 
a longstanding history of vulgar economics, risk consciousness 
and financialisation has put the establishment into a straitjacket. 
It desperately wants to go Green, but finds it difficult to do so. 
 If elites were simply myopic about climate change, and 
so needed just to ‘see sense’ in order to be shaken into acting, 
Green investments and technologies would be everywhere. So 
why is business so reluctant to do more than pontificate about 
climate change? Not because it’s unconcerned, but rather 
because it has made weak innovation into a whole way of life. 
 Business seems unable to accelerate Green 
innovations, let alone the wider ones that are needed. That’s 
one more reason why people need to stop worrying about 
their personal carbon footprint, and start acting as citizens 
engaged in a political, society-wide mobilisation for a better 
energy supply, and for broader efforts to transform the planet 
in a human direction.
 In a moment we’ll conclude with some elements of the 
programme of transformation that we have in mind. For now, 
however, it’s worth recalling that innovation and economics 
are today interpreted as being to do with ecosystems. So let’s 
now briefly trace how a simple idea – that nature knows best – 
has come to put the dubious concepts of natural capital and 
ecosystem services into the mainstream of economics. Once 
that tracing is done, it will become clear how fundamentally 









The doctrine of natural capital
Today’s Greens argue that the natural world forms the bulk of the 
world’s wealth. But it was E F Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful 
(1973) that first introduced the idea of ‘natural capital.’ 
 Schumacher acknowledged the role of human beings in 
creating a ‘large fund’ of scientific, technological and other kinds 
of knowledge, as well as infrastructure and capital equipment. 
He noted, however, 
‘… all this is but a small part of the total capital we are 
using. Far larger is the capital provided by nature and not 
by man – and we do not even recognise it as such.’ 85
Schumacher’s first example of natural capital was inanimate: 
fossil fuels. ‘If we treated them as capital items, we should be 
concerned with conservation’, he claimed. 86 
 While squandering fossil fuels threatened civilisation, 
squandering ‘the capital of living nature’ threatened life itself. This 
second kind of natural capital, for Schumacher, was the animate 
world’s capacity to absorb pollution – a capacity, he claimed, 
that had been degraded by man’s synthesis of ‘compound 
substances unknown to nature’. Such activity, Schumacher 
argued, used up ‘a certain kind of irreplaceable asset, namely 
the tolerance margins which benign nature always provides’. 87 
 Today, natural capital is about lifeless resources, while 
the living natural world’s continuing and beneficial processes are 
termed ‘ecosystem services’. 
 Schumacher’s ideas, which drew upon Catholicism, 
had humanistic components. His divided loyalties came out 
in his famous phrase: ‘Man is small, and, therefore, small is 
beautiful’. 88 The phrase elevated man, making him the measure 
of the good, but at the same time diminished him with the 
proposition that, because of the size of his body, not his mind, 
smallness must prevail. 
























E F Schumacher: more humanistic than his successors
Born in Bonn in 1911, Schumacher went to Oxford in 1930, and 
then to Columbia University, New York City. Without completing 
his studies, he returned to Germany to work in banking. Then, 
with the rise of Nazism, he left for England again in 1936.
 Later interned as an enemy alien after war broke out, 
Schumacher was sent to labour in England’s fields, where he 
wrote on economics. Keynes spotted his work, and incorporated 
it in his proposal for a new Bank for International Settlements to 
manage finance between the post-war Western powers. 
 In 1950, Schumacher began 20 years as chief economic 
advisor to Britain’s National Coal Board. Given that the NCB 
employed no fewer than 800,000 people, energy soon became 
central to his thinking.
 In 1955, whilst acting as a UN advisor to Burma, he came 
to question ‘development’ and the way mainstream economics 
favoured simply maximising consumption. He felt that what was 
consumed really mattered.
 It was only after Small is Beautiful, however, that his ideas 
gained widespread recognition.
 Catholicism made Schumacher suggest that man live 
peacefully not only with others, ‘but also with nature and, above 
all, with those Higher Powers which have made nature and have 
made us’. He also insisted that science could not produce 
ideas by which people could live. The methods of physical 
science, he wrote, ‘cannot be applied to the study of politics 
or economics’. 89
 Schumacher was right there. By contrast, today’s Greens 
deify science – only to go on to invert Darwin by casting humanity 
as inferior to animals. For Greens, after all, human beings are 
culpable. And animals? They’re not just innocent, but provide 










 Schumacher was far-sighted in his designation of living 
organisms as a capital superior to fossil fuels. At the 1992 
Rio summit, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was 
signed alongside the better-known – and also legally binding – 
International Framework Convention on Climate Change. 90 Then, 
in 1997, Robert Costanza and others famously valued world 
natural capital and ecosystem services by adding up what people 
would pay to replace them. Constanza and his team found that 
the annual value contributed by 17 ecosystem services was $16-
54 trillion – much more than the world’s GNP of $18 trillion. 91
 For Schumacher, work wasn’t to be automated; rather, 
it was good for body and soul – and production methods and 
machines should ‘leave ample room for human creativity’. 92 
But Schumacher’s heirs ignored even this Catholic view of 
labour. With nature now worth trillions, their aim became simply 
to minimise its use. Thus in 1999, about their ‘next industrial 
revolution’, Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins and L Hunter Lovins 
said: ‘It is people who have become an abundant resource while 
nature is becoming disturbingly scarce’. 93 
 Labour was to be exploited; nature, left free. Technology 
had a role not to free mankind from toil and humanise the 
planet through higher labour productivity, but to win resource 
productivity – derive ‘four, ten, or even a hundred times as much 
benefit from each unit of energy, water, materials, or anything 
else borrowed from the planet and consumed’. 94 
 Here, technological innovation was once more constrained. 
Its purpose was not to serve thoughtful human beings, but to 
cosset plants, animals and inanimate nature.
Birth control for cars
For all their market-orientated praise for high technology, Hawken 
and the Lovinses cramped its potential and, in the process, 
denigrated human beings. Once they vaunted natural capital, 
their focus for innovation in energy had to be on efficiency and 
conservation in use – on ‘energy productivity instead of energy 
























they wanted ‘superwindow and efficient-lamp factories instead 
of power stations and transmission lines’. 96 ‘Hypercars’ could 
be ultra-light, ultra-low-drag and hybrid-electric or hydrogen-
powered; but the world also needed ‘birth control for cars’. 
Anyway, land use had to come before mobility, which was ‘a 
symptom of being in the wrong place’. 97 
 To want to travel was to be in the wrong place. Instead, 
Hawken and the Lovinses favoured a world in which land use 
was restrained – one which ‘put the places people live, work, 
shop and play all within five minutes’ walk of one another’. 98
 Though too miniaturised for many people, such a world at 
least sounds laid-back. But in playing up resource productivity, 
Hawken and the Lovinses were quite explicit that labour 
productivity should go down, not up. Resource productivity was 
‘a basis to increase worldwide employment with meaningful jobs’ 
and, indeed, safeguard against the loss of social cohesion. 99 The 
Hawken/Lovins ‘service paradigm’ meant that their meaningful 
factories making superwindows and efficient lamps would be 
‘considerably more labour-intensive’ than power stations – and 
that this was something to be celebrated.
 So you might, if Hawken and the Lovinses had their way, 
walk to work. But work might be just a little labour-intensive. 
Employment would be buoyant; but what exactly would you be 









Time to start manufacturing houses
The UN says nearly 100,000 new homes are needed every day 
if the world is to house its urban population by 2030, as well as 
re-house today’s 1 billion people living in urban slums.
The UN on world population, cities and homes, 2030 100 
Urban population, 2003 3,043,934,680
Estimated urban population, 2030 4,944,679,063
So:
Additional urban population 2003–2030 1,900,744,383
Population living in slums, 2001 923,986,000
So:
Nos in need of homes and urban services by 2030 2,824,730,383
Increase in households over 25 years 877,364,000
New housing units needed per year 35,094,000
New housing units needed per day 96,150
New housing units needed per hour 4,000
These figures may not be very accurate. 101 But clearly the 
world needs houses to be manufactured on a high-tech, high-
productivity, high-volume basis. That way, there could also be 
continuous competition over the basic energy efficiency of 
different types of houses. Moreover, once hi-tech, energy-saving 
technology for the home gets put into mass manufactured 
houses at the start of the production process, it will come cheap 
enough to attract even the most recalcitrant ‘consumer.’
 Boeing performs final assembly on its 777 planes on 
a line moving at nearly 4cm a minute. Already, too, Toyota 
manufactures 5000 homes a year at a plant at Kasugai. 102 So 
what is needed to meet the UN’s rough target of an annual 35m 
new homes for the world? About 7000 Kasugais.
 For today’s backward housebuilding industry, that 
























The UN’s Millennium Assessment  
popularises ecosystem services
In 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed that, just as 
the International Framework Convention on Climate Change took 
scientific advice from the IPCC, so the Convention on Biological 
Diversity also needed advice. Accordingly the UN, the World 
Bank, the Washington environmental think-tank World Resources 
Institute, together with various wealthy US foundations, set up 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA). In 2005, the MA 
published thousands of pages of reports. 103 Its board, which 
included representatives from Unilever, Lucent Technologies and 
Skanska, issued what it called ‘a stark warning’:
‘Human activity is putting such strain on the natural 
functions of Earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems 
to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for 
granted… Nearly two thirds of the services provided by 
nature to humankind are… in decline worldwide… the 
benefits reaped from our engineering of the planet have 
been achieved by running down natural capital assets.’ 104 
 
The MA broadly defined ‘ecosystem services’ as ‘benefits people 
obtain from ecosystems’, such as 
supporting – nutrient cycling, soil formation, primary •	
production
provisioning – food, fresh water, wood and fibre, fuel•	
regulating – climate, flood, disease, water purification•	
cultural – aesthetic, spiritual, educational, recreational. •	
An astounding diagram (see diagram on page 460) illustrated 
the ‘linkages’ between these services and human security, 
material goods, good health, good social relations and, ultimately, 










 For the MA, then, humanity’s engineering of the planet 
not only ran down natural capital, but also, through that process, 
destroyed the source of ‘human well-being’ itself. 
 Once nature is described as a capital, and its value added 
up in the usual Benthamite way, engineering could only be a bad 
idea – and minimising humanity’s imprint on nature became the 
way to reach ‘well-being’.
 The MA frames every modern problem as a product of 
human misdeeds with the environment. Take the MA Synthesis 
Report on Health. The diagram on the next page is said to 
describe ‘the causal pathway from escalating human pressures 
on the environment through to ecosystem changes resulting in 
diverse health consequences’. 106
 As we can see, the environment is held to have ‘impacts’ 
on almost every aspect of human health.
 Now, around the planet, floods, malnutrition and slums 
still constitute severe and urgent problems. As the MA also notes, 
a billion people lack access to safe water supplies, 2.6 billion 
lack adequate sanitation, and 3.2 million people die each year 
from water-associated infectious diseases. But why see access 
to clean water as a question of ecosystem services? If that were 
true, then the best strategy for increasing access to water would 
indeed be to minimise human impact. 
 Yet such a strategy would be absurd. In the developed 
world, access to clean water isn’t determined by ecosystem 
services. To turn on a tap isn’t to rely directly on nature, but 
upon a complex network of pipes, pumps, sewage works, dams 
and reservoirs. 
 If people had to rely directly on nature, cities like London, 
New York and Tokyo simply couldn’t exist. What cities demonstrate 
is that human infrastructure can massively multiply the quantity 
of water ‘provided’ by nature. 
 Human beings have always had to work up nature’s 
resources. Nature doesn’t, in a conscious or beneficent fashion, 
service humanity. As we’ve seen, those who laud ecosystem 
























clearly also imagine that nature works too hard for humanity. 
 The MA rightly argues that ecosystem degradation hits 
rural populations and the poor especially hard. 107 But this 
enforced dependence on nature isn’t itself a law of nature. 
Developed-world technologies can work among the poor.
 Malnutrition isn’t a simple product of degraded ecosystems. 
Yes, the poor depend heavily on the soil, and on the natural 
availability of water for irrigation. But again, that isn’t a reason 
why the technologies that have made agriculture so productive 
in the developed world cannot be applied among the poor.
 It’s equally wrong to root war, whether in Darfur now or 
in the Middle East later, in climate change. 108 Ever since the 
Enlightenment of which he was a part, the philosopher Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) has been accused of idealising 
nature and condemning civilisation. But at least he saw that 
human conflicts arise from society, not from nature. In 1754 
Rousseau explained:
‘The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, 
bethought himself of saying This is mine, and found people 
simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil 
society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from 
how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one 
have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up 
the ditch, and crying to his fellows, “Beware of listening to 
this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the 
fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to 
nobody.”’ 109
In 1642, in his De Cive, Thomas Hobbes had primitive life as a 
‘war of all against all’. For Rousseau, by contrast, every feature of 
human life, good and bad, only emerged after primitive man had 
left the state of nature and embarked on civilisation.
 Making a decent world, to repeat the point, means fixing all 
aspects of infrastructure, production and environment. So in that 









Only connect: how the UN’s Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment tries to link everything to ecosystem 
services
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energy and climate change. However, we already suggested in 
Chapter 3 that what we called the transformation of the planet is 
a better route to progress than the mitigation of CO2 emissions 
or adaptation to climate change.
 To give more detail on transformation, we now return 
to this triad. By thinking big and having faith in human talents, 
a programme of transforming the planet in the direction of 
humanism could do much for energy supply and CO2 reduction. 
 ‘Mitigation’ means, literally, to make a problem less bad. 
Certainly we want to mitigate the problem of climate change, 
and indeed other problems. But to alleviate is still to leave things 
as they were before.
 Preventing the Earth from warming more than a few 
degrees is sensible. But why not go further? 
 Mitigation is based on targets for concentrations of gases 
and aerosols in the atmosphere and for factors such as land use. 
So suppose that such a system were fully implemented. Far from 
bringing an end to ‘anthropogenic’ climate change, the system 
would for the first time make such change purposeful. Climate 
would become human and anthropogenic in its fullest sense. 
The idea of mitigation, then, implies that human beings have a 
preference about the kind of climate they want. Yet that is what 
the concept of geo-engineering is all about.
 Many environmentalists have come out against engineering 
the planet in this way on the grounds that humanity is just not 
up to it. Bill Becker, executive director of the Presidential Climate 
Action Project at the University of Colorado, explains that:
‘Geo-engineering is born of the dangerous conceit that 
human engineering is superior to nature’s engineering. In 
reality, the first wonder of the world is the world itself, a 
system that has taken billions of years to evolve through 
endless trial and error – or, depending on your cosmology, 
that was created by God – and that performs immeasurable 










About geo-engineering, climate sceptics often come surprisingly 
close to agreement with Greens. Philip Stott, Emeritus Professor 
of Biogeography at the School of Oriental and African Studies at 
the University of London, writes:
 ‘Climate is the most complex, chaotic, non-linear system. 
The idea that climate can be managed “in a predictable 
way” by manipulating one factor, carbon dioxide, out of 
the millions of factors involved is Alice-in-Wonderland 
science, with the verdict before the trial. This is the 
ultimate flaw: the sheer hubris of humans maintaining a 
“sustainable climate” vividly demonstrates the delusions of 
the sustainability myth.’ 111
We agree that geo-engineering is not easy, cheap, or even 
attainable in the short term. But we disagree that the aspiration 
to engineer is a ‘dangerous conceit’ or shows up the ‘sheer 
hubris’ of human beings. 
 Environmentalists don’t want to follow through on the 
consequences of mitigation. But they are even more nervous 
about adaptation. To the extent that humanity can adapt to 
climate change, there will be less of a problem to mitigate 
through the adoption of more ethical lifestyles. That’s anathema 
to Greens. 
The aspiration to go geo-engineering
Geo-engineering, the idea of engineering the earth on a planet-
wide scale, is an idea that the Greens love to hate. To them 
it takes human arrogance and impact on the planet to the 
highest degree.
 When geo-engineering is raised today as a way of 
coping with climate change, there are two responses. Green 
opponents denounce it as beyond the pale, suggesting that we 
have had quite enough human interference with the climate 
as it is. Its proponents take a surprisingly similar line, arguing 

























 The reluctance to back geo-engineering is very much a 
product of the nervous noughties. In many respects suspicion 
of climate engineering parallels that of nuclear power. Like 
atomic engineering, meteorology received a tremendous boost 
from the Second World War. During the Cold War there was a 
great deal of military interest in the possible use of weather 
modification in war. 
 James R Fleming points to the attempted use of weather 
modification by the US military in Vietnam as a turning point 
in attitudes. By 1977, a UN Convention on the Prohibition of 
Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques was in place. 112 
 Of course, modifying climate or the weather is not yet 
practical in the way that nuclear energy is. But people should 
be open to the possibility of such technologies being developed 
in the future. As with nuclear technology, the possibility of abuse 
is a reason to promote a humanist politics, not put the brakes 
on the whole idea of development.
 In reality, the prospect of geo-engineering is not so 
scary. After all, even the idea that people prefer a certain global 
temperature and will cut emissions or sequester carbon to 
achieve it is a modest step in the direction of geo-engineering. 
More generally, it’s far from surprising that recent interest in 
climate science has generated plenty of ideas for intervening 
in the climate.
 There’s increasing interest in geo-engineering. A recent 
special issue of the Royal Society’s Philosophical Transactions 
dealt with techniques such as cloud seeding clouds and fertilising 
and oceans. 113 These investigations are in their early stages. 
However, about the prospect of humanity reshaping the planet, 









More than adapting to the world,  
mankind has gone about transforming it
In the hyperbolic style preferred by many environmentalists, Mark 
Lynas has described adaptation as genocide – since adapting 
to a changed environment requires resources, and to rely on it 
means denying the poor the ability to deal with climate change, 
which leaves them to suffer the full consequences of this. 114 
But there can be no doubt that adaptation will play an important 
part in the future. Around the planet, humans live in a built 
environment, whether in the countryside or the city. The effect 
of the climate and weather on human beings depends as much 
on that built environment as it does on climate itself.
 Damage from hurricanes in the US, for example, has 
increased. Yet that isn’t because there are more severe storms, 
but because more people have built expensive properties in the 
path of these storms. If 2005 levels of development in the US 
are projected all the way back to 1900, the US has suffered no 
increasing trend in the damage caused by hurricanes – even 
including Hurricane Katrina. 115
 Protecting yourself against hurricanes has its place. Yet 
like mitigation, the way in which adaptation is interpreted today 
can reveal a sad narrowing of human horizons. Right away, for 
example, adaptation nowadays tends to connote biological 
adaptation through evolution. But when humans adapt, they do 
so with foresight. Evolution isn’t like that.
 More importantly, people don’t so much adapt to their 
environment, as adapt it to fit them. In extreme cases, they’ve 
carried a bubble of breathable atmosphere into outer space or 
to the bottom of the oceans.
 Third and most critical, it’s easy to overlook how, in the past, 
human beings haven’t so much adapted as totally transformed 
the planet – and how they retain the potential to pursue more 
transformation in the future.  
 In a comprehensive assessment of what’s known about 
























Michael Williams has shown that little of the world has been 
untouched over the millennia. After the Americas were discovered, 
Europeans saw the New World as virgin territory. But in fact 
indigenous populations had burned, cleared and foraged among 
forests, only for human diseases to usher in reforestation. In the 
shape of the land, humanity was already a key factor.
 As Williams suggests, there’s been a big switch over the 
decades, from colonial mindsets to a Green myth of natives 
living in harmony with nature. And that’s only made people still 
more myopic about humanity’s role in shaping the American 
landscape. Yet in the Americas, it’s probable that the forest 
landscape of 1750 was: 
‘… less humanised than that of 1492, when Indian 
numbers and their impact was [sic] at their peak. With such 
evidence, the terms presettlement and postsettlement 
should be consigned to the intellectual trash can. States 
of “natural” and “equilibrium” have probably not existed 
since the end of the Ice Age.’ 116
Whereas Williams brilliantly evokes the changing relationship 
between humanity and nature since the Ice Age, Lord Nicholas 
Stern fails to do that. Stern wrote: 
‘A warming of 5º C on a global scale would be far outside 
the experience of human civilisation and comparable to 
the difference between temperatures during the last ice 
age and today.’ 117
But like landing on the Moon, finding America was ‘far outside 
the experience of human civilisation’. And a temperature rise 
even of 5ºC in the future would take place in a context different 
from that which has occurred since the Ice Age. The difference 
is precisely human civilisation, and what it can now do – about 
climate change, and about everything else.









the land. In a famous paper, The Pristine Myth: The Landscape 
of the Americas in 1492, University of Wisconsin geographer 
William M Denevan wrote:
‘The tropical rainforest has long had a reputation for being 
pristine, whether in 1492 or 1992. There is, however, 
increasing evidence that the forests of Amazonia 
and elsewhere are largely anthropogenic in form and 
composition.’ 118
Above the treetops, the famous lost cities of Latin America are 
sometimes visible today, but only as the peaks of the highest 
temples. Yet these peaks just conceal the remains of a farming 
civilisation that first quelled the forests, then was buried under 
their re-advance. Concurring with Denevan that, in Latin America, 
there were no virgin tropical forests in 1492, Williams widens his 
insight about the era before that year:
‘Whether it was Europe, the Americas, Australia, New 
Zealand, or Asia, it was a far more altered world than we 
have ever thought.’ 119
Since civilisation began, humanity has continually changed the 
Earth. Today, know-alls distort that achievement to draw the 
most pessimistic conclusions. It’s as if mankind can’t credit itself 
with the improvements it has made over the centuries.
 The transformation to which Energise! looks forward will 
differ from those of old. Humans now know a lot about the 
environment, and can be more discriminating and ingenious in 
their handling of it. But transformation will not be based on the 
patronising premise that, in tackling a cure for AIDS, for example, 
‘money is not the answer’. 120 Nor will it be about everyone 
minimising their water footprint. 121 
 Transformation, as we’ve said, will be about major 

























Was it really only luck that brought humanity this far? 
According to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, best-selling author of The 
Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007), to 
argue that past successes result from anything other than luck is 
like ‘someone playing Russian roulette and finding it a good idea 
because he survived and pocketed the money.’ 122
 Taleb was once a trader on financial markets. There luck 
indeed plays a larger role than skill. But Taleb’s book suggests 
a wider role for luck, holding that it trumps aptitude throughout 
human affairs. For Taleb, the appearance of a black rather than 
a white swan is the unforeseen, unknowable event that changes 
everything – helping some and ruining others. Using this idea, 
Taleb contends that people today underestimate luck, because 
they are over-optimistic about humanity. Worse, 
‘Justification of [such] over-optimism on the grounds 
that “it brought us here” arises from a far more serious 
mistake about human nature: the belief that we are built 
to understand nature and that our decisions are, and have 
been, the result of our own choices. I beg to disagree. So 
many instincts drive us.’ 123
In common with today’s biological interpretations of everything, 
Taleb takes human instincts as evidence that humans are simply 
not able to exercise choice.
 In the ancient world, humanity’s achievements were 
thought to be the work of the gods. Pre-modern thinkers 
couldn’t believe that human beings were truly responsible for 
big breakthroughs. Today, acclaimed by modern critics, Taleb 
reverts to this pre-modern view.
 In Chapter 1 we mentioned the Greek myth of Prometheus 
stealing fire from the Gods. But that myth never happened in 
reality. Humans decided to master fire for themselves – whatever 









Smart electrical grids and global ones
Modern electricity grids are perhaps the most remarkable 
engineering achievement ever. That’s not generally appreciated – 
in part, because grids are too large to see all in one place. 
 People mostly encounter the grid only as sockets and 
switches on a wall. But the entire grid is essentially a single 
construction. The electrons in the wires that stretch across 
whole nations and continents march in lockstep in every power 
station and every consumer device attached to the grid. Keeping 
the system in balance with power delivered just where it needs 
to be is no mean feat.
 Like many others, Barack Obama is keen on a new ‘smart 
grid’. On the campaign trail in 2008, he warned that the Chinese 
were ‘preparing for a very competitive 21st century economy’ 
– especially in infrastructure. One of the most important 
infrastructure projects America needed, Obama went on, was 
 ‘… a whole new electricity grid. Because if we’re going to 
 be serious about renewable energy, I want to be able to 
 get wind power from North Dakota to population centers, 
 like Chicago. And we’re going to have to have a smart 
 grid if we want to use plug-in hybrids then we want 
 to be able to have ordinary consumers sell back the 
  electricity that’s generated from those car batteries, back 
 into the grid. That can create five million new jobs, just 
 in new energy.’ 124
Obama is right that America’s power grid needs updating 
and expanding. However, while national grids are good, 
international ones can be even better. They represent a 
chance to expand economies of scale in energy supply beyond 
national boundaries. 
 So when Obama hinted at heightening US rivalry with 
China around infrastructure, it was a pity. Technology, after all, 
























not be allowed to stand in the way of international grids.
 Obama is also right that America will have to make new 
connections to bring renewable energy to where it is consumed. 
But the new President’s suggestion that a smart grid could allow 
plug-in hybrid owners to sell electricity back to it is the wrong 
premise on which to promise millions of new jobs. 
 Here Obama seems carried away with the green ideal of 
distributed generation. In truth when plug-hybrids draw power 
from the grid, there’s little point in their owners selling electricity 
back into it. More important, plug-in hybrids will be still very much 
be powered by carbon-based fuels – but these fuels can never 
generate electricity in the large, centralised and thus efficient 
style of, say, gas-fired electricity plants.
 New grids will be smarter, no question. They will integrate 
power systems with the latest IT. But more thoughtful IT should 
not be used to entangle the consumer in minute to minute bills, 
selling power back to the grid, or managing a way round power 
cuts. Smart grids should work behind the scenes – like present-
day grids, only better, more stable and on a larger scale.
Transport, water and electronic grids
Chapter 5 looked at oil and gas grids, but also at cars. So what 
about roads? Here, as with the infrastructure of energy, there’s 
a clear story of underinvestment. In the UK, British Chancellor 
Alistair Darling proclaimed in the 2008 Budget speech: ‘We need 
more capacity on our roads but we cannot build our way out of 
all the problems we face’. 125 Yet over 1996-2006, Britain built 
just 50 miles of main roads a year. 126 Meanwhile in the US, ever 
since a steel-deck truss bridge in Minneapolis collapsed into the 
Mississippi River in 2007, attention has been focused on the 
country’s 600,000 road bridges. As Barack Obama has clearly 
registered, more than a quarter of these are either structurally 
deficient or functionally obsolete. 127
 Alongside roads, railway lines deserve a long gale 
of creative destruction. Russia, for example, has no less 










 In Europe, plans to rationalise 27 national systems for air 
traffic control into just a few regional grids have the potential to 
make fuel-intensive holding patterns a thing of the past. 128
 Humans have constructed a variety of interlocking water 
grids. A first grid supplies water to our taps. In the developed 
world, water, like the energy we seek in the future, is always 
Algal bloom off the coast  
of Cornwall. This kind of 
problem confirms the need  
























on and always ready to hand. The same grid delivers irrigation 
for agriculture, as well as water for industrial uses – the largest 
of which, predictably enough, is in energy supply. Meanwhile 
a second grid, just as essential as the first, carries away used 
water and sewage. 
 Environmentalists worry that humans pollute water with 
the residues of pesticides and with the hormones contained 
in contraceptive pills. It’s true that traces of many man-made 
chemicals are distributed in the water supply. But in fact natural 
pollution can be a bigger problem. 129
 Humans need better water grids so that they can take 
control over water flows and cleanliness. For example, a more 
serious problem than either pesticides or hormones in water is 
the high concentration of nitrate fertiliser in the run-off from 
agricultural land. Nitrate-enriched water can trigger a bloom of 
algae and bacterial growth that chokes off other life by consuming 
available oxygen – a process known as eutrophication. Blooms 
can also contaminate water supplies and be toxic for humans. 
 On top of better water grids – for transport, leisure, flood 
control and sea-borne trade – the world also needs more water. At 
present it relies on capturing fresh water from the rain, or mining 
water from underground reservoirs. In the future, mankind will 
both disinfect used water and feed fresh water back into grids 
through desalination. 130
 The most efficient desalination plants work by forcing the 
water through a membrane with microscopic pores. The right sort 
of membrane will keep salt from passing through. Naturally, salt 
water is not in short supply, and the only other major requirement 
is energy to power the pumps. 
 That’s yet another reason why the world will definitely 
need more energy.
 The most famous grid, of course, is the Internet, which 
grew out of – and is now absorbing – the telephone grid. The 
Internet has taken mankind beyond voice communication and is 










 At CERN’s Large Hadron Collider, the Internet has been 
beefed up to carry the 15 million Gigabytes of data a year that 
the experiment will generate.
 Grids connect us to one another. They tie us in to 
civilisation. And they will also equip us with another means to go 
transforming the planet: bio-engineering.
Transformation vs other approaches (1): the IPCC
So much for geo-engineering, grids and bio-engineering. We 
now contrast our sketch of transformation to the ideas of the 
IPCC, the consultants McKinsey, and the Danish statistician 
Bjørn Lomborg. We begin with the IPCC and McKinsey on energy 
and climate.
 In Chapter 3, we attacked the IPCC’s Working Groups II 
and III for their eclectic computer modelling of adaptation and 
mitigation. It’s also true that, just as Working Group II shows a 
marked enthusiasm for ‘altered food and recreational choices’ 
and more regulation, so Working Group III looks forward to 
motorists adopting an ‘efficient driving style’. 131 But to be fair, 
Working Group III offers a useful table assessing what it calls 
‘key mitigation technologies and practices’ over six sectors; 
and, in a technical summary, Working Group II offers another 
useful table assessing how the world might adapt to droughts, 
floods, warming and storms over the ‘vulnerable sectors’ of food, 
fibre and forestry; water resources; human health, and industry, 
settlement and society. 132
 In due course, we will condense the IPCC’s two tables and 
add three extra columns for comparison: the first, a distillation of 
what McKinsey has said might be done around climate change; 
the second, a summary of the views of Bjørn Lomborg; and the 
last, our own views.
 On the relationship between mitigation and adaptation, 
























‘Mitigation will have global benefits but, owing to the lag 
times in the climate and biophysical systems, these will 
hardly be noticeable until around the middle of the 21st 
century... The benefits of adaptation are largely local to 
regional in scale but they can be immediate, especially 
if they also address vulnerabilities to current climate 
conditions… [So] climate policy is not about making 
a choice between adapting to and mitigating climate 
change. If key vulnerabilities to climate change are to be 
addressed, adaptation is necessary because even the 
most stringent mitigation efforts cannot avoid further 
climate change in the next few decades. Mitigation is 
necessary because reliance on adaptation alone could 
eventually lead to a magnitude of climate change to which 
effective adaptation is possible only at very high social, 
environmental and economic costs…’ 133
 
Sensible stuff. However, it’s apparent that the IPCC is unable 
to move beyond mitigation and adaptation. What’s more, the 
consultants McKinsey also concentrate on mitigation.
Transformation vs other approaches (2): McKinsey
In a Marshallian mood, McKinsey announced in February 2007 
that ‘market-distorting subsidies, information gaps, misaligned 
incentives, and other market inefficiencies now undermine 
energy productivity’. There was a need to apply conventional 
technologies more than renewables, and by 2020, proven 
technological opportunities could cut the growth in annual global 
energy demand from a base case of 2.2 down to a desirable 
0.6 per cent. For McKinsey, ‘removing policy distortions, making 
the price and usage of energy more transparent, and selectively 
deploying demand-side energy policies’ could, by 2020, lower 
world energy consumption by a quarter. The emphasis was on 
correcting market failures: on conservation, not innovation. 134
 McKinsey did note the scale of the grids of energy that 









‘In natural gas, the amount of indigenous production 
consumed within countries will continue to decline, 
replaced by cross-border flows delivered by long-distance 
pipelines and by ships carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
Oil production too will increasingly switch to regions that 
are more and more remote...’ 135
Yet the McKinsey downplayed energy innovation. It believed 
that energy had the potential for causing a transformation, and 
insisted that energy helped firms ‘transform capital and labour 
into finished goods and services’. 136 But McKinsey didn’t want 
to do too much transforming. 
 What detained McKinsey was that, from 2000 to 2005, the 
value of the top 25 private equity deals in energy and materials 
had tripled to $64 billion. It trumpeted that the developing world 
could contribute to
the profitability of energy firms: in Asia, energy firms had •	
adapt their ‘traditional capital-intensive business models’ 
to take better advantage of low labour costs 137
the ‘abatement’ of more than half of the world’s GHG •	
emissions, given a ‘low cost’ scenario for trading them – 
that is, a price up to a cool €40/tonne. 138
Yes, it’s cheaper to apply clean technologies to a new power plant, 
house, or car than it is to retrofit an old one. Thus McKinsey 
enthused that it’s cheaper to abate new emissions growth in the 
developing world than to cut existing emissions in the West. But 
the firm said nothing about the developing world’s potential role 
in R&D in energy supply. Instead, it highlighted the potential for
 
conservation among the Third World’s large populations•	
fixing the Third World’s •	 forests, so as to allow emissions to 
be avoided quite cheaply. 
























The question of forests
As we pointed out in Chapter 3, climate change is not all about 
energy. Changes in land use also have a significant effect. The 
amount of carbon locked up in plant life and soil, and particularly 
in forests, is vast. 
The clearing of the world’s forests is taking place most 
rapidly in Brazil and Indonesia, but also in Myanmar, sub-Saharan 
Africa and elsewhere. According to the IPCC, global forest cover 
in 2005 was nearly four billion hectares, about a third of the 
earth’s surface. Gross deforestation came to 13.1 million 
hectares per year over 1990-2000, falling slightly to 12.9m 
hectares per year over 2000-2005. Bringing into account land 
reconverted back to forest, net losses slowed more dramatically 
– from 8.9m hectares per year in 1990-2000 to 7.3m hectares 
per year in over 2000-2005. 140
As land is cleared, much of carbon stored by the forests 
is released into the atmosphere. Even at relatively slow rates 
of clearing, the amounts are large. Most controversial has 
been burning of Indonesian peat bogs to make way for palm 
oil plantations. In the exceptionally warm year of 1998, burning 
of these Indonesian forests alone was estimated to equate to 
13-40 per cent of annual CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. 
141
Greens complain that biofuels accelerate deforestation by 
pushing up demand for land; they cannot be regarded as carbon 
neutral. But to see the arrest of deforestation as a cheap-and-
cheerful resolution of climate change ignores the full relationship 
between development and land clearing.
In some respects deforestation is a symptom of 
underdevelopment. As urbanisation continues and agriculture 
becomes more industrialised, the rate of deforestation ought 
to fall. A big slowing up of deforestation tends to come when 
the rural poor of an underdeveloped nation gain access to 
modern energy. In China forests have spread as consumption of 
wood fuel has fallen. But in Africa, consumption of wood fuel is 









Another positive contribution to the world forests will come 
when a better capitalised forestry sector is able to invest in long-
term plantations rather than the simple harvesting of wild trees. 
Altogether, deforestation is likely to continue for several 
more decades as developing countries industrialise. Unlike in 
the developed world, however, in the tropics the process is likely 
to come to a natural halt before all the forests are gone. Those 
who wish to see forests preserved should seek to accelerate the 
industrialisation of the tropics, rather than halt that process.
 
In 2007, McKinsey favoured not innovation in energy supply, 
so much as efficiency and conservation in transport, buildings, 
forestry, and agriculture. Even though this potential, it conceded, 
was ‘difficult to capture, as it involves billions of small emitters – 
often consumers’. 143 Indeed, McKinsey found that 70 per cent 
of its possible GHG abatements 
 
‘… would not depend on any major technological 
developments. These measures either involve very little 
technology (for example, those in forestry or agriculture) 
or rely primarily on mature technologies, such as nuclear 
power, small-scale hydropower, and energy-efficient 
lighting. The remaining 30 per cent of abatements 
depend on new technologies or significantly lower costs 
for existing ones, such as carbon capture and storage, 
biofuels, wind power, and solar panels. The point is not 
that technological R&D has no importance for abatement 
but rather that low-tech abatement is important in a 2030 
perspective.’ 144
In April 2008, however, looking at the US, Germany, the UK 
and Australia, McKinsey changed its line on technology. ‘Many 
opportunities’ now involved low-carbon energy technologies. 
At low cost and without changing popular lifestyles, the US, 
























Australia by 70 per cent. 145
 To cut emissions by 80 per cent for 2050, forests would 
once more need fixing – yet now some new technologies, 
recorded in the tables that follow, were felt worthy. However, 
McKinsey also argued:
‘Countries could choose to influence the consumer’s 
behavior through regulations, financial incentives, or both: 
citizens might be motivated to travel less, to use public 
transportation more, or to buy smaller cars. Countries 
could also motivate their people to consume less water, 
use less floor space and fewer appliances, and unplug 
idle appliances.’ 146
What an adventurous perspective! 
 
Water: dams do more than just provide energy
As we saw in Chapter 6, large dams have faced heavy criticism 
for causing environmental and social disruption. There can be 
no doubt that dam construction on the largest scale poses 
challenges that go far beyond getting the engineering right. In 
China, the Three Gorges dam displaced about a million people. 
The benefits of dams make it essential to find ways to meet such 
challenges.
It isn’t just their enormous energy output and social 
significance that gives giant dams their importance. As Chapter 
6 also suggested, dams play a key role in the smooth running of 
an electricity grid, through their ability to hold on to electricity – 
‘pumped storage’. At times of low demand for energy, dam water 
is pumped back uphill using energy generated elsewhere. At 
times of high demand, dam water is released and extra capacity 
rapidly brought on line. 
 The flexibility of hydroelectric turbines, which can 
be turned on or off far more rapidly than the high temperature 









grid. But the greatest benefits of dams emerge from taking a still 
broader view. It’s in application rather than in construction that 
dams will truly astonish in years to come.
 Unlike more rapidly developing technologies, the basic 
techniques of constructing dams and hydroelectric turbines 
are mature. These fields will see incremental as much as 
revolutionary development. There is, however, big scope for the 
development of wider water management systems, of which 
dams will an integral part.
Water management is essential to a wide range of human 
activities: the supply of drinking water; agricultural irrigation; 
industry (not least, managing the water that cools power 
stations is important); sewage management; flood control, 
and, increasingly, recreation. The future may also likely see the 
development of new activities such as aquaculture (fish-farming), 
or unforeseen applications such as a revival of water transport.
The trend will be toward management of entire drainage 
basins consisting of river systems and coastal regions. No doubt 
this will be driven in part by concern that climate change will 
raise sea levels, increase storminess and increase rainfall.
Yet as an increasing part of the world’s population builds 
on flood plains along its coastal regions, the world will anyway 
need to take control of water flows, global warming or no global 
warming. By doing so, it can do much better than merely adapt 
to a changing climate, but rather open up whole new possibilities 
in land, settlement and agriculture, as the Dutch have been 
finding out for centuries.
The future, then, will see not just more dams, but the 
coordination of dams through IT. Radar tracking and the direct 
chemical and electronic monitoring of water will more and more 
happen in real time.
Taken together, these developments will allow water to be 
























Transformation vs other approaches (3):  
Bjørn Lomborg 
Bjørn Lomborg shot to notoriety in 2001 with his publication of 
The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the 
World. He took aim at what he called the ‘litany’ of environmental 
disaster stories with which people are nowadays assailed, and 
set out to present a corrective. His work covered energy, global 
warming, chemicals, water, forests and more. Overall, he claimed 
that while environmental problems remain, most are getting 
resolved rather than getting worse. 
 Environmentalists panned the book. 147 Mark Lynas 
personally slapped Lomborg with a cream pie during a book launch. 
‘I wanted to put a Baked Alaska in his smug face,’ explained 
Lynas, ‘in solidarity with the native Indian and Eskimo people in 
Alaska who are reporting rising temperatures, shrinking sea ice 
and worsening effects on animal and bird life’.148 Meanwhile, a 
review in Nature compared Lomborg’s treatment of the extinction 
of animal species with the views of those unprepared to accept 
that the Nazis had tried to extinguish the Jews. 149 
 As a climate scientist might put it, this kind of mudslinging 
didn’t create a very calm atmosphere. 
 For ourselves, we find Lomborg’s approach wanting – but 
not as wanting as that of environmentalism. While critics attacked 
many of his specific scientific claims, they missed his key political 
argument. First, Lomborg claimed that one of the most serious 
consequences of the litany was that it undermined 
‘… our confidence in our ability to solve our remaining 
problems. It gives us a feeling of being under siege, 
constantly having to act with our backs to the wall, 
and this means that we will often implement unwise 
decisions based on emotional gut reactions. The Litany 

































The one critic who did reply to this argument was Kathryn Schulz, 
editor at large of the environmentalist magazine Grist. While 
conceding that media coverage could influence people, Schulz 
averred that 
‘the Litany may be compelling because of people’s lived 
experiences. Lomborg… could not be less interested in 
the community concerned about the cyanide in its water 
supply, the neighbourhood battling the smelter in its 
backyard, or any of the millions of people all over the 
world who confront the consequences of environmental 
degradation every day.’ 151
But while the impressionistic ‘lived experiences’ of communities 
may simply suggest environmental degradation, the larger 
reality may be not enough economic development. To take ‘lived 
experience’ as the basis of decision-making is a profoundly 
anti-scientific approach – and one that can only be hostile 
to innovation.
 For all their moralising, environmentalists are simply blind 
to the idea that anybody might disagree with them on social or 
political grounds. For them, disagreement can only issue from 
Stupid People Who Do Not Agree With The Science.
 In Cool it (2007), Lomborg’s argument is as follows: 
1. Global warming is real and man-made
2.  Statements about the strong, ominous, and immediate 
 consequences of global warming are often wildly 
 exaggerated, and this is unlikely to make for good policy
3. We need smarter solutions for global warming 
4.  Many other issues are much more important than global 
 warming. 152
Grinning and bearing it: Bjørn Lomborg. Staying though he 
does within the technocratic framework of cost-benefit analysis, 
the Danish statistician has scored some palpable hits against 









We completely agree with this perspective. But what we propose 
around the transformation of the planet leads us into some 
significant differences with Lomborg.
 First of all, while Lomborg’s call for cool tempers is coupled 
with a devastating critique of many Green dogmas, he doesn’t 
look too closely at technological innovation – and he doesn’t 
mount any kind of critique of ecosystem services. 
 For Lomborg, the irrationality of environmentalism today is 
to do with the media’s commercially-orientated search for scare 
stories, stories about conflict, and stories about guilt. It is bound 
up with politicians’ desire to capture the moral high ground, to 
distance themselves from the usual squabbles, and to make 
some taxes popular. 153 
 These comments are true, but don’t get to grips with the 
detailed, if faulty, political economy of environmentalism. Despite 
useful historical excavations of past doom-mongers on climate, 
Lomborg rather de-historicises the culture surrounding climate 
change today, speaking of ‘a deep-seated human tendency to 
believe that things were better in the old days’, and of ‘the age-
old media focus on bad news about the natural world’. 154 
 In Cool It, global warming boils down to the costs and 
benefits of taking different courses of action. In this scheme, 
Kyoto comes out badly, adaptation to climate change in the 
medium-term future is sensible, and geo-engineering might at 
least be a pragmatic course. Separate measures are necessary 
to beat malaria, poverty, starvation, water stress, HIV/AIDS, 
damage to eyesight through malnutrition, poor drinking water 
and sanitation. 155
 Lomborg’s programme of what we might call ‘adaptation 
plus’ may well be more efficacious than environmentalist policies. 
But by failing to take up Green theory enough, he is reduced 
to saying that Greens show ‘a neglect of thinking out priorities’. 
Everything is a question of trade-offs between what you would 
like to happen and what it will cost. 156
 That won’t cut it. Environmentalism would not be wrong to 
























sought by society are never a technocratic, and always a political 
question. Environmentalists deify nature; Energise! puts human 
needs first. Natural science cannot decide that.
 Charmingly but naïvely, Lomborg says that the debate on 
global warming ‘has often become so fixated on CO2 cuts that it 
neglects what presumably is our primary objective – to improve 
the quality of life and the environment’. 157 But he presumes too 
much of his opponents. This chapter’s discussion of ecosystem 
services has shown that environmentalists do not make a ‘trade-
off’ between quality of life on the one hand and environment on 
the other. At bottom – and the Millenium Ecosystems Assessment 
was very clear on this – they attribute all aspects of human life, 
including quality of life, to nature. 
 A kind of global ‘business case’, complete with a simple 
defence of free trade, will do little to lessen Green influence. 
Nor will Lomborg’s advocacy of a tax of $2-14 per tonne on 
CO2. 
158 But perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Lomborg’s 
programme is its limited ambitions in technological innovation 
and R&D.
 Lomborg rightly notes that energy R&D has fallen sharply 
since the early 1980s, whether private or public, and over 
nuclear, fossil fuels and renewables alike. He wants nations to 
commit themselves to spending not the current 0.006 per cent 
of GDP on renewables R&D, which is what OECD countries do, 
but 0.05 per cent, or about $25bn a year. 159 
 Perhaps this is enough. It certainly needs to be 
accompanied by big expenditures on R&D in non-renewable 
energy, and outside the field of energy altogether. That will require, 
politically, a sterling defence of technological innovation. 
 Lomborg doesn’t mount such a defence – perhaps 
because his cost/benefit approach isn’t so different from that 










Which way to beat malaria?
Very properly, Bjørn Lomborg emphasises that malaria cannot 
be understood as a function of temperature alone. Up to the 
19th century, malaria was endemic throughout Europe, even as 
far north and Finland and Siberia.  In 1933, no less than 30 per 
cent of the population of the Tennessee River valley was infected, 
while an epidemic took place in the Netherlands in 1943-46, 
during and after the war years. 
 The lesson Lomborg draws is that in Europe and the US: 
‘… we eliminated malaria while the world warmed over 
the past century and a half. While temperature does 
impact malaria, it is clearly not destiny. What probably 
matters much more is a wide array of factors, from 
nutrition and health care, through draining and mosquito 
eradication, to income and availability of quinine or newer 
treatments.’ 160
That’s right. But how sad that Lomborg feels called upon to 
disparage the 70 million cases of malaria putatively saved by 
Kyoto till the year 2085, and instead talk up what he calls the 
‘simple and cheap’ United Nations Millennium Development 
Goal of halving the incidence of malaria by 2015! 161 By 2085, 
achievement of the UN’s goal early on in the century might ensure 
that more than 28 billion cases of malaria had been prevented. 
But what about also increasing R&D into malaria dramatically, so 
that a total cure for it might be found by 2015 – if not before? 
 Lomborg calls for ‘targeted policies, mosquito nets, 
medicine and mosquito eradication’. 162 Yet it is not far-fetched 
to suggest that drugs and vaccines should be developed so that 
malaria itself can be eradicated. That, after all, is one of the 
goals of the Global Malaria Action Plan, announced at the UN 
Millennium Development Goals malaria summit in New York in 
2008. The Plan points out that the Maldives, Tunisia, and most 
recently the United Arab Emirates have eliminated malaria from 
























 Much has been learned about the sequencing of the 
genome of three parasites that carry malaria. Much remains 
to be learned. 164 But on the whole, research in genetics and 
pharmaceuticals has a lot more going for it than the distribution 
of mosquito nets.
Summing up this book (1): Obama’s collective 
solutions and ours
We started this book by suggesting that man-made climate 
change can and should be solved as part of a wider effort – an 
effort to address society’s need for a lot more cheap energy. In 
the process, we upheld the energised citizen, informed and able 
to win arguments about the kind of energy supply people and 
organisations can and should have. We made a trenchant attack 
on those who believe that changes in their habits as individual 
consumers, once added up over millions, are the right way to 
save the planet.
 In an unguarded moment, Barack Obama was on the 
same wavelength. Facing himself with an imagined question, on 
a televised debate about what he personally had done that was 
Green, Obama revealed a forthright, if not coarse attitude. He 
told Newsweek magazine that he’d have said:
‘Well, the truth is, Brian, we can’t solve global warming 
because I f***ing changed light bulbs in my house. It’s 
because of something collective.’ 165
In looking at climate change, energy supply and, in this chapter, 
at broader and more longstanding problems to do with the 
physical world, Energise! has put forward solutions that are 
indeed ‘something collective’. Obama’s remarks should serve as 
a rebuke to those in Britain who make conspicuous their highly 
personal non-consumption.
 Obama’s collective solutions, however, are not our 









CO2; we look to technical fixes, global grids and an international 
division of labour to get things done. He wants individuals to 
engage in informal but politically binding partnerships with the 
state – partnerships that are designed to save on the personal 
consumption of energy. By contrast, we favour a citizenry that 
is thoughtful and alert about every aspect of energy supply, and 
that is ready to participate in the execution of a much bigger and 
better supply. 
 Obama has said that Americans ‘can lead the world, 
secure our nation, and meet our moral obligations to future 
generations’. 166 The generations we are interested in, however, 
are rather different from his. This book has dwelt not on the 
resentment that future generations are thought bound, in due 
course, to bear toward folks today, but rather on future generations 
of technology that need to be nurtured with great researchers 
and proper budgets: 4G nuclear reactors, 3G biofuels, 3G kites 
to harness the wind, and 3G photovoltaic panels, 
 There will come a time when millions of citizens are moved 
to stand up for new generations of technology, and for the R&D 
that will make such developments possible. People won’t easily 
be fooled again by the state’s lack of resolve in energy supply. 
Nor will they be sympathetic to the hesitations of private energy 
suppliers.
Summing up (2): for elites, security has  
more or less become energy security
Throughout this book, we’ve tried to show that the blinkered 
perspective of the independent consumer and his decentralised 
microgeneration of energy is, like the doctrine of the carbon 
footprint, the wrong way to think about energy and climate 
change. However, once society’s focus shifts from hidden energy 
supply to tangible energy consumption, energy comes to be 
perceived as a winnable squabble over resources that are finite 
and scarce.
 That tendency must be resisted. Energy and climate 
























are, perhaps, the main mediator nowadays, more important than 
arsenals, trade or even – dare we say it? – Olympic Games. 
 In fact energy is only a mediator in tension, and rarely an 
originator of it. Yet whether it’s to do with fissile nuclear materials, 
dirty coal, Russian gas, Asian demand for oil, or Obama’s 
confidence that ‘green collar’ American workers are better than 
any other kind of workers, energy, and especially oil, has now 
become, in the public mind, a cipher for tense manoeuvres 
between West and East, and between North and South. In that 
sense, every informed and active citizen needs to know about 
and take an independent position on energy.
 Late in November 2008, the US National Intelligence 
Council published one of its most path-breaking reports. Global 
trends 2025: a transformed world was widely commented upon 
for its forecast of an end to US global leadership. 167 What was also 
striking about the report, however, was its mechanistic assertion 
that, ‘under any scenario’, what it called ‘energy dynamics’ could 
produce ‘a number of new alignments or groupings with geopolitical 
significance’. 168 What might those alignments be? They could 
be Russia dominating Central Asia, Beijing hooking up with 
Riyadh, Beijing getting friendly with Tehran, or India making 
overtures to Burma, Iran and Central Asia. But whatever they 
might be, the whole discussion only goes to show one thing: 
that energy and oil are, like climate change, meant to explain 
everything nowadays.
 In the minds of many, security has more or less become 
energy security. Independence from oil was a key plank in 
Obama’s election manifesto. Like few other issues, energy has 
come to concentrate national and international fears.
Summing up (3): until 2030, handwringing and  
hysteria about GHGs – unless energised citizens  
make a good political riposte
What, though, about choice of technique? Summing up chapters 
4-6, we can forecast an overall future for energy with respect to 









Al Gore has put forward a goal of making the US electricity 
supply carbon-neutral by 2018. 169 There’s a difference between 
ambition and foolishness. Gore’s target is foolish for two reasons. 
First, even the most ambitious clean energy program 
will not reduce emissions unless and until the existing stock of 
power stations are closed down. That puts one limit on how fast 
emissions can be reduced.
A second reason why electricity cannot be decarbonised 
inside just one decade is that energy technologies take time 
to development. Almost every week brings news of incremental 
advances in the methods needed to turn solar power into a 
practical source of energy. Yet a long period of incremental 
advance is likely to be required for solar to come of age.
We have predicted that, though it’s on the verge of 
becoming economic in the sunniest areas, solar will take a 
decade to take off the way that wind has taken off today. 
Solar may eventually become the world’s largest single 
source of energy. Other technologies lie in a more distant future. 
Innovative varieties of geothermal and high altitude wind have 
huge potential, but at present exist only in demonstration form. 
They will likely take at least two decades to be implemented on 
a scale that makes a difference.
While Gore was referring to electricity, similar points apply 
to transport: efficient hybrid cars will take at least a decade to 
become commonplace, even after the technology has advanced 
enough to make them competitive on price. Although biofuels 
could replace oil relatively quickly, the advanced variety is still in 
development.
For these reasons, and even with all-out investment in 
clean energy, we don’t expect that emissions of CO2 will begin 
consistently to fall much before 2030. After that, we do expect 
that investment in clean energy will begin to pay off. Emissions 
will begin to fall, slowly at first and more rapidly after 2040.
Unless the terms of debate on energy and climate are 
altered soon, then, hand-wringing and hysteria about emissions 
























next 20 years. 
 It’s a dismal prospect. The carbon footprint blame game 
will do nothing to spur the investment in energy necessary to 
transform the world.  It will do nothing to prepare people for the 
rest of what could still be a great century.
We hope that Energise! will contribute to an alternative 
approach. There is a need to challenge the precautionary principle, 
whether applied to governments’ choice of technique in energy 
supply, or to the decisions made by energy companies.
Summing up (4): precaution means no  
real state commitment to nuclear, and little  
risk-taking private investment in energy 
The impact of the precautionary approach to the environment 
taken by the British state is seen most clearly in relation to 
nuclear energy. Few British politicians are prepared to go beyond 
the idea that nuclear must be an ‘option’. In practice, elected 
representatives fall back on ageing reactors, and postpone 
taking real action. 
We argue, by contrast, that nuclear should be a mainstay 
of electricity supply. Even in 2050, when solar might account for 
a quarter of electricity, nuclear should supply another quarter. If 
the nuclear revival doesn’t reach that extent, there will certainly 
be problems meeting the world’s energy needs.
In Britain successive governments have equivocated 
over nuclear for more than a decade. As a result there is an 
annual discussion over whether winter gas demand can be met. 
If decisive action had been taken, the problem would now be 
solved. Of course new nuclear will not come on line instantly, but 
that’s all the more reason to start soon.
While precaution is publicly celebrated around new 
nuclear and coal-fired plants, it’s less visible in the low-carbon 
domain. Nevertheless, we have pointed to many examples. The 
future of genetically modified biofuels may also prove particularly 
contentious.









failure to invest. This is likely to be accentuated in the wake of 
the Crash of 2008. In its World Energy Outlook 2008, the IEA 
projected that, even without the expense of investing in clean 
energy, investment of more than $26 trillion will be needed 
over the period 2007-2030 – 52 per cent of the sum going 
on power generation, and most of the rest going on oil and 
gas. 170 In particular, the IEA worried about oil. With oil, it said, 
‘the immediate risk to supply is not one of lack of global resources, 
but rather a lack of investment where it is needed’. It went on 
that there was a ‘real risk’ that under-investment would cause an 
‘oil-supply crunch’ before 2015. 171
The IEA was right to conclude that, even giving geology its 
due, economics remains the determining factor in oil supply – as 
it does in energy generally. Yet if there’s now a real dearth of 
investment in oil, that cannot be explained simply as an inevitable 
downswing in the business cycle – one in which oil prices are so 
low, investment in oil production no longer makes sense.
No doubt that’s part of the story. But even before the Crash 
of 2008, investment in oil, as in all parts of the international 
energy industry, was far from impressive. As this chapter has 
shown, energy companies have for some time been more 
interested in financial juggling and exotic business models than 
they have in actually generating higher levels of energy.
The IEA says that while the current financial 
crisis is ‘not expected to affect long-term investment’, 
it could lead to ‘delays in bringing current projects to 
completion’. 172 That verdict might prove too sanguine. For years 
industry has been looking for any excuse not to invest. Failure 
to invest in the oil sector in the late 1990s was blamed on low 
oil prices, despite a growing economy. Today the world is still 
feeling the consequences of that period of low investment. After 
enjoying a ramp up to record high oil prices, oil firms have found 
themselves a new, up-to-date version of an old excuse for not 
investing – low oil prices. 
They have found it just in the nick of time. Indeed, low oil 
























means of explaining that sector’s unwillingness to invest.
It’s reasonable to ask why companies as large as the oil 
majors, at least, now feel unable to take the long-term view of 
investment. There was a time when they were able to look past 
the unavoidable swings in prices or growth that take place in the 
first few years of a new project’s life. 
Late in 2008, BP withdrew from a CCS project in the UK 
and Shell pulled back from investing in Canadian oil sands. We 
believe that the reluctance to invest is a form of corporate risk 
aversion, one that is just as unhealthy as the green sort.
How can this reluctance to invest be dealt with? It’s no 
good just exhorting people or firms to innovate. What is at issue 
is a struggle not to improve personal behaviour, but to change 
the whole way society thinks and acts about producing energy. 
It’s a struggle to preserve science from manipulation, individuals 
from regulation, and society from power cuts.
We’ve no doubt that citizens can rise to that challenge.
 
How our perspective of transformation  
stacks up against other perspectives
In the tables below, we show how our programme of transforming 
the planet in line with mankind’s needs and talents goes beyond 
the measures that the IPCC and McKinsey propose in relation 
to climate change. We show, too, how our proposals are more 
ambitious than those proposed by Lomborg.
 For each sector, beginning with energy supply but going 
well beyond it, we describe innovations and investment strategies 
whose benefits should exceed those that are required purely to 
deal with climate change. 
 Why do the benefits of our approach go further than simply 
dealing with climate change? Because our strategies were in 
the first place designed to deal with the roots of longstanding 
problems other than climate change. 
 The world needs a great deal of inexpensive energy. In 
building a new round of supply, it can start to minimise climate 










Sector IPCC’s key mitigation 
technologies on the 
market today 173 
IPCC’s key mitigation 
technologies to be 
on the market by 
2030  174
IPCC’s examples of 




Improved supply and 
distribution efficiency; 
switch from coal to gas; 
nuclear; renewable heat 
and power (hydropower, 
solar, wind, geothermal, 
bioenergy); CHP; early 
applications of CCS (eg 
store removed CO2 from 
natural gas)
CCS for gas,  




including tidal, wave, 
concentrating solar, 
solar PV
Transport Fuel efficiency; hybrids; 
cleaner diesel vehicles; 
biofuels; shift from road 
to rail/public transport; 
cycling, walking; land-
use; transport planning 
2G biofuels; more 
efficient aircraft; 
advanced electrics 
and hybrids with more 





Efficient lighting, use 
of daylight; efficient 
electrical appliances, 
heating and cooling 
devices; improved cook 
stoves, insulation; passive 
and active solar design 




Integrated design of 
commercial buildings 
including technologies 
such as intelligent 
meters that provide 
feedback and control; 
integrated solar PV 
FLOODS: Improve  
adaptation capacities, 
especially for livelihoods; 
incorporate climate  
change in development 
programmes; improve water 
supply systems, co-ordinate 
jurisdictions. DROUGHT: 
Improve flood protection 
infrastructure; flood-proof 
buildings; change land use  
in high-risk areas; flood hazard 
mapping, warnings; empower 
community institutions.  
WARMING: Assistance 
programmes for especially 





Emergency Warning Systems 
(EWS); more resilient 
infrastructure; financial 
risk management


























McKinsey’s GHG  
abatement measures
Lomborg Energise!
Increase energy R&D 
by a factor of ten to 
0.05 per cent of GDP, or 
$25bn a year: pilot pro-
grammes, public-private 
partnerships on high 
risk projects, training 
scientists and engineers, 
prizes for crossing 
technological thresholds, 
international collabora-
tion and research cen-
tres. policy  encouraging 
adoption of new and 
existing technologies to 
speed learning 176
Increase all forms of energy R&D, 
especially in 4G nuclear, fusion; 
burning coal better, CCS; 3G 
biofuels, New Carbon Infrastructure; 
floating wind turbines, kites; 3G PV, 
CSP; tidal, engineered geothermal. 
To speed growth in developing 
world, ramp up investment in clean 
energy as it becomes competitive 
with fossil fuels.
Political leadership to overcome 
precautionary opposition to 
investment, especially in nuclear. 
Private sector leadership to increase 
R&D and investment long term
Efficiency measures, mainly 
in transport and buildings, cut 
demand for energy, and at no 
net cost, cut GHGs by 6 Gt. 177
Biofuels replace 20-30 per cent 
of current transport fuels by 
2030, cut emissions by 80 per 
cent below the level they would 
reach with fossil fuels 178
Biofuels won’t cut CO2 
emissions, but double 
them.
Stopping flying would 
‘quite plausibly be one of 
the worst ways’ to help 
starving Ethiopians. 179 
Improve road, air and public 
transport to expand capacity, make 
travel easier and cheapen the costs 
of world trade. Hybrids to contribute 
to efficiency. 2G and 3G biofuels 
to reduce emissions. Mag-lev 
trains; supersonic, then hypersonic 
passenger planes (London to Sydney 
in 5 hours) 
With 25 per cent of global energy 
demand, housing is the largest 
energy-use segment. Fit out 
new homes with tight building 
shells, including chemically 
treated windows to cut ingress 
of winter cold and summer heat; 
high-grade insulation; compact 
fluorescent lighting; solar water 
heaters. Higher efficiency 
standards for appliances; cut 
standby power requirements. 
Measures in lighting, heating, 
and cooling could slow annual 
growth in residential energy 
demand from 1.4 to 0.5 per 
cent, and reduce 2020 total 
world energy demand by three 
per cent. 180 Biomass,  
geo-thermal, district heating 181 
FLOODS: barriers, dikes, 
levees, coastal barriers 
and – rarely – giving up 
land. 182  WARMING: 
Green spaces and water 
features can produce 
local cooling, while also 
making more beautiful 
cities’. Painting surfaces 
white can avoid heat build 
up. Air conditioning 183
Expand production of clean energy 
to allow buildings to do what they’re 
meant to: provide comfort and 
convenience, including generous 
space requirements, good insulation 
and air conditioning, solid flood- 
and storm- resistant design. 
Mass manufacture of housing 
would help reach these goals. 
FLOODS, WARMING: full planning 
of infrastructure around homes to 
allow house manufacturers maximum 









Sector IPCC’s key 
mitigation 
technologies 





to be on the 
market by 
2030   
IPCC’s examples  
of adaptation for  
vulnerable sectors
Industry More efficient 
end-use electri-
cal equipment; 


















Agriculture Improved crop 
and grazing land 
management 
to increase soil 
carbon storage; 
restoration of  
cultivated peaty 
soils and degrad-




ment to cut 
CH4 emissions; 
improve applica-
tion of N2 fertiliser 
to cut N2O emis-
sions; dedicated 
energy crops to 





DROUGHT: Crops: development of new 
drought-resistant varieties; intercropping; 
crop residue retention; weed 
management; irrigation and hydroponic 
farming; water harvesting. Livestock: 
supplementary feeding; change stocking 
rate; alter grazing and rotation of pasture. 
Social: Improve extension services; 
debt relief; diversification of income. 
FLOODS: Crops: polders and improved 
drainage; development and promotion 
of alternative crops; adjustment of 
plantation and harvesting schedule; 
floating agricultural systems. Social: 
Improved extension services. WARMING: 
Crops: development of new heat-resistant 
varieties; altered timing of cropping; 
pest control and surveillance of crops. 
Livestock: housing and shade provision; 
change to heat-tolerant breeds. Social: 
diversification of income. STORMS: 























DROUGHT: Leak reduction. Water 
demand management through metering 
and pricing. Soil moisture conservation 
eg through mulching. Desalination of 
seawater. Conservation of groundwater 
through artificial recharge. Education for 
sustainable water use. FLOODS: Enhanced 
implementation of protection measures 
including flood forecasting and warning, 
regulation through planning legislation 
and zoning; promotion of insurance; and 
relocation of vulnerable assets. WARMING: 
Water demand management through 
metering and pricing. Education for 
sustainable water use. STORMS: Coastal 
defence design and implementation to 
protect water supply against contamination
Comparing strategies for the world (2): industry,  
























McKinsey’s GHG  
abatement measures
Lomborg Energise!
General: replace halogen lamps with  
Light Emitting Diodes.184 Steel: in US, 
expand co-generation, improve  
recuperative burners to cut energy  
demand by 30 per cent. Bigger  
opportunity in developing world mills – 
efficiencies and human maintenance  
costs are lower. Paper: extended nip  
presses extract 5-7 per cent more water 
from intermediate products, so cutting the 
need for dryers. Cement: fit out traditional 
ball mills with high-pressure roller presses, 
or replace with horizontal roller mills. 185 
German industry could cut 30m tonnes/year 
by 2020 by adopting more energy-efficient 
motor systems with variable-speed drives 186 
Many mitigation  
options today too 
expensive to pursue. 
Trade liberalisation  
and lowering the  
cost of starting a 
business will increase 
industrial growth 187  
Expand production of 
clean energy to allow 
the rest of industry 
to restructure around 
saving human labour, 
rather than saving 
energy
In agriculture and waste disposal,  
developing economies represent  
more than half of the 1.5 Gt of  
possible abatements 188 
Improved soil health, 
water management, 
research, school meals, 
nutrient fortification. 
Increasing income  
above subsistence 
agricultural levels to  
allow food imports from 
more areas more suited 
to agriculture 189
Increase mechanisation 
and use of IT, especially 
in the developing world, 
so as to end malnutrition. 
Increase properly 
managed application of 
fertilisers, pesticides and 
herbicides. New crops, 
including genetically 
modified ones. Improve 
transport and storage 
infrastructure in 
developing world, to 
connect agricultural 
products to markets. 
Integrate biofuels and 
other bioproducts into 
agriculture
WASTE: Bring basic 
water and sanitation 
services to 3bn people 
over 8 years. WATER: 
Trade between water 
rich and water scarce 
regions. Drip irrigation 
can cut water usage 
30-70 per cent while 
increasing yields. 
Industry could cut  
usage by 30-90 per  
cent at a low cost.  
Water in the developing 
world should be priced  
to reflect true cost 190 
WASTE: Where 
recycling makes sense, 
do it industrially, in 
a mechanised and 
professional manner 
– not at the level of 
individual households.
WATER: Abundant cheap 
and clean energy supply 
will make desalination 
practical. Increase  
supply through dams, 
grids. FLOODS,  
STORMS: use water  
grids to control effects 
of bad weather across 









Sector IPCC’s key 
mitigation 
technologies on 
the market today 
IPCC’s key 
mitigation 
technologies to  
be on the market 
by 2030   
IPCC’s examples  








use of forestry products 
for bioenergy to replace 
fossil fuel use
Improve tree  
species to up biomass 
productivity and carbon 
sequestration. Improve 
remote sensing 
technologies to analyse 
vegetation/soil carbon 
sequestration potential 
and to map land use 
change
WARMING: Fire manage-
ment through altered stand 
layout, landscape planning, 
dead timber salvaging, 
clearing undergrowth. Insect 
control through prescribed 
burning, non-chemical pest 
control. Social: Diversifica-
tion of income
Health DROUGHT: Grain storage; 
emergency feeding stations; 
safe drinking water/
sanitation; strengthen 
public institutions and 
health systems; access 
to international food 
markets. FLOODS: EWS; 
disaster preparedness; 
post-event emergency 
relief. WARMING: World 
surveillance for disease 
emergence; strengthen 
public institutions and 
health systems; national 
and regional heat warning 
systems; cut urban heat 
islands through green 
spaces; adjust clothing 
and activity levels; up fluid 





























McKinsey’s GHG  
abatement measures
Lomborg Energise!
Forestry measures –  
protecting, planting, and 
replanting forests – save 6.7 Gt. 
Halving deforestation rates in 
Africa + cutting them by 75 per 
cent in Latin America saves 
nearly 3 Gt. Big abatements in 
Asia’s forests cost more: land is 
scarce, commercial logging has  
a higher opportunity cost than 
subsistence farming in Africa  
and commercial agriculture in 
Latin America 191 
Debt-for-nature swaps; 
labelling of sustainable 
timber; ‘higher economic 
growth and a better 
economic foundation 
so as to secure the 
countries concerned  
the resources to think 
long term’ 192 
Replace slash-and-burn  
agriculture with industrial 
agriculture. Provide modern  
energy to those relying on 
woodfuel. Invest capital and  
R&D in timber production.  
Plan landscapes to control  
fires, insects 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
malnutrition are higher 
priorities than reducing 
the impact of climate 
change 193  
Increase R&D in genetics,  
stem cells, emerging diseases  
and pharmaceuticals. Eliminate 
malaria through vaccines and  
drugs; treat HIV, cancer and  
heart disease better. DROUGHTS, 
FLOODS: Accelerate economic 
development, including 
infrastructure such as dams.  
Aim to eliminate food and water 
shortages resulting from drought, 
and minimise the consequences  
of floods. WARMING: Improved 
nutrition and overall health should 
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